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This thesis examines how secrecy and absence shape the representation of covert 
counter-terrorism in the public sphere. Contemporary covert practices, from missile 
strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles to special forces 'kill/capture' operations, have come
to exemplify U.S. counter-terrorism in public debate. This is significant because these 
practices shift the ethical stakes of witnessing state warfare. Previous scholarship on 
war and news media has argued that public glimpses of state violence, alongside official 
declarations, can demonise or dehumanise the targets of such violence, and thus prompt
witnesses to accept the state's rationalisation of these actions and the use of secrecy. 
News coverage of contemporary covert action, however, offers no such glimpses. 
Instead, coverage draws primarily upon residue: the rumours and debris left behind. By 
applying this concept of residue to drone strikes, the special forces raid that killed 
Osama bin Laden, and kidnap rescue efforts in the Sahara-Sahel, the thesis argues that it
is all this speculation, rubble, and empty space, rather than the state itself, which 
signifies to newsreaders the possibility of state secrecy. That suspicion of secrecy then 
frames the absences in this residue, the conspicuous lack of certain bodies and objects. 
Secrecy makes those absences appear suggestive, in that the latter cannot publicly 
corroborate different aspects of these unseen events. This allows residue to intimate – 
to hint at unverifiable ideas about that which is absent, in a way which can undermine 
more explicit claims and justifications of what has taken place.
To examine how this dynamic reframes the ethics of witnessing, the thesis 
develops an historical affiliation, a method of linking disparate practices of violence 
based on similar representational qualities, in order to examine whether witnessing is 
being shaped by these qualities in obscured or unspoken ways. This affiliation is made 
between representations of covert counter-terrorism and those of lynching in the 
United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite their 
differences, in both cases unseen violence and absent bodies are represented as 
significant in their being disconnected from wider society and difficult to comprehend, 
to understand how and why the violence takes place. This occurs in today's counter-
terrorism through hints and allusions from absence, which represent these covert events
as physically intangible. As with lynching, violence and its casualties are implicitly 
represented in their absence as reflecting the public's intellectual and moral distance 
from the practice. This takes covert counter-terrorism beyond a binary of fostering 
assent or dissent towards the state. Instead of prompting newsreaders' complicity with 
state narratives for its actions, residue intimates doubts and unspoken possibilities 
about these events that curtail their rationalisation. Insodoing, however, these 
representations marginalise the violence inflicted upon casualties from ethical 
consideration. They do so while obscuring how that marginalisation occurs, as 
newsreaders are prompted to see themselves as distanced from these events and to focus
upon that distance, rather than on how absences are being given significance in the 
public sphere. Using the historical affiliation with lynching, the thesis concludes that an 
ethical witnessing of covert counter-terrorism through its residue cannot be based on 
an attempt to recognise and 'recover' lived experiences of suffering from rumours and 
debris. Rather, ethical witnessing would involve an awareness of how distance is 
constructed through that residue, and how this gives unspoken meaning to absence.
Lay summary
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, wars abroad have been 
documented and shown to populations 'back home' through news coverage, from 
accounts of battles and strategy to photographs and videos of soldiers in combat. This 
news coverage plays an important role in shaping what citizens of warring nations think
of war, including its causes, the aims and objectives of their leaders, and crucially 
whether the war and its conduct is ethical. This coverage can make it more or less likely 
that citizens will support or oppose the war effort.
But one kind of warfare which does not obviously fit this pattern is covert 
counter-terrorism. Covert operations are actions designed so that the role of the state in
carrying them out is kept hidden – the action is at least partly secret. A secret act of 
counter-terrorism would likely not appear in news coverage in the same way as a war 
that was officially declared; indeed, it would often be designed not to appear in the news.
How does coverage of such actions therefore affect what newsreaders think of that 
violence, and the ethics of carrying it out?
This thesis examines this question by looking at news coverage of covert 
counter-terrorism over the last several years, specifically coverage of drone strikes, of 
the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, and of attempts to rescue hostages in northern 
Africa. Of course, secret state activities are not new, and covert operations were widely 
publicised during the Cold War and after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
The thesis argues, however, that the secret counter-terrorism carried out mainly by the 
United States today, namely drone strikes and special forces operations, are different 
from previous actions in terms of how they enter public debate. In the past, the U.S. 
would pre-empt how people interpreted its secret actions by providing public narratives
that justified those actions in the abstract, and crucially the secrecy surrounding them, 
as moral and necessary in the face of some existential threat. The U.S. would 'address' its
secrecy to the public, explaining its use in terms of the magnitude of the threat and the 
need to carry out exceptional actions that it was better the public did not see. This 
explanation would be backed up by glimpses of covert agents carrying out such 
violence, provided either by the news or in popular fiction. The image of covert action 
produced as a result portrayed these operations as morally justified, by demonising or 
dehumanising those people who were the targets of that violence. By accepting this 
portrayal, citizens would assent to the state's secret use of violence.
Today this is no longer the case. While the U.S. still talks of a struggle against a 
terrorist threat around the world, government and military officials rarely acknowledge
individual covert operations that appear in the news, and almost never explain why the 
use of secrecy was justified and ethical. In fact, the U.S. rarely confirms that secrecy 
itself. Nor do citizens get to see glimpses of these operations being conducted. Instead, 
journalists and activists gather together snippets of information, rumour and debris left 
behind by these operations, and use these to write news stories. It is these rumours and 
debris, and the lack of more substantial and clear information within them, that hint at 
the use of secrecy. How does this then affect how newsreaders are likely to understand 
counter-terrorism and the ethics surrounding it?
To answer this question, the thesis looks at what remains absent from this news 
coverage but is nonetheless hinted at or alluded to by the rumours, rubble and 
contradictions left behind by these covert operations. Because these speculations and 
debris are portrayed by journalists as evidence of unseen state actions, some absences 
start to stick out and become significant – for instance, the lack of evidence of the 
identities of those killed. These absences stick out further when coverage hints at the 
U.S.'s use of secrecy, because that same lack of evidence appears not to have been 
covered up by the state. The thesis argues that these suggestive absences affect how 
newsreaders are likely to understand these operations. Absences are able to suggest to 
newsreaders that not everything might be as it appears, that perhaps some parts of the 
story do not fit the U.S.'s general narrative for counter-terrorism. For example, the 
uncertainties around casualties' identities become significant, suggesting the possibility 
that those killed were not actually the right targets. None of these ideas are confirmed 
or even spoken out loud by news coverage, but their mere possibility means that this 
coverage is unlikely to produce unquestioning support for U.S. counter-terrorism. The 
thesis therefore argues that we need to think about war and news media in ways that go 
beyond the idea of either assent or dissent towards war. Perhaps there are other 
positions in-between these two poles that newsreaders might adopt.
To examine this possibility, the thesis compares this news coverage and its 
absences with coverage of lynchings in the United States in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. While the violence of both cases is of course very different, both 
were covered in newspapers at the time not through images of the violence itself, but 
through the rumours and objects left behind. Both were also portrayed as separate from 
wider society, as secluded and aberrant practices, and as therefore difficult to 
comprehend.
In the case of covert counter-terrorism, this difficulty is hinted at by the 
absences discussed above, which suggest that these operations are physically intangible 
in different ways – that drone strikes are too quick and too dispersed to follow clearly, 
and that the story of bin Laden's killing and its significance will remain uncertain and 
contradictory so long as footage of his death is kept hidden. Just as with lynchings a 
century earlier, this idea that the violence is difficult to understand frames that violence 
as ethically important in terms of distance. Within this news coverage, the violence's 
physical distance from the public, as something that goes unseen, appears to produce an 
intellectual distance, focusing attention on the practice being difficult to understand. 
This in turn suggests a moral distance from the public as well, that the public are 
unconnected to the violence being carried out. Through this focus on distance and its 
consequences, other ethical questions about the infliction of violence on unseen 
casualties are sidelined. This does not produce public assent towards war, but nor does 
it encourage dissent. This news coverage and its absences make counter-terrorism seem
ethically significant in some respects, but while marginalising other ethical issues.
Given this, the thesis concludes that we need to rethink what it means to 
ethically witness warfare, to view war through news coverage in a way that is ethical. 
Because news coverage in the past involved glimpses of violence, and was thought to 
shape public support for wars, ethical witnessing was framed as adopting a different 
attitude towards the people who appeared in those glimpses: of seeing them as ethical 
subjects in their own right, rather than accepting portrayals of them as inferior and 
deserving of violence. But because such portrayals are today regularly undermined by 
the hints and allusions discussed above, ethical witnessing cannot be reduced to this 
kind of change in attitude. Ethical witnessing would instead have to involve two things: 
first, an awareness of how an intellectual and moral distance between the public and 
these operations is constructed by this coverage; and second, a consideration of how 
that imagined distance marginalises other ethical questions about the violence itself. 
Ethics would involve a change in attitude towards the absences and the things left unsaid 
about these secret events, and an awareness of how we as newsreaders are actually 
connected to those absences and the meaning given to them through this coverage.
I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that, except where 
stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgement, the work presented is entirely my 
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“Even the most indelible things are of fixed duration, just like the things that leave no
trace or never happen... Thus what we see and hear comes to be similar and even the
same as what we didn't see or hear, it's just a question of time, or of our own
disappearance... [T]he weak wheel of the world is pushed along by forgetful beings who
hear and see and know what is not said, never happens, is unknowable and
unverifiable.”




Witnessing absence in contemporary counter-
terrorism
“[T]here is no way to separate, under present historical conditions, the material reality
of war from those representational regimes through which it operates and which
rationalise its own operation.”
Judith Butler (2009: 29)
“The war will be won in large measure by forces you do not know about, in actions you
will not see and in ways you may not want to know about.”
A.B. “Buzzy” Krongard, CIA executive director, 18 October 2001 (quoted in Landers,
2001)
Beginning: three moments
Three moments from the history of U.S. covert action help establish the aim of this 
thesis: to examine how the secrecy and absences of covert counter-terrorism shape its 
representation in the public sphere and affect the question of assent and dissent towards
state violence.
The first moment is 30 September 1954, the dateline of a report commissioned 
by President Eisenhower and undertaken by retired Air Force Lieutenant General James
H. Dootlittle. At the time of the report, seven years after the founding of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States had carried out covert paramilitary 
operations in Albania alongside the British Secret Intelligence Service, paramilitary 
operations in Korea, support for Ukrainian and Polish anti-communist forces and 
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covert operations to overthrow Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and President Jacobo 
Arbenz in Guatemala (Stiefler, 2004: 635-8; Dujmović, 2012). In the face of increasing 
Congressional pressure for oversight of CIA activities, Eisenhower commissioned Lt. 
General Doolittle to head an investigation into the Agency's covert activities and make 
recommendations on its future conduct. The resultant report is worth quoting at length:
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is 
world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in 
such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the 
United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of ‘fair play’ must be 
reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services 
and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more 
sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become
necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support 
this fundamentally repugnant philosophy (Doolittle Commission, 1954: 2-3, emphasis
added).
At the time, U.S. citizens were rarely presented with any examples of this 
philosophy, but the CIA nonetheless maintained strong relations with the mainstream 
press – for instance, the proprietor of Time magazine Henry Luce regularly spoke with 
members of the intelligence community, including CIA Chief Allen Dulles. Indeed, his 
magazine published a highly critical profile of Mosaddegh that implicitly justified 
intervention, before later reporting on the coup without mentioning the CIA's role 
(Mistry, 2013: 115). The significance of the Doolittle Commission report is that it 
advocated making the U.S. public aware of the CIA's role in covert action, that 
knowledge of its methods might be necessary in order to foster public support for the 
usurpation of 'fair play'. The Commission does not, however, call for individual actions 
to be made know – only the philosophy behind it. What Doolittle was calling for, then, 
was public awareness of secrecy, of the kind of things the CIA was doing away from the 
public eye, but not a display of the activities themselves.
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Doolittle's report has been widely interpreted as an attempt to whitewash CIA 
activities, yet as Harold Greenburg points out, if that were so it was a lousy attempt. The
secrecy surrounding the Doolittle Commission itself meant that the public learned little 
about it or its conclusions, but that secrecy was held up by Congressmen as further 
evidence of the need for CIA oversight (Greenburg, 2006: 691). Equally interesting was 
the report's call for the CIA to embody “an aggressive covert psychological, political and 
paramilitary organisation more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless 
than that employed by the enemy” (Doolittle Commission, 1954: 2). As Greenburg again 
points out, such a call advocates for “more complex and ambitious” operations that 
would increase the risk of “disclosure and implication of the US government” 
(Greenburg, 2006: 692). Perhaps the public would start to see examples of covert action 
after all. Both the commission of the report and the conclusions drawn by it therefore 
demonstrate the flexible and ambiguous relationship between the rationale and the 
secrecy of covert operations, as well as the potential for secrecy to become visible within
and shape the public sphere.
The second moment is nearly forty years later, 1996, when retired career CIA 
officer Arthur S. Hulnick asked in an intelligence operations journal, “U.S. Covert 
Action: Does It Have A Future?” (Hulnick, 1996). Suggesting Doolittle's prescience, 
Hulnick argues that “a conscious decision was made early in the Cold War by America 
to be at least as devious and as clever as its main adversary, primarily because it saw no 
alternative if it was to protect itself against what was then viewed as the growing threat 
of Communism” (ibid: 145). But in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hulnick
is asking whether there is a place for covert action in U.S. national security policy. 
Answering this, according to Hulnick, requires knowing how to evaluate the success or 
failure of covert operations, something which “has received little attention”. Short-term 
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successes can turn out to be long-term failures, and vice-versa. “Of course”, he notes, 
“the American public judges covert action mainly on the basis of what it learns from the 
press”, and while the public will “quickly hear about a covert action that fails”, they “will 
rarely hear about a successful venture” due to the CIA's inability to “anticipate 
revelations” – that is, to know when it is likely that their actions will be uncovered (ibid:
151, 153).
Hulnick's argument highlights the difference between the instrumental use of 
state secrecy for covert action and the uncontrollable consequences of that secrecy in 
the public sphere. The CIA may consider a successful covert operation to be one when 
no-one finds out about it, but if this means that the only public covert actions are failed 
covert actions then claims of overall success will be difficult for citizens to accept. 
Going beyond the Doolittle Commission's call for a public awareness of secrecy, 
Hulnick is making the case for publicising details of those secrets. As with Doolittle, this 
argument appears to be premised on the likelihood that covert operations will be 
revealed: “Remembering that covert actions – especially those that require large 
numbers of personnel and resources – will likely become public, the intelligence system 
needs to consider methods of explaining its covert actions to the public in an organised 
fashion”, to “prepar[e] ahead of time for the inevitable revelations” (ibid: 153-4). In other
words, given that state secrecy is likely to be discovered and even undone, shaping the 
public meaning of that secrecy becomes just as important to a covert action as the 
logistics of the operation and, indeed, its covertness.
The final moment brings us close to the present, 21 October 2015. Satellite 
imagery from Google Earth is used as evidence of ongoing covert U.S. activities in the 
Horn of Africa. The imagery appears to show the gradual build-up of a U.S. military 
base in Djibouti. Chabelley Airfield began life in 2013 as a “lower-profile airstrip” to 
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house the Pentagon's fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles or drones, which had previously 
been held ten kilometres away at Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti's capital. But in the 
following two years the “bare-bones compound once used by the French Foreign 
Legion” was transformed, from a temporary base for Pentagon and CIA drone 
operations in the region, to an “enduring” base subject to a “long-term implementing 
arrangement” with the Djiboutian government. According to Nick Turse, this upgrade 
includes a security system of sensors, cameras, radar and thermal imaging devices, 
designed around a 7,720 metre perimeter fence (Turse, 2015b). Satellite images of the 
base in 2013 and in March 2015 visualise this upgrade (ibid; Figure 1). The image taken 
in April 2013 appears to show a demarcated square of desert housing only some small 
structures and vehicles in one of its corners. The image from March 2015 shows that 
now-cordoned-off area filled with buildings, a large airstrip and the familiar grey 
outlines of unmanned drones, now surrounded by much more prominent fencing. The 
number of vehicles dotted around the site and the haphazard arrangement of the drones
suggest activity – this appears to be a base very much in use.
Figure 1: Google Earth satellite images of Chabelley Airfield, Djibouti, April 2013 and March 
7
2015 (Turse, 2015b).
At first glance, these images appear to reveal something that previously was 
secret. Revelation seems embedded in the images, and indeed that is how they are 
framed by the accompanying news article, as evidence of a hidden U.S. military build-up
in Africa. Yet the images are also interesting because of what they do not show. There 
are no images of covert operations being undertaken here, no covert agents carrying out
paramilitary activities. No idea is offered of individual operations being enacted from 
this site, and the vehicles, planes and buildings shown give no clear sense of something 
happening in the captured moment. The accompanying article notes that “[t]he military 
is tight-lipped about Chabelley, failing to mention its existence in its public list of 
overseas bases and refusing even to acknowledge questions about it — let alone offer 
answers”. It is left, then, to “[o]fficial documents, satellite imagery, and expert opinion” 
to establish that “Chabelley is now essential to secret drone operations throughout the 
region” (ibid, emphasis added). What the satellite images do, then, is hint at ongoing state
secrecy. They do not confirm that secrecy, nor do they offer concrete, definite details of 
those secrets. That the base is related to drone operations seems reasonably clear. But 
beyond indicating ongoing operations involving the U.S. and drones, these images, like 
other satellite imagery of secret bases (Perkins and Dodge, 2009), seem to primarily 
represent secrecy in a particular way – as being related to particular configurations of 
space, as requiring an infrastructure, and as possibly wide-ranging – rather than 
represent the uncovering of secrets.
The snatched details surrounding the decision to upgrade the Chabelley airfield 
add to this representation of secrecy. Turse states that the Pentagon's drone contingent 
was moved there as a response to numerous cases of drones crashing around Camp 
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Lemmonier, including in residential areas, as well as to local air traffic controllers who 
“ignor[ed] pilots’ communications and forc[ed] U.S. aircraft to circle above the airport 
until low on fuel”. When the drones were moved, an Air Force engineering publication 
cited the fact that the move “provid[ed] operations anonymity from the International 
Airport” as one of its “significant accomplishments” (ibid). This third moment, then, 
demonstrates the persistent overlapping of secrecy and publicity even in the absence of 
the kind of state proclamations that Doolittle and Hulnick suggested. These overlaps 
range from the material manifestation of secret operations in public space (Paglen, 
2010) to the representation of ongoing secrecy through allusion in the public sphere.
Each of these three moments demonstrate different ways in which secrecy, that 
is, the keeping of secrets, can become a recognisable part of public discourse and have 
consequences which exceed the rationales of state officials. The Doolittle Commission 
raises the possibility of the state publicly articulating that it carries out certain kinds of 
activities in secret, without revealing any individual operation; yet the secretion of that 
very report was represented by Congress as justifying further transparency from the 
CIA. Hulnick suggests that the state articulate details of covert operations in order to 
demonstrate their success, but does so in light of the strong possibility that details will 
become public anyway – through leaks, revelations or the inability to keep operations 
hidden – and may suggest failure instead. The possibility of covert activities at 
Chabelley is represented through objects, images and documents in the public sphere 
that are pointed to as evidence; however, these objects, and the possibility that they 
indicate covertness, are not acknowledged at all by the state. In each case, actual and 
hypothetical, articulations by both state and non-state actors together produce secrecy 
in the public sphere and shape the appearance and meaning of that secrecy, above and 
beyond what any one actor may have intended.
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The interaction between these different articulations of secrecy speaks to the 
paradox implicit in the juxtaposition of the two quotes at the beginning of this 
Introduction. While Judith Butler highlights the importance of public representations of
warfare to the conduct and dynamics of that warfare, former CIA executive director 
Buzzy Krongard alludes to the likelihood that a large proportion of U.S. counter-
terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks may be designed not to be 
represented in public at all. The notion that contemporary warfare 'operates' through 
representational regimes, to use Butler's words, is complicated as a result: much 
contemporary warfare may in fact be intended to have no such operation in public 
discourse. Yet the three moments discussed demonstrate that this intention does not 
settle the matter, since the act of keeping these operations secret can itself be articulated
and thus bring that covert warfare into public discourse even as it remains largely 
secreted. In-between these two claims about contemporary counter-terrorism, then, lies
the possibility that such state activities may exist in part through representational 
practices that signify secrecy, that indicate things are happening that 'you do not know 
about' or that 'you will not see'.
But beyond this possibility, the differences between the three moments outlined 
above elaborate upon the paradox of Butler's and Krongard's statements. For while 
Doolittle called for the public to be made known of the U.S. state's covert capabilities, 
and while Hulnick suggested that public revelations of covert action should be framed 
by that state, the secret activities hinted at in the Chabelley images have neither been 
revealed nor acknowledged by the United States. The secrecy surrounding that base and
its drone operations has been produced independent of any state proclamations around 
it. This speaks to the full implications of Krongard's words: that the state may not even 
articulate its own secrecy in the case of contemporary covert counter-terrorism. 
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Knowledge of these operations may instead be gained from traces left behind by these 
operations in the public sphere, snippets of information and fragments of debris which 
are pointed to as possible evidence of covert activities that have passed unseen. If this is 
so, then Krongard's acknowledgement complicates Butler's assertion. War may well be 
inseparable from its public representation, but that war need not be overt, and that 
representation may not be wholly or even partly produced by those conducting the war.
As a result, the question of how representational practices rationalise 'the material 
reality of war' – that is, how they explain the use and conduct of state violence such that 
it appears justifiable or legitimate – is not self-evident. Consider again the details and 
images of the Chabelley airfield. Does this representation through assembled documents
and satellite imagery rationalise the operation of covert drone attacks? What exactly 
would constitute rationalisation in this context? And what claim do these materials 
make regarding their relationship to the material reality of that covert war?
This thesis is aimed at unravelling that paradox in the counterpoising of Butler's 
and Krongard's statements. In the wake of counter-terrorism being increasingly defined
and argued over as a covert activity, the thesis asks what happens when the public 
representation of state violence turns to activities which appear designed to be partially 
or wholly secret, and where that secrecy is not solely articulated by the state in question.
If public representations are inextricably linked to contemporary war-making, and if 
much contemporary counter-terrorism is conducted in secret, how is that covert 
counter-terrorism represented in public discourse? What is the role of state secrecy in 
this representation? And how do these representations affect the rationalisation of state 
violence? These are the questions this thesis aims to examine and answer.
These questions broach the broader issue of the public representation of warfare
and counter-terrorism, areas of research within which this thesis situates itself. The 
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issue of how warfare is represented to the populations of those states which conduct it 
has been tied to questions of what it means to witness violence and its attendant 
suffering; of the role of violence's perpetrators in shaping that representation; and 
crucially of how that representation prompts the witness to respond. The 
representations analysed in this thesis give novel answers to all of these questions and 
insodoing re-frame the issue of responsiveness: of what it means to encounter 
mediations of state violence and to adopt a position towards them such that they are 
comprehensible or meaningful; and of the consequences this has on the ethical 
significance accorded to that violence. This analysis, in other words, speaks to the 
relationship between ethics and the representation of state violence.
The thesis proposes that contemporary covert counter-terrorism forces a 
rethink of this relationship due to the interaction in its public representation between 
state secrecy and traces of covert violence – what the thesis theorises as residue. When 
faced with a representation of covert state activities like the materials related to the 
Chabelley airfield, the crucial question is this: what is being represented in those 
documents and satellite images? What are we being prompted to see and understand? 
Are we being presented with a revelation of covert violence, a glimpse of it being carried
out? Is state secrecy being articulated to us by a political actor? And do these images and 
snatched details about these activities prompt us to assess these activities, the state and 
its targets in any particular way? If so, does the meaning produced by this 
representation rationalise the operations that are possibly underway? The answers to 
these questions will have implications for how we conceptualise the relationship 
between the state, the public, secrecy and the public residue that constitutes 
representations of covert counter-terrorism.
In the course of the so-called War on Terror, the relationship between the 
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public, the state and representations of violence has predominantly been conceptualised 
in one narrow manner, such that counter-terrorism, both overt and covert, has been 
interpreted as shaping subject-positions of public assent towards those state practices. 
Scholars have argued that public portrayals of counter-terrorism are intelligible or 
“make sense” from “a certain interpretive position” which these portrayals thereby 
prompt witnesses to adopt (Laffey and Weldes, 2004: 28). This interpretive position has 
been theorised as one which accepts the state's own rationalisation of its actions. The 
thesis argues that the covert activities discussed herein do not fit this model. In fact, they
expand the range of possibilities regarding public responsiveness to representations of 
state violence, going beyond what previous scholarship on state secrecy and on 
witnessing state violence has considered. The subject-positions shaped by 
representations of contemporary covert counter-terrorism go beyond a binary of assent
or dissent towards state rationalisations of its violence. Instead of making covert 
operations meaningful in terms of a state rationale, these representations make this 
counter-terrorism meaningful in terms of the its apparent intangibility. This represents 
these operations as discomforting but for very particular reasons: this intangibility 
produces implicit doubts and questions about these operations, but it also has the 
potential to marginalise the violence inflicted on unseen bodies from ethical 
consideration, to frame that infliction as irrelevant to the political and ethical 
significance of these operations. To talk of assent or dissent in this context, or to 
theorise complicity with some hegemonic frame of meaning, occludes the complexity of
the representations and subject-positions produced here. How to conceptualise these 
dynamics in more sophisticated ways therefore forms part of the answer that the thesis 
gives to the questions outlined above.
Before getting to this answer, the aim of this Introduction is threefold: first, to 
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outline what is meant here by contemporary covert counter-terrorism, both in terms of 
the operations themselves and in terms of the definition of covert action; second, to 
place this analysis in the context of the research field of war and media representations, 
detailing the concepts that have arisen from this field and the arguments made about 
their relationship; and thirdly, to examine the position of covert action in International 
Relations scholarship, in order to explain how the narrow conceptualisation of covert 
operations and their secrecy in IR mirrors dominant understandings of the 
'rationalisation' of warfare through news media. This mirroring prompts the 
Introduction finally to propose that the two research fields be brought together at the 
publicity-secrecy intersection: that research on the representation of war and counter-
terrorism consider the role of covertness in that representation; and that research on 
covert action in IR consider these activities' public existence beyond the hidden archives 
of the state. This intersection is where the theorisation and analysis of the thesis itself 
begins.
That analysis focuses primarily on national newspaper coverage of covert 
counter-terrorism in Britain and the United States, with some additional reference to 
social media when overlapping with that coverage. Despite declines in circulation, 
traditional print media continue to shape public discourse around international news 
and foreign policy, through both agenda-setting (that is, shaping perceptions of the 
importance of issues (Singer, 2016: 6)) and use as a primary source of news. The 2016 
Reuters Institute Digital News Report finds that while only 26% and 35% of population 
samples in the U.S. and UK respectively access news via print media, compared to 73% 
and 72% for online media (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2016: 86), 
traditional news organisations dominate people's online sources. Across the 26 
countries surveyed, 69% of people sampled use newspaper brands to access news online 
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(48% in the U.S., 46% in the UK), compared to 45% for 'digital-born' brands (admittedly 
59% in the U.S., but only 31% in the UK) (ibid: 27, 89). Worldwide, The New York Times, 
MailOnline, The Washington Post, The Guardian and The Wall Street Journal are ranked 5th,
8th, 9th, 10th and 11th respectively in terms of estimated unique monthly visitors to news 
websites (ahead of BBC News at 13th), using data from the month to 1 January 2017 
(eBizMBA, 2017).
Rather than signal the death of one medium (newspapers) and the birth of 
another (online news), the changing news media landscape involves the convergence of 
different media. News media whose distinct forms – as newspapers, radio and television
programmes – historically shaped how their content was consumed are now 
increasingly amalgamated within novel media outlets, most obviously the Internet. This 
produces fluctuating global audiences who consume news in hybrid forms that combine
print, still and moving images, interactive and social media components (Conway, 2012:
449-50).
Building on this multiplicity of production and circulation, the key reason for 
national newspapers' continued relevance is their salience within public discourse on 
international politics. Hybrid forms of national newspaper coverage are relatively 
dominant among sources for online news (see above), among those news articles being 
cited, hyperlinked to and discussed within political blog networks (Meraz, 2009) and 
among those shared by journalists on social media such as Twitter (Russell et al, 2015). 
This social media platform is “favoured by journalists, politicians, and heavy news users 
in particular” (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2016: 11), and Twitter users
who read British and U.S. newspaper websites appear to disproportionately favour hard
news articles, relative to their share of print space (Bastos, 2015: 317-8, 320-21). 
Because of this continued circulation and salience, the thesis analyses print newspaper 
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articles, newspapers' online versions of these articles and their online-only content, as 
well as some limited representative Twitter news coverage when it overlaps with 
traditional news media (for instance, through hyperlinks or journalists' online presence).
This dynamic of production and circulation across different media bears on the 
thesis' choice of particular national newspapers as primary data sources, subject to 
backdated online accessibility. This choice includes all UK-wide British tabloid and 
broadsheet newspapers, with the exception of the Financial Times, the i, and the Morning
Star, making 18 newspapers (including Sunday editions),1 accessed via Lexis-Nexis and 
newspapers' own websites where appropriate (for instance, to analyse graphical 
content). In the United States, it includes The New York Times, The Washington Post and 
The Wall Street Journal, three of the highest-circulating newspapers in the U.S. (Cision, 
2016), accessed via separate online databases and newspapers' websites; the choice of 
three among the ten highest-circulating U.S. daily newspapers is weighted towards 
those which also score highly for unique monthly visitors to their websites (eBizMBA, 
2017). The difference in the quantity of U.S. and British newspapers analysed reflects 
their respective international affairs coverage: on average, these U.S. newspapers cover 
international and security politics far more extensively than their British counterparts. 
The three U.S. newspapers analysed have also been found to significantly shape the 
agendas of other media, such as television news (Golan, 2006), to be predominantly 
cited online (Meraz, 2009), and to be subscribed to and circulated on social media above 
their print circulation levels (Ju et al, 2014: 9; Russell et al, 2015). (While The Washington
Post is technically not a national newspaper, it is “the leading newspaper in the nation's 
capital” and shares in this inter-media influence (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007: 148).)
1 These include: Daily Mail, Daily Star, Daily Star Sunday, The Daily Telegraph, The Express, The Guardian,
The Independent, Independent on Sunday, Mail on Sunday, The Mirror, The Observer, The People, The Sun, 
The Sunday Express, The Sunday Mirror, The Sunday Telegraph, The Sunday Times, and The Times.
16
Finally, the production and circulation of newspaper coverage through other 
media forms is increasingly accompanied by the filtering of other media channels 
through more traditional outlets. While the rise of the internet and social media 
appeared to spell the end of mainstream news media's importance, the latter have 
adjusted to this new media ecology by predicting and pre-empting the disruptive 
influence of these other media. In the case of war, counter-terrorism and political 
upheavals, mainstream news media now often acts as a 'networked gatekeeper', re-
contextualising and reproducing social media content such that it selectively represents 
and changes the meanings attached to that content (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2015: 
1325-9; Ali and Fahmy, 2013; Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013). The result, as Hoskins and
O'Loughlin argue with reference to coverage of war, is that “[a]ny content that is 
acclaimed as alternative, oppositional, or outside only acquires significant value when 
acknowledged and reiterated by the mainstream” (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2015: 1321).
This makes it only more important to examine national newspaper coverage: not only is
that coverage produced and circulated outside print form, it also influences, 
incorporates and reiterates other media coverage.
The 'dark side' of the War on Terror
The prosecution of counter-terrorism outside official war theatres through secretive 
means has its roots prior to the events of 11 September 2001. Todd et al contextualise 
the recent growth of the U.S. intelligence services and wider use of covert action within 
the rise of the neo-conservative doctrine of pre-emptive warfare or 'anticipatory self-
defence', as promoted by such figures as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Donald 
Rumsfeld, both outside of office and as part of the Ford and Reagan administrations. 
While the notion of pre-emption during this time was aimed squarely at the Soviet 
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Union, the latter's demise led the neo-conservatives to promote pre-emption as a way of
preventing any other state power from aspiring to challenge U.S. hegemony (Todd et al, 
2009: 71-7). For the neo-conservatives, establishing this pre-emption doctrine first 
required re-establishing broad executive authority in the face of increased attempts 
during the 1980s and '90s to constrain and scrutinise that power, particular regarding 
covert action and intelligence activities. These attempts were prompted both by the 
Church Committee investigations into covert operations and by the revelation of illegal 
assistance being given by Reagan administration members to the Contra insurgents in 
Nicaragua (Scahill, 2013: 10-12).
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the neo-conservative 
doctrine of pre-emption was folded into a growing understanding that U.S. strategic 
primacy could not be maintained only by deterring state rivals; it required countering 
unconventional transnational threats, something which could not be done through 
conventional military superiority. In the years after 11 September 2001, the Pentagon 
therefore reformulated strategic primacy to include an emphasis on 'unconventional 
warfare' (Ryan, 2011: 368). This reformulation aligned with the expansion of executive 
authority that was now being promoted by the neo-conservatives in the Bush 
administration. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld promoted the transformation of 
U.S. defence capabilities away from a reliance on large field armies and towards a 
lighter footprint model built on new technology and special forces. This led to an 
expansion of special forces, a growth in the Pentagon's intelligence capabilities and the 
beginning of at least two domestic surveillance programmes. Crucially, all these policy 
moves were justified in classified legal opinions as the necessary enactment of 
Presidential prerogative as sanctioned by Congress after the 11 September 2001 attacks 
(Todd et al, 2009: 79-83). In 2004, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was 
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designated the lead military command for planning global counter-terrorism operations
(Ryan, 2011: 368-9). Alongside this growth in Pentagon influence and unconventional 
warfare capabilities was a push prior to 11 September by Bush administration officials, 
such as National Security Council member Richard Clarke, to instruct the Central 
Intelligence Agency to carry out a wide-ranging covert action programme against 
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. In particular, Clarke and others wanted to instruct the 
CIA to attempt to kill members of the al Qaeda leadership, an action understood by both
proponents and critics as one that would overturn previous understandings of U.S. 
executive orders which banned assassination (Scahill, 2013: 3-7, 17-19).
On 17 September 2001, that instruction was given by a classified Presidential 
Directive, which is reported to have authorised covert operations across the globe in the
form of both 'targeted killings' of designated individuals, without the need for signing 
off by the President, and the kidnapping, detention and interrogation of suspected 
terrorists (Gow, 2001; Priest, 2005; Kibbe, 2011: 373-5; Scahill, 2013: 20). Two days 
later, Rumsfeld wrote a memo of guidance to the heads of all the U.S. geographical 
military commands, instructing them to help draft plans for military operations against 
worldwide targets, “even outside the Middle East... our field of action is much wider than 
Afghanistan” (quoted in Ryan, 2011: 367). In 2006 this notion of a worldwide 
unconventional counter-terrorism operation was codified in the Pentagon's 
Quadrennial Defence Review. The QDR clarified that the terrorist threat was a 
transnational phenomenon and therefore required “multiple, irregular asymmetric 
operations”, from counter-insurgency to psychological operations and unconventional 
warfare, all of which would involve “conducting war in countries we are not at war 
with” (quoted in ibid).
The result of these moves by Bush administration officials was the creation of a 
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military-intelligence apparatus able to carry out a wide range of covert actions with 
limited oversight. The Presidential finding signed on 17 September authorised an 
umbrella programme code-named Greystone, which relied on the legal opinion that 
Congress had granted the President the authority to target any al Qaeda suspect 
anywhere in the world. All covert actions were thus considered to have been pre-
authorised by Congress. This led to the creation of “a series of compartmentalised 
programs... that, together, effectively formed a global assassination and kidnap 
operation” (Scahill, 2013: 24). These new covert programmes included the CIA's 
rendition and detention programme, which involved a fleet of aircraft and secret 
prisons in a number of countries around the world, as well as the so-called kill/capture 
programme authorising the CIA and, in theory, the Pentagon's covert special forces 
under the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), to target al Qaeda suspects for 
assassination without the need for individual Presidential approval (ibid: 24-30; Turza, 
2013). Having been principally taken up by the CIA, this authorisation for covert action 
was complemented by an 'execute order' from Rumsfeld in early 2004, which gave pre-
approvals for U.S. special forces to carry out lethal operations in fifteen to twenty 
countries where al Qaeda operatives were suspected of operating or receiving 
sanctuary. Rumsfeld had previously argued that Congress had effectively authorised 
covert military action around the world, which had led him and Vice-President Dick 
Cheney to direct JSOC to begin manhunt operations paralleling those of the CIA. 
Alongside Rumsfeld's pre-approval of more such operations in 2004, a new Presidential 
Directive codified SOCOM's authority to conduct lethal action in such operations, 
outside an official battlefield (Schmitt and Mazzetti, 2008; Niva, 2013: 191; Scahill, 
2013: 91-101, 170-1).
While much has been made of the apparent transformation of both the CIA and 
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the Pentagon during these processes, with each supposedly taking on the traditional role
of the other – a paramilitary CIA, an intelligence-focused Pentagon (Jehl and Schmitt, 
2004; Miller, 2004; Ambinder, 2013; for discussion, see Khalili, 2014: 420-1) – many of 
the covert programmes authorised in the period following 11 September 2001 have 
been conducted by both institutions. By President Obama's first term, this had evolved 
to the two working in concert along with other U.S. security and intelligence agencies, 
sharing information and equipment and jointly prosecuting or coordinating covert raids
and missile strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia (Priest and Arkin, 
2011; Niva, 2013: 196-7; N. Shah, 2014: 163-7). By 2009 the CIA and JSOC were 
running parallel kill/capture programmes in Pakistan with each using drones, raids and 
private security contractors (Scahill, 2013: 251-3); by 2011 the two agencies were 
“coordinat[ing]” drone strikes in Yemen “even as operations unfold[ed]”, drawing on 
each other's fleets and intervening in one another's planning (Miller, 2011). At the 
beginning of Obama's first term, General David Patraeus signed a secret directive 
authorising small teams of special forces to conduct clandestine operations outside the 
official war theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq, without the need for President Obama's 
direct approval of each operation. The directive represented an attempt to build upon 
Donald Rumsfeld's execute order six years earlier (Scahill, 2013: 282-3).
These parallel and joint kill/capture operations now take two forms. Personality
strikes are those kill/capture operations that rely upon so-called 'kill lists' of potential 
targets. Intelligence personnel build up profiles of individuals which are then passed up 
the chain of command to national security advisers and the President. Once approved, 
that target is added to a kill list and approval given to attempt to kill or capture the 
individual within a certain amount of time, for instance, sixty days for JSOC strikes 
(Currier, 2015). The CIA and JSOC each have their own separate kill lists and run 
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parallel drone programmes to act upon them; reportedly, the rules governing the CIA's 
kill/capture missions are somewhat looser than for the Pentagon in both Yemen and 
Pakistan (Worth et al, 2013; Entous, 2015). Based on available information, it appears 
that the authority granted the President by Congress in 2001 to target those behind the 
11 September attacks is interpreted broadly, leading to strikes against 'associated forces' 
far beyond the ranks of al Qaeda (Landay, 2013; Serle, 2014b). The other form of 
operation is the so-called signature strike, prosecuted on the basis of 'pattern of life' 
analysis conducted by intelligence agents, which involves gathering data on unidentified
individuals' daily movements within a certain spatial area and identifying any 
'suspicious' activity based on pre-defined categories of probabilistic threat. In short, 
targets are constructed based on judgements from daily movements of the likelihood of 
future terroristic activity (Crampton et al, 2014: 207-9).
The procedures for approving both personality and signature strikes have now 
been streamlined, with joint CIA-State Department-JSOC analysis of kill list 
submissions and the augmentation of those separate lists by a so-called disposition 
matrix, a growing database of biographies, analysis and kill/capture strategies, “creating 
an operational menu that spells out each agency's role in case a suspect surfaces in an 
unexpected spot” (Miller, 2012a). The ratio of personality to signature strikes remains 
unknown. However, given reports of stricter rules governing personality strikes, the 
small proportion of kill/capture operations that kill mid- to high-level militant 
organisers and the much larger number of drone strikes that are carried out compared 
to the number of known individuals on kill lists, it seems probable that signature strikes 
are the dominant method (Becker and Shane, 2012; Heller, 2013: 90; Landay, 2013; 
Currier, 2015).
Under President Obama, the kill/capture programme of special forces 
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operations and missile strikes has expanded dramatically. In the fiscal year ending 30 
September 2014, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) had deployed to 133 
countries, carrying out both kill/capture raids and training exercises. This includes 
covert and clandestine forces under the command of JSOC, operating so-called 
Forward units of small teams in countries across the Middle East and Africa (Turse, 
2015a). The growth of special operations forces and both CIA and JSOC drone 
capabilities has involved an expansion of military and CIA bases in the Horn of Africa, 
the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East, in order to expand U.S. special forces' 
scope and to accommodate the geographical reach and flight time capabilities of 
different drones (Ryan, 2011: 370-1; Turse, 2012: 21-31). This infrastructure has been 
accompanied by an expansion of espionage and intelligence-gathering capabilities, 
including an increased reliance on signals intelligence, airborne surveillance, and 
recruitment of clandestine operatives for the Pentagon's Defence Intelligence Agency 
(Krishnan, 2013: 286; Whitlock, 2012; Miller, 2012b).
The salient point regarding the kill/capture programme and these expanded 
operations outside of official war theatres is that they share levels of secrecy. All of these
state activities are, to one extent or another, hidden from the U.S. and partner state 
populations – their enactment is not officially announced, their activities are often 
designed so as to remain secret, and state officials do not acknowledge these operations 
if and when they are uncovered. These operations stand in stark contrast to the military 
interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, which have been interpreted as 
intensely visualised affairs. These wars were seen to saturate the public sphere with 
textual and visual images of their enactment, from the 'shock and awe' campaigns of 
aerial bombing to subsequent prolonged counter-insurgency (Mirzoeff, 2005; 2011: 
277-309).
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The operations described above have not been presented to the public in the 
same manner. The representations of these practices in public discourse have instead 
been framed by the idea that they are secret state activities, that they are not designed to 
produce a flood of images that will shape public understandings. Their secrecy has been 
a vital aspect of their representation. In an interview on NBC's Meet the Press on 16 
September 2001, U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney emphasised the difference between 
the mediation of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for the public and the mediation of these
covert operations: “We have to work, through, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've 
got to spend time in the shadows of the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be 
done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and 
methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if we're going to be successful. 
That's the world these folks operate in” (NBC News' Meet the Press, 2001).
If the covert operations outlined above represent the dark side that Cheney 
envisioned, then the secrecy that surrounds them may well be an important factor in 
their public representation. Any analysis of such representations will need to consider 
the relationship between secrecy and publicity that is enacted within them.
The representation of war and ethical witnessing
The two quotes from Judith Butler and Buzzy Krongard discussed earlier frame the 
representation of warfare as a question of how such representation may legitimise or 
rationalise the state actions portrayed. Butler elaborates upon the relationship between 
war, representation and rationalisation through the idea of recognition, of how people 
are prompted by representations to understand the lives of others and their suffering. 
This is a matter of the “general terms, conventions and norms” produced through 
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representational practices that determine what can be a “recognisable subject”, that 
determine what it is “to qualify... as a life or, indeed, as part of life” (Butler, 2009: 5, 3). 
Recognisability in turn affects the rationalisation of state violence: lives which do not 
meet the criteria for being recognised as lives therefore cannot be grieved; as such, they 
can be exposed to violence without some countervailing force of grief and outrage from 
states' populations (ibid: 24-5). War, then, is rationalised by the production of certain 
populations as not lives and therefore as ungrievable.
Butler's notion of the unequal distribution of grievability speaks to the broader 
field of study into war and representation, which conceptualises a link between the 
representation of suffering and the meanings attached to state warfare. The process of 
representation, subject-formation and rationalisation that Butler implies here requires 
unpacking through this literature. The question of the representation of warfare is 
framed in the literature as a question of witnessing suffering: of the political ethics of 
being confronted with representations of suffering and of responding to those 
representations. In this context, witnessing is tied to the idea of co-presence, of the 
sensory experience of proximity to events. While for some this proximity is a matter of 
physical closeness to an event and an embodied experience that results (Peters, 2001), 
for many within war representation studies witnessing can occur through a relation 
between representation and audience (Frosh, 2009: 56). From this perspective, 
mediations can prompt an experience of co-presence by signifying their own “liveness 
[and] immediacy” in relation to an event, and by addressing the audience as being co-
present with the journalist or narrator as she experiences or details that event in the 
representation (ibid: 52). While this signification cannot fully efface the fact that the 
mediation is just that, a representation at a spatial and temporal distance from the real 
event, it can prompt readers and viewers to “make themselves imaginatively present at 
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the event” through the experience of that representation, as well as through the 
knowledge that one is experiencing the mediation as part of a collective, a disparate 
group of people reading the same newspaper or watching the same television 
programme (ibid: 58). This mediated co-presence is therefore not total – witnesses are 
still aware of “remain[ing] in the here and now” – but is an acceptance of the 
representation's presumed intention to articulate a real event and to prompt this 
imagining of co-presence, 'as if' one were there (ibid: 59-60).
This prompted imagining of co-presence determines the potential for 
witnessing, including the witnessing of suffering in representations of war. The 
importance of the potential for witnessing for this literature is that this potential is 
conceptually tied to the meanings and ethical significance given to suffering in 
representations. It is through co-presence that meaning is attached to violence and 
suffering. This suggests that the act of witnessing is more than merely seeing suffering 
via physical proximity or mediation, since it is centrally about how readers and viewers 
come to understand that suffering. But as Sue Tait notes, that co-presence or “proximity 
to the real” is nevertheless posited by this literature as essential to the shaping of this 
meaning and ethical significance, as “lay[ing] a moral burden on the audience” (Tait, 
2011: 1224). If they are judged as trustworthy, these representations of co-present 
suffering will be “invest[ed]... with a force of authentic testimony” that allows them to 
signify particular ethical significances for the witness regarding that which is 
represented (Chouliaraki, 2009: 218). The act of co-present witnessing is thereby given 
an ethical underpinning in this literature.
For represented suffering to be accorded ethical significance, then, requires that 
witnesses be made co-present with that suffering. But this co-presence is not sufficient: 
the shaping of co-presence can allow for a recognition of suffering's ethical import, but 
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it can also occlude such recognition. The signification and thus potential recognition of 
suffering's ethical significance is determined by how that suffering is represented and the
subject-positions produced as a result from which that suffering is comprehensible. The 
literature in this research field broadly conceptualises ethical significance in terms of 
whether represented suffering posits the ethical import to the witness of the sufferer's 
experience of suffering, or whether it instead signifies its meaningfulness as a mere 
display of that suffering for aesthetic contemplation. Each of these significations 
“[invest] suffering with certain ethical orientations regarding what is legitimate and fair 
to feel and do towards [that suffering]” –  that is, they prompt readers and viewers as to 
how to comprehend the meaning and significance what is being represented, thus 
shaping the likely potential for the ethical consideration of sufferers (ibid: 217). The 
distinction between these two significations and subject-positions is asserted as one of 
whether witnesses are prompted to recognise the subjectivity of sufferers. To recognise 
a person's subjectivity in this context “is more than being aware of their existence, or 
curious about their circumstances, or able to see them, or saddened by the thought of 
their pain; it is an attunement to their capacity to suffer, the ascription of ethical urgency 
or significance to that suffering” (Adelman and Kozol, 2014, emphasis added). It is 
recognition that prompts “different ways of knowing and being” on the part of the 
witness (Kozol, 2014: 12).
But if recognition is an ethical act, it must also be acknowledged as an imagined 
one. As with the production of co-presence through news media, the recognition of 
subjectivity is “an imaginative process” prompted by the way the representation appears 
to address the witness (ibid: 149). After all, the thoughts and feelings of the sufferers are 
not articulated by the sufferer directly to the witness, nor are they transparently 
accessible; the production of imagined co-presence instead allows representations to 
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signify that those thoughts and feelings exist and have an ethical urgency on their own 
account. The imagining of that subjectivity, then, is constitutive of a particular 'ethical 
orientation'. This is conceptualised in the literature as an intersubjective process of 
recognition whereby the witness 'responds to' the sufferer – that is, the suffering is 
made meaningful as addressing the witness to respond to the sufferer (ibid: 90-1). The 
recognition of suffering's ethical import, then, echoes Butler's notion of recognisability 
in that it requires that representation signify a suffering subject as part of that 
representation of suffering.
The potential for recognisability, in terms of imagining sufferers' subjectivities, 
is shaped by whether a representation includes “markers of subjectivity” linked to the 
suffering bodies represented, or whether instead the representation of sufferers “severs 
subjectivity from the material body”, turning the body into an object of suffering rather 
than that of a subject (ibid: 149, 151). What counts as markers of subjectivity – as that 
which constitutes and indicates a human subject for witnesses – is itself shaped by the 
socio-cultural context within which a representation is produced and is “not necessarily 
tethered [essentially] to the material bodies” represented (ibid: 152). In the absence of 
those markers, representations produce suffering as an object insofar as that suffering 
signifies that it is meaningful primarily in terms of its showing to witnesses what that 
suffering looks like, in terms of allowing the experience of witnessing that suffering 
(Chouliaraki, 2009: 221-2).
Christina Konstantinidou demonstrates this process in her analysis of Greek 
newspaper coverage of suffering during the invasion and occupation of Iraq. One 
photograph of an Iraqi man wailing over the coffin of his son restricts the possibility for
recognising that man's subjectivity firstly by narrowing the visual field to the man's 
body, occluding the place and people surrounding him which might otherwise give 
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context and meaning to the image beyond the display of that suffering. In the discursive 
context of cultural tropes of lamentation and practices of grieving, the emphasis on the 
man's pained facial expression and emblematic 'tragic', 'indiscreet' bodily gesture 
emphasises the man's suffering over any indication of his identity, his agency or the 
circumstances of this suffering. Finally, the gaze of the man is turned away from the 
camera's lens and towards his son's coffin; with the man making no eye-contact with the
viewer as a result, his suffering is objectified as something to look at without visual 
confrontation from the signified subjectivity of the man himself (Konstantinidou, 2007: 
153-5). In these ways, the representation of the wailing father is signified as meaningful 
in terms of displaying suffering, rather than representing a subject who is suffering. The 
singularity of the sufferer is effaced by a signification of his suffering as to be 
experienced for its own sake; the uniqueness and identity of the sufferer is rendered 
unimportant, since he merely allows for the aesthetic appreciation of his generalised 
suffering (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2010: 51-2). The subject-position produced as a 
result is one oriented towards “reflecting upon its own experience of 'watching itself 
seeing'” (Chouliaraki, 2009: 223). The representation of this man's suffering therefore 
regulates how witnesses are prompted to understand and respond to this suffering, 
curtailing recognisability in the process.
As Butler's earlier comments indicate, however, markers of subjectivity are not 
just shaped by the articulation of the suffering body. That body is articulated within a 
representation of war or of an act of state violence, such as counter-terrorism, and 
witnesses are prompted to incorporate this context into their understanding of the 
suffering. News coverage frames its amalgamation of text and images as a 
representation of suffering pertaining to a state's foreign policy, as a report on that 
policy's enactment (Konstantinidou, 2007: 153). If co-presence requires that the 
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representation signify its meaningfulness in terms of its trying to report on a real event 
(Frosh, 2009: 61), then co-presence in representations of state violence requires that the 
latter signify their meaningfulness in terms of reporting on a state's foreign policy. The 
question of ethical recognition in these cases is therefore related not just to the bodies of
sufferers but implicitly to the state perpetrator of violence. Representations of suffering 
related to a state's foreign policy produce subject-positions in relation to both sufferers 
and perpetrators, making both identities meaningful through understandings of the war 
being perpetrated (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2010: 45-6). The articulation of suffering is 
shaped by this foreign policy framing, with suffering bodies ascribed meaning 
depending upon whether they signify that they are comprehensible through articulated 
narratives of war, whether they reflect metonymic identities within those 
rationalisations that position them in relation to the state. This is conceptualised in the 
literature as a representational practice where the signification of suffering echoes the 
terms that aim to rationalise the war.
Representations of Afghan citizens since 11 September 2001, for instance, have 
been produced in the context of the U.S. state's rationalisation of the war in Afghanistan
as a liberal humanitarian project. This context gives particular meanings to the 
represented bodies: markers of female bodies' decontextualised social and economic 
precarity come to stand in for the country's structural collapse under the Taliban, while 
those bodies' Islamic dress echoes and so signifies the gendered oppression that is 
posited by the U.S.'s rationale for the war. These significations, in the absence of a wider
articulated context, define Afghanistan as a racialised and gendered place of suffering 
relative to the presumed witness, with race and gender giving meaning to one another. 
This same representational practice effaces the subjectivities of the women depicted: 
their suffering is made meaningful as gendered vulnerability through markers of 
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racialised alterity, markers that literally obscure their faces and figuratively occlude 
their agency; this effacement-through-racialisation restricts the possibility of 
recognition for the presumed witness (Kozol, 2014: 74-7).
Within news media discourse detailing the U.S. state's “seemingly benign 
humanitarian logic” for the invasion of Afghanistan, civilian suffering more generally 
has been articulated as pivoting on brutal repression by the Taliban: restrictions on legal
freedoms and religious conservatism are represented as having negated the population's 
agency, reducing civilians to helpless victims unable to lead politically-meaningful lives. 
This further restricts the possibility for recognisability even in cases of counter-
insurgency casualties, since Afghan civilians are positioned in a narrative for war where 
they “could only be understood as potential humans... residing in a state of abeyance as 
they waited for the international community to restore to them the possibility of a 
liveable life” (T. Gregory, 2012: 337, emphasis in original). Ascribed meaning in this 
way, suffering is signified as reflecting the state's own terms for justifying the conflict, 
producing a subject-position from which women's liberation and democratic freedoms 
appear concomitant with the presumed witness' society, “a natural part of 'Western 
humanist values'” (Stabile and Kumar, 2005: 775).
Witnessing suffering is linked in the above conceptualisation to the 
rationalisation of war. Representations of suffering signify their comprehensibility 
within particular normative frameworks posited as the rationale for war. Within those 
frameworks, the articulation of suffering decouples that suffering from subjectivities, by
foreclosing the possibility that sufferers could “could appear as politically qualified 
subjects possessing lives that could be comprehended as viable or meaningful” (T. 
Gregory, 2012: 336). This qualifies the notion of suffering being signified as a mere 
object of contemplation: that objectification or dehumanisation takes place through 
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narratives of war that produce bodies as lacking subjectivity. These examples 
demonstrate that subjectivities are decoupled from suffering bodies through the 
signification of those bodies as meaningful within categories of difference – race, sex 
and class. In order for the representation of female Afghan civilians to objectify their 
suffering, those represented bodies must signify that their appearance and behaviour – 
the lack of a visible face, the framed lack of agency – reflect a particular configuration of
these categories which precludes recognition. Suffering can therefore be positioned at 
the centre of representations of state violence while appearing to reiterate the terms that
rationalise ongoing violence, “explaining how [sufferers] appear to be so lose-able in the 
quest to liberate them” (ibid: 337). These representations, then, reiterate a redemptive 
narrative of U.S. state violence that relies upon the articulation of suffering while 
dehumanising those who suffer within that narrative, preventing a consideration of 
their capacity to suffer as a result of this redemptive violence.
The fact that the subject-positions produced by such representations may 
prompt sadness or even outrage at suffering demonstrate that such affects are not 
sufficient for recognising subjectivity. While Butler frames the importance of 
recognisability in terms of “why it is we might feel horror in the face of certain losses 
but indifference or even righteousness in light of others” (Butler, 2009: 41-2), others 
caution that there is no clear-cut connection between particular affects towards 
suffering and recognising subjectivity. Narratives of war can shape subject-positions of 
outrage at suffering but for very particular reasons that efface the role of state violence 
in perpetuating suffering. The objectification of suffering may be articulated such that it
signifies that suffering as horrific on account of its de-contextualised aesthetic qualities, 
prompting an “analytical self-contemplation over the evils of warfare” disconnected 
from any scrutiny of that war (Chouliaraki, 2009: 223). The subject-position that Wendy
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Kozol describes as recoiling from representations of suffering may act as an expression 
of horror at that suffering, but the recoil from such representations may prevent 
witnesses from acknowledging how those portrayals address them as if they held a 
certain social identity that corresponds to the narrative for war. By preventing such 
scrutiny, then, recoiling from suffering may inadvertently reiterate identities of the 
witness and sufferer that fit within the rationalisation of that war (Kozol, 2014: 155-8). 
Indeed, studies of British newspaper coverage of the Iraq war have found that (rare) 
representations of civilian suffering could be framed as horrifying or outrageous 
without signifying that the suffering posed a challenge to state claims about the 
rationalisation of the war (Parry, 2012: 182-3). For this reason, I maintain that the 
crucial contribution of this literature on war and representation is the consideration of 
how the representation of suffering can efface the subjectivities of those who suffer. It is
the non-recognisability of these subjectivities which shapes subject-positions that 
rationalise war.
This thesis contributes to the literature on the representation of war and 
suffering, by examining representations that challenge the dynamics of recognisability 
outlined above. The presumption in the above analytic is that the imagining of the 
sufferer's subjectivity is more ethical than the objectification of her suffering. This is 
grounded in the idea that to have such an imagining is to acknowledge the ethical 
import of the experience of the sufferer, of her experience of suffering. The lack of an 
ethical response is consequently equated with dehumanisation, conceptualising the 
latter as always an unethical process of representation (Pick, 2011: 6). But the 
recognition of a human being's experience and thus their ethical significance is still “a 
narration imposed on affect”, a meaning that the witness is prompted to attach to her 
affective response to represented suffering (Kozol, 2014: 90). Indeed, the ascription of 
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suffering to any creature, human or non-human, is a precarious production of meaning, 
since there is no catalogue, outside of socio-culturally-framed discourses, of the 
appearances and behaviours that definitively denote the experience of suffering by a 
sentient being (Aaltola, 2012: 49-67). Nevertheless, critical scholars on the 
representation of suffering in war place an ethical weight on the ability of witnesses to 
recognise the existence and qualities of sufferers' subjectivities. In this sense, while 
feelings of outrage may be insufficient for recognition, the ability to have an affective 
response is considered necessary for recognisability. In making this assumption, these 
scholars mandate an articulation of suffering by sufferers, a meaningful 'presence-ing' of
that suffering in representations, as grounds for recognising the ethical worth of 
sufferers (Abbas, 2010). Moreover, this analytic of recognisability empowers the affects 
of the witness in response to suffering as able to produce knowledge of others' 
subjectivities – that is, the feelings of the witness allow for the recognition, through 
imagining, of sufferers' experiences (Möller, 2009: 788).
Within this analytic, then, affective reactions to suffering are what produce 
'ethical orientations' towards that suffering. But while these affective responses might be
experienced by witnesses as a spontaneous reaction to the recognition of a sufferer's 
experience, and therefore be understood as an unproblematic reflection of a common 
humanity, the response of witnesses is shaped by wider public discourse in terms of 
what counts as a marker of subjectivity or not (Adelman and Kozol, 2014). This analytic 
frames recognition as a mere matter of its being allowed unimpeded or its being 
curtailed, rather than its being discursively produced through and reiterating ideas of 
what denotes subjectivity and to whom it can potentially belong. As a result, so long as 
ethical responsiveness is reduced to an imaginative response to subjectivity, there is 
always the conceptual risk of naturalising witnesses' affects and perpetuating 
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unquestioned a wider discourse which delimits the markers of subjectivity and the 
potential for an affective response to violence. Privileging the imagining of subjectivity 
in this way leaves unexplored the ethical valences of witnessing violence that does not 
produce recognisable suffering, that does not lead to representations of sufferers whose 
suffering a witness can identify through the socio-cultural mores which shape our 
affects.
Given this socio-cultural shaping of the potential for affect and thus 
understanding, this thesis questions the restriction of ethics in relation to 
representations of war, the restriction of ethical responsiveness, to the understandings 
that are produced by affects in response to co-present suffering. Why should co-presence
with suffering be a precondition for ethical responsiveness? Such a precondition simply 
equates the affect-induced imagining of subjectivity with an ethical response to 
suffering and, by implication, state warfare. As a consequence, the absence of sufferers 
from representations of violent state foreign policy is equated with a lack of ethics, with 
a curtailment of the ability to respond ethically, on the grounds that without co-
presence no recognition of subjectivities is possible. Indeed, absence is over-determined
in this regard: while co-presence is not guaranteed to produce recognisability, since it 
could alternatively lead to the objectification of suffering, the absence of sufferers 
necessarily precludes an ethical response.
This thesis challenges the association between recognisability and ethical 
responsiveness by foregrounding representations of violent state foreign policy where 
sufferers are absent and all that remains are the non-bodily, non-human traces of state 
violence. These representations expand the range of representations of war that are 
commonly associated with absence. The literature on the representation of war has 
conceptualised the absence of suffering largely as a matter of the effacement of sufferers
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through hegemonic normative frameworks produced by the state. Representations of 
war which do not presence suffering have been studied primarily in two contexts. The 
first is those which portray war through signifiers of the state technologies that enable 
it. This critical analysis of the public portrayal of war became influential in the 
aftermath of the Gulf War, with scholars pointing both to the intense media focus on the
capabilities and technology of 'precision' military weaponry (Griffin and Lee, 1995; 
Philo and McLaughlin, 1995: 149-53) and to the ubiquity of images and video footage 
taken from the cameras attached to 'smart-bombs', which allow audiences to follow the 
trajectory of missiles as they close in on their target (Stam, 1992: 102-5; Franklin, 2000: 
41-2). In either case, it is argued, the representation of war through markers of military 
technology prompts witnesses to view war through the lens of these technologies 
(figuratively and literally), a subject-position which objectifies the deployment of these 
weapons in acts of violence as an aesthetic display of their unbelievable high-tech 
capabilities. The second context within which the absence of suffering is normally 
studied is those representations which appear to sanitise war by refusing to show 
suffering bodies (Campbell, 2004). This critical analysis has most recently been applied 
to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, finding that U.S. and UK news media appeared 
reticent to show images of Iraqi casualties of coalition forces' violence (Silcock et al, 
2008; Parry, 2012).
Within these research strands, the absence of sufferers is equated with their 
effacement, producing representations of 'war without casualties'. This thesis argues, 
however, that while representations of contemporary covert counter-terrorism 
similarly do not represent sufferers' bodies, they do not simply remove any markers of 
those sufferers and their suffering such that “dead enemies [lose] this very last strand of 
recognition: being represented” (Delori, 2014: 526), prompting witnesses to ignore 
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them. Rather, these mediations of covert state violence signify that sufferers are not co-
present with witnesses when the latter adopt the subject-position offered. Within the 
spatial and temporal coordinates produced by these representations, sufferers are 
signified as absent. The thesis therefore argues that the subjectivities of these sufferers are
not being 'effaced' in these representations. In the context of the reviewed literature, it is
analytically unclear how the notion of effacement could be made meaningful here, since 
witnesses are being prompted to imagine the absence of sufferers rather than be 
discouraged from considering that absence. In this sense, that absence is made 
meaningful in these representations. Since sufferers are themselves made meaningful as 
absent in this sense, their suffering therefore cannot be produced as an object for 
aesthetic contemplation. Witnesses are prompted to be co-present with the aftermath, 
rather than the enactment, of state violence. Neither objectification nor sanitisation is 
taking place here; the absence of suffering in this case is instead a matter of the 
representation signifying that a covert operation has been and gone, leaving only non-
bodily public traces in its wake.
Despite this absence, these representations of covert action traces nonetheless 
have the potential to shape more or less ethical responses to what they do and do not 
show. Ethics, far from being banished by the mere fact of bodily absence, is still a live 
question in relation to these representations and the interpellations they produce. 
Representations such as of the drone airfield in Chabelly discussed earlier are still being 
articulated within the context of contemporary counter-terrorist policy – that is, they 
signify that they are to be understood as part of the workings of that policy. For this 
reason, the thesis places these representation within the lineage of representations of 
war. Moreover, these representations signify that the relevant counter-terrorist policy 
involves the perpetration of state violence and the infliction of suffering: the text and 
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images used to make news stories about these policies include references to deadly state 
intentions, to violent actions, and to casualties that result. News coverage therefore 
signifies that these covert policies are meaningful as state actions likely to cause deaths 
and injuries. As such, the subject-positions from which these representations are 
comprehensible will include understandings of the state and its infliction of violence. 
These representations produce subject-positions in relation to both the state 
perpetrator of counter-terrorism violence and the casualties of that violence. In the 
course of theorising and analysing the roles that secrecy and public traces play in 
making these operations meaningful, this thesis therefore argues that the question of an 
ethical or unethical witnessing of these representations is still both a relevant question –
the possibility for ethical witnessing is not a priori disproved – and an open one: what it 
means to ethically witness these representations is a matter for theorisation and 
empirical analysis.
In order to study how the signified absence of suffering shapes the meanings 
that are attached to that suffering – the representational dynamics of absence – this 
thesis turns away from an exclusive association between ethical witnessing and the 
recognition of subjectivities. Rather than ask, 'Is recognition possible here?', the relevant
question is, 'How is meaning attached to absence in these representations?'. Just as 
witnesses are prompted to understand the co-presence of sufferers in particular ways, 
so it is that when the absence of suffering and of suffered bodies is signified to them, 
witnesses are prompted to understand that absence as meaningful from a particular 
interpretive position. For this reason, the first two chapters of the thesis will set about 
conceptualising representational dynamics produced by signified absences: how those 
absences are themselves produced, what shapes their meaning, and how they in turn 
frame the events to which they relate. The subsequent empirical chapters will examine 
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what meanings are attached to and produced by the absence of those rumoured or 
presumed to suffer as a result of covert counter-terrorism operations and the subject-
positions that are shaped as a result. Those subject-positions will help provide an 
answer to the question of ethical witnessing in the case of contemporary covert action, 
not in terms of the imagining of suffering experience, but nonetheless in terms of the 
ethical orientations that Chouliaraki spoke of earlier: of what witnesses are prompted to
think it is legitimate and fair to think, feel and do in response to these public traces of 
covert action, and through them towards these unseen operations, their state 
perpetrators and their casualties.
The hidden file: absence and the covert action archive
The narrowness with which absence is implicitly conceptualised in the literature on the 
representation of war is one shared with what appears at first to be a rather different 
field: International Relations research into the political dynamics of covert action. 
Despite their differences in predominant theoretical and methodological assumptions, 
both fields define their research positions towards absence in opposition to their 
positions towards presence. As a consequence, while the literature on war 
representations sees absence as negating ethical responsiveness, literature on covert 
action in international politics posits absence as an impediment to research. This 
relegation is something too that this thesis aims to question and rethink: far from 
restricting research, the absences related to covert operations and their impact on the 
international stage are part of the constitution of those operations and thus a productive
area for analysis.
The problem of absence for IR research into covert action begins with the very 
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definition of these state operations. While any research into the role of covert action in 
international relations logically must begin by delineating the boundaries or criteria of 
these state activities, in order to determine the scope of inquiry, the intuitive problem is 
that such activities are not fully available for scrutiny in order to determine those 
criteria. One is left paradoxically trying to define a phenomenon that is barely visible. As
Kaeten Mistry notes, the conceptualisation of covert action has been tied directly to the 
Cold War history of the uncovering of state activities that were being kept hidden from 
the public. While governments “slowly and sheepishly admitted to” certain activities and
labelled them covert action, “scholars and former intelligence practitioners” were the 
ones left to offer criteria for that label's application in the public sphere. Indeed, the 
founding document of the CIA itself “deliberately avoided” reference to covert action, 
seemingly to allow for an inconspicuous covert action function in light of public 
opposition to a permanent peacetime intelligence agency (Mistry, 2013: 112, 113).
Most definitions of covert action in the scholarly literature keel to what might 
be called a functional-institutional definition largely based upon U.S. state practice, 
defining covert action by its purported function and the institutional delineations made 
by those carrying out such action. This has led to a conceptualisation of covert action 
based on plausible deniability: that covert operations are defined by their being state 
activities designed “to influence... conditions abroad” but where “it is intended that the 
role of [the government in question] will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly” 
(U.S. Code, 2013: § 3093 (e)). The clear justification for this conceptualisation is that the 
U.S. legal statute which defines covert operations this way has governed a sizeable 
proportion of the secret state activities that scholars propose to study (Scott, 2004: 322-
5).
But such a delineation does not solve the issue of scope. A focus on plausible 
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deniability leaves unexplained how to define the means and ends of operations to be 
studied under this heading. It is unlikely that scholars would want all state activities 
designed to be plausibly deniable to fall into the covert action category. Intuitively, 
covert operations are not as 'passive' and observational as other 'intelligence activities', 
but rather involve an interventionist component (ibid: 323). That 'covert' is used within 
statutory definitions as an adverb further suggests that some state actions may be covert
without qualifying as 'covert action' (A. Wall, 2011: 129). This latter point connects to 
institutional scope, which is also ambiguous: while the U.S. legal code indicates that a 
covert action could involve or be undertaken by any number of “departments, agencies 
or entities” of the U.S. government, it exempts “traditional diplomatic or military 
activities or routine support to such activities” (U.S. Code, 2013: § 3093 (a), 3093(e)). 
This raises the pertinent question of whether military activities outside official war 
theatres which meet the plausible deniability criterion – for instance, those recent 
counter-terrorism activities conducted by the expanded U.S. Special Operations 
Command but not acknowledged by the Pentagon – should be considered by analyses 
of covert action (Kibbe, 2007: 59-60). It is often unclear whether such covert operations 
count under the U.S. Code as 'covert action' or 'traditional military activities', due to 
uncertainty over who has command authority in each case and whether the operation is 
linked to definable 'ongoing' or 'anticipated' overt military action (ibid: 63; A. Wall, 
2011: 132-6; N. Shah, 2014: 166-7).
In order to decide which means, ends and institutional affiliations are sufficient 
criteria for a state activity to count within a covert action study, scholars would first 
need to know which activities meet the one necessary criterion defined above: that they 
be designed and conducted with the intention that the state role remain neither 
apparent nor acknowledged, implicitly to a general public (as well as other state and 
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non-state actors). The problem is that such an intention may not be determinable. 
Firstly, the converse intention that the operation be apparent or acknowledged is not 
the same as the operation actually being apparent or acknowledged; scholars would 
therefore need to know that this intention was present even if the operation itself was 
neither apparent nor acknowledged in the public sphere, since if so the operation would
not count as a covert action. Secondly, the intention for the state's role to be neither 
apparent nor acknowledged could nonetheless be foiled – an operation may become 
apparent or may be inadvertently acknowledged, despite the state's intention otherwise. 
Scholars would not necessarily be able to determine from the public evidence whether 
this intention was ever present in such a scenario. Thirdly, a state could intend to 
acknowledge an operation but simply not be asked about it; thus the role of the state 
may remain unapparent even if the state did not intend to hide its role (A. Wall, 2011: 
130-1).
The dilemma outlined above is one produced by pinning the conceptualisation 
of covert action on a determination of the state's intentions. If scholars presume that 
covert actions are precisely those state actions where the link to the state in question is 
intended to be obscured somehow, it becomes difficult to know whether any apparent 
visible link is real, a misapprehension or actually part of this obscuration – that is, 
whether the public information or purported evidence of covert action is trustworthy 
(Scott, 2004: 326-8). This reflects the positioning of absence as a hindrance within IR 
research on covert operations. If one aims to study state actions that one presumes are 
designed to be partially hidden based on the public evidence of those actions, absence is 
implicitly posited as a real possibility and a potential barrier to that study.
Thus in the sub-field of IR most devoted to studying covert action, intelligence 
studies, individual covert actions have been analysed primarily to establish the decision-
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making and foreign policy conduct of states. Precisely because of the perceived need to 
fill in the blanks around this conduct, the issue of evidence has been foremost in 
scholars' minds: important details of the planning, execution and political fallout of 
covert action are brought to light years or even decades after they took place, or (it is 
presumed) do not emerge at all. This has been seen to raise questions around the 
reliability of research into the frequency and success of covert action, the decision-
making processes of state bureaucracies and the international consequences of 
operations (ibid: 325-8; Mistry, 2011: 247-9). Those studies which have emerged 
therefore largely try to establish the historical record using declassified state materials. 
One such study, of British covert action during the 1962-4 Yemeni civil war, bemoans 
the dearth of research into covert operations' political dynamics, arguing that 
intelligence studies' “subjective definitions” of covert action, in the context of such 
action being a “closed activity”, “pose an inherent epistemological problem” (Jones, 
2006: 718). That is, covertness makes it difficult to determine one's scope of inquiry and 
methods of analysis.
Beyond individual case-studies, covert action has only relatively recently been 
conceptualised for the purposes of incorporation into wider IR research agendas. The 
manner of this incorporation, however, implicitly posits the evidential absences 
produced by covertness as a barrier to research. This reinforces a conceptualisation of 
covert action which ultimately reifies the state's influence on the public sphere. In 
criticising the lack of IR interest in covert action nearly twenty years ago, Elizabeth 
Anderson frames this lack of attention as reflecting a “tendency to regard covert 
operations as being outside the realm of “regular” foreign policy”, rather than as “an 
integral element in advancing the interests and foreign policy goals of a government, by 
employing secret means to accomplish that which cannot or should not be pursued 
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overtly” (Anderson, 1998: 403-4). By framing an IR research agenda towards covert 
action as the study of “a means of implementing foreign policy objectives”, however, 
Anderson limits analysis of covert action to analysis of the state's implementation of it, of 
its dynamics and effectiveness as a foreign policy tool, using “theoretical concepts” 
developed “to explain other instruments” of state policy-making (ibid: 404, emphasis 
added). More than a decade after Anderson's appeal, the incorporation of covert action 
into IR research as a foreign policy tool was still being advocated for in these terms. 
Richard Aldrich argues that the work of intelligence agencies has still not been fully 
conceptualised within IR scholarship, with interest largely reduced to “detailed study of 
the foreign policy machine” rather than to how intelligence work speaks to “broader 
debates in international relations” (Aldrich, 2011: 143, 144). Aldrich himself, however, 
conceptualises intelligence agencies' relevance in terms of the need to “understand the 
transformative impact” of changes in international relations “upon [their] own 
activities”, the “significant changes and challenges” those agencies face (ibid: 140, 141). 
To study covert action in IR, then, is a matter of examining how those state agencies can
and do conduct operations in the wider world.
Within the area of IR research carved out for covert action, the covertness of 
these operations is therefore only significant insofar as it either shapes states' decisions 
to instigate those operations or affects their conduct and success. Thus one recent 
assessment of the “painfully short supply” of “systematic analysis” of covert intervention
in IR frames a research agenda as determining the state's “rationale for preferring a 
covert intervention” to an overt one (Carson, 2016: 104, 108). Within this research 
programme, the secrecy of covert operations is considered important, but only as a 
“policy tool” to pursue states' foreign policy; applying IR theory to covert action is 
parsed as “theorising secrecy's appeal” to state leaders, the appeal of carrying out an 
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intervention covertly rather than overtly (ibid: 128).
In this sharply-prescribed research agenda, the same impasse emerges as that 
recognised in intelligence studies literature: if one aims to examine the implementation 
of states' covert foreign policy, one faces the problem of the absence of declassified or 
otherwise publicly-available primary sources detailing that implementation. Covertness 
is framed as an analytical impediment. This likely reflects covert action's entrance into 
social scientific study through arguments in the 1980s over its importance in the history
of the Cold War. The early academic literature on covert action argued that “archival 
data” and interviews with key participants could now establish covert operations as 
“significant link[s] in the ongoing chain of cold war history”, rather than mere 
“background incident[s] in the escalating cold war” (Immerman, 1980/81: 629). Covert 
action was thus introduced as part of a debate over the political dynamics of the Cold 
War, resulting in a focus on establishing covert operations' existence and importance to 
these dynamics and to state geopolitical considerations, largely through empiricist 
research methods (Gaddis, 1989; Garhoff, 2004: 40-3).
This focus on states' implementation of covert action and an empiricist 
methodology seen to flow from this have together conceptualised covert action as a tool
of foreign policy whose secrecy may well indicate something about state decision-
making, but which nonetheless obscures the resultant roles covert action has played in 
shaping international relations. Methodologically, this encourages approaches that try 
to get past secrecy in order to analyse the secret state implementation of covert action 
and its traceable effects on world politics. Conceptually speaking, then, the existence of 
covert action is reduced to the state documentation that might establish its organisation 
and conduct. While more recent work in intelligence studies has moved beyond a 
narrow concern with declassifying government materials and has critiqued the previous
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neglect of concern with methodology, questions of the latter are largely reduced to how 
one analyses declassified documents, and in particular how to control for the distorting 
influence of secrecy that both surrounds covert operations and frames the declassified 
state archives that detail them (eg. R. Hughes, 2008: 849-54). Covertness remains 
something that stands in the way of analysis by producing absences in the public record.
As Mistry argues, by focusing on that historical record and presuming that it can be 
filled in through state archives, studies of covert action have implicitly conceptualised “a
'hidden truth' that lurks inside a dusty box on some far-flung archival shelf” (Mistry, 
2011: 267). Within this conceptualisation, the existence of covert action is constituted 
by the state's archives of its deliberations and actions. With those archives secreted by 
the state, the absences that are produced in the public sphere are distinguished from 
covert action – those absences are not thought of as shaping or co-constituting the 
existence of covert action but as merely obscuring that existence. Covert action is thus 
conceptually separated from the public sphere (see Carson, 2016: 109-11).
This thesis challenges the analytical focus on the hidden file, on the idea that 
covert action fundamentally exists in the classified state archives that would reveal both 
state intentions and the secret shaping of international politics by covert agents. 
Searching for the hidden file only reinforces a presumed connection between the 
political dynamics of covert operations and the intentions of the state, as if without 
knowledge of these intentions those dynamics are invisible and inaccessible – indeed, 
that those intentions are what determine those dynamics in the first place. That search 
also neglects the full implications of covertness, of its definition in terms of plausible 
deniability. While this official definition might appear to set up public absence as a 
barrier to accessing these operations, it also implies that a covert operation may have a 
public existence beyond state actions and articulations. In these legal definitions, to be 
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covert need not mean to be clandestine: for an operation to be clandestine, according to 
U.S. military doctrine, involves it being “sponsored or conducted by governmental 
departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment”. Clandestine
operations therefore differ from covert operations in that “emphasis is placed on 
concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor”
(U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008: 91). The implication of this distinction is spelled out by 
the Senate Report which accompanied the 1991 amendment to the U.S. Code that 
statutorily defined covert action: “covert actions may involve activities which are visible 
or public, but the role of the United States in carrying out such activities is itself not 
apparent or acknowledged” (quoted in Radsan, 2009: 534, emphasis added).
Covert operations, then, may in fact broach the public sphere, being visible in 
ways that allow for plausible deniability but which nonetheless present these operations 
in venues beyond state archives. The response of the empiricist IR scholar might be that 
a covert operation would still be difficult to identify for study, since without the 
determination of a state sponsor it will remain entirely unclear what visible events are 
in fact state activities being conducted covertly. Furthermore, an operation “may be 
both covert and clandestine”, suggesting an operation where both the state sponsor's 
role and the operation itself are designed “to assure secrecy or concealment”  (U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2008: 91). But even here, the official definitions suggest an unexplored 
avenue of research. A covert and clandestine operation may still leave traces of itself in 
the public sphere – for instance, an operation to sabotage a bridge may be clandestine 
“but the results are clearly not – the locals would know the bridge was damaged” (Gross,
2009: 13). This possibility speaks to a wider consequence: depending upon their 
characteristics and contextualisation by those who encounter them, such traces of 
covert and even clandestine action could imply an attempt at state secrecy, could 
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suggest their relation to an event that was covert, or alternatively they could prompt 
rumours or speculative claims to that effect. In other words, public traces of covert 
action could signify plausible deniability and thus could produce state secrecy in the 
public sphere.
A focus on the hidden file, then, would ignore the potential intersection of 
secrecy and publicity. Even if both the role of the state in prosecuting a covert action 
and the act itself were secreted, with neither being apparent or acknowledged, public 
traces of an operation can make secrecy recognisable within the public sphere, by 
articulating an act of secrecy or hints at its secret contents. The signification of state 
secrecy through an operation's traces will in turn produce that operation in public 
discourse, by representing that operation and its covertness through the claims and 
suggestions of those traces. The existence of covert operations will therefore include its 
public existence through representations of state secrecy. This conceptual argument is 
based upon the claim that covert action, like any state foreign policy act, is a product of 
representational practices. These representations are not just attempts to 'reflect' some 
secreted material reality that itself defines these operations. These representations 
produce the social reality of these operations, for the simple reason that the world these 
operations exist within is only accessible to human beings through social practices that 
make that world intelligible, giving the world and its objects materiality (Dunn, 2009: 
426, 431). Far from precluding access to those operations, then, state secrecy can 
become part of their existence in the public sphere. Public claims regarding past or 
ongoing operations – which can be articulated through speech and through other non-
textual means, such as images and material objects – constitute those secrets of which 
they speak, materialising those covert activities as comprehensible events in the world 
and fixing meaning to them.
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The fact that this public existence of covert operations can result from traces left
in their wake also demonstrates that covert operations are not the sole product of the 
intentions and actions of state actors, but rather of broader representational practices 
not limited to those actions, which together materialise and reiterate social reality above
and beyond the presumed agency of those actors (Bialasiewicz et al, 2007: 406-8). 
Practices of assembling documentation of suspected traces may lead to representations 
whose significations of plausible deniability, as well as the means and ends of covert 
action, exceed any state intentions. These collations of traces left in the public sphere 
are just as much a part of the existence of covert action in the world as the state 
decisions and practices that instigate those operations. The scope of inquiry should 
therefore not be restricted to state decision-making; decisions to enact some statutory 
definition do not determine the existence of covert action in the world. The 
international political dynamics that covert actions shape or become a part of are a 
product of representations and social practices which make the world meaningful 
through claims of state secrecy, exceeding the instrumental aims of states in using 
covertness. The rationale for searching the state archive, namely to find the hidden truth
of these operations, is therefore nullified: those representational practices which 
produce state secrecy and shape the political dynamics of covert action do so “not 
because of the inherent 'truth' of those representations, but because of the strength of 
that specific representational power” (Dunn, 2009: 426). This is a matter of studying not 
what the state might mean by its covertness but what that covertness does in the world, 
how it shapes public discourse and thus political dynamics.
But this does not make covert action the same as overt action for the purposes of
analysis. The public existence of covert action will involve representations not just of 
secrets but of an act of secrecy, an attempt by the state to ensure its role is neither 
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apparent nor acknowledged. A research agenda based around the public existence of 
covert operations will consequently aim not to 'uncover' the secret of these operations. 
Rather, as Claire Birchall has recently put it, it will aim to “stay with the secret as secret”,
to examine how secrets “operat[e] within a particular delimitation of space, time, the 
visible, the sayable, the audible, and political experience” and so form part of public 
representations as a recognisable quality or characteristic of state operations (Birchall, 
2014: 26, emphasis in original). Far from dodging the issue of dealing analytically with 
the state's hiding of its activities, this conception of covert action's existence through 
public discourse is an attempt to wrestle with the production of state secrecy as a public 
phenomenon, as will be elaborated upon in the following chapter. To attempt to study 
state practices which one already assumes are designed to remain hidden is to analyse 
the production of that state secrecy within public representations, its articulation as a 
characteristic of state practices that themselves exist through those representations.
This production of state secrecy through traces of covert action challenges the 
conceptual separation of covert operations and the public sphere, since it suggests 
instead that the articulation of covert action's secrecy goes hand-in-hand with the 
production of the public sphere – that the two co-create one another. The IR literature 
on covert action discussed earlier posits a sharp boundary between the public sphere 
and the state's covert activities; the latter happen out of the public eye and outwith 
public deliberation. In making this claim, the literature presumes that the public sphere 
is something that already exists prior to those people, objects and issues that either are 
or are not within it – that the public sphere is some objective realm that is then filled 
with things. Specifically, this presumption follows a classic liberal Republican model by 
equating the public sphere with deliberation, with an area of social life where state 
citizens collectively discuss issues and public opinion is formed. The public sphere 
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exists, then, to the degree that citizens are 'public-spirited' and able to engage one 
another in dialogue on neutral social terrain in order to determine public opinion on 
societal issues (see Adut, 2012: 239-42). This public-spiritness implies the creation of a 
public, of a collective that recognises itself as such through its deliberation for a 
common purpose. As covert action is enacted and operated outwith any channels of 
deliberation amongst this public, this literature argues that covert action remains 
outside the public sphere, except when public revelations allow operations to 'enter' 
already-existing channels of debate.
The problem with this conception is that the public sphere is not a given: it 
depends upon the discursive production of ideas over what it means for something to be
public, how the 'publicness' of things is to be recognised. Such ideas are themselves 
shaped by people and objects which signify their claim to publicness, and equally those 
that signify acts of secrecy. This signified publicness is a particular kind of co-presence, 
in that it prompts witnesses to consider themselves as sharing a public sphere with these
other things. This co-presence is shaped by representations which are sensorily 
accessible to witnesses and which signify that this sensory access is in principle available
to others in the witness' society; moreover, represented people and objects will signify 
that they share a physical or virtual space with others, including the witness – that they 
are part of one space of accessibility (ibid: 243). It is this in-principle generalised sensory
accessibility that signifies publicness and thus materialises the public sphere where 
things share this quality. This publicness involves the signification of a public, defined 
not through collective deliberation but through the publicity of representations. 
Publicity involves representations being given attention by a collective that may be 
comprised of strangers but which, through acts of witnessing, recognises itself as 
sharing in this giving of attention – disparate newsreaders being one example (ibid: 
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244-5).
The signification of publicness is not neutral, however, but attaches particular 
meanings to the public sphere. The social practices and relations of people and objects –
for instance, the action of carrying out normally-'private' activities in a public space, or a
journalist entering a private home after a special forces operation and reporting from it 
live on television – are able to shape and re-shape others' understandings of the social 
spaces that they share or do not share, “creat[ing] for others a sense of place or out-of-
placeness” (Walters and D'Aoust, 2015: 56, emphasis in original). The appearances and 
behaviours of these people and objects can be signified as appropriate or inappropriate 
within the public sphere, thus producing that public sphere through ideas of what it 
means to inhabit it. The journalist entering the ransacked home might behave in a way 
that signifies her wandering through a space that it once would be inappropriate to 
enter and broadcast from but is now newsworthy and so public in a conditional sense. 
In this sense, ideas associated with the public sphere can be shaped by the publicity of 
representations, by their prompting collective attention through their appearance in 
news coverage. The public sphere, then, is one that constantly shifts its boundaries and 
norms of practice through representational practices which signify publicness or 
otherwise.
This 'or otherwise' is where secrecy becomes important. Public traces of covert 
operations which prompt a particular kind of co-presence with witnesses help produce 
the public sphere in relation to the secrecy that they signify. By producing secrecy, these
traces gain meaning as being 'out-of-place' in the sense of having entered the public 
sphere of general accessibility as a result of people, objects and political mechanisms 
that remain outside the public sphere, that are not sensorily-accessible. Their 
documentation and contextualisation within news coverage allows these traces to 
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signify their meaning through things that remain secreted; these traces thus produce 
ideas of the limits of the public sphere, of that which is not not within it but which 
instead lies in other less accessible spheres, namely certain covert state activities. 
Furthermore, the representation of these traces shapes what it means to inhabit the 
public sphere by signifying their precarious position within that sphere, their being 
incidental remainders of covert events that may just as easily not have become publicly-
accessible in the sense discussed above. Traces in turn signify a blurred boundary 
between the public sphere and the covert realm, by indicating that covert operations 
may well have occurred in the public sphere but went either unseen or undocumented, 
with covert agents having now left the public sphere. Far from producing an impassable 
divide between the public sphere and covert operations, state secrecy discursively 
produces both in relation to one another and suggests their intersection, and is able to 
do so through representations of covert action traces.
To reduce covert operations to the hidden state archive is therefore to ignore 
how covert action, through its public traces, can help shape understandings of the public
sphere. Furthermore, those traces may produce absences within that sphere. When 
contextualised within news coverage, those traces are able to signify public absences 
related to the unseen covert event – not just the absence of documentation of the event 
itself but the absence of representational markers of people and objects involved in that 
event. These significations can include the absence of suffering bodies, as discussed in 
the previous section. Once produced by public traces, these absences can interact with 
other elements of a news representation, those other traces seen to have been left 
behind in the public sphere. As such, absences can shape the meaning of covert 
operations – indeed, being part of these operations' public representation, absences are 
part of the public existence of covert action. Absence is therefore not something that IR 
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scholars should shy away from; nor should scholars necessarily attempt to eliminate 
them or deactivate their signifying power for fear of their 'contaminating' research 
results.
In approaching the study of covert counter-terrorism, this thesis resists the 
temptation to 'fill in' absences in the public record of contemporary operations. Rather, 
it tries to examine what these absences do in public discourse, how they help configure 
the meanings that are attached to covert operations in representations of the rumours 
and debris they leave behind. In doing so, the thesis demonstrates that when absences 
are materialised and made meaningful through public representational practices, they 
do not remain empty or opaque. In fact, absences in the traces of covert counter-
terrorism are produced in ways that give them representational content, that allow 
them to signify meanings of their own in concert with the rest of a representation. 
Specifically, through their framing by state secrecy, these absences become meaningful 
in terms of suggestive but equivocal ideas that they signify about these unseen events. 
These allusions from absence are conceptualised in chapter two as intimations from the 
residue of covert violence. This thesis therefore begins by acknowledging not just the 
intersection of secrecy and publicity, but the intersection of presence and absence, and 
the potential for both intersections to influence one another. Covert counter-terrorism 
exists, then, not in the hidden file of a state archive, but in public discursive dynamics 
that form between secrecy and absence.
Beyond the 'rationalisation' of state violence
Once covert operations exist not solely through state rationalities and operating 
procedures but through representations of their traces in the public sphere, their 
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political dynamics become more complicated than suggested either by the war 
representation literature or by those focused on the covert action archive. The ability of 
representations to signify the absence of suffering bodies, rather than simply efface the 
subjectivities of counter-terrorism casualties, decouples ethical witnessing from the 
notion of 'recognition' by raising the possibility of other as-yet-unanalysed subject-
positions towards casualties and the state. In addition, the possibility that secrecy and 
absence might be signified by the remainders of covert action – those rumours, 
speculation and debris left in its wake – suggests that the meanings attached to covert 
counter-terrorism are not necessarily dependent on how the state frames its own 
activities. The state need not address itself to the public which witnesses these 
representations; indeed, if these operations are intended to be covert, then state officials
may deliberately avoid acknowledging public discourse surrounding such operations. 
Yet state secrecy, covert operations and absences in their public traces may still be 
produced in the public sphere and shape the meaningfulness of these unseen practices. 
The paradox present in Butler's and Krongard's statements on the representation of war
is elaborated by these public traces. The crucial question therefore is, what would it take
for these representations to legitimise or rationalise these operations? And pressing 
further, what exactly would legitimation mean in this context?
Scholarship on contemporary counter-terrorism and foreign policy violence 
more generally contains a widespread assumption about legitimation. In order for 
representations of counter-terrorism to reiterate terms that rationalise these policies – 
for them to shape legitimising subject-positions – those terms of rationalisation must 
themselves be articulated in public discourse and pre-empt understandings of state 
violence and suffering, so that representations of the latter prompt witnesses to recall 
those terms and to see them echoed in these portrayals. For representations of veiled 
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Afghan women to legitimise U.S. intervention on the grounds of liberation, veiling must
be associated in public discourse with racialised ideas of sexual oppression, such that the
image reiterates those ideas and appears to address the reader or viewer as if she held a 
contrasting configuration of identity. Laura Shepherd summarises this pre-emption as a
process of “the dissemination of specific interpretations of representational practices”, 
primarily in the form of state narratives for its foreign policy actions, which rely on the 
“implied authority” of representations as reflecting those actions in order to try to fix 
the meaning associated with these practices (Shepherd, 2008: 214). Analysing public 
images of Presidential authority and the legitimacy of U.S. power at Guantánamo Bay, 
Shepherd argues that the state narratives which accompanied these images, and 
counter-narratives from humans rights organisations, attempted to “render the images 
decipherable, meaningful, and thus to fix the viewer(s) of the images in a specific 
relationship to the images themselves – as interpreter of a predetermined visual terrain” 
(ibid: 218, emphasis added). Elspeth Van Veeren characterises this process as one of 
“creat[ing] and maintain[ing] an 'interpretive frame' that privilege[s] a reading” of 
counter-terrorism practices as “essential in the fight against terrorism”. This pre-
conditioning of public discourse “generate[s] support” for counter-terrorism by shaping 
how representations of these practices are understood as intelligible, by trying to pre-
determine the meanings that 'make sense' of these public portrayals (Van Veeren, 2011: 
1724, 1725).
This predetermination of meaning is crucial: narratives of the rationale for state 
violence must prompt witnesses to find violence and suffering comprehensible in 
particular ways, to understand what those representations signify and what political 
context they relate to, in order for that violence to reiterate the very terms that are 
shaping the meaning of that violence for witnesses. As Rancière argues, in order for 
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representations to produce particular subject-positions towards violence and suffering, 
their meaning must be pre-empted such that witnesses are prompted to understand 
those representations as addressing and positioning them in a particular way; witnesses 
must “already be convinced” about what is being represented and their own relation to 
it (Rancière, 2009: 85). This pre-conditioning of public discourse surrounding state 
violence is premised upon representations of that violence either echoing wider 
discourses that are already circulating, or articulating their own narrative for, and thus 
contextualising, what they represent.
This pre-conditioning points to something both Campbell (2007) and Rose 
(2009) have termed the visual economy of representations, the idea that the discursive 
production of the world through representational practices is a matter “of what images 
do in circulation rather than just an interpretation of their iconography”, how 
representations are “imbricated” within particular “social spaces, affects, cultural 
histories and political contexts” (Campbell, 2007: 361). If the concept of images is 
expanded here to refer to visual and textual representational practices – since the two 
often work in concert to produce the world as meaningful – then this economy of 
representations can be understood as being part of the materialisation of the public 
sphere discussed above, the production of what appears sensorily-accessible to co-
present witnesses. It is through practices of producing and contextualising images 
within particular discourses of meaning – for instance, framing a satellite photograph of
an airfield in Djibouti within a discussion of ongoing U.S. covert activities in the Horn 
of Africa – that social reality is made intelligible. The idea of pre-conditioning is that the
economy of counter-terrorism representations is largely determined by the state actor 
in question, with state rationalisations setting the terms for how representations are to 
be understood.
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The critical literature on counter-terrorism therefore analyses the meanings 
attached to these state practices as a product of state political actors who frame textual 
and visual images of these practices; these actors articulate narratives of state policies 
and address those narratives to the public, pre-conditioning a subject-position towards 
images of those policies. This analytical dynamic has recently led Clive Barnett to 
caution that the standard critical understanding of security politics, including of 
counter-terrorism, too often presumes that citizens will always adopt subject-positions 
as a result of, or be interpellated by, state discourses surrounding security policies. 
These works make “deductions about [the] subject formation” of citizens from the 
“governing rationalities and programmes of rule”, taking the latter as “strongly 
constitutive of the entire social field” of public discourse (Barnett, 2015: 264). The 
presumption that state discourses aim at “spreading fear and circulating anxieties 
among whole populations through public means” snowballs into a conception of the 
public sphere as “a surface in which powerful actors effectively manipulate the 
dispositions and feelings of whole populations”, with those discourses inevitably 
mobilising citizens for securitising aims (ibid: 261, 259). At the same time, those 
discourses are thought to mask their meaning-making power “by working through 
registers that resist explicit recognition or reflection by subject populations”; this 
conception posits state discourses as successfully circumventing possibilities for public 
action and deliberation around security policies in any way contrary to these discourses'
intended meanings (ibid: 262, 260).
In this understanding of counter-terrorism practices, the public sphere is 
conceptualised as a pre-existing medium for security actors to manipulate thoughts and 
affects in line with discourses that are insidiously always-already hegemonic in public 
life. The pre-conditioning of public discourse discussed above is therefore taken to 
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wholly or predominantly shape the meaning of counter-terrorism. This analytic 
constructs subject-formation, the issue of what subject-positions witnesses adopt in 
relation to counter-terrorism, as a matter of assent or dissent towards state discourses. 
Through contextualising narratives of its actions, the state addresses its counter-
terrorism policies to the public, by offering a particular understanding of represented 
foreign policy practices that the public can then accept or reject. The question of 
legitimation, of witnesses contributing to the rationalisation of state violence, is 
therefore framed as one of responding to an address by the state. This gives an extra 
political weight to the recognisability of suffering subjectivities discussed earlier. 
Recognition is now framed as one side of a binary of possible responses to state 
discourses, namely the side of dissent from a state rationalisation of its policies. On the 
other side is “complicit[y]” (Shepherd, 2008: 214), an understanding of state violence 
within the frame of state narratives for its actions.
This analytic of the public discourse that constitutes counter-terrorism is 
reflected in discussions of resistance, of opposition to or the challenging of state 
rationalisations of violence. Resistance is often used as shorthand in an implicit 
reference to the dominance of state rationalisations of its counter-terrorism. For 
instance, in critiquing scholarship which perpetuates an opposition between the 
'appearance' and 'reality' of counter-terrorism, David Campbell centres the “critical 
challenge” of “think[ing] how resistance would be possible and what resistance would 
look like” if this material-discourse binary were replaced with an understanding of the 
world as intelligible only through representations (Campbell, 2008: 542). This is a 
challenge because within such a conceptualisation, state discourses could not simply be 
contested by offering supposedly 'undistorted' portrayals of state actions that would 
reveal the former's illusory nature. Campbell argues that “[t]he question of resistance” in
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this framework therefore depends upon (referencing Debord) “how comprehensive the 
power of the spectacle is understood to be” – that is, how much public discourse is 
thought to have been pre-determined such that representations appear meaningful 
within only one hegemonic framing. Campbell asks whether critical scholars are to 
think of that control of public discourse as “absolute” or merely “dominant in social life”
(ibid: 546). In the context of the literature on the representation of war, the answer to 
this question pivots on whether the state's pre-conditioning of representations curtails 
any recognition of sufferers' subjectivities. Resistance would depend upon the 
possibility for a subject-position that recognises these subjectivities and which through 
this recognition rejects the state's rationalisation of its violence. The rationale for using 
the term resistance is that it is a subject-position in response to representational practices
determined by hegemonic discourse, a subject-position that contests the meanings 
attached to social reality by that discourse.
As already noted, recognisability is frequently conceptualised as a matter of the 
affective response of witnesses to representations of violence. Recognising the 
subjective experience of suffering and its moral significance is predicated upon being 
affected by that suffering, upon being prompted to interpret one's affect as a response to
suffering. For this reason, the question of resistance is frequently answered in terms of 
having different kinds of affects to those prompted by state rationalisations for its 
counter-terrorism. It is therefore thought that having a particular affect is necessary to 
disrupt the meaning-making involved in state rationalisations. This is described in the 
literature on representations of suffering in counter-terrorism as a matter of shaking 
the public out of their apathy and indifference: “War sustains its practices through 
acting on the senses, crafting them to apprehend the world selectively, deadening affect in 
response to certain images and sounds... disposing us to feel shock and outrage in the 
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face of one expression of violence and righteous coldness in the face of another” (Butler, 
2009: 51-2, emphases added). To use the language of Chouliaraki cited earlier, this 
shaping of understandings and affects produces certain ethical orientations which 
indicate how one should legitimately respond to violence and suffering. To talk of pre-
conditioning is to presume that an ethical orientation towards a representation has been
produced by hegemonic discourse, leaving the witness to either unthinkingly accept that
orientation or to challenge it by recognising the experience of sufferers as morally 
significant.
The challenge posed by representations of contemporary covert counter-
terrorism is that they do not appear to be pre-conditioned in the manner theorised by 
the above literature – their meanings are not being predetermined by state articulations.
The economies of representation within which news coverage exists and circulates are a
product of journalists' documentation and assemblage of traces of covert activities that 
have been left in the public sphere. And as the thesis will demonstrate, while the U.S. 
state does articulate rationalisations in the abstract for continuing counter-terrorist 
violence, it rarely addresses these traces and the specific activities they suggest, nor does
it articulate its apparent secrecy and a rationale for its use to the public. It is not at all 
clear, therefore, that the ethical orientations produced by these traces of covert violence 
will be consistent with some pre-emptive hegemonic discourse. The argument of this 
thesis is that if contemporary covert counter-terrorism is being discursively produced 
not through the operating procedures and political rationalities of the U.S. state but 
through rumours and debris left behind, and if those are not contextualised by the state, 
it is unlikely that counter-terrorism is crafting understandings and affects in accordance
with some state rationalisation of its practices. These public traces of covert violence are
signifying their own forms of secrecy and absence which are reshaping the existence of 
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the public sphere, of its extent and qualities; there is no a priori reason why these traces 
should do this in line with the state's rationalisation for its violence if such a 
rationalisation is not pre-conditioning public discourse around these traces.
In analysing the representational dynamics of these traces of covert action, the 
ways they are collated and contextualised in news coverage and the secrecies and 
absences that are produced as a result, this thesis examines the potential for subject-
positions towards counter-terrorism that go beyond this concept of legitimation. When 
approaching the residue of covert action, a binary of assent-dissent, or one of 
legitimation-resistance, is inadequate for conceptualising potential subject-positions. 
The covert counter-terrorism practices discussed in this thesis are not being articulated 
within state rationalisations of counter-terrorism policies. They are being represented 
through collations of their various public traces which are not addressed by the state, 
allowing those traces to make these practices meaningful in ways that do not reflect any 
state rationalisation. State discourses are not being legitimised or resisted in the subject-
positions produced here.
The question then becomes, what would count as ethical responsiveness in this 
context? What does ethical responsiveness rest upon? As already argued, non-bodily 
traces of covert action prompt the need to decouple ethical responsiveness from the 
idea of recognisability, the potential to recognise the subjectivities of sufferers. The 
production and circulation of public traces within news coverage similarly challenges 
the utility of the concept of legitimation and its counterpart resistance. Yet as already 
noted, the subject-positions produced by representations of these traces are nonetheless 
positioned in relation to both casualties and the state perpetrators of counter-terrorism 
violence. This thesis therefore explores how ethical responsiveness towards the residue 
of covert counter-terrorism should be conceptualised, what kinds of subject-positions 
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are possible from this residue and how they position witnesses relative to the state and 
casualties. If witnessing here is not about accepting or dissenting from state 
rationalisations, it nonetheless rests on understandings of the meaning and significance 
of unseen covert violence based on its public traces. The thesis examines how resultant 
subject-positions can be conceptualised based upon the ethical orientations towards 
covert violence that are invested in them.
Lynching and histories of violence
In order to conceptualise the stakes of ethical witnessing beyond rationalisation, the 
thesis proposes an historical affiliation for this covert action, based on its representation
through non-bodily residue and the absences that this produces in the public sphere. 
The historical lineage of contemporary covert counter-terrorism has thus far been 
premised upon its operationalisation, the state's implementation of this violence. This 
focus has connected these practices to various programmes of pacification and policing 
of colonised populations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to 
Cold War counterinsurgency. The concept of 'targeted killing', applied to drone strikes 
and special forces operations, has been connected to twentieth century European 
colonial practices of assassinating insurgent leaders and demoralising sympathetic 
populations through persistent bombing, from the British in Pakistan to the French in 
Algeria (Kilcullen and Exum, 2009; Moyn, 2013: 229-30; Chamayou, 2015: 60-72). 
Persistent surveillance and gathering of information on 'suspect' populations has 
similarly been linked to the surveillance and policing of European colonies from the air, 
tactics designed in concert with bombing to shape more compliant populations 
(Neocleous, 2013; Satia, 2014). Beyond past colonial practices, the contemporary 
practice of constructing 'kill lists' of potential targets has been traced to previous CIA 
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intelligence-gathering efforts in support of counterinsurgency targeted killings, most 
notably the Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War (Tovy, 2009; Shaw, 2016), and to 
perceptions of the strategic 'success' of Israel's policy of assassinating Palestinian 
political leaders (S. Graham, 2011: 140-3; Gunneflo, 2016).
By focusing on continuities in the implementation of state violence, and in the 
political rationalities behind that implementation, this construction of an historical 
lineage rarely addresses the public existence of secrecy and absence that accompanies 
contemporary counter-terrorism operations. This lineage instead attempts to get past 
that secrecy and absence, to reveal the hidden state mechanisms of demonisation and 
dehumanisation. As with the previous-discussed literature on covert action, these works
implicitly position secrecy as a barrier to analysing these state activities. To be clear, this
thesis does not dismiss historical parallels and links with colonial policing and counter-
insurgency, but rather asks what historical affiliations might be suggested if the 
rationalisation of covert counter-terrorism was not taken as a given, if instead we were 
to stick with the public existence of these operations as secret, and examine the 
significations made by the public traces and absences of these activities. For these 
significations have the potential to withhold or circumvent legitimation, and as such, 
the existence of these covert operations is not wholly captured in the political 
rationalities studied by the above literature. The traces of absence around these 
operations suggest different historical connections.
Based on the public traces and absences of covert counter-terrorism, the thesis 
posits a representational parallel with lynching practice in the United States, specifically
public representations of that practice from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth 
centuries. This parallel is theorised as an 'historical affiliation', a representational 
association between historical forms of violence with vastly different motives and 
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mechanisms, an association that can be used to analyse obscured representational 
dynamics shared by both. The aim of this affiliation with lynching is to assess the 
potential for subject-positions that go beyond the rationalisation of violence. Through 
this assessment, historical affiliation is designed to provide an answer to the question of 
what ethical witnessing could involve in the case of covert counter-terrorism's residue.
In order to detail this methodology and its utility, some preliminary explanation 
is needed. Lynching – broadly an extra/quasi-legal form of vigilante violence against 
social minorities by those with systemic power (Belew, 2014: 85-6, 92; J. Carr, 2016) – 
went through a number of phases, with recent scholarship tracing its roots to the 
decades before the American Civil War, and the tense entanglement of extralegal mob 
violence with a fledgling criminal justice system in frontier regions (Pfeifer, 2013). 
Today, however, the practice has become defined by the wave of public spectacle 
lynchings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly against 
African Americans in the South. Scholarship has until recently echoed this focus and 
definition (Brundage, 2005: 405; Belew, 2014: 84-5). These were highly ritualised acts of
violence, where crowds of dozens to hundreds of people would watch the humiliation, 
torture, death and/or dismemberment of victims, often involving hanging, performed 
and legitimised as criminal punishment (Fuoss, 1999; Garland, 2005). These lynchings' 
conscious enactment as public spectacle has shaped analysis of their representational 
power. To witness and 'make sense' of this performance either directly or through 
photography, scholarship has concluded, was to understand it as a demonstration of 
black deviance being put in its place, and thus to be interpellated into an opposing 
racialised collective, to feel part of a united and superior white citizenry transcending 
class divisions (Hale, 1998; Nevels, 2007; Wood, 2009).
Two problems have been identified with this long-lasting focus on the spectacle 
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lynching, which help explain the use of lynching in this thesis. Firstly, this focus neglects
the wide variety in lynching practice across time and geography. Lynching existed 
throughout the United States, developing different characteristics and victims over time
in the South, the West and the North; variances were often linked to regional criminal 
justice systems that institutionalised lynching's terroristic function (Barrow, 2006; 
Gonzales-Day, 2006; Belew, 2014: 86-92; Pfeifer, 2014: 835-7, 842-3). Spectacle 
lynchings were part of only one phase of the practice, from roughly 1880 to 1930 
(Belew, 2014: 84). As W. Fitzhugh Brundage identifies in the cases of Georgia and 
Virginia over this period, lynchings took four broad forms, differing in size, motivation 
and intersection with the law (Brundage, 1993: 18-19). While mass mob lynchings were 
a common form from the 1900s to 1930, smaller terrorist lynchings defending 'moral 
propriety' or economic interests (eg. late-night 'Klu-Kluxers') were not unheard of (ibid: 
19-28). Private secretive mobs punishing alleged criminal offences were the dominant 
form of lynching in the 1880s and remained significant throughout the 1890s to 1920s 
(accounting for the majority of Virginia lynchings from 1990 to 1920), regaining 
dominance in subsequent decades as lynching declined overall (ibid: 28-33). Both 
terrorist and private lynchings enjoyed varying, often ambiguous communal support, 
their legitimacy tested by the tensions they created among communities over their fit 
with prevailing values.
Secondly, this focus on the spectacle lynching has emphasised and elasticated the
lynching perpetrator's intent and perspective in order to judge communal sympathies 
for such violence. Lynching's performative and ritualistic qualities have been theorised 
as interpellating local and regional white supremacist-based support, paralleling 
perpetrators' own understandings (Wood, 2009: 19-44). The above context 
demonstrates, however, that such sympathies cannot be assumed: as Brundage notes of 
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the small secretive events that comprised half of all lynchings in Georgia and Virginia, 
whatever communal sentiments these mobs thought their actions reflected, such covert 
lynchings “could not, in any meaningful way, serve as vehicles to reaffirm widely held 
social values”, being conducted out of the public eye (Brundage, 1993: 32, emphasis 
added). Such lynchings forswore the ritualistic and 'performance' elements of their 
public spectacle counterpart, elements whose witnessing lent lynchings credence as 
enactments of social justice, distinguishing them for witnesses from unseen covert 
vigilantism (Wood, 2009: 43). Without those elements, it cannot be assumed that these 
acts of violence prompted witnesses to legitimise them: not directly, because there were 
often no witnesses present; and not indirectly, because public documentation or 
rationalisation by the perpetrators after-the-fact was lacking, replaced with more 
ambivalent reactions claiming to speak for 'the community'. As Bruce Baker notes, the 
mediated witnessing of lynching should not be analysed from the crude presumption 
that spectacle lynchings saturated the national media environment; nor should the social
influence of speculative knowledge of more secretive lynchings be overlooked (Baker, 
2004). Acknowledging the contingency of mediated witnessing here means 
acknowledging “how varied and complex were the debates about lynching at the turn of 
the nineteenth century”, with public discourse encompassing those who saw themselves 
as looking at lynching practice and culture from the outside; they may not necessarily 
have been prompted to identify with lynching's perpetrators (Goldsby, 2006: 20).
These two issues with lynching scholarship's focus on mass mob violence raise 
the question of lynching's representational power, of how that power operated in the 
public sphere, beyond the spectating crowds of the public lynching. As the above 
discussion indicates, this speaks to the possibility of representational dynamics that 
exceeded a binary of assent and dissent towards lynching, echoing this Introduction's 
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argument regarding research on war, covert action and media representations. As 
subsequent chapters detail, this question of lynching's public resonance has prompted 
recent research on national representations of the practice in the United States, 
analysing first how lynching was made comprehensible for populations outside those 
local communities who were much more likely to witness them first-hand; and second, 
how public discourse shaped particular ethical orientations towards a practice which 
was often conducted in secret, and whose enactment was not performed or documented
for the wider populace. How did the covertness of so many lynchings shape national 
discourse around the practice? And what was the significance of the public absence of 
any spectacle in relation to these lynchings, of any documentation of the violence and 
the violated bodies at their centre?
In addressing these aspects of lynching practice, recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that lynching was not solely represented in public discourse as a spectacle
of white supremacy, and did not need to gain social significance as such a spectacle to 
nonetheless prompt understandings and affects that unwittingly allowed the practice to 
persist, above and beyond perpetrators' rationales (ibid). The complex representational 
dynamics of lynching in national discourse, and the roles of secrecy and absence in 
those dynamics, suggest representational connections with contemporary covert action 
as a basis for analysing the latter. As subsequent chapters will argue, dynamics of 
absence in national portrayals of lynching link the practice to representations of covert 
counter-terrorism that include similar absences, of documented violence and violated 
bodies. With that link established, recent research on lynching's representational 
dynamics can be used to elucidate the possibility of similar dynamics in public discourse
around drone strikes, kill/capture operations and manhunts, dynamics that may be 
more obscured in the latter case but which this affiliation can highlight. These dynamics
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in the public life of lynching speak not to assent or dissent, but to the possibility of more
complicated subject-positions; in this way, lynching scholarship can expand our 
understanding of what it might mean to ethically witness covert warfare.
The linking of violence from different times and places on the basis of 
representational similarities, and the use of that link to analyse inconspicuous 
representational dynamics, is conceptualised here as a method of historical affiliation. In
formulating this method, the thesis draws on the work of and on the prose writer W.G. 
Sebald. Over the past fifteen years, interpretive scholarship in International Relations 
has increasingly examined how representational practices outside the realm of 'high 
politics', from art to popular culture, shape the political world. This scholarship has also 
asked how international politics can be examined with reference to the full range of 
human sensory and imaginative faculties (Bleiker, 2001). Beyond examining artworks, 
then, this line of research has explored how aesthetic objects and practices, and our 
sensory encounters with them, can contribute to interpretive theory, method and 
analysis, how they can broaden “our interpretative repertoire” and shape a new “model 
of thought” interweaving “discordant faculties” (ibid: 519). Yet as Cerwyn Moore and 
Laura Shepherd have noted, this research agenda has failed to fully engage with long-
standing work in aesthetics and literary theory that examines strategies of 
interpretation embodied in artworks and acknowledges the multiplicity of meaning to 
be derived from them, depending on how they are contextualised (Moore and Shepherd,
2010: 302-5). Moore and Shepherd call for IR research to re-engage “interdisciplinary 
approaches” in order to derive “radical accounts of meaning linked to aesthetics” (ibid: 
304). Such radical accounts include “intuitive and imaginary accounts of epistemology”, 
forged through attention to how artworks can imaginatively engage those who 
encounter them (ibid: 308).
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This thesis embraces the call for IR to explore how cultural artefacts, through 
their prompting imaginative engagement, offer new ways of reading the international. 
The thesis uses the prose fiction of W.G. Sebald, and analysis of his work in literary 
studies, to formulate a qualitative method of analysing representations of unseen 
violence; this method derives from what scholarship points to as imaginative reading 
practices produced by Sebald's narratives. Sebald's fictional narratives propose, by 
example, that seemingly disparate and dissimilar forms of violence can nonetheless be 
understood on the basis of shared qualities in their public remainders, in what the 
violence leaves behind in the public sphere. These narratives centre on solitary 
wandering characters preoccupied with violent past events, both personal and historic, 
and their imprint on contemporary landscapes and memories: from ruins of natural and
human destruction, to unclear and ambiguous accounts of history, to suppressed mental
images and dreams of trauma. It is generally accepted that these digressive narratives 
are concerned with the irretrievability of the violent past, the inability to know and 
understand what has happened, and the effect of the past on the present through that 
very opacity. Throughout their travels, Sebald's narrators restlessly repeat their own or 
others' stories, living and dead, and gather up documentation of the violence of the past; 
but this gathering and repetition fails to make events any more comprehensible, or to 
reveal what the past was really like for those who lived it (Kochhar-Lindgren, 2002: 
377). As the narrator of The Rings of Saturn, the prose work which this thesis draws on, 
puts it:
Whenever a shift in our spiritual life occurs and fragments such as these surface, 
we believe we can remember. But in reality, of course, memory fails us. Too many 
buildings have fallen down, too much rubble has been heaped up, the moraines and
deposits are insuperable. (Sebald, 2002: 177)
In this sense, “Sebald's central subject” is the question of how to “[remain] 
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faithful to an irrecuperable past” through the nonetheless “'hopeless' endeavour” of 
“representation” (Ceuppens, 2004: 191-2). As the above quote indicates, Sebald connects
the irretrievability of the past with natural decay and human material destruction over 
time, with fallen buildings and ever-piling rubble. Yet his narratives' focus on such 
traces of past events suggests that there is worth to sifting through this rubble. Despite 
the seemingly aimless wandering within Sebald's narratives – characters frequently get 
lost, digress from their intended route, or are unable to explain why they are drawn to 
places (Long, 2011) – these accumulated, often chance, encounters with physical 
remains or clouded memories slowly offer an awareness of how past violence impacts 
on present environments and social relations. Such encounters allow characters to 
discern hidden histories of violence embodied in objects, landscapes and people, even if 
those histories remain opaque; they allow for a “fragile and fleeting... surfacing of what 
resembles the truth about the past and its repetition in other forms in the present” (Arnds, 
2010: 341, emphasis added). The revelation here is not of the details and experiences 
buried in the past, but of the lost past's imprints on the present.
One aspect of this repetition in other forms, indicated throughout Sebald's 
narratives, is the mutual echoing of disparate forms of violence through their remains. 
In randomly encountering traces of violence, Sebald's narrators either consciously or 
inadvertently highlight representational similarities in acts of violence that could not 
appear more different in their motivations and mechanisms. In the course of their 
travels, narrators frequently detail myriad connections between places and events that 
are not immediately obvious in the present context. Barbara Hui likens Sebald's 
narrative strategy to the geographer Doreen Massey's concept of place, which defines 
the local as “a social dynamic entity that owes its particularity to its location in a larger 
global network of places”; Sebald thereby writes “local histor[ies] that [are] global in 
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scope”, with narratives jumping from characters' situations to many other times and 
places (Hui, 2010: 279, 283).
But in making such global connections, these narratives register the limits of 
rationalist approaches to history, represented by the irrecuperability of the past. Sebald's
narrators often cannot explain why local people and places remind them of other events
and times which they nonetheless go on to detail. These narrative transitions of 
apparent randomness and digression are acts of “sewing” together “ruptures between 
seemingly disintegrative elements” and exploiting latent coincidences and parallels 
revealed through them (Gray, 2009: 44). In this way, the “aimless wandering” of Sebald's 
characters is narrated as “dissolving the linearity of time”, as revealing different traces of
violence in the landscape and associating them on the basis of coincidence (Arnds, 2010:
336-7). Indeed, Sebald sometimes invented unexplained connections in order to then 
discuss events (Smith, 2017). By making these spatio-temporal leaps, his narratives 
adopt a “portrayal of history... that is cyclical and filled with uncanny repetitions”, which
“purely rationalist conceptions” of history would not consider (Hui, 2010: 296, 291). 
This repetitiveness of the history of violence is embodied in the public traces, from 
ruins to memories, of violence that has not been witnessed (or has been repressed) by 
Sebald's narrators. “[U]nexpected conjunctions of spaces and times” are made on the 
basis of these traces' present constitution as traces – including their partiality and 
fragmentation, their “wearing-down” – rather than any certain details of what took 
place in the past (Kochhar-Lindgren, 2002: 379).
In Sebald's fiction, these associations through digression and coincidence 
represent a way to ethically approach unseen violence without presuming that one need,
or can, access either the objective truth of events or the subjective experiences of those 
involved. As Michael Hutchins argues, Sebald forgoes positing causal relationships 
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between events (except through playful invention), out of fear that to make such claims 
risks objectifying and instrumentalising the natural world for human manipulation. 
Instead, Sebald “set[s] up historical connections that are impossibly improbable, non-
formulaic and non-causal in their relationships”, juxtaposing events in order to 
“discover meaningful, non-causal connections across time and space” that would 
otherwise remain unapparent (Hutchins, 2011: 59, 55). The aim is to “mak[e] sense of 
the world through the use of coincidence”, through “willed association” (ibid: 58, 38). To
echo Ceuppen's language, this making-sense remains faithful to the irrecuperable past 
precisely by accepting that any representation of the past is hopeless and moreover 
dangerous, in that it risks codifying narratives of history that claim objectivity and so 
efface people and events. By conceptualising the history of violence as repetitious, 
Sebald suggests that any narrative of history as a singular and linear progression “shears 
off certain events” that do not fit that narrative, producing “an excess”. The aim of 
Sebald's narrative strategies, from repetition to digression, is not to reincorporate that 
excess and produce a 'more complete' narrative of history, but to demonstrate how the 
traces of excess events unsettle and “fragment” any linear narrative, by prompting an 
experience of that fragmentation in readers (Joldersma, 2014: 138-9, 143-4).
This fragmentation of linear history is an alternative act of witnessing towards 
irrecuperable violence. The incongruous digressions and associations of Sebald's 
narratives, the “sorting” and “layering” that enacts “a simultaneity of space-times” 
(Kochhar-Lindgren, 2002: 372), prompt a recognition of the shearing off that results 
from linear historical accounts of violence. Thus the digressive travels of Sebald's 
characters suggest that “witnessing, or bearing witness, is always in some way a 
repetition without a final word: the narrator is no more able to turn the stories into a 
final statement than are the other characters” (Ceuppens, 2004: 191). Through the 
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coincidental associations that defer this 'final word', the act of witnessing is reoriented 
from the violence itself to its public traces and their discursive dynamics in the present: 
how the people and events behind those traces are effaced in representations of 
violence, even as those traces shape present landscapes and experiences. Sebald thus 
circumvents the ethical dilemmas associated with attempts to recognise subjectivities, 
and with claiming mastery over nature through linear narratives, and asserts the ethical 
value of instead exploring the possibility of non-causal historical connections between 
events (Hutchins, 2011: 58-9).  Tracing representational echoes of violence emerges as a 
more ethical relationship towards violence than any attempt at witnessing the unseen 
events and suffering themselves.
This is the ethico-political rationale for associating vastly different violence that 
the thesis builds upon in linking lynching with covert counter-terrorism. When 
confronted with rumours and debris of counter-terrorism that provide no access to 
'what really happened', the disruption of linear time and the use of coincidence 
embodied in Sebald's fiction can circumvent the problem of witnessing this violence, 
and insodoing can reframe the question of an ethical orientation towards the residue of 
unseen events. In this thesis, I use an example of Sebald's willed association from The 
Rings of Saturn to formulate a qualitative method of analysing representations of the 
traces of unseen violence, which I call historical affiliation. As detailed in chapter two, 
this affiliation stays with the existence of traces as traces, and uses juxtaposition to 
analyse how the absent bodies and objects that are hinted at in these traces are implicitly
represented in ways that may go unnoticed because not explicitly articulated. The above
discussion predicts not just the use of this method throughout the thesis, but the 
argument in the Conclusion that affiliation can point towards a more ethical witnessing 
of covert violence today.
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Chapter outline
The thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter examines previous scholarly attempts 
to theorise the role of state secrecy in shaping public representations of covert action. 
This previous work has focused both on Cold War portrayals of covert operations and 
representational practices during the last decade-and-a-half of the so-called War on 
Terror. By identifying the presumptions made by this scholarship, the chapter argues 
that this work has conceptualised state secrecy as something whose public existence is 
instigated and shaped solely by the state – that state secrecy materialises and becomes 
recognisable in that sphere when and how the state wants it to. This presumption 
supports a second made by this literature: that representations of covert action foster 
public assent towards state violence, by prompting the public to understand these 
operations in ways consistent with their state rationale. State secrecy is presumed to 
prompt understandings of covert action as exceptionalist state actions justified by the 
barbarism of its terrorist targets, with that secrecy signified through state articulations 
to the public and glimpses of covert agents in action.
The chapter uses an example of contemporary representations of covert action 
to argue that these two presumptions are no longer valid: covert counter-terrorism is 
represented today not through state declarations and glimpses of operations, but 
through markers of these operations' aftermaths which are contextualised by silence 
from the state. The secrecy that is produced by these representational practices is 
therefore one which is not instigated and controlled by the state – it is signified as a 
mere suspicion through the rumours and debris of posited actions. The chapter uses this
different kind of public or open secrecy to argue that representations of contemporary 
covert action are unlikely to foster public assent towards state violence. Instead, they are
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more likely to shape subject-positions that are closer to acquiescence, whereby covert 
action is made meaningful in terms of ambiguities that stem from the lack of a state 
rationale for that covertness. These ambiguities undermine assent by placing the covert 
power and capabilities of the state in doubt, but insodoing they represent covert 
counter-terrorism as enigmatic.
The second chapter complements the previous one by examining whether the 
rumours and debris of covert violence might produce meaning that goes beyond this 
enigmatic quality and the issue of a rationale for secrecy. Answering this question 
means turning from secrecy to absence. Contemporary covert operations are 
represented in public through things left in their wake which signify that those 
operations have passed unseen – from rumours and speculation around what exactly 
might have happened to material and less-than-material debris apparently left at the site
of these operations. The chapter theorises these markers as residue, traces of covert 
events that signify those events have passed unseen. Using an extended comparison of 
two aesthetically-similar images of state violence – an Israeli air strike in Gaza and a 
drone strike in Yemen – the chapter examines what distinguishes residue from other 
representational markers of seemingly similar events. Based on these representational 
differences, the chapter argues that residue materialises absence in the public sphere, by 
signifying that not everything about these covert operations is present or apparent in 
their aftermath. When framed by a suspicion of secrecy, as discussed in the first chapter,
residue and its absences are represented as significant in having not been secreted.
Framed in this way, the absences within residue can signify not just a lack but 
rather suggestive ideas about that which is absent. These unverifiable possibilities shape 
ethical orientations that go beyond acquiescence. The chapter draws on recent colonial 
historiography to theorise these implicit significations as intimations, which exceed and 
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reshape the meanings produced by the explicit articulations within representations. In 
order to better understand how those meanings shape ethical orientations towards 
absent people, the chapter introduces an historical affiliation between contemporary 
covert counter-terrorism and lynching practice in the United States in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, based on their shared representational 
dynamics of absence and a distancing from wider society. This affiliation is offered as a 
way of exploring how representations position absent people and objects as more or less
relevant to the portrayed significance of this violence. As the subsequent chapters 
demonstrate, this historical affiliation can reveal representational dynamics which 
otherwise would go unnoticed.
The third chapter uses the theoretical and methodological tools developed in the
opening two chapters to examine U.S. and British press and social media 
representations of covert drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia from 2011 to 
2015. The chapter first examines the previous literature on drone strikes, arguing that 
by locating the ontology of drone warfare within the materials and practices that the 
state uses to enact strikes, this literature has neglected the public existence of strikes, the
role of secrecy in shaping that existence, and the spaces and identities which materialise 
as a result. The chapter argues that the residue of covert strikes – from rumours about 
their operating procedures to the smoke and rubble left in their wake – signifies a 
suspicion of secrecy which allows this residue to intimate ideas about absent people and 
objects, in particular the possibility that the identities of casualties may be secreted or 
remain unknown. These intimations undermine the state's abstracted rationalisation of 
'targeted killing', but insodoing they implicitly represent strikes as ephemeral, as events 
that are ongoing but are simply too fleeting and too insubstantial in their public 
footprint to be understood and scrutinised. This representation produces an ethical 
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orientation similar to that towards lynching a century earlier, one focused on the 
struggle to comprehend the confounding dynamics of unseen violence. This orientation 
marginalises the violence inflicted upon casualties, with those casualties intimated as 
worthy of consideration only in reflecting the intangibility of strikes.
The fourth chapter turns to U.S. and British press coverage of the U.S. Navy 
Seals raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on the compound of Osama bin Laden. Previous 
scholarship of the raid has argued that its public representation fostered public assent 
towards the killing of bin Laden. Yet this scholarship has failed to examine the 
importance that secrecy played in the public portrayal and discussion of the raid, 
particularly around the U.S.'s decision not to release documentation of the raid and of 
bin Laden's mortally wounded body. To explore this dynamic, the chapter assesses 
previous IR literature on a parallel between photographs of torture at Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq and lynching photographs. While this parallel is based on the visualisation
of mutilated bodies, the chapter argues that a different parallel can be based on the 
secretion of those bodies, since images of lynch victims were rarely disseminated 
nationally in the United States. The secretion of those images among lynching 
perpetrators and sympathetic communities signified who had the power to see and 
control the meaning of violated bodies. The secretion of images of bin Laden's corpse 
seemed similarly designed to control the meaning of his death, but the 
acknowledgement of that act allowed it to circulate alongside other residue of the raid 
which either remained ambiguous or was not contextualised by the state. That residue 
intimated unverifiable ideas about the raid and that bin Laden's body was being kept 
hidden precisely in order to avoid these possibilities entering the public sphere. Framed 
as such, the state narratives for the raid lost their representational power. This implicit 
representation of covert violence, however, shaped a narrow and self-absorbed ethical 
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orientation towards that violence, positioning the event as discomforting because of 
what the hiding of bin Laden's body might suggest about the significance of the raid for 
a collective counter-terrorist identity.
The fifth chapter analyses press coverage of U.S. and other states' secretive 
responses to the kidnapping of workers and tourists in the Sahara-Sahel by Islamist 
terrorists over the past few years. These operations appear to leave little residue in their 
wake aside from rumours and speculation as to what has happened, along with opaque 
material traces. These rumours, however, are contextualised by references to the 
landscape of the Sahara and Sahel regions. The chapter therefore extends the historical 
affiliation with lynching by detailing how the meanings attached to rural hanging 
lynchings were shaped by representations of the natural landscapes where they took 
place. Characteristics of the landscape figuratively and materially overlapped markers of
lynching violence, giving that violence meaning in a way which foreclosed 
consideration of its wider social context, while also allowing the landscape to embody 
that violence. The chapter argues that a similar dynamic takes place in representations 
of rescue efforts and manhunts in the Sahara-Sahel. Rumours of these operations 
implicitly signify that claims around these events can neither be proved nor disproved. 
These rumours accompany representations of the Saharan and Sahelian landscapes as 
vast, undifferentiated and barren, signifying the absence of substantial residue. Through
these characteristics, those landscapes come to signify and embody that ambiguity of 
knowledge. When framed by a suspicion of secrecy, those landscapes and the absences 
that they materialise are made suggestive, intimating the unverifiable idea that covert 
counter-terrorism is ongoing in this region but is being kept hidden by the terrain and 
texture of the Sahara-Sahel. This intimation defines these operations by a paradox: that 
seemingly empty landscapes might be complicit in the secretion of rumoured 
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operations. This shapes an ethical orientation focused on this unverifiable possibility, 
defining violence by its surroundings which, as with rural lynchings, marginalises any 
wider socio-political context.
The Conclusion begins by examining recent residue that has emerged in the 
public sphere around the rendition and detention programme that was formalised after 
11 September 2001. This is a programme that has become defined in public discourse 
through iconic images of prisoners in orange jumpsuits at Guantánamo Bay and 
detainees being tortured at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In contrast to these images, the 
recent residue of this programme intimates meanings that go beyond the demonisation 
and dehumanisation of victims of this U.S. and British policy. The Conclusion details 
some of this residue in order to argue for the need to beyond the extremities of covert 
counter-terrorism violence in order to formulate an ethical witnessing of that violence. 
While iconic glimpses of detention and torture at 'black sites' have defined the dilemma 
of ethical witnessing in terms of responding to suffering, the residue analysed 
throughout the thesis provides no such glimpse and thus shifts the stakes of that 
witnessing. This provides the final part of the historical affiliation with lynching: as with
that violent practice, an analytical focus on the extremities risks narrowly defining the 
violence and neglecting how its dynamics are perpetuated by an understanding of it as 
distanced from wider society. Ethical responsiveness to covert counter-terrorism must 
therefore be decoupled from responding to suffering. Not only is such suffering not 
present in the residue left in the public sphere, but an analytic that equates ethics with 
recognition is based on the idea that casualties are being dehumanised in public 
representations of this violence. This neglects the fact that, as previous chapters 
demonstrate, a state rationalisation of this violence is undermined by intimations from 
residue. Resistance to state frames of meaning is inadequate for ethical witnessing of 
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residue.
Just as the presumption behind recognising suffering is flawed, so too is the 
analytic which is forwarded to provide that recognition. This is an analytic of recovery, 
of reclaiming suffering subjectivities from the absences in these representations of 
unseen violence. Rather than try to fill in absence in this way, an ethical response to 
residue would scrutinise how those absences, and the people that they refer to, are 
implicitly given meaning by representations of residue in ways which go unnoticed 
because not explicitly stated. It is this meaning-making which shapes an ethical 
orientation towards covert counter-terrorism that marginalises consideration of the 
violence in-and-of-itself. Ethics need not involve knowledge of and an affective 
response to suffering, but can be based on self-awareness, an awareness of how 
witnesses are prompted by the rumours and debris of violence to understand absent 
people and objects as meaningful and significant. In this case, that self-awareness would 
scrutinise the positioning of witnesses as distanced from these operations, rather than 
connected to them through encounters with residue which shape their meaning. The 
Conclusion argues that an historical affiliation with lynching is precisely one way in 




State secrecy and public assent: Past and present 
representations of covert action
It is striking how much contemporary counter-terrorism is openly characterised in 
covert terms. As combat operations have officially wound down in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, public discourse has shifted to an array of secretive state activities 
portrayed as the new major theatres of violent U.S. foreign policy. The CIA programme 
of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones – in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere – is 
frequently described as a “covert programme” that represents “the next phase in the so-
called “war on terror”” (Reprieve, 2015), a programme that epitomises “Barack Obama's 
secret war on terror” (Woods, 2012). Elsewhere there is talk of a “shadow war” of 
'capture/kill operations' carried out by U.S. Special Forces in different countries (Kelley,
2013), of a “covert war in North Africa” against terrorists and hostage-takers that 
involves “[s]mall teams of special operations forces” (Dozier, 2012), and collated 
evidence of a “covert 'war on terror'” in Somalia involving “surveillance, reconnaissance,
and assault and capture operations” (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2015). 
Regardless of the novelty or otherwise of these operations under the Obama 
administration (Jackson, 2011; Ryan, 2011), public discourse in the U.S. and other states 
linked to this action has become saturated with notions of secret state violence, this 
following a period when more overt warfare was seen as the most significant of 
counter-terrorism efforts.
The above references to U.S. counter-terrorism demonstrate a point made in the
Introduction: that secrecy and publicity can overlap, with secrecy being signified and 
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given its own characteristics such that it shapes the representation of foreign policy as 
secret. If the aim of this thesis is to examine how characterisations of secrecy shape these 
portrayals – and how secrecy then interacts with absences in those portrayals – what is 
first needed is a theorisation of how secrecy overlaps publicity, how it becomes a part of
public discourse. The secrecy studied in the following chapters, however, is secrecy of 
the state; the ability to analyse the representational dynamics of covertness will 
therefore depend on how covertness is theorised in relation to the state. This not only 
prepares the ground for the analysis to come, but develops a wider argument about the 
supposed hegemony of states' discourses around their own violence. As noted in the 
Introduction, much of the critical scholarship on security politics presumes that the 
state's rationalisation of its counter-terrorism pre-conditions public discourse and thus 
the interpellation of citizens. The present chapter develops a critique of this 
presumption that the shaping of subject-positions towards state violence is necessarily a
hegemonic imposition. It does so by arguing that the secrecy of contemporary counter-
terrorism rubs against one of the conceptual bases of this critical presumption: that 
subject-positions are produced necessarily as a result of an address made by one subject 
to another, from the state to the public.
To develop this argument, the chapter assesses the previous critical literature on 
the representational dynamics of state secrecy, and the role of that secrecy in shaping 
subject-positions towards covert action. Previous scholarship correctly identifies covert
action as something that often exists as an open secret, with representations being 
shaped not just by the idea of secrecy but by ideas as to what is being kept hidden. 
However, this literature has concluded that such open secrets necessarily prompt public 
assent towards covert action. The chapter unpacks the conceptual presumptions that 
lead to this conclusion. Recent theoretical work on state secrecy has taken the discursive
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existence of that secrecy – its representation in public discourse – to be instigated and 
determined by the state itself. It is the state which is thought to produce state secrecy in 
the public sphere, with any role played by secrecy in public discourse therefore 
reflecting state decisions or intentions and signifying the state's power, its being able to 
carry out activities away from the public eye. This link between secrecy and the state 
lays the foundation for a particular theory of covert operations, as the chapter 
demonstrates through an analysis of literature on covert action representations. The 
representation of covertness has been theorised as prompting the public to view covert 
violence on the same terms as its perpetrators, to accept a discursive framework of the 
rationale and identities of covert action which are implied by the violence and its 
covertness. Since state secrecy is what prompts the adoption of this framework, state 
secrecy is therefore theorised as interpellating public assent, perpetuating a binary 
assent-dissent conception of the public's positioning towards state violence.
By excavating these two presumptions from previous scholarship – of secrecy as
a state instrument and of covertness as aligning the witness' gaze with covert action's 
perpetrators – the chapter argues that this theory of state secrecy relies on the latter 
being produced by two things: state invocations, explicit or implicit, that it is carrying 
out certain activities, and glimpses of those activities. The combination of these two 
things is what articulates that not everything is being publicly revealed about state 
activities. Using the example of a 2014 drone strike in Pakistan, the chapter argues that 
representations of contemporary covert counter-terrorism cannot fit into the above 
model of public assent because state secrecy is not being produced in the same way: 
neither state invocations nor glimpses of covert violence are present. Instead, a 
combination of state silence and markers of operations' remainders or after-effects 
signify secrecy as a mere suspicion. This suspicion of secrecy does not prompt witnesses 
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of state silence and the aftermath of violence to view covert operations through a 
discursive framework matching that of the state: while a state rationale for counter-
terrorism might be articulated in the abstract within public discourse, a state rationale 
for the suspected covertness of operations such as this drone strike in Pakistan is not 
addressed or implied to the public. Such operations are therefore unlikely to interpellate
public assent towards that use of covertness.
Instead of shaping complicity with a state rationale, these representations 
prompt witnesses to focus on the uncertain and ambiguous details of these unseen 
operations, implicitly signifying questions over the aims and capabilities of the state. 
This raises the challenge of conceptualising subject-positions towards covert violence 
that go beyond assent and dissent: for while assent is undermined in this case, the 
chapter argues that the seemingly enigmatic traces of unseen covert events are likely to 
prompt a focus on that enigmatic quality, at the expense of fostering dissent or a 
contesting of the violence itself. This suggests that ethical witnessing here may hinge on 
how that enigmatic quality of covert action's traces is made intelligible to witnesses. 
This question of meaning-making is developed in the following chapter, which 
theorises how a suspicion of secrecy shapes the meaning of absences within the rumours 
and debris of covert events; this interaction of secrecy and absence produces subject-
positions that exceed a simple focus on the inscrutable. The present chapter first 
demonstrates, however, that what is at stake in examining covert counter-terrorism is 
how secrecy is conceptualised in relation to the state: whether state secrecy is thought to
be discursively owned by the state, or whether it can exist in public discourse outside 
state decisions and articulations, and thus challenge an understanding of interpellation 
as a matter of assenting to or dissenting from a state address.
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The open secret of covert action
Despite their being ostensibly hidden by the state from the public, covert operations 
have a long history of being publicly-represented in different forms. From news media 
accounts to popular ‘spycraft’ novels to spectacular Hollywood films and immersive 
computer games, the public has been presented with detailed and visceral 
understandings of what counter-terrorist covert action is actually like, both during the 
Cold War (Rogin, 1990) and in the post-9/11 period (Ingram and Dodds, 2011). This 
representational depth demonstrates the peculiar discursive existence of covert 
operations: their being phenomena that are both hidden and visible. These operations 
constitute official state secrets: they are rarely admitted to publicly by the state, nor are 
details of individual operations officially made available for public consumption. And 
yet covert counter-terrorism is far from unknown: their general existence is part of 
public discourse and characterisations of these kind of operations do circulate in, and 
thus materialise the norms and limits of, the public sphere. While drone strikes and 
kill/capture operations are not broadcast or documented for public consumption, 
public discourse does include details of what drones and special forces operatives are 
like, their objectives, how operations are conducted, and that these are ongoing out of 
the public eye.
In one respect, this curious discursive existence of covert action reflects the 
more general existence of secrets. For a secret to be produced in public discourse, it is 
not enough for an actor to hold knowledge that others do not possess; that inequality of 
knowledge must be articulated, along with the indication that the contents of the secret 
will not be disclosed to those others (Blakely 2012, 49). This understanding of how 
secrecy operates in the public sphere is a first step towards conceptualising state 
secrecy's representational dynamics. The signification that a secret is being held 
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produces what has been called a secrecy effect, an awareness of a social relation between
those who are in the know and those who are not (Derrida, 1994: 245-6). But the kind of
public knowledge percolating around contemporary covert operations is not simply the 
knowledge that a secret is being held; it is somewhat-unverifiable knowledge about the 
contents of the supposed secret.
Covert state practices whose contents are suggestively detailed in the public 
sphere exist as public or open secrets, things which are generally known but cannot be 
easily articulated, owing in this case to the secrecy surrounding them and the indefinite 
nature of the details circulating about them (Taussig, 1999: 7-8). In elaborating upon 
this notion, Clare Birchall conceptualises the ‘known unknown’ of the open secret as 
that whereby the “withholding, obfuscation and opacity” which maintains the secret 
becomes part of a representational phenomenon. This representation articulates 
something as secret but signifies its characteristics other than 'being secret' as either 
unknown or unverifiable – its contents are represented as “that which everybody 
unofficially knows or suspects, but proof (and therefore knowledge) of which remains 
elusive” (Birchall, 2014: 33). Gargi Bhattacharyya theorises this open secrecy specifically
in relation to covert state violence, positing open secrets as actions and events whose 
general existence is known but whose specificities remain largely hidden, with the 
public only having access to “almost-knowledge”, that is, to “knowledge [about these 
events] that resists substantiation”. This representation of covert operations through 
open secrecy results in “an imaginary space in which a global public can surmise what 
may occur but cannot verify through official sources” (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 112, 59). 
Birchall characterises this as an interpellative state of “know[ing] and not know[ing] at 
the same time”, a representation of “knowledge’s fallibility and accommodation of its 
lack” (Birchall, 2014: 34). Open secrets are therefore events or actions which, while 
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portrayed as being kept hidden by state elites, nevertheless exist in the public sphere in 
the form of suggestive and unverifiable snippets of information about what is being kept
hidden.
To say that a representation is of an open secret is to say that this representation 
is likely to be understood as a suggestive snippet of a state secret, of a violent practice 
that remains largely hidden. Open secrets are things which indicate their own partiality.
Secrecy as a state instrument
While an open secret may rely upon the signification of a social relation between those 
in the know and those out of it, recent theoretical writings on state secrecy have 
concluded that this signification is necessarily one articulated by the state which holds 
the secret. This analytic of state secrecy uses the social relation between the state and 
the public as the basis for conceptualising the representational dynamics of state 
secrecy, and consequently delimits those dynamics to secrecy's instrumental use by the 
state. While IR and cultural studies scholarship has increasingly acknowledged that 
secrecy need not delimit representations of state practices but can actually shape them 
by becoming part of those portrayals (eg. Birchall, 2014; Walters, 2015; Anaïs and 
Walby, 2016), attempts to theorise state secrecy have gone further by positing a 
conceptual link between the state and the secrecy that surrounds its practices, theorising 
state secrecy through the notion of state strategy. This notion leads to a narrow 
conceptualisation of the public dynamics of state secrecy, as being instigated and 
determined by the state in order to support its covert activities. This is despite the fact 
that the question of state secrecy's political rationale is distinct from that of its 
representational dynamics; the two may co-align but it is not a necessity within any 
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representation.
One notable line of thinking on state secrecy after 11 September 2001 stems 
from Jack Bratich, who theorises state secrecy as being signified and scrutinised in the 
public sphere such that it continues to mystify the covert operations under its purview 
(Bratich, 2006; see also Perkins and Dodge, 2009; Paglen, 2010). Knowledge and details 
of the existence of covert action – the kind of snippets that turn these operations into 
open secrets – percolate the public sphere but these snippets' representation of 
operations only seems to further confuse public understanding of such action. Bratich 
characterises this public performance of secrecy as a matter of turning “[r]evelations” of 
the existence of covert action into “a strategy of public perception management”, one 
that “renew[s] the power of the spectacle as it appropriates the powers of secrecy for 
itself” (Bratich, 2006: 498, emphases added). In speaking of revelations of secrets as a 
public perception strategy, Bratich traces secrecy's representational dynamics back to 
the state, as that which reveals secrets in an equivocal or ambiguous manner and uses 
that representational power to restrict the interpellative possibilities of the public. By 
conceptualising secrecy as “a tool of governing” that is “put... in circulation” solely when 
“deployed as strategy by the state”, Bratich delimits the representational dynamics 
associated with a “'making visible' of secrecy” to those that act as “a way of short-
circuiting critique” (ibid: 501, 496). The representational dynamics of state secrecy are 
restricted to only those likely intended by the state itself as a means to stymie critique of
covert action.
A second recent theorisation by Eva Horn echoes this restriction. Horn 
differentiates between two 'political logics' of secrecy, two ways that the “withdrawal 
from knowledge, communication and debate” can “be enacted” by a political actor (Horn,
2011: 108, emphasis added). The first is the logic of 'arcanum', where state secrecy is 
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produced by keeping state practices “locked away and hidden” from the public for the 
purposes of effective government, opening up an exceptionalist space for state action 
that stabilises state power and so ultimately maintains the rule of law (ibid: 108, 105-6). 
The second is the logic of 'secretum', where secrecy is produced in public discourse 
through “the awareness (or belief or suspicion) that a secret exists”; secrecy is thus 
represented as a relation of “social inclusion and exclusion” between “those who suspect 
and those who are 'supposed to know'” (ibid: 109, emphasis in original). In either case, 
Horn argues, the discursive dynamics of secrecy are produced by the state's withholding
of information. In the logic of arcanum, the state's “technique of silence and 
concealment”, rather than any specific secret, is represented as reflecting “the 
prerogative of power to withhold certain issues from debate, avoid justifications and 
instead take care of issues behind closed doors”; by thus keeping potentially-damaging 
secrets out of the public sphere, the state remains legitimised (ibid: 108, 107). In the 
logic of secretum, where the public suspects a secret, the representation of the state as 
having “the potential for future disclosure” of the secret “constitutes the power that [the 
secret's] holder has over others” (ibid: 109). In Horn's theorisation, then, it is the state's 
act of withholding that instigates and determines state secrecy's role in public discourse,
with secrecy either rationalising state power or nonetheless confirming that power in 
the eyes of the public.
A final significant theorisation of state secrecy has been provided by Joseph 
Masco. Masco argues that the U.S. state has increasingly justified its withholding of 
information about its practices on the grounds that any piece of information, no matter 
how seemingly innocuous, potentially poses a threat to national security once in the 
public sphere, since it could be combined with other bits of information to produce 
dangerous knowledge (Masco, 2010). Masco sees this justification as an extension of the 
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Cold War-era association made by the U.S. between classified information on nuclear 
weapons and apocalyptic consequences, with the state “discursively positioning every 
classified file as potentially an “atomic secret”” (ibid: 443). In the period following 11 
September 2001 this practice has been expanded, with information simply being 
removed from public circulation, rather than officially classified, on the grounds of 
'innocent' data's accumulative threat. Masco argues that the state's discursive 
positioning of information determines secrecy's representational dynamics, with the 
state using “a vast system of secrecy” as “a fully nationalised system of perception 
management and control” (ibid). By “promising catastrophic consequences for... 
revelation” while “classifying the considerations, evidence, and precedents supporting 
such an assertion”, thus denying the public any knowledge of the considered 
consequences of covert action, the state shapes a public subject-position whereby any 
repercussions of covert action in the form of 'blowback' “appear to the U.S. public as 
without context and thus irrational”. This subject-position reiterates identities of an 
inherently violent terrorist enemy and a calm U.S. state “provoked by irrational attacks”
(ibid, 454, 450). Secrecy, once again, is conceptualised as an instrument of state strategy 
whose discursive dynamics are determined by state intent and actions.
In each of these theorisations, the existence of secrecy in public discourse is 
dependent upon the state – secrecy is conceptualised as something addressed by the 
state to the public and which shapes meanings conducive to that state. This 
conceptualisation begs the question of state secrecy's discursive dynamics by presuming 
they necessarily align with the state's political rationale for its secrecy. There is no a 
priori reason why public secrecy should align with state rationales; that depends on how 
state secrecy is represented in public discourse and from where significations of secrecy 
arise. To presume that state secrecy is shaped solely by the state reifies Jodi Dean's claim
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that since secrecy “suggests a world relationships that have been withheld”, “the actual 
contents of a secret are therefore immaterial”, with secrecy being merely “a form that 
can be filled in with all sorts of contents and fantasies” (Dean, 2002: 10, emphases 
added). These theories use the social form of state secrecy – of a state actor withholding 
from others – as the basis for understanding how secrecy produces meaning. From this 
perspective, state secrecy shapes public discourse as part of the state's manipulation of 
the public sphere, and so propagates state hegemony.
Gazing at covert violence: state secrecy and assent
If state secrecy's public existence is a product of its instrumental articulation by the 
state, any part it plays in representations of covert violence will appear designed to 
forward state objectives in some way. Studies of the representation of covert action 
have turned this predisposition into an explicit theory. This scholarship has traced the 
representational dynamics of state secrecy to two elements within portrayals of covert 
operations: first, textual and visual snippets of covert action being carried out, with 
those snippets theorised as providing some minimal, mediated glimpse of the violence; 
and second, the context provided these glimpses by invocations from the state that it is 
carrying out some form of covert action. The combination of these two elements 
signifies that the state is keeping secrets from the public, that not everything about 
covert action is being revealed and that these representations provide the only glimpse 
of what remains a secret. Theories of this covertness echo the scholarship on war and 
media discussed in the Introduction. As demonstrated below, these theories argue that 
state invocations of covertness signify a rationale for the use of that secrecy which gives 
particular meaning to glimpses of covert violence. By providing a rationale for 
covertness when signifying secrecy, the state prompts witnesses to understand these 
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glimpses of covert violence through the same discursive framework as that invoked by 
the perpetrators of these operations. State secrecy therefore makes covert action 
meaningful through the characterisations and identities implied by its enactment. Since 
that secrecy is thought to further state objectives, this scholarship argues that the 
covertness of these operations perpetuates the discursive violence of these events, 
making them meaningful through the very terms that rationalise them; the public thus 
becomes complicit in and assents to state violence.
This representational dynamic of state secrecy takes on different forms 
depending on the time-frame considered. Timothy Melley theorises the secrecy of Cold 
War covert operations as emerging from a combination of official state 
acknowledgements that violent covert action is being hidden from the public and 
glimpses of that violence, in the form of entertainment spectacles of covert agents in 
action. The open secrecy that results is theorised as making covert action tolerable for 
the public by interpellating witnesses into accepting that they should not know about 
those things which are being kept secret. To make this argument, Melley adapts Louis 
Althusser's example of interpellation whereby the subject responds to the policeman 
who shouts “Hey, you there!”, by turning round, thus being 'hailed' into the subject-
position they think is suggested by that shout (Althusser, 1971: 174). In the case of Cold 
War state acknowledgements of covert action, “instead of the subject answering when 
the state says, “Hey, you!”... [the public] close their eyes when the state, “Don't look””. 
Melley calls this subject-position one of “mystified submission” (Melley, 2012: 15).
The public persists in looking away because it has something else to look at, 
namely fantastic fictional narratives centred around heroic covert agents, what Michael 
Rogin calls an “easily forgettable series of surface entertainments – movies, television 
series, political shows”. These entertainment spectacles are signified as glimpses of 
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covert action which allow witnesses to “have the experience” of viewing such operations
without being prompted to consider their real socio-political impacts, since these 
“covert spectacles” are represented as mere theatre – “the reality principle never 
reaches, directly and forcefully, into [the public's] lives (as it did, for example, in the 
1930s depression or the 1960s draft” (Rogin, 1990: 106, 117). The understanding of 
covert ops signified by these fantasies constitutes a particular form of Birchall's 
'knowing and not knowing' that makes those operations an open secret. That these 
fantastical representations of covert action can be dismissed as having no real-world 
consequence is important because they portray covert agents as figures who must usurp 
the law and normal democratic procedures in order to protect these things, and by 
extension the public, from subversive threats to this 'way of life' (Melley, 2012: 210-12). 
These fantasies of covert action fall into a representational tradition of 
countersubversion, where a supposedly subversive threat to one's 'way of life' is 
characterised in demonological terms – as monstrous, barbaric or evil in some sense or 
other – such that tactics which actually mirror this threatening enemy's behaviour are 
justified as necessary (Rogin, 1987: xiii).
It is the representational dynamic of covertness itself which supports this 
narrative of covert violence as a necessary exceptionalism. The state secrecy produced 
in the public sphere by state appeals to look away and fantasies of 'exceptional but 
necessary' covert violence signifies that concrete details of actual covert action are being
kept secret for a reason: so that the public can maintain a separation between its self-
perception as democratic and civilised and any extralegal, unpleasant and uncivilised 
actions of covert agents which might challenge that self-perception. State appeals of 
'Don't look!' and entertainment spectacles of heroic but maverick agents together 
suggest that keeping covert ops secret is in the public's best interests (Melley, 2012: 173-
95
174). The subject-position produced by state secrecy is therefore one from which 
witnesses tolerate covert action as a necessary exceptionalism, so long as they are not 
told the dirty details of operations.
In the case of covert operations during the so-called 'War on Terror' following 
11 September 2001, the state's acknowledgement of covert action has been theorised 
not as a simple invocation not to look, nor are entertainment spectacles of 
exceptionalist heroic agents the only glimpses now provided. Though such glimpses 
continue to be propagated (Brereton and Culloty, 2012), they now compete with 
glimpses of a different kind. In the War on Terror period, the notion that covert action 
is being carried out without public awareness is often conveyed implicitly rather than 
explicitly, as in the case of redacted documents from the Bush administration on 
extraordinary rendition and torture. These documents have been theorised by Conley 
and Saas as articulations of a state acknowledgement of its secrecy: by placing thick 
strips of black ink over parts of the text, or in some cases simply replacing pages of text 
with the notice 'Denied in Full', information is not so much hidden as visibly obscured, 
thus signifying state secrecy in public. In the context of questions over whether 
'enhanced interrogation techniques' constitute torture, these documents have been 
conceptualised as “a mischievous way to admit the inadmissible” regarding these 
techniques, a way for the state to suggest that problematic techniques are being used by 
'passing over' or declining to describe the policy, instead “naming through coyly 
refusing to name” (Conley and Saas, 2010: 331). This redaction acts both as a state 
acknowledgement of secrecy and a suggestion as to the nature of what is being hidden, a
way of implicitly admitting that yes, problematically violent techniques might be being 
used covertly: “when viewing heavily redacted memos one is left wondering what lies 
beneath the smattering of black ink. Left to its own devices, the mind can imagine any 
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number of ghastly deeds so hidden in the dark” (ibid: 341).
This refusal to name and its suggestiveness has been theorised as signifying the 
incontestable way that certain bodies can now be treated by the state – incontestable 
because state secrecy ensures these practices remain unverifiable and their lines of 
accountability muddied. Alongside these refusals to name, covert action is now 
presented to the public not just through entertainment fantasies but through textual and
visual glimpses of actual covert practice, from rendition to detention and torture 
(Peirce, 2012). These glimpses of real covert action are what prompt the imagination of 
Conley and Saas' 'ghastly deeds'. While they are not deliberately relayed by the state, 
nonetheless “[t]here is little attempt to hide what is being done, only to deny culpability” 
(Bhattacharyya, 2008: 121). This denial replaces state acknowledgements of any covert 
practice with mere “affirm[ations]” of “the necessity of extreme measures”, with the state
“never quite admitting to any particular allegation”. Covert practices are “not denied, 
but instead not admitted but justified with reference to our newly dangerous times” in 
terms of the terrorist threat faced (ibid: 140).
Gargi Bhattacharyya conceptualises state secrecy as emerging from this 
combination of state refusals to confirm or deny and glimpses of actual covert practices 
being enacted. The result is a state secrecy which signifies that these glimpses are 
horrifically suggestive but ultimately inconclusive: the lack of state acknowledgement 
and the partiality of glimpses signifies uncertainty over the nature of the covert 
practices portrayed and what remains covered up. The subject-position this produces is 
not one of entertained complacency but paralysed suspicion, with the public “see[ing] 
enough to learn to be terrified at what [they] do not see” and accepting the 
incontestability of the state's treatment of certain bodies (ibid: 59, 113-4). At the same 
time, by suggesting that much of these practices remain covered up or unsubstantiated, 
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state secrecy shapes a subject-position from which covert operations 'make sense' as 
exceptional actions of an uncivilised nature – that this is why they are being kept hidden 
– in contrast to the implicit normal civilised behaviour of the state (ibid: 142-4). 
Witnesses are thus prompted to view glimpses of covert violence from the perspective 
of a horrified, and therefore civilised, counter-terrorist population; meanwhile, “[t]he 
barbarians are those beyond the contract of circulating knowledges” (ibid: 141) – that is,
those who are presumed not to react with such horror.
Theorisations of the representation of covert action therefore take secrecy to be 
produced through a combination of two things: state invocations, explicit or implicit, 
regarding its covert activities and public glimpses, real or fantastical, of those activities. 
This state secrecy frames representations of covert operations such that those 
operations are made meaningful as exceptionalist state actions. In both theorisations, 
state secrecy signifies the power of the state: state invocations and glimpses indicate that
the state has the ability to shape events away from the public eye, and that its counter-
terrorism capabilities and effectiveness stem from this secretion. Thus the state is 
represented as “a quasi-divine being with extraordinary powers”, able to “secretly shape 
history” in “a space safe from social pressure” (Melley 2012: 119, 122).
In order to make these arguments that state secrecy fosters public assent and 
perpetuates state power, the scholarship discussed above implicitly invokes the analytic 
around the representation of war discussed in the Introduction. In this analytic, the 
mediated witnessing of violence makes the witness complicit in discursive violence 
against the represented sufferer. As discussed, this analytic pivots ethical witnessing on 
whether witnesses are prompted to imagine the subjectivity of sufferers through their 
affective response to their suffering. State rationales for its violence, this scholarship 
argues, can prevent this imagining by prompting witnesses to adopt a subject-position 
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paralleling the perpetrators of state violence. By understanding the represented violence
through a state rationale, the witness' perspective is aligned with the perpetrator's 'gaze' 
and the witness reiterates a discursive framework implied by the violence itself. The 
witness sees the violated body as the perpetrator sees it, as de-contextualised evidence 
of a particular social identity and position within society (Alexander, 1994). As Sue Tait 
assesses the theory, this alignment of gazes is presumed to interpellate the public as “a 
participatory spectator in an act intended to terrorize”, with witnesses adopting and 
reiterating the state's rationalisation of its violence (Tait, 2008: 103).
By drawing on this analytic of witnessing and complicity in state violence, these 
theories of covert action representations echo the dominant critical conceptualisation of
interpellation that exists today. Within this model, as detailed by Matthew Lampert, 
subject-positions are produced as a result of an address made by one subject to another: 
in this case, witnesses are confronted with a discourse articulated by the state regarding 
its covert activities and understand themselves as being 'hailed' by that discourse, 
leading them to respond to that imagined address (Lampert, 2015: 130). From this 
perspective, subject-formation or the adopting of subject-positions is always 
conceptualised as subordination to some hegemonic discourse which appears to address
the witness (ibid: 140). The above theories of covert action representations echo this 
model of interpellation as responding to a hail, and so presume the hegemony of state 
discourses. The only difference is that state secrecy is placed at the centre of this 
dynamic. It is state secrecy that aligns the public's understanding with the state 
perpetrator of violence, by signifying the state's apparent rationale for its secrecy – either 
as a way for the public to maintain its civilised self-perception in the face of necessary 
exceptionalism, or as a way to obscure horrific violence which would otherwise 
contradict the 'normal' behaviour of the state. The rationale implied by the state's 
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articulation of secrecy constitutes the hail to which witnesses can respond only by 
assenting to or dissenting from the state's use of covert violence, of accepting or 
rejecting the state's rationalisation.
Given that these theorisations echo a theory of witnessing derived from overt 
violence, however, they sharply foreclose the political dynamics of state secrecy in 
public discourse. Secrecy, and the imaginary of the public sphere which is produced as a 
result, becomes just another way for hegemonic actors to interpellate the public into 
assenting to the former's violent practices. Moreover, this secrecy is a by-product of two
very particular representational characteristics: state invocations and glimpses of state 
violence. The theorisation of these two characteristics together implicitly acknowledges 
that the subject-positions produced by representations of violence depend upon what 
markers of that violence are represented and how they are contextualised; these two 
elements are what shape how witnesses are prompted to understand the representation, 
for instance as either a legitimisation or a condemnation of the violence being 
represented (Hoskins and O'Loughlin, 2010: 53-9). Were the two characteristics in this 
case to disappear, the dynamics of state secrecy theorised above would not be produced 
in public discourse and the public's gaze could not be aligned with the state 
perpetrator's; witnesses might therefore be prompted differently.
Contemporary covert action and suspicions of secrecy
The above theories of state secrecy and covert action, whereby secrecy is an instrument 
of the state and prompts public assent, all depend on identifying the discursive 
dynamics of state secrecy, on tracing how those dynamics are produced and what they 
then do in representations. These theories locate state secrecy as emerging from 
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particular elements of Cold War and post-2001 representations: state invocations and 
glimpses of violence. Since this signification of state secrecy has to be empirically 
demonstrated in order to elaborate a theory of how that secrecy shapes the subject-
positions of witnesses, the following section uses an example of contemporary covert 
counter-terrorism to examine whether the theory of covertness shared by the above 
scholarship is adequate for analysing contemporary covert action. Does state secrecy 
still enter the public sphere in the same way?
On 29th September 2014, U.S. news media reported that a U.S. drone strike had 
been carried out the previous day in Karikot, north-western Pakistan, the first strike 
carried out in the South Waziristan region in almost a year. The New York Times' report 
of the strike went little beyond the statement from “Pakistani officials” that the strike 
had occurred and a note of its material target, “[a] vehicle parked near a house” (Masood,
2014). What else was said about the strike took the form of speculation which 
emphasised how little was known. The strike was said to have killed “at least four 
people” who were “suspected of being militants”, with two “believed to be citizens of 
Arab nations” – “[b]ut their identities could not be immediately confirmed”. This is all 
that was said about the strike itself, with the rest of the article concerning itself with 
more general speculation over whether the U.S.'s “classified drone program” in Pakistan
was winding down given the decreased number of strikes in recent months, as well as a 
note that “activists and the Pakistani government do not agree” on the number of 
civilian casualties from these strikes (ibid).
These kind of reports of strikes in their suspected aftermath constitute by far the
most common public representation of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and other 
countries, at least within those states such as the U.S. which conduct this covert 
counter-terrorism. The other most prominent representation of strikes takes the form 
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of speculation over the general operating procedures governing strikes, with the covert 
actions themselves being even further removed from the representational frame (eg. 
Becker and Shane, 2012; see chapter three). Given this, the above example demonstrates
that these representations are not glimpses of those operations' violent enactment. 
Covert practices are not represented either through the visualisation of the target's 
violated body or through any other portrayals, real or fictional, of the violence being 
meted out by covert agents. In the case of the Karikot strike, the operation is instead 
represented through signifiers of the operation and its violence having passed unseen, 
without being witnessed. The vehicle is articulated as already-destroyed, the targets 
merely as a suspected death tally; their characterisation as such points to a violent event 
that has already occurred and that the public has not been able to observe. The rest of 
the article's more general speculation further emphasises the slightness of this reporting 
and the fact that the event has occurred unseen.
The covert strike is therefore not articulated through signifiers of its enactment, 
the infliction of the violence. There is no extended narration of the strike, nor glimpses 
of violated bodies. To be sure, demonising portrayals of the targets of overt counter-
terrorism in official war theatres continue to circulate in public discourse, with terrorist
bodies identified and represented in gendered, racialised and dehumanising ways 
(Steuter and Wills, 2010; Manchanda, 2015). Public discourse surrounding 
contemporary covert operations, however, has developed independently of these 
established discourses on terrorist threats and countersubversion; public discussion of 
covert drone strikes pivots not on glimpses of demonised bodies or snapshots of covert 
agents but on sparse after-the-fact accounts of individual strikes and speculation on 
their legal, institutional and operating mechanisms. These are not glimpses of the 
violence of covert operations, which is merely hinted at through signifiers of the event's 
102
having passed unseen. When these operations enter the public sphere, therefore, their 
representation does not conceivably allow for any alignment of the public's 
understanding or gaze with one akin to covert violence's perpetrators. Such a 
perspective is simply not available.
In addition to this change in representational content, the context given to these 
news accounts by the state has also changed: state acknowledgements of its covert 
action are largely no longer present. Representations of contemporary covert counter-
terrorism are not accompanied by state commands to look away, nor state refusals to 
confirm or deny. Instead, they are accompanied by state silence, a non-
acknowledgement of such glimpses. In the above news report, the Karikot strike is 
revealed by “a local administration official” who spoke to the Times “on the condition of 
anonymity because he was not authorised to talk to the news media”, a statement which 
materialises an official silence from Pakistan and, given the lack of any other statements,
the U.S. in response to the event (Masood, 2014). This silence juxtaposes the articulation
of the strike through unconfirmed rumour and contested speculation over clandestine 
U.S. operations in Pakistan; together, they signify state secrecy as a mere inferred 
suspicion based on how details of the event appear, are disseminated and are 
contextualised. The juxtaposition of the claim a strike occurred and the slightness of the
report signifies that the strike has not been documented for witnesses, that it has passed 
unseen, and that not everything about the strike is publicly-visible in its aftermath. But 
because of the state's silence, its non-acknowledgement of the purported event, the 
representation does not definitively signify that the U.S. has been or is hiding 
something; what is signified is the likely possibility that the event was a secret kept by 
the state from the public.
Representations such as this, then, do not explicitly articulate that secrets are 
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being held by the state – both in terms of the event itself and in terms of certain details 
or material traces in the event's aftermath. As a consequence, the non-acknowledgement
by the state and the lack of glimpses of covert agents in action mean that this 
representation does not articulate the rationale for the secrecy that is signified as a 
suspicion. While a reader may reasonably infer a rationale for the violence in terms of 
the threat of Islamist terrorism, which is how drone strikes have been justified in the 
abstract by the U.S. as a mode of 'targeted killing' (The White House, 2013), this 
rationalisation is not echoed by the representation, which provides no bodily markers of
targets and perpetrators to act as 'proof' of the identities from such a narrative. But 
moreover, markers of this event's aftermath are not contextualised by a state declaration
which, when combined with a glimpse of the action, would invoke a rationale for the 
operation being covert. By neither telling the public to look away nor refusing to confirm
or deny, the state does not shape the meaning of the suspected secrecy which then 
implicitly frames the operation; the state therefore does not pre-condition the meaning 
of the rumours and debris left behind. State secrecy is signified and given materiality, 
through the ambiguous public traces left behind, but its rationale remains unresolved.
From assent to acquiescence
If state secrecy enters the public sphere in such a way that it does not signify a state 
rationale for its use, the theory of covertness as fostering public assent cannot hold. In a 
scenario where secrecy is produced not by state invocations and glimpses of covert 
agents but by non-bodily rumours and debris left in the wake of those agents, that 
secrecy does not belong to the state – that is, its discursive dynamics are neither 
instigated nor determined by state articulations. Secrecy is not being addressed by the 
state to the public, and as a result witnesses to these representations are not being hailed
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by the state into a subject-position of complicity. Without a state rationale for its 
covertness, the discursive framework which witnesses might adopt is not produced and 
does not prompt those witnesses; there is therefore no rationalisation of the state's use 
of covertness for witnesses to 'assent' to.
Yet it could be argued at this point that a wider state narrative for its overall 
counter-terrorism strategy might over-determine the meaning attached to these covert 
operations. Certainly, this chapter has already acknowledged the continued circulation 
of representations that articulate a collective terrorist identity in demonic terms, and 
that therefore imply a rationale for actions identified as counter-terrorism. Perhaps 
even if state secrecy does not rationalise the use of covert violence for witnesses, other 
articulations might pre-condition how these news reports of indefinite information are 
nonetheless understood. What counters this argument is the fact that the suspicion of 
covertness produced in this news coverage itself shapes the representation of these 
covert events, not despite, but precisely because of the lack of a state rationale for 
secrecy in these accounts. Not being determined by the state, the representational 
dynamics of secrecy can signify things in excess of any wider state rationale for counter-
terrorism. Any subject-position produced as a result therefore may not necessarily align 
with state objectives. In order to examine how a suspicion of state secrecy might prompt
witnesses to consider these unseen covert events and their possible state sponsors, it is 
necessary to theorise subject-positions towards state violence that is not rationalised by 
the state, interpellations that would not fit a model of assent or dissent towards that 
violence.
Engels and Saas provide the beginnings of such a theorisation in their inquiry 
into official state discourse that has accompanied violent post-11 September 2001 U.S. 
foreign policy. Pointing to state invocations that are markedly different from those 
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studied in the works cited throughout this chapter, invocations that do not rationalise 
any glimpsed state violence, they argue that these discursive practices entail not public 
assent but what they call acquiescence. Alongside representations that act to “demoni[se]
the enemy”, U.S. state officials have perpetuated rhetorics, characterisations and social 
practices that encourage the public to “leave the war-making to the professionals”, 
which implore the public “trust us, we've got this” (Engels and Saas, 2013: 227, 228, 
emphasis in original). Rather than indicate the state is carrying out covert activities and 
suggest why those are being kept hidden, this signification merely hints at possible 
ongoing covert activities without suggesting what they might be or prompting any 
particular subject-position on the part of the public towards those activities. Regardless 
of any glimpses of possible covert activity that might exist in the public sphere, no 
rationalisation is made either of state violence or its secrecy. State exceptionalism is 
neither implied nor justified; nor is the public prompted to avoid the dirty details. This 
state invocation is therefore unlikely to act as “a mobilisation of the public... for the 
prosecution of the “war on terror”” – assent is not the representational logic at work 
here (ibid: 227).
Instead of assent, whereby those addressed by the state adopt a discursive 
framework implied by both the glimpsed violence and the rationale for its covertness, 
Engels and Saas see this state invocation as “promoting a glazed-over half-acceptance” 
of unseen activity, “a process of coming to peace with war while withholding assent”, 
which they call acquiescence (ibid: 227, 228-9). This acquiescence is not assent towards 
the state, but nor is it a subject-position of dissent from or contesting state violence. 
This notion of acquiescence breaks out of the binary assent-dissent understanding of 
public positions towards state violence. While this notion therefore enriches the 
theorisation of state secrecy, the process by which such acquiescence might be produced
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needs clarifying. For while Engels and Saas posit acquiescence in the singular, their 
argument actually hints at two different kinds of 'glazed-over half-acceptance' of state 
violence. One subject-position is produced by representations that “display war in such 
a way that it cannot be contested”, “creat[ing] a symbolic landscape in which resistance 
to objective violence seems pointless” (ibid: 227). A second subject-position, however, is 
suggested by the idea that representations might “constitut[e] a distracted civic body 
numb to violence abroad”, that they could prompt “numbness toward the unacceptable 
human costs of battle” (ibid: 227, 229).
If numbness is interpreted simply as a subject-position that is prevented from 
responding to violence by dissenting from or contesting the state, this interpellation 
need not result from a belief that dissent is impossible. Photographs of drones 
remaining stationary in hangers, or flying in empty, unspecified skies, fail to provide a 
sense of what that warfare is like, instead offering drab monotonous images of 
indistinguishable objects and spaces. Such images signify that they are inconsequential 
and will remain opaque despite scrutiny, inviting disinterest (Ohl, 2015: 615-6, 625). By 
signifying shared opacity and monotony, these photographs prompt a dulling of 
witnesses' senses in response to such representations, “corroding the very infrastructure
of thought, feeling, and action” (ibid: 615). Prompted to feel unable to engage with 
boring warfare, witnesses become numb to these portrayals, as their capacity to respond
politically to sensations of warfare is decreased.
In the case of news representations studied in this thesis, a different kind of 
acquiescence from numbness is produced, thanks to the lack of an actual state 
invocation that 'We've got this'. The snippets of information that represent covert 
operations such as the Karikot strike in public discourse signify state secrecy as an 
inferred suspicion, neither confirming nor denying the covering up of the event through 
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the use of plausible deniability. While details of these operations may be suggested 
unofficially by anonymous governmental and military figures, these suggestions do not 
signify how the public should react to these suspected events. They do not prompt 
witnesses to such events to look away, nor to understand the secrecy of these events in 
terms of a need to hide exceptionalism.  They do not even implore the public to simply 
'trust us' and leave things to the professionals. In other words, the state does not indicate
that secrecy has been and continues to be used regarding these events, that they were 
hidden from the public. Instead, unofficial anonymous tip-offs act as unverified and 
often speculative hints about these events that exist alongside other hints from outside 
the state, in the form of material evidence and rumour left in their wake. Without a state
narrative that might frame the significance of each piece of evidence, there is a levelling 
out of these hints within representations, whereby one seems no more definitive about 
these operations than any other.
Because the state does not signify a rationale for its covertness in this case, the 
secrecy that is articulated by public traces of state action can gain meaning through that 
lack of a rationale. For that lack is itself signified: ambiguities and uncertainties in news 
accounts of these events are framed by a suspicion of secrecy produced by those same 
accounts; this juxtaposition signifies that as a report on a state action, these ambiguities 
cannot explain or account for the use of secrecy by that state. In the case of the Karikot 
strike, the sparse, speculative and unverifiable qualities of the event's representation are 
made meaningful in relation to the possibility that the strike was a covert action. Those 
ambiguities are thus represented as ambiguities in the public record of the event, of how
and why it happened in secret. Without a state rationalisation of secrecy to make sense of
these ambiguities – to frame them, for instance, as things the public should look away 
from – the latter are represented as being unable to confirm for witnesses the extent of 
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secrecy and why it has possibly been used. State secrecy therefore positions witnesses 
towards the state and its use of violence in a way that does not fit a model of assent.
Such a subject-position is produced by the news report of the Karikot strike. 
When framed by the mere suspicion that the strike is a state secret, highlighted 
deficiencies in knowledge of the event gain meaning in terms of uncertainty over the 
secrecy's rationale. Being unmoored from state articulations, secrecy does not reiterate a
narrative of the strike's rationale but represents gaps in knowledge as reflecting a lack of
clear rationale. Therefore, because the suspected use of secrecy is not rationalised 
through representations of the targets, the lack of knowledge over their identities is 
implicitly represented as leaving unanswered who was targeted in secret, in what sense 
they were considered operationally important, and why they were targeted covertly 
rather than overtly. Suspicions around the casualties' nationality are framed similarly, 
prompting the question of whether that nationality is significant or merely an arbitrary 
scrap of available knowledge; again, without a rationalisation of secrecy, the reception 
of this detail is not pre-conditioned and made intelligible. Having not been articulated 
by the state in response to this event, the suspicion of secrecy signifies that it remains 
uncertain whether that secrecy extends to those identities, if they too are being kept 
hidden, and if so why. In lieu of state invocations, these gaps in knowledge are what give
meaning to suspected secrecy, not in terms of a narrative of necessary exceptionalism, 
but in terms of uncertainty over the scope and aims of the secrecy itself.
By highlighting various unanswered questions or unspoken ambiguities 
regarding the Karikot strike, the suspicion of secrecy which emerges from this coverage 
does not reiterate the state's covert power and capabilities. Without a state rationale for 
the use of secrecy, newsreaders are not prompted to understand the event as indicating 
the efficacy of the state's covert instruments on its own terms. Rather than prompt an 
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adoption of the state's rationalisation of covertness in this way, state secrecy here 
prompts witnesses to focus on the absence of such a rationalisation, as reflected in 
uncertainties over what exactly happened. That absence is signified as raising the 
possibility of limits to or ambiguities around the state's covert power, that the 
capabilities of the state in its covert sphere remain unconfirmed. Without an 
articulation of secrecy by the state itself, the secrecy that materialises in rumours and 
debris does not echo a state narrative rationalising the use of violence, but instead 
emphasises that the extent and purpose of the secrecy remains unresolved. Any wider 
state rationalisation of its counter-terrorism therefore cannot determine the meaning of
this representation: the uncertainty over the rationale for secrecy raises questions that 
undercut the certainty of claims about those targeted, preventing the latter from 
echoing a wider rationalisation.
While this representation of state secrecy disrupts the rationalisation of the 
state's use of violence, it does not shape a subject-position of dissent. News coverage of 
the Karikot drone strike does not make the strike intelligible as a use of force that must 
be contested. The subject-position produced by unresolved questions around this event 
is one closer to acquiescence, a subject-position which does not focus on the human 
costs of violence, to use Engels and Saas' phrasing, as being unacceptable on some 
ethical grounds. The reason for this is that the suspicion of state secrecy frames the 
strike as significant in terms of uncertainties over the rationale for secrecy and thus the 
state's covert power. This makes the public traces of the strike intelligible for 
newsreaders in terms of their being enigmatic: the rumours and speculation around this
covert action are defined by their hinting at meaning, in terms of how and why this 
operation may have been conducted covertly, that remains out of reach. Unlike the 
photographs discussed by Ohl, these enigmatic traces do not cultivate disengagement on
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the grounds of their opacity, but rather prompt witnesses to endlessly scrutinise them 
for meaning by focusing on the questions they implicitly raise, a position similar to the 
restless and inconclusive scrutiny that Santner identifies as being prompted by ruins 
(Santner, 2006: 80-1). Casualties are not represented as uncivilised threats justifying 
exceptionalist responses, but rather as being similarly enigmatic, their characteristics 
inferred from wider state rationalisations but then rendered uncertain by the destroyed 
objects and equivocal rumours that hint at secrecy. The meaning of the event is that it 
remains inconclusive.
These representations therefore do not shape an ethical orientation focused on 
the violence inflicted upon casualties; the human cost of these events is not represented 
as demanding ethical consideration. Suspected secrecy prompts a focus away from such 
consideration and towards uncertainties in the public record of the event and the state's 
covert capabilities.
Conclusion
This chapter has assessed previous literature on state secrecy, on how it is able to enter 
the public sphere and shape the representation of covert operations. Like these past 
analyses, this thesis argues that state secrecy is something that needn't simply restrict 
possibilities for representing state actions but can become part of and be ascribed 
characteristics within those representations. Covert operations can therefore exist as 
open secrets, events whose representation can indicate to witnesses that not everything 
has been revealed, and that what little is in the public domain is partial and difficult to 
substantiate. The present chapter parts from this previous literature, however, in 
arguing that the question of how such open secrecy might shape the representation of 
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state actions is distinguishable from the state's political rationale for secrecy. Whatever 
reasons a state may have for trying to keep some of its activities hidden from the public, 
those reasons need not determine how secrecy materialises in public discourse and 
shapes the meaning attached to covert events. While theories of state secrecy have 
asserted that state secrecy is instigated by the state and therefore furthers state 
objectives in its impact on public discourse, this chapter has argued that this is not an a 
priori proposition. What matters is how state secrecy is articulated.
In establishing this point of argument, the chapter examined past scholarship on 
the representation of covert action during the Cold War and in the aftermath of 11 
September 2001. The chapter demonstrated that theories of covert action's 
representation locate the articulation of state secrecy in two representational elements: 
glimpses of covert agents carrying out violence and state invocations which 
contextualise those glimpses and pre-condition how witnesses are prompted to 
understand them. Through this combination, these past works argue that state secrecy is
produced in a way that implies the state's rationale for that secrecy, an implicit narrative
of why covertness is being used which represents the identities of the state and the 
targets of its violence. State invocations of secrecy prompt witnesses to see this rationale
echoed in glimpses of covert action and thus to adopt an understanding of covert action 
which mirrors this rationale. In this way, state secrecy aligns the public's understanding 
with that of the perpetrators of covert violence, making witnesses complicit in the 
state's rationalisation of its actions. By identifying the presumption made in this 
literature about how state secrecy is articulated, this chapter has argued that the theory 
of state secrecy as fostering public assent does not hold in the case of contemporary 
operations. With the latter, state secrecy is a product of two new elements: public traces 
left in the wake of unseen covert violence; and silence from the state in response to 
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these traces. No glimpses of violence or state declarations in relation to these events 
circulate in the public sphere. It is unlikely that state secrecy produced in this way will 
prompt witnesses to adopt a discursive framework mirroring the state's rationale for 
covertness, as that rationale is not signified.
If state secrecy is not 'owned' by the state in this case, how does it shape the 
representation of contemporary covert counter-terrorism? The chapter concludes by 
analysing one recent example, a covert drone strike in Pakistan. The covertness of this 
strike is signified as a mere suspicion without any indication of the state rationale for its
use. The chapter has argued that in the absence of this rationale, state secrecy can frame 
covert operations in ways that undermine or curtail the hegemony of a state 
rationalisation of its counter-terrorism. Firstly, the representation of a covert action 
through its public traces does not provide a glimpse of covert violence inflicted on 
bodies whose markers could then echo a state narrative for that violence. Secondly, the 
framing of these inconclusive claims by a suspicion of secrecy signifies the absence of a 
rationale for that secrecy. This signification implicitly highlights uncertainties in the 
public record of the event regarding the extent and purpose of the state's use of secrecy: 
who were the casualties of this action, what characteristics are significant, is the state 
obscuring their identities and why. The uncertainty over the rationale for covertness 
does not reiterate a narrative justifying state violence but instead curtails any wider 
rationalisation of counter-terrorism by signifying that it remains unclear whether the 
covert operation in question fits or echoes such a rationalisation. Yet while this 
representation of secrecy does not prompt public assent, it shapes a subject-position 
focused on the inconclusive and indecipherable quality of the public traces that remain 
of this covert event. That focus reflects something closer to acquiescence towards covert
violence, a narrow ethical orientation whose focus is turned away from the violence that
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is actually inflicted.
In critiquing past theories of state secrecy while raising this possibility of a 
subject-position beyond assent or dissent, the present chapter has introduced the 
dynamic that is central to the argument of the thesis: the interaction between secrecy 
and absence in representations of covert counter-terrorism. The chapter, however, has 
focused on the secrecy half of that dynamic, examining how state secrecy can be 
produced in the public sphere independent of the state and how its role in 
representations can be shaped by a state rationale, or lack thereof, for its use. This has 
allowed the chapter to demonstrate why the hegemony of state rationalisations cannot 
simply be presumed when analysing covert counter-terrorism. But the thesis intends to 
argue that a mere suspicion of state secrecy, without the state articulating a rationale for
that secrecy, does not just produce secrecy in public discourse but acts to undermine it, 
by implicitly signifying ideas about that which is absent from these representations. 
These ideas, which the thesis conceptualises as intimations, produce meaning that 
exceeds the signification of an enigma; public traces are consequently represented not 
just as obscuring meaning but as being highly suggestive regarding absent people and 
objects related to these events. In order to theorise this production of excess meaning, 
the following chapter conceptualises the other half of this discursive dynamic, the 
absence that shapes and is shaped by secrecy.
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Chapter 2
Smoke, blood, and silhouettes: residue and intimations 
of covert violence
As both the Introduction and the previous chapter have detailed, the continued 
rationalisation of state violence has usually been conceptualised in critical scholarship as
a matter of an address, of the state addressing the public and prompting the latter to 
respond. That this scholarship is so often pitched as an investigation into state 
hegemony reveals an unspoken assumption: that public discourse is significantly, 
perhaps predominantly, pre-conditioned by the state, with the latter's addresses to the 
public setting the terms for understanding and even contesting state violence. The state 
address is always-already made, leaving witnesses only to respond, by assenting or 
dissenting. When state secrecy is considered, this analytic is echoed with secrecy 
functioning as the address made by the state. By examining how this analytic 
conceptualises state secrecy and testing its presumptions against contemporary covert 
action, the previous chapter challenged the idea that state secrecy need always be 
articulated by the state to the public. State secrecy can be signified not by state 
invocations but by the juxtaposition of sparse and speculative claims regarding an event 
that has neither been documented for the public nor acknowledged by the state. In 
making this argument, the chapter demonstrated that the hegemony of state discourses 
around its counter-terrorism cannot be presumed with covert practices: when signified 
as a mere possibility by the traces of an event, state secrecy may be represented to 
witnesses in ways that curtail any wider state rationalisation of such covert violence.
In critiquing the common critical notion that the representation of state 
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violence is necessarily pre-conditioned by the state, the previous article examined how 
open secrecy could gain meaning in the context of the state not articulating a rationale 
for that secrecy. The idea of a state rationale therefore anchored the argument of the 
previous chapter. But having established that such a rationale need not be reiterated in 
the public sphere when covert violence enters that sphere, this argument raises another 
question: if the state does not articulate a rationale for its possible use of secrecy, do 
representations of that secrecy make covert counter-terrorism meaningful in ways that 
go beyond the lack of rationale? Put differently, is the lack of a state rationale the most 
holistic way of understanding how covert counter-terrorism is represented? Having 
established that secrecy, when produced by rumours and debris left behind by covert 
action, need not belong to the state, there is no reason to think that this secrecy is 
ascribed meaning only with reference to this non-belonging; secrecy may be 
represented as having other characteristics dependent upon the traces that produce it. 
For this reason, the present chapter theorises the public traces of covert violence not in 
terms of a state rationale, as the previous chapter did, but on their own terms, by 
examining what those traces signify over and above the lack of an attempt to rationalise 
covertness.
By switching analytical focus in this way, the present chapter turns from 
conceptualising secrecy to conceptualising absences within the public traces of covert 
violence. As the chapter explains, contemporary covert counter-terrorism is 
represented through those things left in the wake of an event that has passed unseen – 
that is, where the event has not been documented to allow for co-present witnessing of 
the kind discussed in the Introduction. The chapter conceptualises these rumours, 
speculations and material debris left behind by covert action as residue, representational
markers which signify that an event has passed unseen. It is these markers which 
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produce state secrecy as a mere suspicion. In signifying an action has passed unseen, 
however, these markers also materialise absences within the public sphere, namely the 
absence of people and objects implicated in this event and affected by it, including the 
casualties of these actions. Residue allows for the intersection of presence and absence 
in this way, with present residue referring to and thus signifying these absent traces as 
part of its meaning.
The present chapter details the dynamic between these absences and secrecy 
that lays the conceptual foundations for the argument of the thesis. When framed by a 
suspicion of secrecy, residue gains meaning as possible public evidence of an otherwise-
covert event, as having escaped or avoided state secretion, without implying any state 
intentionality. As a result, the absences within that residue – as materialised through 
lacunae, ambiguities and contradictions in the rumours and debris left behind – also 
gain meaning as equivocal absences within the public record of a possibly-secret event. 
Having been made meaningful in this way, these absences signify that they leave 
different aspects of these events unresolved in the public sphere. Just as the state secrecy
discussed in the previous chapter is equivocal when produced by residue, existing only 
as an inferred suspicion, so too are the absences within that residue: it remains 
indefinite what exactly is absent and why. Being part of the public traces of covert 
action, these equivocal absences therefore become suggestive: framed as having not been 
secreted by the state, these lacunae and ambiguities relating to absent people and objects
are represented as possibly revealing things which secrecy would have otherwise kept 
obscured. This is why the thesis talks of residue as both producing and undermining state
secrecy.
By juxtaposing a suspicion of state secrecy, the equivocal absences in residue 
implicitly signify suggestive but unverifiable ideas about the characteristics of that 
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which remains absent. The chapter conceptualises these implicit significations as 
intimations, significations from absence which exceed the explicit claims of news 
coverage and which can therefore reshape the meaning attached to these covert 
operations. Drawing on recent historiographies of colonial archives, the chapter 
proposes a method of reading for these intimations that identifies the lacunae and 
ambiguities of residue and examines how, when juxtaposed with a suspicion of state 
secrecy, they implicitly reshape the meaning that is explicitly signified by these news 
accounts.
In conceptualising how secrecy and absence together produce intimations, the 
chapter elaborates upon the idea of subject-positions towards state violence that go 
beyond assent or dissent. Because these absences remain equivocal, any intimations 
from them are similarly indefinite: the hints and allusions produced by these suggestive 
absences remain unverifiable possibilities, signified not by documentation of the event 
but by the fact that the public record in its aftermath is partial and unstable. Being 
suggestive but unverifiable, these intimations shape subject-positions towards state 
violence that neither rationalise that violence nor are motivated to contest it. Witnesses 
to residue are positioned towards the state in a more subtle and uncertain way, having 
been prompted to understand covert counter-terrorism in terms of possible but 
unverifiable characterisations of absent people and objects, and to consider what these 
unseen characteristics might reveal that secrecy would have otherwise obscured. 
Witnesses are not 'hailed' by a state rationalisation but are prompted to perceive 
intimations from that left behind by state violence.
There is nothing to guarantee, however, that intimations from residue will 
prompt witnesses to focus on those things which are intimated, to consider the ethical 
worth of absent casualties in relation to the state's use of violence. The intersection of 
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presence and absence may signify absentees, but it need not signify that the latter and 
their violation are central to the significance of the event for witnesses; intimations may
shape the meaning of absences in ways that marginalise the ethical import of violence 
itself from the meaning of these operations. In order to trace how this dynamic of 
secrecy and absence shapes the representation not just of covert counter-terrorism but 
of those people who are absent, the chapter details the concept of historical affiliation. 
Drawing on the work of and on W.G. Sebald, the chapter argues that acts of violence 
can be linked to other seemingly-dissimilar historical acts of violence through their 
shared representational qualities of presence and absence; doing so allows the dynamic 
that shapes the meaning of absent traces in one representation to potentially highlight a 
similar dynamic in another that might not otherwise be analysable.
The chapter beings to build an historical affiliation between the residue of 
contemporary covert counter-terrorism and representations of lynching in the United 
States, based on their shared dynamics of presence and absence – namely, the public 
absence of the violated body – and constructions of distance between unseen violence 
and the wider public. As subsequent chapters elaborate, recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that national coverage of lynching, which drew on traces in the aftermath 
of the violence, represented the practice in different ways as spatially and morally 
distanced from society and as difficult to comprehend, shaping a narrow ethical 
orientation towards absent lynch victims. This historical affiliation is used in the 
analysis of covert counter-terrorism, to examine whether unseen violence is given 
similar meaning – not through explicit narrative, as with lynching, but through 
intimations from the suggestive absences of residue. This affiliation allows subsequent 
chapters to detail how witnesses are ethically oriented towards both the state and the 
absent casualties of these operations in ways that are obscured because remain 
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unspoken.
From enigmatic to suggestive: traces of unseen state violence
The covert counter-terrorism under review does not materialise in public through 
documentation of these operations being undertaken. Instead, these operations are 
represented through text and images of the markers left in their wake, that signify these 
operations have occurred without being witnessed by the public. These markers can 
take many forms: plumes of smoke rising into the air; smouldering rubble of destroyed 
buildings or the burn-out chassis of vehicles; diverse objects and marks on the 
landscape left behind by covert agents; bullet holes and blood scattered across the walls 
and floors of empty rooms; indistinct, poor-quality photographs and video footage; 
contradictory eye-witness statements and rumours of what took place; unofficial 
insights and speculation into the general operational dynamics presumed to be behind 
such operations; and conspicuous unanswered questions regarding what exactly took 
place. When represented alongside the claim that a covert operation has occurred, these 
phenomena signify their dissimilarity from the claimed event – plumes of smoke do not 
appear to show the unfolding of a covert operation but its aftermath. As such, these 
markers signify that the operation has already occurred. In materialising a covert 
operation in public, they signify that the people and objects who constituted the event 
itself are now absent.
The previous chapter demonstrated that these markers of a covert event's 
aftermath juxtapose a conspicuous silence from the state, a non-acknowledgement of 
the event and its apparent traces, and that this produces a suspicion of state secrecy, 
without a state rationale for this possible covertness. While the previous chapter argued 
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that this suspicion of secrecy represents covert action as enigmatic in terms of this 
absent rationale, traces of a covert operation can signify more than lost or inaccessible 
meaning when framed by such secrecy. These further significations depend upon the 
traces themselves, their various forms and characteristics as described above; not only 
do they shape how secrecy is represented, they shape how absences among these 
remainders materialise in the public sphere.
An extended example demonstrates how the qualities of these traces shape the 
representational dynamics of covert action. On 15 October 2014 a drone was reported 
to have fired missiles at a car in Shabwa province, Yemen. The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism (2014) has noted that the Yemeni defence ministry reported the name of one 
person killed in the car, Mahdi Badas, and identified him as a local al Qaeda leader, 
while three other people were also reported killed by local sources. A Reuters report of 
the attack went no further than to state, in the middle of a wider report on militant 
violence in Yemen: “Also on Wednesday, residents and a local official said a drone strike
hit a car carrying suspected al Qaeda militants in Shabwa province. The car was 
completely burnt and destroyed” (Reuters, 2014). A Twitter feed run by data artist Josh 
Begley, 'Dronestream', reported the attack with an accompanying photograph seemingly
taken from a mobile phone at the scene of the strike (Begley, 2014; Figure 2). The image 
shows the burnt-out chassis of a car with a flaming front-right tyre, motionless in a flat 
landscape and surrounded only by an expanse of sand and a small sparse crowd of 
onlookers. The clear sky is punctuated only by birds flying overhead and some trees and
mountains on the horizon in the far distance.
121
Figure 2: Reported photograph of U.S. drone strike on 15 October 2014 in Shabwa province, 
Yemen (Begley, 2014).
In order to demonstrate the representational dynamics at work in this image of 
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a drone strike, it can be contrasted with another image that at first seem aesthetically 
and contextually similar. The Israeli military assault on the Gaza Strip in the summer of 
2014 was extensively documented by journalists. The Daily Mail published online 
articles filled with photographs of the air assault. One such article contained a 
photograph captioned by the statement: “Smoke and fire from the explosion of an 
Israeli strike rise over Gaza City as Israel continued its bombardment of the besieged 
territory today” (Reilly and Gayle, 2014; Figure 3). The image shows dozens of tightly-
packed buildings viewed from a high angle and from a distance, with two dark billows 
of smoke and a ball of fire towering over those buildings on the near horizon and 
reaching high into the clear sky.
Figure 3: Photograph of reported Israeli air strike in Gaza City on 22 July 2014 (Reilly and 
Gayle, 2014).
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Aesthetically, the two images have many similarities. Formally, they both centre 
on a cluster of fire with smoke rising from it, the destruction emphasised by standing 
out against a seemingly calm sky. In both cases, the smoke rises towards the edge of the 
frame, encouraging viewers to follow its drift towards the empty horizon. Finally, in 
neither image are the casualties of the strike visibly present. There is no blood, no torn 
limbs. But as the previous chapter discussed, the representational economy within 
which covert action traces circulate is crucial, and the contextualisation of each 
photograph by accompanying news accounts shapes the materialisation of each 
photographed site, of what is being shown, giving different meaning to each strike.
The image of the Israeli strike is framed in the news article as a glimpse of an 
ongoing bombardment: Israel is described as “continu[ing] to devastate the Gaza Strip 
with air strikes and artillery today” as its “warplanes bombarded a wide range of targets 
along the densely populated coastal strip” (ibid). The image, then, is framed as showing 
the ongoing event of an unfolding military action, as being spatially and temporally 'in 
the middle' of that action. The relation between the image and the event is therefore 
likely to be clear and unambiguous for newsreaders: the image documents the event as it
is happening. This framing figures the image as eventful, in the sense used by Frosh and 
Pinchevski, whereby the capturing of a moment on media allows it to be subsequently 
represented (via its endless playback or recall) as revealing a significant event that was 
inadvertently documented. By being framed as showing an unfolding Israeli military 
operation, the billowing fire and smoke in the image are transformed from “merely 
incidental” aspects of a captured moment to “singularly significant” elements of an event
that is revealed through them (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2014: 599). The image is therefore 
signified as eventful.
By contrast, the image of the burnt-out car is simply contextualised in the tweet 
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by the statement that “Four people were killed when U.S. drone missiles struck a Toyota
Hilux” (Begley, 2014). The tweet links to a Xinhua article reporting that “Four suspected 
al-Qaida fighters were killed Wednesday in a U.S. drone strike”, with a local security 
official quoted as saying the “air raid” had “targeted small pick-up truck [sic]” and 
“kill[ed] four people inside”. The car is reported to have been “travelling in the Bin Aasf 
village in Shabwa province, where the al-Qaida group has a strong presence” (Xinhua, 
2014). This framing articulates some speculative notions of the identity and behaviour 
of the people targeted by the strike and emphasises the physical action of missiles 
hitting a material object. The accompanying texts also figure the strike as an event that 
has now ended. Against this framing, the image emphasises its dissimilarity with the 
purported event: there is little sense of impactful movement within this space, of objects
hitting one another; the behaviour of the surrounding people suggests a lack of ongoing 
danger, at least so far as they are aware; and the markings of violence, in the form of the 
chassis and smoke, seem slight and exceptional against an otherwise unremarkable, 
undynamic scene. Presented as evidence of a strike, the image signifies a lack of 
eventfulness, that it has not captured potentially-significant details of an event but a 
moment that lacks expected qualities of such details, one that therefore cannot provide a
“visual narrativisation” of the strike through its recall (Ohl, 2015: 621). Instead, the 
image represents and so materialises a site of traces, material marks of an event that has 
passed unseen within this space.
There is nothing in this image or its accompanying text that explicitly indicates 
the significance or otherwise of these traces in relation to the event. With that event 
having passed and the image appearing uneventful, the latter is figured as arbitrary, as 
showing just whatever happened to have been left behind by the action. But the 
respective eventfulness and uneventfulness of the two images under discussion are also 
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shaped by the two representations' respective qualities of overtness and secrecy, and it is
this which allows the drone strike image to gain significance.
The image of smoke billowing from a crowded Gaza neighbourhood is 
accompanied by articulations of the motivation and purpose of the Israeli military 
operation. Israel is described as having “launched a massive aerial bombardment of 
Gaza on July 8 to stop relentless Hamas rocket fire into Israel”, while Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is described as “urg[ing] the international community to 
hold Hamas accountable for the latest round of violence, saying its refusal to agree to a 
cease-fire had prevented an earlier end to the fighting” (Reilly and Gayle, 2014). By 
noting the state's own avowed rationale for the operation, this representation 
characterises the operation as overt, as being openly admitted to and justified by the 
Israeli government. No state secrecy is articulated. The air strike image is therefore 
figured as showing this event without obscuration; nothing in the overall representation
prompts newsreaders to think that the image is incomplete on the terms set by its 
framing, that some part of 'what is happening' is being kept from the public sphere. 
Newsreaders may themselves think that there is something being obscured by the Israeli
state – say, the true cost of Palestinian lives lost – but the image and text combined do 
nothing to prompt such thoughts. Consequently, while anyone killed or injured by the 
strike are not visually displayed in the image, their spatial co-presence is signified 
through the framing of this image as showing an unfolding, unobscured public event. 
The people who may well be casualties are represented as spatially and temporally 
present for witnesses: they are there, in those buildings and on those streets. They are 
part of the meaning of what takes place in the image.
Undoubtedly, the image of the burnt-out car in Shabwa province invites viewers
to think of the casualties of the drone strike, to imagine their likely fate in that 
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hollowed-out husk of the vehicle. But while the accompanying news report states the 
strike as a matter of fact, that four people “were killed” and that the strike had been 
“confirmed”, details are given by a “local security official” who spoke to the news agency
“on condition of anonymity” (Xinhua, 2014). There is no articulated U.S. state 
acknowledgement of the strike, no demand for the public to look away or refusal to 
confirm or deny its occurrence (to follow the schema of the previous chapter). This 
silence and anonymity juxtapose the sparseness of details that have been documented 
only in the aftermath of the strike. That juxtaposition signifies a suspicion of state 
secrecy, the equivocal suggestion that the unseen event was a secret kept by the state 
from the public, but without any accompanying notion of the state rationale for trying 
to keep it secret.
This implicit suggestion that not everything about the event may have been 
publicly revealed casts a different light on the uneventfulness of the image. While that 
uneventfulness signifies the arbitrariness of these traces in their having been left in the 
wake of the strike, the suspicion of state secrecy signifies that these traces are significant
precisely because they appear arbitrary. Figured as public traces of an event that has 
otherwise been kept secret, the burnt-out chassis and billowing smoke are implicitly 
characterised as not having been successfully secreted by the state, without implying any
state desire or attempt to do so. These traces gain meaning in relation to that suspicion 
of covertness and thus appear not insignificant but suggestive: this representation 
signifies that having escaped secretion, these traces possibly reveal things about the 
event which covertness would have otherwise obscured – again, not because those 
traces would have all been hidden by the state, but because their relationship to a covert 
action might have remained unknown. This representation therefore materialises a 
space which appears significant in that it exists and has been identified in the public 
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sphere beyond the control of the state perpetrator. This suggestiveness prompts 
witnesses to see the image as significant not in relation to the inaccessible past, the event
that cannot be replayed, but in relation to the present state of these traces. The traces no 
longer appear simply enigmatic.
The suspicion that these traces have escaped state secretion now shapes new 
significations. The accompanying text in the tweet defines the strike by its supposed 
targets: “Oct 15, 2014: Four people were killed when U.S. drone missiles struck a 
Toyota Hilux (Yemen)” (Begley, 2014). With these traces framed as public evidence of an
otherwise-hidden event, these four people are now conspicuous in their absence. Unlike
in the image of the Israeli air strike, where casualties are characterised as present in 
what is shown, markers of casualties and their identities are implicitly signified as 
absent from the public remainders of this covert strike. The suspicion of secrecy 
therefore highlights that this public evidence cannot establish the identities of these 
absent casualties. The suggestiveness of these traces, as possible public evidence of 
covert action, prompts witnesses to scrutinise the image for evidence of those who were
killed, to look for their bodies among the car wreckage. But in constituting the site of 
these four people's covert deaths, the burnt-out chassis is represented as inscrutable: not
only does the decrepit state of the wreckage make distinguishing bodies seem a difficult 
task, but the fire and smoke suggest the evidence of the strike is dissipating, that these 
traces and anything they may reveal about the strike may not last much longer. Secrecy 
and absence therefore implicitly signify the possibility that whatever remains of this 
operation in the public sphere will not be enough to reveal the identities of those killed.
 The news report linked to in the tweet continues to explicitly define the strike 
by those killed, but the suspicion of secrecy now reshapes what is articulated. While the 
headline states that the strike 'kill[ed] 4 al-Qaida militants in SE Yemen', the first line 
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states they were “[f]our suspected al-Qaida fighters”. The anonymous official elaborates: 
“The air raid was conducted by a U.S. drone plane which targeted small pick-up truck 
[sic] in the Shabwa province, killing four people inside who are suspected to be members 
of al-Qaida terrorist group”. The car, meanwhile, is reported to have been “travelling in 
the Bin Aasf village in Shabwa province, where the al-Qaida group has a strong presence” 
(Xinhua, 2014, emphases added). While these statements attach terroristic identities and 
behaviour to those killed, allowing the representation to potentially resonate with a 
wider state narrative rationalising counter-terrorism, these statements are juxtaposed 
both by a suspicion of state secrecy and by the photograph of the wrecked vehicle. This 
juxtaposition highlights the speculative and equivocal quality of the statements, that 
these people's identities remain unverified in the non-state public record of this secret 
event and cannot be confirmed by the inscrutable traces which are possibly all that 
remain. As part of a representation of a state action, this juxtaposition also prompts 
newsreaders to consider that the criteria by which the strike was conducted are not in 
the public sphere. The image of the burnt chassis signifies that witnesses have not seen 
how the purported targets were identified and tracked down, and that these public traces
cannot establish that the people who died inside the car shown were the speculated 
targets. As public evidence that has avoided secretion, this wreckage and the absence of 
markers of casualties within this space signify the suggestive idea that it remains 
uncertain how anyone inside that vehicle could have been identified before or after 
targeting. This idea is signified as inconclusive, its implications unverifiable, but it 
nonetheless shapes the meaning of the representation.
What happens in the case of this image, then, is that absences in these visible 
traces of a possibly-secret event produce unverifiable ideas about what isn't visible. As 
public evidence of covert action, these traces prompt witnesses to be curious about 
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those absences, about the identities of those killed and the mechanisms that led to their 
deaths. So while the casualties of the Israeli air strike were represented as being part of 
the unproblematic and comprehensible meaning of what the image showed, the 
casualties of this drone strike are signified as absences in the public sphere that change 
the meaning of what the image shows.
This analysis of two aesthetically similar photographs, one of an overt and 
unfolding event, the other of a covert and passed event, demonstrates that the public 
traces of contemporary covert counter-terrorism need not just signify their being 
enigmatic. Instead, by being made significant in having avoided state secretion, they can 
signify ideas about the characteristics of those things which are absent from the public 
aftermath of that event. Traces of covert action therefore both produce state secrecy in 
the public sphere and implicitly undercut that secrecy by hinting at details of the 
operation in ways that the state's covertness would have otherwise curtailed. Two 
conceptual questions are raised by this analysis: how to theorise the materialisation of 
absence in the public sphere; and how to understand these implicit significations of 
ideas about that which is absent, ideas which can change the meaning of what is 
articulated by a representation while remaining inconclusive and unverifiable. 
Answering these questions will lead towards a conceptualisation of the subject-
positions produced by these suggestive absences.
Theorising residue and its absences
A number of aspects of this comparative example help to theorise covert action's traces 
and the representational dynamics that they inculcate. The first thing that seems 
significant, in terms of how covert counter-terrorism is represented, is that these traces 
130
signify that they are markers not of the event itself but its aftermath. In his discussion of
the concept of an event, François Dosse notes the event's seemingly paradoxical 
existence: it refers both to a rupture in time, an unexpected occurrence, and to the 
outcome of a causal chain (Dosse, 2015: 29). This paradox reveals that events are 
constituted by human beings through the linking together of different phenomena into 
a narrative; emerging through this narrative linkage, an event can then be juxtaposed to 
other events in terms of differences and similarities, that is, the event's unexpectedness 
and its causal connections (ibid: 38-9). Representations of covert action which draw on 
the traces of an operation do narrate events in this way, but crucially they do so by 
stating an event took place and then providing representational markers (text and 
images) that seem uneventful in Frosh and Pinchevski's (2014) sense: these markers 
emphasise their dissimilarity from the expected qualities and dynamics of the event 
itself. In the above example, the textual framing of the image of a burnt-out chassis 
signifies that the image has not captured a drone strike as it unfolds. The texts and 
materials that enact this representational dynamic, when mediated and contextualised 
in news coverage, can be conceptualised as residue of covert violence: markers of the 
aftermath of a covert action which, through their uneventfulness, signify to witnesses 
that the event itself has passed unseen.
A conceptual comparison can be used to gauge the analytical purchase of this 
concept of residue. The conclusion of the previous chapter, that these representations 
prompt witnesses to focus on the seemingly enigmatic character of these traces of 
covert violence, invites a comparison with the concept of ruins. As the decaying 
remainders of objects which point to the inaccessible past for their meaning, ruins have 
been conceptualised as enigmatic signifiers, as artefacts which hint at lived symbolic 
orders that once gave them meaning but without revealing what those orders were 
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(Santner, 2006: 16-17). Ruins stand as fragments of a lost symbolic order. By signifying 
that lost meaning, ruins have been thought to represent the transience of human 
existence, the permanent threat to society's complacent pomposity from an indifferent 
natural world (Pensky, 2010: 67-9). Were traces of covert violence to gain meaning in 
this way, they would risk being devolved of their political context, the violent events 
that produced them, and turned into generalised emblems of the inaccessibility of a past 
“radically cut off from the present” (Middeke and Wald, 2011: 13). They would remain 
enigmatic.
But covert action traces are not reducible to relics of once-whole objects that 
were implicated in the event itself. The smoke and fire emanating from the car, for 
instance, are not remnants but new material, or seemingly less-than-material, markers 
produced by the event. Most importantly, the burnt-out chassis in the Shabwa strike 
example does not signify, through its gradual deterioration, the decline of a symbolic 
order or society that in the past was built around this object (DeSilvey and Edensor, 
2012: 471). These traces do refer to a covert action that has been and gone, but 
insodoing they signify the continued existence of relations of people and objects which 
carried out that action and left these traces, namely the agents and technologies of state 
foreign policy violence. These traces refer to the present as well as the past for their 
meaning.
While those state relations and practices may not have vanished into the past, 
they nonetheless remain unseen in these representations. This points to a key 
conceptual element of residue, the intersection of presence and absence that residue 
produces. While the invisibility of any people in the image of the Israeli air strike might 
intuitively preclude them from being represented, presence-absence is not a zero-sum 
characteristic. Both are multifaceted categories: something can be absent in one sense 
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while simultaneously being present in another sense. The invisibility or seeming 
immateriality of a thing, understood as a visual and corporeal lack that prevents any 
potential physical interaction, need not rule out that object or person possessing other 
kinds of presence, as in the spatial presence of casualties in the streets and buildings 
under Israeli bombardment (see Buchli, 2010: 186-7). As noted in the Introduction, co-
presence with witnesses needn't involve spatial proximity; a representation can prompt 
witnesses to be imaginatively present at the scene represented (Frosh, 2009: 58-60). 
That which is invisible can therefore gain co-presence with witnesses as well, as part of 
that scene.
But as the Shabwa strike image indicates, just as different degrees of presence 
are possible, so too are different degrees of absence which can themselves materialise 
through representational practices. Absence can be signified through witnesses' 
sensorial engagement with markers that are present, if the latter are represented as 
intelligible through something else which cannot be engaged with in the same way. Like 
the remains of the dead, traces of past activities “bear the imprint[s]” of what has passed 
and can signify “chains of associations” to absent people and objects (T. Keenan and 
Weizman, 2012: 18, 65). Worn-down objects understood as having particular purposes 
or uses can point in this way to the people and activities once associated with them that 
are now materially and temporally absent (Edensor, 2005: 327-30). No degree of 
presence or absence is essential or exclusive to one or the other: materiality or visibility 
might signify absence (the temporal absence of someone pictured in an old photograph, 
for instance), while immateriality might signify presence (as in the metaphysical 
presence of God). Absence, in this sense, has a “relational ontology”, materialising 
through representational practices that give objects presence and allow those objects to 
then “give absence matter” (Meyer, 2012: 107). In the case of covert action, residue 
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which is co-present to witnesses – that is, which is represented 'as if' witnesses were 
present with it, prompting that imagining  – signifies the spatial, visual and material 
absence of those state relations noted above: bullet holes indicate a firefight that was not
witnessed; the smoke drifting from a wrecked building alludes to that which set the 
house alight.
But the absence of state mechanisms of violence is given particular meaning in 
the Shabwa strike case: they appear to remain hidden, to have been kept from the public
by the state. To understand the production of absence here, it is therefore necessary to 
conceptualise residue as materialising not just the aftermath of state violence, but a 
suspicion of state secrecy. These traces do not just indicate that an event has passed, but 
through conspicuous qualifications and lacunae signify that this event is possibly a 
secret the state has been trying to keep from the public. The comparative example above
suggests that this suspicion of secrecy alters the meaning of residue: the latter is framed 
by that secrecy as public evidence of an operation which has otherwise been obscured 
from public view. Rumours and speculation about the event, along with material traces 
at the site of passed violence, thus gain significance in existing and having been 
identified in the public sphere outwith the articulations or control of the state. Indeed, 
because this rumour and debris appear dissimilar from presumed qualities of the unseen
event, and because many of them appear at risk of altering or disappearing (consider 
rusting wreckage or dissipating smoke), they signify that their relation to the event is 
not self-evident but precarious, that they need to be linked to that event through 
journalistic effort. When framed by secrecy, residue is therefore represented as 
significant because it exists outside of state articulations, because it has been 
documented independent of representations by the state perpetrator.
Through this representation, lacunae, ambiguities and contradictions within 
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that residue gain similar significance. Framed as non-state markers of otherwise-covert 
actions, they are represented as questioning or leaving unresolved the characteristics of 
people and objects which are not co-present in this residue and therefore appear absent 
from the public sphere. With details of those people and objects remaining unclear, 
these absences materialise and gain significance as being equivocal and ambiguous 
(Meier et al, 2013: 425-7): with no confirmation and documentation to hand of that 
which is absent, it remains unclear what exactly is absent, as does the precise nature of 
that absence – whether something is simply not among the traces that have been 
identified, or if it no longer exists, or has been secreted or destroyed. Having avoided 
state secretion, these equivocal absences are represented as significant in leaving the 
public record of 'what happened in secret' inconclusive and even incoherent, depending 
upon how different traces reflect upon one another through these absences.
By appearing equivocal in this way, residue and its absences become suggestive. 
Because these public traces of possibly-covert events exist and are identified 
independent of state articulations, they signify that they may potentially reveal things 
about the event which the state's covertness would have otherwise prevented being 
articulated in the public sphere. Moreover, the precariousness of the link between this 
residue and the event represents the former as significant in the present moment, while 
that link is still evident. Through this precarious suggestiveness, residue is represented 
to witnesses as worthy of attention and scrutiny, in terms of what it might reveal. 
Absences within that residue are represented similarly: by leaving residue unable to 
reveal or corroborate certain details of what has taken place, these absences render 
those details ambiguous and gain significance in terms of what their equivocal quality 
could indicate about an otherwise-secret event. This is what allows the image of the 
burnt car chassis in Shabwa province to reshape the meaning of statements on those 
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targeted. That chassis is framed by suspected secrecy as having escaped secretion and 
been identified in the public sphere. As a result, it is represented as significant in its 
inscrutability, in its being unable to confirm details of the event, since it does not offer 
markers of the targets' claimed terrorist identities at the site where they were killed. The
absence of casualties therefore gains materiality and meaning as producing incongruity 
in the public evidence of the covert strike.
Intimations from absence
It is one thing for smoke exuding from car wreckage to hint at a missile strike, or even 
its probable casualties; it is quite another for that smoke to implicitly suggest ideas 
about that strike in relation to things which are not present. What does it mean, then, to 
say that the residue of a covert operation such as the Shabwa strike can hint at 
characteristics of absent people and objects?
This ability is firstly a consequence of residue's suggestiveness. With residue 
represented as worthy of scrutiny, and its absences represented as leaving that residue 
unable to confirm aspects of the event, residue prompts witnesses to consider what the 
lacunae, ambiguities and contradictions that reflect these absences might suggest about 
the unseen covert operation. Suggestion here is a matter of relevant possibility. At the 
same time that residue is made significant in having escaped state secretion, it is 
represented as unstable in terms of the visibility and clarity of its link to the event that 
produced it. So long as the state's use of covertness remains unconfirmed and 
documentation of the event is not forthcoming, these public traces are indefinite in 
terms of how exactly they relate to the claimed state action, what exactly they prove or 
disprove beyond the apparent use of state violence and suspected secrecy. But because it
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does nonetheless exist in the public sphere and has seemingly avoided secretion, residue 
is represented as allowing for certain unverifiable possibilities. The significance and yet 
inconclusiveness of these traces is what together allow them to implicitly signify ideas 
about absent people and objects. By appearing worthy of scrutiny, residue prompts 
witnesses to consider what it possibly reveals about an unseen event, what its equivocal 
absences could indicate that nonetheless remains unverifiable. These possibilities are not
the product of witnesses' independent speculation; they are signified to witnesses by 
these representations because of the way absences materialise in relation to secrecy.
The quality of these significations, however, requires further reflection. For in 
the comparative example above, the unverifiable ideas about the absent casualties of the 
drone strike in Shabwa province are not explicitly articulated in the representation. 
They are produced by that representation without being reducible to its explicit 
articulations: they are not spoken by a political actor, articulated by the journalist, or 
visualised in the image of the smoking vehicle.
In order to identify these implicit significations and demonstrate the analytical 
worth of the ideas presented in this chapter, the thesis turns to recent colonial 
historiography which has attempted to study unspoken allusions in colonial archives 
and literature. Using this work, the thesis conceptualises implicit and unverifiable 
significations through the notion of intimation. Intimation is used here in a play on its 
double meaning. Intimacy normally refers to the closeness involved in certain social 
relationships, a proximity of bodies that engenders familiarity. Different intimacies 
offer actors the opportunity to define those relationships through categories of 
difference: the contrasting appearance and behaviour of bodies in close contact can be 
used as supposed evidence of different types of race, sex, sexuality and class. As products
of intimacy, however, those claims of separateness are always precarious, prone to being
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undone by the “awkward familiarities” and “unsolicited attentions” that such proximity 
often engenders (Stoler, 2006: 15-16). This unintended miscegenation overlays this 
notion of intimacy with the verb to intimate, the latter meaning indirect 
communication, to hint or allude to something without stating it explicitly. The 
relationships developed between bodies in close proximity might intimate that 
categories of difference are not so clear-cut, that different supposed 'types' may not have
essential and exclusive traits.
This concept of intimation as meaning produced in excess of what is explicitly 
articulated can be elaborated through the work of Michelle Aung Thin, who draws on 
the double meaning discussed above to examine the discursive power of skin, 
specifically the skin of the Anglo-Burmese female protagonist in F. Tennyson Jesse's The
Lacquer Lady, a novel set on the brink of the British reunification of Burma. The ability 
of Fanny Moroni to move between social circles of the coloniser and the colonised, that 
is, her perceived ambiguous and shifting social standing, reveals that skin can signify 
more than is intended of it by colonial categories of difference. For while those 
categories may separate 'European' from 'Burmese' by associating certain bodies with 
certain behaviours and thus cultural competencies – designating who can reach 
'European' status – the skin of a person can allude to the possibility of those two 
identities coexisting in one body, or of either of those identities being insecure, by 
appearing to decouple bodies and thus identities from their expected behaviours and 
competencies. This excess meaning “stretches the idea of skin and what may or may not 
be contained within it. It connects to and stands in for other skins (where skin 
delineates the limit of or is a metaphor for a subject). Through this continuous allusion, 
this contingency, it complicates rather than clarifies difference” (Aung Thin, 2013: 74).
This double meaning of intimacy captures how the allusions from the Shabwa 
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strike's residue were not the product of any one public trace, but were the result of that 
smoking wreckage being explicitly linked to a passed covert operation. Through that 
linkage, the image emphasised its inability to corroborate or reveal aspects of the unseen
event, due to equivocal absences in these traces. News coverage thus signified a 
connection between present and absent traces of the operation that reshaped the 
meaning of what was explicitly stated about casualties. Here the idea of intimacy is 
taken beyond notions of physical proximity (Stoler, 2006: 15; Pain and Staeheli, 2014: 
344-6) and expanded to apply across degrees of presence and absence, so that two things
can have intimacy while differing in the kinds of presence and absence they each hold. 
Present residue can signify its intimacy with absent people and objects and so allow the 
absence that materialises as a result to produce excess meaning about the event that 
fostered this intimacy, meaning in excess of what those visible traces themselves 
explicitly articulate.
Applied to the comparative example, intimation makes conceptual sense of the 
intuitive differences between these two representations and the subject-positions they 
might produce, despite their similar visual aesthetics of the effects of missile strikes. 
Were analysis to focus only on the explicit articulations in these news accounts, those 
things stated and visualised which construct these accounts, these two examples would 
appear to produce similar meanings. Both accounts state that a strike occurred and 
ascribe identities to the targets; and while neither report visualises those targets as proof
of these identities, nor do they explicitly draw attention to that visual lack. Moreover, 
while one event is characterised as ongoing and the other as something that has passed 
unseen, this does not seem to affect the way each event is represented. But to restrict 
analysis to these explicit significations is to ignore how secrecy and absence can be 
signified and gain materiality without being spoken out loud. Any intimations produced
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as a result can shape the subject-positions towards residue: by signifying unverifiable 
ideas about that which is absent, intimations position witnesses of residue in relation to 
both the state perpetrator and absentees; like more explicit discursive practices, 
intimations “structure our encounters with other human beings in space and time” 
(Campbell, 2007: 361), even if those beings are absent. If one does not presume from the 
outset the hegemony of state rationalisations of its actions, then secrecy and absence 
appear able in principle to prompt witnesses to understand unseen events in ways that 
are not determined by explicit articulations alone.
In the case of the Shabwa strike, material and less-than-material traces were 
used by journalists to construct a news story of a strike, with journalists 'translating' 
these traces into representational markers by articulating them in coverage. The 
photograph of a charred vehicle is framed as the public remainders of a missile strike 
and so signifies its connection to those things left unseen and unaccounted for in these 
traces, the targets of the strike and the state mechanisms that enacted it. But having been
represented as public evidence of covert action, these traces signify that their lacunae 
and ambiguities leave unresolved certain aspects of this event. This residue acts 
analogously to the skin described above: while some of this residue explicitly articulates 
that four al-Qaeda militants were killed in the strike, the car wreckage is framed by 
secrecy and so alludes to its inscrutability, its inability to confirm these identities. In that
ambiguity, this residue intimates the possibility that these identities have not been 
proven and might not be what has been claimed. Qualifications that those targeted were
suspected of being terrorists are similarly highlighted by the suspicion of secrecy, 
allowing that residue to allude to the operating mechanisms of these covert drone 
strikes, intimating that they remain unknown, possibly secreted, and that therefore it 
remains unclear how those mechanisms could identify potential and then successful 
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targets. These intimations thus reshaped the meaning of what was explicitly articulated 
about the strike, by representing this residue as significant in terms of the unverifiable 
possibilities it suggested.
By allowing for the possibility of excess meaning that reshapes what is explicitly 
stated, this concept of intimation pushes analysis of representations beyond an 
assumption that any new sensory phenomena in the world – such as the public traces 
that witnesses encounter through news coverage – are inevitably reinscribed and 
'contained' within the explicit signifiers used to articulate social reality. This assumption
implies that alterity, that which witnesses encounter as new and unfamiliar, is made 
comprehensible for witnesses within chains of signification that journalists articulate to 
produce news reports. As Rey Chow argues, this “epistemic framework” presumes the 
inevitable success of this reinscription, suggesting that anything which “appears to lie 
“outside”” a chain of signification already comprehensible to witnesses – such as a state 
narrative of terrorism vs. counter-terrorism – is “continually recoded” within such 
chains and becomes meaningful on their terms (Chow, 2006: 62). That which is new and
unfamiliar about these people, objects or events is recoded into signifiers whose alterity 
is already meaningful in relation to other signifiers – 'al-Qaeda' in differentiation from 
'United States', for instance (ibid: 67). In sum, this framework does not allow for 
unfamiliar events to signify in excess of the articulations used to try to make them 
intelligible. By contrast, the concept of intimation acknowledges this possibility of 
excess meaning, and insodoing avoids the presumption that where explicit signifiers 
echo state rationales, events will necessarily become meaningful for witnesses through 
those rationales.
Because intimations are a product of explicit signifiers but are not reducible to 
their explicit meanings, they pose a methodological as well as a conceptual challenge. In 
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her work on colonial archives and the intimacies left unspoken in them, Lisa Lowe has 
elaborated a methodology of reading for significations that are produced by absences 
within a representation's explicit articulations. The intimacies that interest Lowe, 
between Chinese indentured labourers and slaves in nineteenth-century British 
Caribbean colonies, were actively discouraged by the British colonial government, and 
as a result they are rarely explicitly detailed in the various documents and records of 
colonial governance in the Caribbean. But although those intimacies “[are] not explicitly
named in the documents”, they are “paradoxically, everywhere present in the archive” in
the form of “rhetorical ellipses” or “the rhetorical peculiarities of the documents, the 
places where particular figures, tropes or circumlocutions are repeated to cover gaps or 
tensions” (Lowe, 2015: 35). Intimacies between indentured contractors, indigenous 
people and slaves “are referenced by negative means, in cautionary rhetorics and 
statements of prohibition”; these hints at such interactions implicitly signify the 
colonisers' awareness and fear of “racial proximity in a context of mixture and unstable 
boundaries”, namely the social boundaries of difference that were supporting colonial 
rule (ibid: 34). Lowe conceptualises these implicit significations as residual intimacies, 
which “continue, but are less legible” in the aftermath of the social practices that 
constituted them (ibid: 19). This resonates with the concept of residue that signifies 
connections between present and absent traces in the wake of a covert event.
Building on Lowe's methodology, this thesis analyses the residue of covert 
counter-terrorism by tracing the ellipses and peculiarities within that residue which 
materialise absence, the lacunae, ambiguities and contradictions that relate to people 
and objects not present in these representations. By tracing these ellipses and how they 
are made conspicuous and ascribed meaning by a suspicion of state secrecy, analysis can
detail how the ambiguities of residue intimate ideas about that which is absent. These 
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intimations can then be compared to the explicit articulations made about these covert 
operations, in order to establish how the former are likely to reshape the meanings 
produced by the latter. This methodology is how the intimations from the Shabwa 
strike residue were identified: the representation was examined first for significations 
that would produce a suspicion of secrecy, and second for ambiguities and 
contradictions that spoke to absent people and objects; the analysis then examined how 
that suspected secrecy would reflect on those incongruities that are consequently 
highlighted as ellipses in the public evidence of 'what happened' in secret. The analysis 
examined what those incongruities now allowed for in terms of unverifiable ideas about
that which is absent, what the ambiguity of this residue would suggest as possible about 
absent casualties or targeting mechanisms. By comparing these implicit significations 
with those explicitly articulated by the news coverage, the analysis demonstrated how 
the former reshapes the meaning produced by the latter. This analysis captures 
significations that would otherwise be ignored, and therefore allows for a more accurate
understanding of the subject-positions that are likely to be produced by this coverage.
Historical affiliations of residue
In order to understand how residue positions witnesses relative to both the state 
perpetrator and casualties of covert counter-terrorism, it is not enough to trace the 
intimations made by this residue. While this analysis can demonstrate how unverifiable 
possibilities are signified to witnesses and change the meanings attached to these events,
identifying these hints and allusions does not necessarily reveal how that which is 
alluded to is itself represented. Whether discussing physical proximity or relations 
across presence and absence, intimacy can affect how all parties to it are understood by 
others. Intimacy is not an instrument wielded by one actor against another but a social 
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relation extending beyond any actor's agency, which can produce excess meaning 
regarding all the people and objects involved. The problem in the case of covert 
counter-terrorism is that one half of the intimacy being posited is absent from these 
representations. When residue hints at the covert agents involved, the weaponry used, 
the networks that enact these operations, and those at the receiving end of the violence, 
markers of these absent things are not being 'unearthed' from documentation of 'what 
really happened'. But witnesses are nonetheless prompted by these absences to consider 
possibilities regarding those absent people and objects, and as such witnesses are 
positioned in relation to those things. Any analysis of the subject-positions produced by 
residue must therefore analyse how witnesses are prompted to understand the 
importance or significance of absent people and objects to the meanings of these events. 
This means examining how that which remains unspoken bears on that which is absent 
– a further methodological challenge.
The thesis proposes to meet this challenge by placing covert counter-terrorism 
in an historical affiliation with acts of violence possessing similar representational 
qualities. The justification here is that just as absences in a representation are 
highlighted to witnesses through juxtaposition – the contrast between the idea of a 
violent action and the uneventfulness of what is used to report on it – so the way 
representations implicitly frame the significance of those absent can be revealed 
through juxtaposition, by comparing that representation with another. This comparison
can highlight discursive dynamics that have been identified in one representation but 
are obscured in the other by remaining unspoken. Without this juxtaposition, discursive
dynamics might go unnoticed by becoming naturalised in a representation, since they 
may attach meanings to absent people and objects in way that are implicit rather than 
explicitly articulated, and are not drawn to witnesses' attention. Representational 
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markers might therefore instigate wider processes of meaning-making while leaving 
unsaid and unacknowledged how that meaning is contingent upon implicit ideas or 
presumptions.
But it is not just any comparison that can reveal these processes. Comparison 
provides the most evidence of such dynamics when based upon shared representational 
qualities. Moreover, by highlighting representational dynamics that otherwise are not 
signified within the terms of the representation itself, such a juxtaposition can focus the 
ethical stakes of witnessing in this case. Juxtaposition can highlight unexamined 
understandings perpetuated by these representations and how they shape witnesses' 
ethical consideration of different aspects of an event. As the Conclusion will elaborate, 
the use of historical affiliation is as much normative as methodological: it proposes 
different ways of judging the ethics of witnessing.
In unpacking this concept of historical affiliation, and in order to demonstrate 
its analytical value for covert counter-terrorism, the thesis turns to narrative strategies 
identified in the work of W.G. Sebald. As discussed in the Introduction, Sebald's prose 
fiction is concerned with comprehending the continuing presence of tangible and less 
tangible debris that results from manifold destructive episodes in human and natural 
history, debris which resonates with the empirical focus of this thesis: from ruins, to 
recounted memories, to glimpses of smoke and dust across landscapes. Sebald's prose 
work The Rings of Saturn arguably best exemplifies this focus. The narrator of Rings 
recounts a 1992 walking trip along a thirty-odd mile stretch of coast in the south-
eastern English county of Suffolk. For the narrator, this walk is designed to “[dispel] the 
emptiness that takes hold of me whenever I have completed a long stint of work”; and 
while “[his] hope was realised, up to a point”, he admits to a “paralysing horror that had 
come over me at various times when confronted with the traces of destruction, reaching
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far back into the past, that were evident even in that remote place” (Sebald, 2002: 3). The
subsequent narration details not just the narrator's walk through dilapidated, hollowed-
out towns and isolated countryside, but chains of association between Suffolk and other
places and times, chains forged by those evident traces of violent events.
Relating to our methodological challenge, in The Rings of Saturn Sebald appears 
to recognise the potential for the lives of those caught up in destructive events to be 
effaced even as they are hinted at by these traces. At one point, the narrator describes 
the experience of encountering that debris as one that obscures rather than reveals past 
lives, resulting in knowledge akin to “a dark background with a grey smudge in it, a slate
pencil drawing, some unclear letters and numbers in a gothic script, blurred and half 
wiped away with a damp rug” (ibid: 177-8). Significantly, the narrator does not propose 
that uncovering the subjectivities of past lives can act as a counterweight to this 
experience afforded by debris. Rather, the narrator obsessively details the various 
“elective affinities and correspondences” that he comes across on his journey (ibid: 182). 
Throughout this walking trip, as Sebald weaves together traces of violence based on 
coincidence and proximity, these juxtapositions invite readers to consider associations 
between events based on what they leave behind, and thus to consider those now absent,
and their effacement from historical narratives, in a new light (Joldersma, 2014: 43-4).
In Rings, the narrative frequently branches off into multiple overlapping lines, 
with one narrative voice melting into another. Despite this seeming randomness and 
discontinuity, Sebald's narrative transitions between these different spaces and times 
imaginatively tie them together, with the narrative looping back and forth to explicitly 
or implicitly link different traces of violence through coincidence (Gray, 2009: 41-2, 47).
The associations posited by this narration appear designed to prompt readers' 
consideration of the particular qualities of the memories and debris left behind by 
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violence, qualities of partiality, decay, and absence. As Richard Gray argues, the 
narrative coincidences of Rings keep the historical fragments encountered by Sebald's 
narrator in “a state of suspension” (Gray, 2010: 41). Through narrative association, 
“entropy itself is held in abeyance”, as certain characteristics of these traces that might 
otherwise dissipate and escape attention instead form the basis for “relational affinities” 
that emerge from their narrative weaving. Like the rock fragments that now form the 
real rings of Saturn, these traces of violence are held in “suspended animation” by their 
proximity, “between de-composition and re-amalgamation” (ibid: 42). These traces' 
qualities neither pass by unnoticed, nor coalesce into a single coherent narrative of 
history, but keep one another in suspension. This in turn prompts readers to consider 
aspects of these historical fragments that otherwise go unnoticed, aspects that disrupt a 
singular narrative, as discussed in the Introduction.
For our purposes, this suspension of traces can highlight representational 
dynamics of absence: how absence is given meaning and shapes understandings of 
violence in ways that go unspoken. This can reveal to readers the ethical stakes of 
witnessing these absences, even to the point of implicitly critiquing attempts to 
'recognise' suffering subjectivities in this residue.
An example from Sebald's work demonstrates the analytical purchase of this 
approach and its relevance to covert counter-terrorism. During one passage in The 
Rings of Saturn the wandering narrator reflects on the herring industry along the coast 
of Suffolk, describing a series of experiments once carried out on herring to determine 
the extent to which they could survive outside of water. “This process inspired by our 
thirst for knowledge”, he says, “might be described as the most extreme of the sufferings 
undergone by a species always threatened with disaster”. After describing these 
experiments, the narrator notes that despite the common assumption that herring do 
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not feel pain, “the truth is that we do not know what the herring feels”. This passage is 
accompanied by a photograph of seemingly-nonchalant fishermen knee-deep in the 
herring they have caught (Sebald, 2002: 57). The narrator then turns to the story of an 
eccentric recluse, George Wyndham Le Strange, who left his fortune to his housekeeper 
as recognition of her agreement never to speak to him for over thirty years. After off-
handedly mentioning that Le Strange had served in the anti-tank regiment that had 
liberated the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in April 1945, Sebald prints a full-
spread grainy photograph of what was presumably discovered upon that liberation: 
mounds of barely-visible corpses covered up by tents and shaded by trees (ibid: 59-61).
While this series of pages might seem at first to be positing an equivalence 
between two seemingly unrelated events, the fishing of herring and the Shoah, in fact 
the passage reflects on how the residue of past violence that one did not witness shapes 
understanding in the present. By noting Le Strange's role in World War Two, Sebald 
alludes that the man's hermetic silence is a result of his war experience. When presented 
alongside the weathered photograph, however, Le Strange's silence emphasises the 
reader's inability to comprehend his witnessing of that violence, with the residue of 
photography unable to transmit that experience. The reader nevertheless understands 
that this violence did occur and that the people whose bodies are barely discernible in 
the photograph did suffer egregiously, despite the fact that markers of this suffering are 
rendered obscure in this blurred image, leaving that suffering represented only 
indirectly through the silence that alludes to Le Strange's trauma. The juxtaposition of 
the story of herring, however, highlights the different emotional reactions to each event.
While the experiments carried out on the herring is described in some detail, 
contrasting Le Strange's silence, the reader is likely to feel no more than “puzzled 
horror, perhaps even sorrow, but a muted sorrow... not a deep feeling of horror or 
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disgust as we might feel over a singularly repellent act of cruelty to, say, a large 
mammal” (Bernstein, 2009: 45).
While by itself this reaction might appear an inevitable reaction to such an event,
since in the narrator's words we do not know what herring feel, the juxtaposition with 
Le Strange's story de-naturalises this reaction by provoking the thought that it is 
actually the way the herring have been represented over time that allows for this muted 
response. The two photographs share representational qualities: both show piles of 
undifferentiated, almost indistinguishable bodies whose contextualisation signifies the 
absence of clear markers of suffering, as well as the absence of victims' experience. 
These similarities, however, prompt an awareness that it is despite these absences that 
readers acknowledge the suffering of those who died during the Holocaust, whereas 
with the herring readers are enabled by this representation to dismiss the possibility of 
their suffering. The juxtaposition suggests that the “forms of knowledge through which 
we have placed the herring”, which the narrator describes while outlining their 
experimentation, marginalise interest in the experiences of those herring in the course 
of this experimentation. They do so by obscuring “the fact of [herring's] sentience, their 
being alive”, prompting witnesses to understand their own muted sorrow as an 
inevitable reaction to the nature of herring themselves; for when represented in 
“educational movies, natural histories [and] scientific experiments”, herring appear as if 
they do not feel pain (ibid: 50). This juxtaposition therefore reveals a shared 
representational dynamic across both images that marginalises absent experiences of 
suffering, and prompts readers to consider how this dynamic relies on forms of 
knowledge that are now largely rejected in the case of Bergen-Belsen, hence the 
different emotional reaction, but remain accepted and so naturalise that dynamic in the 
case of herring. That acceptance is revealed to produce a very different ethical 
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orientation towards absence.
Historical affiliation is therefore a way to study the ethics of witnessing state 
violence that goes beyond the question of whether suffering is 'recognisable' in each 
case. Such an analysis does not presume knowledge of those markers that accurately 
reflect suffering, as if to resolve the question of the herring's experience, but rather 
examines how representations circumscribe the relevance of living or dead beings to the
meaning attached to events. That circumscription shapes the ethical consideration that 
witnesses are prompted to give to those beings – for instance, as inert matter or sentient
creatures. In this analysis, ethics is not about whether witnesses can 'respond' to 
suffering – as if we can always know whether such suffering exists or not – but whether
representations obscure or naturalise the process by which they delimit the meaning of 
beings. An affiliation between residue based on shared qualities of absence can therefore
establish how that which is absent is treated within a representation in ways that go 
unarticulated. An historical affiliation involving covert counter-terrorism would need 
to account for what is particular about the absences in news coverage of these events, 
how those absences are ascribed characteristics and shape the meaning of events. Such 
an affiliation is not premised on similarities in the acts of violence themselves – indeed, 
it allows for non-causal, non-linear associations between vastly different events – but 
on similarities in the traces left in their aftermath.
The historical affiliation threaded throughout this thesis associates 
contemporary portrayals of covert counter-terrorism with national representations of 
lynching practice in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This affiliation is based on a representational similarity of absence: both 
practices are represented through public traces of violence that do not include 
documentation of its enactment or the violated bodies at its centre. As discussed in the 
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Introduction, recent scholarship has attended to the national representation of lynching 
outside their immediate localities, on terms not necessarily set by lynching perpetrators.
The vast majority of lynchings in the U.S. were not represented nationally through 
documentation of the act itself, and in particular not through visual documentation of 
the violence as it unfolded. That documentation was secreted among local sympathetic 
communities in an attempt to control the meaning of the practice and the identities 
ascribed to those individuals and communities implicated in it (Wood, 2009: 12-14, 
103-9). Thus “although some lynching images... circulated nationally, most did not, 
especially as the antilynching movement gathered steam in the early twentieth century” 
(ibid: 105). Journalists of national newspapers instead drew upon places and objects 
related to the lynching which were documented in its aftermath – courtrooms, streets, 
lynching trees and so on (ibid: 106). These traces were contextualised not by 
perpetrators' rationales but by various claims made about the practice, from eye-witness
accounts and textual re-constructions to journalistic and editorial arguments as to the 
causes of the violence. While lynch victims were often described and represented, their 
lynched bodies became absent traces, absences signified through the traces that were 
drawn upon by newspapers.
The absence of violated bodies gained meaning within a particular narrative that
portrayed lynching practice as unconnected to wider society. As with contemporary 
covert counter-terrorism, lynching was characterised as violence organised without 
national public knowledge until after it occurred, and as a practice that had not been 
countenanced by that public. With documentation of these events themselves seemingly 
secreted, censored or unavailable, those public traces that remained allowed lynching to 
be represented as cutting against the grain of societal developments which otherwise 
indicated a move away from a political culture that would condone such violence. 
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National commentators lamented lynching as an aberrant reversion to barbarism that 
risked spreading like a disease and stymieing progress towards a more civilised society. 
These claims were made despite the fact that the evidence of lynching which was cited –
from mock re-enactments of the practice to lynchings' occurrence in well-connected 
urban centres – hinted at the practice's relation to social changes heralded by modernity
(Goldsby, 2006: 18-25; Wood, 2009: 5-9). This representation of lynching as an atavistic 
reflection of regional cultures continued through the mid-twentieth century, when the 
increasingly private and secretive nature of lynching themselves was interpreted as a 
sign of a wider societal shift away from social relations that would inculcate the practice
(Rushdy, 2012: 97-105). National coverage thus spatialised and temporalised the 
practice as a regional throwback, discursively positioning the violence as separate from 
U.S. society at large and obscuring its potential connections to or fit within wider 
societal developments (Goldsby, 2006: 56-7, 280-1).
This representation of lynching had a crucial consequence for the meaning 
attached to the absent bodies of lynch victims and the violence committed against them 
that remained outside the public sphere. Within this national news narrative of lynching
as an aberrant regression from wider society, newsreaders were prompted to adopt the 
position of that society and to focus on the separation between it and this unseen 
violence. From this subject-position, the absences discussed above were meaningful 
only as reflecting this separation. This representational dynamic did not shape subject-
positions of assent towards the practice: witnesses of its public traces were not 
prompted to adopt a discursive framework echoing perpetrators' rationale for the 
violence. But as subsequent chapters will elaborate, this subject-position delimited the 
ethical orientation of newsreaders towards the absent violence and victims of lynching. 
In different ways, the narrative of a disconnect from wider society curtailed 
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consideration of the violence as worthy of ethical scrutiny in its own right, by 
delimiting the relevance of the violence itself to the meaning and significance of these 
events. The unseen violence and lynched bodies became significant only as evidence of 
this narrative of aberration. An ethical understanding of what was perpetuating the 
violence and newsreaders' potential link to this process was also curtailed, since these 
representations obscured how lynching was enmeshed in broader societal 
developments.
Contemporary covert counter-terrorism and lynching practice a century earlier 
differ markedly in their dynamics of violence. But their shared representational quality 
of absence, the absence of documentation of the violent event and its casualties, allows 
for an historical affiliation in order to examine whether representational dynamics that 
are more easily identifiable in one case – due to the explicit articulation of lynching as a 
societal anomaly – are active but obscured in the other case. Covert counter-terrorism 
is not articulated as spatially and temporally removed from wider society in the same 
way as lynching: unlike the latter, these operations are not represented as some aberrant
throwback. But the signified absence of the violence and its violated bodies does 
produce representations of these practices as distant from the U.S. and British public – 
not through explicit narration, but through intimation. While these intimations 
undermine any potential echoes of a state rationalisation, as the earlier example of the 
Shabwa drone strike demonstrated, they can also delimit the importance of absent 
casualties to these events while obscuring how this takes place. As subsequent chapters 
argue, this delimitation goes unsaid and thus risks being unacknowledged. An historical 
affiliation with lynching practice helps to highlight this dynamic and its obscuration.
Conclusion: responding to absence
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This chapter has built on the argument of the previous one, that state secrecy need not 
rationalise the state's use of violence in public discourse but can instead implicitly 
undermine any rationalisation. That argument concluded that state secrecy which does 
not articulate the rationale for its use might provoke doubts and uncertainties about the 
public evidence of the corresponding covert action, defining that action as enigmatic. 
The present chapter has qualified this idea by investigating the other important part of 
covert action representations today: the absences materialised by rumours and debris 
left in the wake of operations. A suspicion of secrecy does not just frame those traces as 
significant, but gives particular meaning to the signified absence of certain people and 
objects from this public evidence: as reflecting lacunae, ambiguities and contradictions 
that leave aspects of 'what happened' unresolved, and might hint at things about the 
event which would otherwise remain secreted. Within that space of uncertainty, the 
public traces of covert counter-terrorism can allude to unverifiable possibilities about 
those absent things, transforming these traces from enigmatic to suggestive. The chapter
conceptualised this process as resulting from the absences of residue, those things left in
the wake of a covert operation which signify its having passed unseen. Residue of covert
violence, the chapter argued, is able to produce intimations about that which remains 
outside the public sphere.
This chapter has aimed not just to outline this dynamic of intimation but to 
explore its significance for ethical witnessing in relation to covert counter-terrorism. 
Intimations from residue are not addresses made by a political actor to the public at 
large, and as such they reshape the idea of subject-formation as a matter merely of 
accepting or rejecting state narratives for its own actions. These intimations, moreover, 
suggest possibilities around covert events that implicitly undercut any such narrative. 
Subject-positions in this case are produced as a result of equivocal absences: those 
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absences do not 'address' witnesses but are framed by secrecy as suggestive. To talk of 
assenting to or dissenting from their suggestions mischaracterises this discursive 
dynamic: intimations from absence remain unverifiable, prompting witnesses only to 
consider their possibility, and to see absences as significant in that they do not allow for 
confirmation either way but equally cannot confirm explicit claims about the event. As a
result, these intimations shape ethical orientations towards the state perpetrator and 
casualties of operations – not within terms set by a state rationale, but through the 
instability of public evidence. What would it mean, then, to respond ethically to these 
absences?
The chapter has proposed an historical affiliation as the beginning of an answer 
to this question. By associating covert counter-terrorism portrayals with those of 
lynching a century earlier, the aim is to 'suspend' the entropic and disintegrative 
qualities of these traces, in order to examine how absent people and objects are 
implicitly given meaning in ways that go unacknowledged in these representations. This
affiliation is based on shared absences, the absence of violence and of violated bodies in 
these portrayals, with lynching representations giving these absences meaning in ways 
that marginalise interest in the violence inflicted upon victims. Juxtaposing these 
representations with those of covert counter-terrorism can highlight any similar 
dynamics in the latter case that are otherwise obscured.
This analysis suggests that the question of an ethical witnessing of residue goes 
beyond recognising suffering. What shapes the ethical orientation of witnesses towards 
absent violence and bodies in this case is whether and how those absences become part 
of the significance attached to covert events: by what criteria are witnesses prompted to 
evaluate these unseen operations, and how does this affect their consideration of the 
violence at the absent centre of these operations?
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The following chapters identify intimations from residue, and associate them 
with representations of lynching, in order to answer these questions. Insodoing, they 
analyse the subject-positions shaped by this residue, not by presuming a response to the 
state of assent or dissent, but by conceptualising a response to absence that can 
marginalise the violence inflicted upon casualties even while perceiving these 
operations as questionable and discomforting. This kind of interpellation repositions 
ethics as a matter not of avoiding complicity, but of questioning the idea that witnesses 
are distanced and therefore unconnected to these unseen events.
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Chapter 3
Absent traces and the ephemerality of drone strikes
If there is one image whose ubiquity across popular media has made it an exemplar of 
the supposed 'Obama era' of counter-terrorism, it is that of the anonymous and 
indistinctive Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flying through the sky, presumed to be on a 
mission to take out terrorist suspects through missile strikes. Media and scholarly 
references to the 'drone age' (Calhoun, 2015), the 'age of drone warfare' (L. Gardner, 
2013), the 'drone era' (Bass, 2014) and 'remote control warfare' (Gusterson, 2016) attest 
to the perceived centrality of this technology in contemporary counter-terrorism. 
Indeed, the use of armed UAVs has increased exponentially under President Obama, 
with at least eight times as many strikes having been launched by 2014 in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia since Obama's first inauguration compared to the whole of 
President Bush's terms in office (Serle, 2014a). This ubiquity in the public sphere is 
matched by portrayed omniscience on the part of the drone itself. The use of stock 
photographs of a drone in flight in news discussion of the technology frequently fails to 
mark out or qualify the pictured drone as having any distinguishing features, as being a 
single unique instance of a UAV on a particular mission. Because of this lack of spatial 
and temporal delineation, drones are implicitly portrayed as having the ability to fly 
over and scrutinise any part of the Earth, as being able to be anywhere at any time 
(Riopelle and Muniandy, 2013: 158). The monotony of these unremarkable, indistinct 
and undynamic photographs is also likely, as Ohl (2015) argues, to dull witnesses' senses 
towards the violence of drone warfare, by prompting disengagement from its 
representation.
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This monotonous ubiquity and omniscience, however, has representational 
consequences which have not yet been acknowledged in scholarship. One of the most 
ubiquitous images related to the drone programmes, a stock photograph of an armed 
drone in flight which exemplifies the qualities noted above, is in fact a fake (Figure 4). As
James Bridle notes, “the “canonical” image of a drone”, which by 2013 was “the first 
Google image result for “drone” and as such is reproduced endlessly elsewhere”, displays
many physical inaccuracies on close inspection: “missing hatches on the cockpit and tail,
the shape of the air intake, the greebling on the fins and body. That ‘NY’ on the tail: it’s 
not aligned properly, it’s a photoshop” (Bridle, 2013). The image is in fact a rendering 
from a 3D computer-generated model, whose creator Michael Hahn “pieced together 
the planes insignia for [sic] references images found on wikipedia and google searches”, 
while “[t]he background came from a now-difficult-to-find Flickr image of the Afghani 
landscape” (quoted in Madrigal, 2013). This compositing using different online sources 
represents an effort to visualise unseen events using their few traces in the public 
sphere: knowledge of the shape and capabilities of a Reaper drone and the places where 
they are being deployed. An unseen event is thus made visible in unreal form, 
represented through a drone whose serial number '85-566' is fantastical, since the first 
two digits are supposed to indicate the year the aircraft entered service (Bridle, 2013).
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Figure 4: Michael Hahn's composite 3D modelling of a Reaper drone (Madrigal, 2013).
This composite image used to represent a largely-unseen state policy 
demonstrates how secrecy has shaped portrayals of counter-terrorism in the public 
sphere. Drone strikes are at present conducted by three different U.S. entities, with the 
U.S. Air Force conducting overt military strikes in official war theatres, while strikes 
outside those areas are carried out by both the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
SOCOM subdivision Joint Special Operations Command (Oxford Analytica, 2013; 
Zenko, 2013). This latter use of armed drones to target suspected terrorists worldwide 
were initially authorised as part of the 17 September 2001 Presidential Directive 
discussed in the Introduction (Fuller, 2015: 786-7). The CIA is instructed to conduct 
strikes under Title 50 of the U.S. Code, that is, so that U.S. Government sponsorship is 
neither apparent nor acknowledged publicly. JSOC has at times also been instructed to 
operate under Title 50, alongside the CIA; at other times, it has conducted strikes 
covertly while avoiding both Title 50 stipulations and the oversight normally applied to 
'armed forces' operations, using the authority granted SOCOM by successive 'execute 
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orders' and Presidential Directives (Kibbe, 2011: 379-82; Scahill, 2013: 169-71; Turza, 
2013; see Introduction). Regardless of statutory authority, all these strikes are covert. 
The two agencies have operated parallel and joint kill/capture programmes in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia. While U.S. state officials assert that the U.S. can conduct counter-
terrorism outside official battlefields, and have in this context referenced “targeted 
action... with remotely piloted aircraft” (Obama, quoted in The White House, 2013; see 
also Koh, 2010; The White House, 2011), these programmes' operations appear designed 
so that U.S. sponsorship is neither apparent nor officially acknowledged (Lederman, 
2014; N. Shah, 2014: 163-7; Chaynes, 2015: 86).
State secrecy has consequently shaped snippets of public information on strikes, 
which are assembled into visual representations claiming to make these programmes 
visible. Indeed, as of May 2016, four of the first five Google Images search results for 
'drone attack' appear to be computer renderings (google.co.uk, 27 May 2016; see eg. 
Bridle, 2015). As such, these images flex the lines of visibility and invisibility around 
strikes (Campbell, 2007: 358). But secrecy also contributes to the meaning signified by 
such images. Even minor inaccuracies aside, that images such as the above should have 
become ubiquitous is striking considering that “on even a little closer inspection [it] is 
clearly a rendering”. As Alexis Madrigal argues, however, drones in photographs known
to be real equally “seem more rendering than material object” (Madrigal, 2013; see eg. 
Figure 5). The uncanniness of these images is given particular meaning through 
accompanying news framings which qualify them as glimpses of an ongoing strike 
programme. Positioned as reflecting a state foreign policy, the sparse and unspecific 
quality of these scenes hints at the idea that not everything about these ongoing events is
in the public sphere – when used generically in news stories, the images allude to their 
own partiality through the absence of contextualising information within and around 
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them. This allusion produces state secrecy as a suspicion related to ongoing state 
actions. Both real and fake images thus signify ambiguity: they are framed as 
representing ongoing state activities, yet it remains unclear what exactly they show or 
reveal about those operations.
Figure 5: “An MQ-9 Reaper, armed with GBU-12 Paveway II laser guided munitions and AGM-
114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Col. Lex Turner flies a combat mission over southern 
Afghanistan” (U.S. Air Force, 2015).
What the Photoshopped image of the Reaper drone demonstrates is how the 
public representation of drone strikes has been shaped by two factors: the public 
existence of these operations only in residue, and a suspicion of secrecy that surrounds 
them. Hahn's image was created as a reaction to the lack of documentation of drone 
strike events: “We see the aftermath of explosions, sometimes, but almost never the 
actual movements of unmanned aerial vehicles as they strike in Somalia or Afghanistan”
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(Madrigal, 2013). At the same time, the image looks the way it does because of those 
public traces of drone strikes that do exist: details of where they take place, what drones 
look like and how strikes are undertaken. A suspicion of secrecy that surrounds 
individual strikes then colours the implicit meaning and significance of an image such as
this: it emerges as a (faked) trace of events that otherwise remain unseen and are 
suspected of being a secret kept by the state from the public. These traces gain 
significance in relation to secrecy – likely the reason why this photograph has achieved 
its level of exposure.
It is this interplay of public traces and a suspicion of secrecy that structures the 
analysis of the present chapter. Covert drone strikes are publicly represented through 
their residue, from details of the general operating procedures used to enact them to the 
material and less-than-material remainders that litter the site of individual strikes. 
Crucially, there are rarely any markers of the bodies of casualties in these 
representations. The fact or possibility of deaths and injuries are certainly discussed, as 
are rumours and speculative details of the identities of those targeted or struck. But the 
representational markers used to portray strikes in their aftermath are decidedly non-
bodily; textual descriptions or visualisations of bodies are rarely among them. The 
absence of these bodies and other traces of drone strikes, however, is first highlighted by
claims of events that would involve such bodies and then made suggestive by the 
suspicion of secrecy that surrounds these events. As the chapter will demonstrate, the 
public residue drawn on by journalists in accounts of these programmes intimate absent
traces of drone strikes and their possible characteristics.
The ability of drone strike representations to produce intimations of absent 
bodies and objects is an important addition to scholarly work on drone strikes and their
political dynamics. Before analysing these intimations, therefore, the chapter first 
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provides an overview of previous scholarship and demonstrates how this work has 
located the ontology of drone warfare in the materials, discourses and networks that 
propagate it. As a result, past scholarship has argued that strikes materialise spaces and 
identities that cohere with the internal rationalisation of this violence, as reflected in the
materials and practices that operate drones. The representational power of strikes, the 
meanings they produce in the world, is reduced to their operationalisation. But 
intimations from news coverage demonstrate how strikes exist beyond the networks and
materiality of targeting procedures, and how their representational dynamics can shape 
social reality in excess of their internal rationalisation.
Having assessed past research, the chapter proceeds to analyse newspaper and 
social media coverage of covert strikes from 2011 to 2015, pivoting on three periods 
when U.S. and British critical interest in drone warfare increased: the period January-
April 2011, during which there was increasing talk of a rift in U.S.-Pakistan relations as 
a result of strikes in the latter state; the period May-June 2012, when it was revealed 
that President Obama had been regularly overseeing a 'kill list' of potential targets for 
strikes; and the period February-March 2013, covering the lead up to and aftermath of 
John Brennan's confirmation hearing as the new director of the CIA. This selection 
method is supported by previous research, which has established that representational 
practices around foreign policy are often intensified and more richly developed at such 
moments of contestation around a political issue, providing a relevant source of data 
that likely influences subsequent representations (Doty, 1996: 12-13). This focus also 
allows us to test the idea that intimations from residue could reconfigure state 
rationalisations, which similarly intensify at such times. Within these three periods, 
across the eighteen British and three U.S. newspapers identified in the Introduction, all 
articles which discussed the covert drone programmes or covert strikes were analysed. 
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A representative sample of articles on individual strikes outside these periods from 
2013 to 2015 have also been included in order to assess representations of strikes when 
they actually occur.
In examining this coverage, the chapter argues that the residue used to report on
the covert strike programmes – the smoke, rubble and scant operational details left in 
their wake – produces a suspicion of secrecy around these programmes and their 
individual strikes. With residue framed as significant on these grounds, it is then able to 
intimate ideas about that which residue leaves unknown or ambiguous, namely details 
of the casualties and operating networks that are absent from these public traces. These 
intimations suggest that casualties may not have been the claimed or intended targets, 
and that targeting mechanisms may not be as accurate as suggested in official and 
unofficial state assurances. These unverifiable possibilities undermine the explicit 
claims made in these representations about the precision targeting quality of strikes, the 
proffered source of their efficacy and legitimacy. By shaping subject-positions focused 
on these possibilities, these representations curtail any rationalisation of covert drone 
warfare in line with the representations and practices that enact them, including public 
rationalisations offered in the abstract by the Obama administration.
In circumventing a state rationalisation of these strikes, however, these 
intimations of absent casualties and targeting networks reframe these unseen events. 
While a suspicion of secrecy signifies that these programmes continue outside the public
sphere, the equivocal absences within strike residue produce the idea that strikes are too
fleeting, too spatially and temporally indistinct, and too insubstantial in their public 
mark for public witnesses of its traces to comprehend its dynamics, to understand 'what 
happened'. Strikes are implicitly represented as too ephemeral and evanescent for 
details of their absent casualties and targeting procedures to be established. The subject-
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position produced as a result is examined in this chapter through the historical 
affiliation with national U.S. coverage of lynching in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. As is explained, this coverage, which similarly drew on non-bodily 
traces in the wake of the violence, gave meaning to the practice as something 
confronting society in its aberrance, as significant in challenging society to comprehend 
its causes and implications. Newsreaders were prompted to focus on that struggle to 
comprehend, marginalising the violence inflicted upon lynch victims from the 
significance ascribed to the practice; lynch victims became relevant only in indicating 
the practice's unspeakable, confounding and incomprehensible quality.
The chapter demonstrates that drone strike representations enact a similar 
dynamic but implicitly, through unspoken hints and allusions rather than explicit 
narration. As intimations of casualties represent strikes as ongoing but too ephemeral to
scrutinise, witnesses are prompted to focus on the consequent struggle to comprehend 
this practice's intangible dynamics, including the public's relation to this seemingly new 
form of state warfare. While intimations prompt witnesses of residue to consider what 
these absences in residue might indicate about counter-terrorist states' pretensions to 
due diligence and justice, that same subject-position is positioned as part of a wider 
society that is spatially distanced and morally disconnected from strikes. The ethical 
orientation towards strike violence is reduced as a result, with absent casualties 
intimated as significant only as part of strikes' intangibility, as indicating the public 
difficulty in pinning down these fleeting events. As a consequence, the relationship that 
does exist between strikes and witnesses, whereby the latter are prompted to adopt a 
subject-position that marginalises the violence inflicted upon casualties, itself escapes 
scrutiny and continues unnoticed.
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Theorising 'targeted killing' beyond its operationalisation
As the computer-rendered composite image demonstrates, the public imaginary 
surrounding drone strikes has been influenced by the scattered information about this 
practice that circulates in the public sphere. Critical scholars and journalists have drawn
on snippets of information, rumour and debris to assemble particular understandings of
drone warfare. These understandings have delimited the ontology of drone warfare, of 
what constitutes this warfare, and the kind of issues and discussion considered relevant 
to understanding that warfare. Speculative or rumour-based details have consequently 
been presented as emblematic of the practice in popular and scholarly discourse, even as
the piecemeal nature of those details has been acknowledged. The idea that these 
snippets have become emblematic echoes Bhattacharyya's conception of “iconic 
glimpses” of violent 'War on Terror' practices, whereby one “moment” or fragment of a 
practice “stand[s] in for the whole”. That fragment is framed as reflecting the essential 
dynamics of that practice, such that “what is represented purports to the be the instance 
that holds the meaning of the process” (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 58, 124). Sparse snapshots 
of the covert drone programmes have been framed as nonetheless condensing the 
'meaning' of the practice for those who do not have access to the larger secret process 
that constitutes it (ibid: 130). The difference with drone strikes as opposed to previous 
War on Terror practices, however, is that these snippets do not show the enactment of 
this practice but represent its public traces.
Critical scholarship has created iconic glimpses of drone warfare by drawing on 
traces of the operationalisation of drone strikes policy, covering the visualisation 
methods of drone surveillance, the operating procedures of target-construction, and the
materiality and embodiment involved in drone strike networks. By formulating these 
traces as glimpses that can 'stand in' for drone warfare as a whole, critical literature in 
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International Relations, political geography and security studies has traced the existence
and political dynamics of strikes, the meanings that strikes produce in the world, to the 
materials, discourses and networks that operate these programmes. Insodoing, this 
literature has reduced the ontology of drone warfare, that which constitutes strikes in 
the world, to the prosecution of strikes within these state procedures and networks, and
delimited strikes' political dynamics to those that correlate to their internal 
representation and prosecution. As such, the spaces and identities that are produced by 
drone strikes – that is, the way that social reality is made intelligible, giving spaces and 
identities materiality, through the social practices that constitute strikes (Dunn, 2009: 
426, 431) – have been conceptualised as cohering with the internal rationalisation of 
this violence, with the way this violence is made meaningful by these materials and 
operating procedures. Secrecy is implicitly relevant only insofar as it hampers analysis 
by restricting access to the event of a strike, which exists outside the public sphere. 
What happens once strikes leave the state apparatuses that enact them and become 
public events through the narration of their public traces is left unaddressed (although for
a recent rare exception analysing overt Israeli strikes, see Walters, 2014).
The theorisation of covert strikes through their operationalisation reflects the 
broader public framing of the policy as one of 'targeted killing'. From early in Obama's 
presidency, off-the-record explanations of drone policy, the confirmation of strikes 
against 'high-ranking' terrorists (eg. Hussain, 2009; Spiegel and Soloman, 2009; P. Shah, 
2009), and military comparisons with Israel's assassination policy against Palestinian 
opponents (Mazetti, 2009; Shane, 2009; see Kendall 2001; Ben-Naftali and Michaeli 
2003), have led to drone warfare being contextualised as a state strategy of locating and 
eliminating particular individuals (Mayer, 2009). Indeed, generalised state 
acknowledgements of strike programmes outside official battlefields have centred 
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practices of target identification (Koh, 2010; The Daily Telegraph, 2012; The White House, 
2013).
Notwithstanding that the majority of strikes are 'signature strikes' (see 
Introduction), targeting not identified individuals but detected patterns and 
irregularities in unknown bodies' behaviours (Crampton et al, 2014: 207-9), the targeted
killing framing remains the dominant lens through which drone violence is debated in 
public discourse (eg. Alston, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2014) and security studies 
scholarship (eg. Boyle, 2013; McCrisken, 2013), having become the “term du jour” by 
which proponents themselves have “rebranded” state violence (Scahill, 2015b). While 
critical scholarship on drone warfare has extensively critiqued the claims of state 
officials regarding the targeting precision of strikes, and has analysed both personality 
and signature strikes, from early on it has conceptualised drone warfare through the 
networks, procedures and materials that enact it (eg. Downes, 2004; Ulrich, 2004). 
Scholarship has located the representational practices that produce drone strikes in the 
world, the “discourses [that] constitute the objects of which they speak” (Bialasiewicz et 
al, 2007: 406), within these practices and materials, theorising that strikes materialise 
spaces and identities consistent with drone warfare's internal rationalisation.
For Grégoire Chamayou, this conceptual and analysis focus is a matter of 
“taking apart the mechanism of violence” in order to “discover the implications of how 
it works for the action that it implements”. Chamayou thus extrapolates the discursive 
dynamics of strikes from those mechanisms, since the means of violence “not only make
it possible to take action but also determine the form of that action” (Chamayou, 2015: 17, 
emphasis added). Drawing on snippets of targeting procedures, Chamayou theorises the 
covert drone programme as a form of militarised manhunting, whose apparatuses of 
visualisation and surveillance of territory and bodies shift the dynamics of warfare (ibid:
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37-45). For theorists, the target-construction and identification involved in drone 
operations means that drones “fulfil the hunter-killer role conveyed by their hideous 
names” (D. Gregory, 2012: 169), this being a reference to the well-known Predator 
model of UAV. According to Chamayou, this shift in the dynamics of warfare produces 
subject-positions of the drone-as-hunter and its evasive prey, representing strikes 
through these identities, while re-constructing the space of 'armed conflict' where lethal 
means may be legitimately used – from a fixed battlefield located around those engaged 
in combat, to an indeterminate space that ceaselessly re-forms wherever the target is 
located (Chamayou, 2015: 30-5, 52-9).
Chamayou's analysis demonstrates what is at stake in locating the ontology of 
drone warfare in its materials and practices of prosecution. From this perspective, 
drone warfare shapes spaces and identities that rationalise drone violence: individuals 
are produced as threats and thus legitimate targets, while spaces are rendered as both 
unruly, therefore threatening, and endlessly mutable in scale and position for the 
purposes of mobile networks of violence. Critical scholarship that begins with the 
operationalisation of strikes frames the challenge of drone warfare as one of revealing 
how this production of space and identity occurs. The analytic that is constructed to do 
so has two consequences: it delimits drone strikes to the materials and practices that 
enact them outside the public sphere; and it relegates secrecy and absences to 
epistemological barriers to research.
Scholarship examining the visual technologies of drone surveillance and 
targeting echoes this analytic. Examining the 'kill chain' of “actors, objects, practices, 
discourses and affects” which enact both overt and covert drone strikes, Gregory details 
the 'scopic regime' that is reiterated within this chain, culturally-mediated frames of 
vision that helps drone pilots and analysts make sense of the wealth of visual data that 
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drones accumulate (D. Gregory, 2011: 196, 190). Produced through the combination of 
surveillance imagery and real-time connectivity between actors at different points of 
targeting networks, this regime shapes pilot subject-positions that are immersed in 
ambiguous visualisations of the terrain 'down below' but that are also intimately 
connected to fellow soldiers within these networks and visualised on that terrain. 
Military personnel below are brought 'closer' to pilots, “render[ing] 'Our' space familiar 
even in 'their' space – which remains obdurately Other”, filled with potential but opaque
threats (ibid: 201). Wall and Monahan elaborate the role of visuality, conceptualising 
drone networks as practising an “exclusionary politics of omniscient vision”, where 
ambiguous visual information is placed within “functional categories” that “correspond 
to the needs and biases of the operators, not the targets, of surveillance” (T. Wall and 
Monahan, 2011: 243, 240). This scopic regime “radically homogeniz[e] local difference, 
lumping together innocent civilians with enemy combatants” (ibid: 240). The event of 
the strike is theorised as producing homogeneously dangerous spaces and peoples.
Other analyses focus on how the operating procedures of covert 'signature 
strikes' produce people and terrain in biopolitical terms, with observed behaviours, 
rather than known identities, coded and categorised based on a notion of the potential 
for future threat. Locating the political dynamics of strikes in the “governmental 
technologies” and “political rationalities” of target-construction, Shaw theorises that the 
coding of information on potential targets' behaviours into analysable patterns produces
targets as “virtualised forms of emergence that may become threats in the future”, based 
on a “process-based, even epidemiological understanding of danger” (Shaw, 2013: 540, 
549, 548). Allinson modifies this biopolitical theorisation by conceptualising target-
construction as a “racial algorithm of distinction”, whereby surveillance and auditing 
produce distinctions between populations worthy of life and populations whose lives 
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threaten the health of the former (Allinson, 2015: 117, 118-20). This conceptualises 
drone strikes from the perspective of “[t]he drone's eye view”, with the “visible 
techniques of distinction and allocation... used by the drone pilots” producing social 
reality by “delineating those areas and populations” where death is acceptable (ibid: 120).
Vasko goes one further, analysing how “reconnaissance-strike complexes” rely on 
anthropological knowledge, coding and mapping patterns of behaviour through 
concepts of culture (Vasko, 2013: 85, 95-7). By coding behaviour as evidence of culture, 
strike events produce spaces in terms of “hierarchical relations”, with spaces containing 
potentially-threatening cultural behaviours constituted as “spaces of threat [that] are 
always threatening the Homeland, and thus need to be intervened upon” (ibid: 91, 92). 
This in turn “fully realise[s]” the subject-position of “a secured, singular, and universal 
power like the United States” (ibid: 90). In the biopolitical reading of operating 
procedures, strikes produce threatening spaces and bodies and collective identities that 
need securing against infiltration by the former.
Finally, critical scholarship focusing on the materiality and physical 
embodiment of drone warfare locates the political dynamics of strikes in the materials 
and flesh that enact this violence. Wilcox focuses on how visualisation and target-
construction shape drone pilots' bodily experience of feeling 'at home', of being within 
familiar spaces and social relations, by producing targets who are intimately 
experienced through visualisation as “embodying... formless, malevolent forces” and as 
therefore being 'out of place' (Wilcox, 2015: 128, original emphasis). Those targeted “are 
materialised” as close-but-distant “contaminating terrorist bodies” that are 
unassimilable and must be protected against (ibid: 130, 129). Holmqvist conceptualises a
human-material assemblage of 'fleshy' and 'steely' bodies as constituting drone warfare, 
and points to the agency of materials within this assemblage, with the drone camera 
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screen recoding people and objects down below and fostering pilots' embodied 
experience of omnipresence (Holmqvist, 2013: 538-9, 543-5). These “material [powers]” 
and resultant experiences reshape the ontology or “norm of the human” in war, 
“producing populations” as “the grey mass of non-existence or possibly 'collateral 
damage'” (ibid: 550, 547). Material 'agents' therefore shape pilots' experience of spaces of
violence. Finally, Shaw and Akhter posit a “more-than-human explanation” for “the 
transformation of war” through drone strikes (Shaw and Akhter, 2014: 215). 
Cumulative Presidential Directives under which covert strikes are conducted 
decentralise responsibility, by legitimising anonymous bureaucratic actions and pre-
empting sovereign decision-making. Meanwhile, the 'kill lists' of potential targets 
diffuse responsibility by subordinating individual pilots' judgement to targeting data 
and imagery that has already been shaped and coded within the targeting network (ibid: 
221-2, 228-9). This analysis locates the political dynamics of drone violence in the 
spaces within which these objects circulate, “connecting battlefield with boardroom”. 
Secrecy is relevant insofar as it is a product of “bureaucratic power” that attempts to 
“deflect public criticism”, conceptually relegating it to these bureaucratic spaces (ibid: 
221, 226).
Even scholarship which critiques the narrow foci of drone strike literature 
theorises the production of space through the state's operationalisation of this violence. 
While Grayson rightly notes scholarship's tendency to ignore how drones' “technical 
rationalities” are “culturally produced and circulated” through public narration, that 
“political culture” is conceptualised through “its deployment of violence” and “its own 
self-understanding” in the process (Grayson, 2012: 30). As such, cultural production is 
interpreted as a question of “how a liberal regime – as a potential assassin – understands
itself as a moral actor and biopolitical entity” (ibid: 36, emphasis added). This 
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conceptualisation does not pinpoint the perceptual boundaries of that liberal regime – 
that is, who counts as producing these representations of targeted killing and self-
understandings. While Grayson argues that the “policy resiliency” of strikes is partly 
dependent upon “forms of rationalisation” that make up its cultural narration, he also 
speaks of “audiences” who must recognise these rationalisations and accept their 
narration of events (ibid: 30, 36). This hints at the potential for representations 
encountered by a public 'audience' that exceed liberal states' rationalisation of their own 
violence.
By focusing on the operationalisation of covert strikes, be it the visual regimes, 
procedures of target-construction, or the materials and embodiments within drone 
networks, the above critical literature reduces the event of the strike to the materials 
and social practices that enact it, separating drone warfare from the public sphere. 
When these practices do cross over into the public sphere, they are theorised as 
materialising spaces and identities conducive to the internal rationalisation of this 
violence, of permanent potential threat. Secrecy, explicitly or implicitly, assists in this 
production of space by preventing access to the ontology of drone warfare, hiding the 
political dynamics of strikes that rationalise these programmes. This analytic echoes the 
phenomenon described by Roger Stahl as drone vision, where the view provided by a 
drone's 'gun camera' is interpreted as a glimpse of a wider hidden apparatus of power. 
This interpretation accepts the representation of subject and object implied by this 
militarised vision while imbuing the drone with an opaque power, as the object that sees
all while remaining aloof (Stahl, 2013: 663-4). This perpetuates “the fantasy of gaining 
access to telepresent military power” through this glimpse (ibid: 667). This above 
theorisations similarly offer a fantasy of access to drone warfare, promising to reveal the
'meaning' of a state practice that remains largely hidden. Echoing the historical trend in 
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covert action research, these theorises implicitly conceptualise “a 'hidden truth'” (Mistry,
2011: 267) within the documentary archives and networked apparatuses of the state.
The problem with this promise is that the materialisation of drone strikes 
includes their existence as narrated events in public discourse. That existence is on the 
basis of the public traces of strikes which are left in their wake, since the unfolding of 
these events is rarely documented 'in the moment'. The existing critical scholarship on 
drones focuses on how the sensory phenomena which are surveyed and targeted by 
drones and drone pilots, the people and terrain down below, are 'recoded' through the 
materials, social practices and embodied experience involved in the operationalisation 
of drones, making those bodies and spaces intelligible in ways that match the internal 
rationalisation of this practice. By focusing on this internal dynamic, this scholarship's 
analytic makes the theoretical presumption identified by Rey Chow, that any encounter 
with new sensory phenomena is inevitably made intelligible within articulated schema 
of identity and alterity, such as those articulated by and which rationalise the 
operationalisation of drones (Chow, 2006: 62-3, 67). This theorisation presumes that 
such an encounter leads to the successful materialisation of space and identity 
conducive to those schema – indeed, this analytic builds that success into its theory and 
thus “essentiali[ses] such alterity (or its process of reinscription)” (ibid: 63).
The analysis in this chapter avoids this theoretical presumption by examining 
representational practices that produce strikes outside of their operationalisation, and 
the subject-positions produced towards strikes as they exist in the public sphere. Within
these public representations, the snippets of information referenced by the analyses 
discussed above may be modulated by other signifiers of drone warfare, namely the 
public traces, apparent secrecy and equivocal absences of strikes, all of which exist 
independent of state articulations. Such modulation can produce meanings in excess of 
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those suggested by any one signifier, including those of operating practices, and can 
thereby curtail a shaping of terrain and identity in line with the internal rationalisation 
of drone violence.
Lynching, drones, and the marginalisation of casualties
Just as the existence of covert drone strikes goes beyond their operationalisation to 
public traces, so too does the existence of absences related to these strikes. Regardless of
how military-intelligence-policy practices might represent the actors and technologies 
involved in these operations, the residue that constitutes the public existence of these 
unseen events may materialise them differently even as those people and objects remain 
absent from the public sphere. The rendered image of a Reaper drone discussed earlier 
suggests that absence plays an important role in the discursive production of strikes: 
residue such as this image becomes significant in appearing to relate to unseen covert 
activities, but so too does the paucity and partiality of such residue, with the rendering's 
opaque surface hinting at what remains unconfirmed. How witnesses of residue are 
positioned towards the absences suggested by such paucity is a matter not of the state's 
targeting networks, but of how the remainders of those networks intimate various 
possibilities.
In order to examine the dynamic between secrecy and absence that positions 
newsreaders towards absent casualties and targeting networks, the chapter develops the 
historical affiliation introduced in the previous chapter between contemporary covert 
counter-terrorism and lynching in the United States. As noted, lynching practice was 
rarely portrayed in national news coverage through documentation of the event itself 
and the violated body at its centre. Drawing on eye-witness accounts, material debris, 
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speculation and rumour, coverage represented lynching in the absence of such 
documentation as an unspeakable and incomprehensible practice compared to 'modern 
society'. National discussion revolved around how to understand lynching in relation to 
wider societal developments that were otherwise seen to indicate a civilising of U.S. 
society (Goldsby, 2006: 18-25). By representing lynching within a narrative of societal 
progress, national coverage prompted newsreaders to disavow lynching violence as 
unconnected to wider society.
The notion that this violence was difficult to comprehend in relation to societal 
developments obscured how those developments, from changing citizenship laws to the 
growth of corporate capitalist social relations, had helped constitute this practice. 
Jacqueline Goldsby points by way of example to lynchings in response to suspected 
crimes of conspiring white and black men, crimes which signalled that new relations 
fostered by impersonal corporate contracts would override entrenched racial divisions. 
That those who then lynched the accused could use the anonymising processes of new 
judicial bureaucracy to avoid identifying one another demonstrates that lynchings were 
both shaped by and able to continue because of the increasingly depersonalised legal 
procedures of justice (ibid: 121-4). The extent to which modern societal developments 
were implicated in lynching, however, was masked by the national representation of the
practice as an atavistic and barbaric throwback to past rituals of violence that was 
difficult to fathom given modern societal conditions (ibid: 56-7, 280-1). Lynching 
became something 'confronting' modern society rather than implicating it in any way.
The spatialising and temporalising of lynching practice discursively constructed 
and separated a national society from this violence and prompted newsreaders to 
consider themselves part of that society. From this subject-position, lynching was 
intelligible and significant in its confounding aberrance. With the struggle to 
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understand the practice becoming one of the pivots of national news accounts, these 
representations therefore prompted a focus back on those 'confronted' with this 
violence (Lutes, 2007: 471-2). Within this discourse, the body of the lynch victim, which 
is largely not co-present in these accounts, is signified in its absence only as part of what
is unspeakable, incongruent and thus confounding about the practice. As such, the 
violated person at the centre of any lynching is figured as meaningful primarily as an 
emblem of this struggle to comprehend, and is made significant only on these terms. As 
Goldsby argues from contemporaneous literary accounts of lynching and related 
violence, the victim “becomes marginal to – precisely because he is a spectacle of – the 
story of his own... death”, while “a spectacle of worried impotence... becomes the most 
important focal point in the story's telling”, that is, in narratives of the practice 
(Goldsby, 2006: 147, 148). This signification of a worried impotence obscures how 
lynch victims are marginalised in the process, since it defines lynching as separate from 
and confounding to a public that really is trying to scrutinise this discomforting violence.
This chapter uses an historical affiliation between lynching and contemporary 
covert counter-terrorism to examine whether news coverage of covert drone strikes 
enacts a similar dynamic that marginalises the violence inflicted on bodies by focusing 
on a struggle to comprehend. As the following analysis demonstrates, while the two sets 
of representations share an absence of documented violence and violated bodies, and 
both practices are represented as separate from wider society, the dynamic of disavowal 
and marginalisation takes place differently in the contemporary case. Rather than result 
from an explicit narrative of incongruity, this dynamic derives from the combination of 
secrecy and absence which makes the latter suggestive. Hints and allusions which result 
from this suggestiveness implicitly frame the covert drone programmes as spatially 
diffuse and temporally slight, and thus difficult to understand and judge based on their 
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public traces. This framing shapes a subject-position focused on the fleeting and 
ungraspable quality of this practice, and on trying to understand how it affects the 
public's relation to warfare. This focus marginalises the unseen violence and casualties 
of these operations in a way that does not draw attention to itself, since this 
marginalisation is not explicitly articulated through a narrative of regional aberrance 
but is a result of things left unspoken that emerge as suggestive possibilities. This 
historical affiliation pivots analysis towards problematising what might otherwise 
appear natural or incontestable – in this case, the image of strikes as intangible that 
allows for this marginalisation.
Actual criteria, potential targets
Most news coverage of the covert drone programmes is not coverage of individual 
strikes, which are rarely officially acknowledged and only intermittently covered in 
British and U.S. national presses (see eg. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2012, 
2014, 2015). Drone strikes are instead largely intimated, alluded to, through discussion 
of the U.S. administration's decision-making procedures for these programmes, in 
particular discussion of the criteria used to decide upon 'targets' for future 'personality 
strikes'. The various suspicions and suggestive snippets of information which circulate 
about these criteria constitute residue of actual strikes, being some of the more 
extensive traces of drone strikes' ongoing enactment without being markers of these 
events themselves. Reports of leaks or of attempts to force the U.S. government to 
release details of these criteria have not just emphasised that the latter are being 
withheld, but have carried various lacunae and uncertainties that signify the public 
absence of actual strikes conducted using these criteria. As reports on a state policy, they
have also produced a suspicion of ongoing secrecy around those strikes and their 
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operating networks. Framed by this suspected secrecy, the partiality of coverage 
becomes suggestive public evidence of covert action, allowing those ambiguities to 
intimate the possibility that the real identities of those targeted remain unknown, 
unconfirmed or even secreted. This implicitly undermines explicit claims of strikes' 
accuracy and effectiveness, and of targets' dangerous terroristic nature. Yet those 
targeted are simultaneously marginalised from the significance of strikes, which pivots 
instead on the potential target as alluded to by absence, rather than violence inflicted on 
actual casualties.
Articles premised on discussion of drone strike policy have frequently framed 
'the drones issue' as one revolving around “growing unease... that there are no publicly 
understood rules for picking targets” (The New York Times, 2013a). Thus in the run up to
John Brennan's confirmation hearing, press coverage focused on U.S. lawmakers' 
repeated requests for the release of a “long-sought, classified Justice Department 
opinion” giving the Obama administration's legal justification for drone strikes against 
U.S. citizens abroad. Such coverage signifies that strikes are continuing on the basis of 
unclear targeting criteria, framing snippets of the latter as public traces of actual strikes. 
In this context, coverage presented the image of members of the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees “go[ing] to an office... at the Justice Department, where they 
can sit and view the legal opinion” which “isn't being made public” (Gorman and Perez, 
2013). The juxtaposition of the idea that strikes are ongoing and this image of 
Congressmen holed up in an office viewing classified targeting rules materialises 
absence: it signifies the lack of any other markers of actual strikes, including targets. 
This juxtaposition also produces a suspicion of secrecy in the public sphere, by 
signifying the possibility that those unseen strikes remain unacknowledged by Obama 
administration officials and are thereby being hidden along with the rules that govern 
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them.
This suspected secrecy makes the absence of markers of casualties suggestive, in 
that it indicates that their identities remain unconfirmed in the public sphere. Given the 
image of lawmakers viewing a classified memo on how those bodies were targeted, this 
equivocal absence alludes to the unverifiable possibility that those identities have also 
been secreted, or in fact cannot be proven by the Obama administration. Without a 
rationalisation of covertness by the U.S. state, absences produced by this representation 
intimate the ambiguous extent and purpose of state secrecy, alluding to the possible 
meaning of those absences and shaping a subject-position of doubt towards claims that, 
in Brennan's words, “[w]e... use these technologies carefully and responsibly” (ibid).
Yet while these intimations undermine explicit articulations of drone policy, 
curtailing an interpellation of assent, the subject-position produced does not constitute 
dissent from the state's use of violence. The unknown casualties of actual strikes are 
alluded to only through the figure of the ambiguous potential target. Brennan himself 
articulates this figure when justifying strikes: “Determinations about whether an 
individual fits the criteria for targeted killings are made on a case-by-case basis and a 
determination of how “imminent” a threat they pose, he wrote” (ibid). The sparseness of 
detail as to what 'imminent' means and the conspicuous lack of 'cases' again signifies the 
absence of casualties from the public sphere. In the context of suspected covertness 
around ongoing strikes, this absence intimates the possibility that claims of precision 
may remain unsupported. Yet this intimation makes absent casualties meaningful only 
in indicating the difficulty in comprehending unseen and distanced strikes. The ethical 
orientation towards casualties is narrowed to questions of what their absence possibly 
reveals about targeting mechanisms.
Another article perpetuates this logic, first stating that “the [drone] campaign has
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killed over 1,500 people in Pakistan and Yemen” before immediately switching focus to 
the potential target, noting that “[t]he criteria used by the CIA and the military 
determining targets are closely guarded secrets” (Gorman, Entous and Barrett, 2013). 
This mention of secret criteria juxtaposes the implicit absence of the strikes that caused 
these deaths, creating a suspicion of further covertness. When this suspicion frames the 
statement that “U.S. officials sa[y] very few of those killed were civilians” (ibid), the 
latter intimates actual strikes and their absent casualties as having an unclear and 
potentially secreted relation to the category of civilian. But this intimation delimits 
interest in those tallied casualties to an interest in what they may imply about the extent 
of secrecy and uncertainties around the targeting procedure, not in the violence 
inflicted upon them.
More critical coverage, despite explicitly scrutinising the unclear definition of 
'imminence', also inadvertently restricted consideration of absent casualties. One 
Guardian piece asserted that a secreted memo on drones discussed during Brennan's 
confirmation hearing “defined imminent threat broadly to include the possibility that if 
a suspect was not killed they could at some future date carry out an attack against the 
U.S.” (McGreal, 2013b). Alongside the suspicion that strikes are ongoing outside the 
public sphere, this rumour and its implicit lack of actual suspects intimates the 
possibility that people are being continually targeted through misleading definitions of 
imminence that belie claims of existential threat. Yet actual casualties are marginalised 
by being integrated into this intimated opacity in targeting criteria. Other implicitly 
critical articles perpetuated this focus: a New York Times piece noted Attorney General 
Eric Holder's assertion that “the president does not have the authority to kill a United 
States citizen on American soil who is not engaged in combat” but then qualifies this 
with the statement that “Mr. Holder did not say how the president would determine 
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who is an enemy combatant”, ie. engaged in combat (Stevenson and Parker, 2013, 
emphasis added). With the suspicion that ongoing strikes are being kept secret, the 
implicit absence of the operating mechanisms that enact strikes becomes suggestive, 
hinting that selection procedures for targeting may be lax and thus secreted. The lack of 
any state rationalisation of secrecy thus allows traces of unseen strikes to undermine 
claims of precision. But this dynamic invites a focus not on the lived suffering of 
casualties but on what their absence might suggest about ongoing counter-terrorism 
procedures and their secretion. The focus is shifted to those 'confronted' with this 
intangible practice and its suggestive implications, not the infliction of violence.
This logic of marginalisation was repeated in earlier coverage of the revelation 
that President Obama was personally involved in the compiling of drone strike 'kill 
lists'. In the New York Times piece that broke the story, the “top-secret “nominations” 
process to designate terrorists for kill or capture” is characterised as an analysis of “mug 
shots and brief biographies [that] resembled a high school yearbook layout”. President 
Obama is described as “approving every new name on an expanding “kill list”, poring 
over terrorist suspects' biographies on what one official calls the macabre “baseball 
cards” of an unconventional war” (Becker and Shane, 2012). Framed as public traces of 
ongoing absent strikes, these sparse and abstracted details produce a suspicion of 
ongoing covertness around those strikes, with no accompanying state rationalisation of 
its use. This renders these details significant as public residue of covert actions, 
highlighting the public absence of those targeted through this procedure, their identities
inscrutable within unseen “PowerPoint slides bearing [their] names, aliases and life 
stories”. With these 'baseball cards' remaining out of view within a process characterised
as surreal in its banality, “a grim debating society”, this absence intimates the possibility 
that targets' identities are being secreted and even skewed or misunderstood through 
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their presentation within this “strangest of bureaucratic rituals” (ibid).
This allusion reshapes explicit claims that drone strikes reflect “American 
values” of “moral responsibility” in a fight against a “metastasizing enemy [in] new and 
dangerous lands” (ibid). That rationalisation is implicitly represented as bearing an 
unproven and possibly faulty relation to the slide-shows viewed by state officials in 
secret. But this intimation also shapes a narrow ethical orientation towards violence in 
those 'dangerous lands'. As with lynching, this representation discursively distances 
unseen covert strikes from wider society: with these public traces hinting at unverifiable
further secrecy, they produce a subject-position from which the practice is 
discomforting on account of the suggestive but inaccessible workings of this insular and
uncanny debating society. Actual absent casualties are marginalised, intimated only as 
reflecting the bizarre opacity of targeting. As one Telegraph piece commented, what is 
“deeply unsettling” about drone strikes is that “America has developed a clinical, 
dispassionate procedure for selecting... targets” (Blair, 2012, emphasis added).
Scrutinising the ephemeral
When news coverage turns to the ubiquitous figure of the drone pilot, strikes are 
represented as diffused events, existing across a variety of points in space and time. The 
popular image of “[u]nleashing hell from a padded seat in suburbia” (The Sunday Times, 
2013) reflects on one level the significance that is attached to the pilot as “represent[ing] 
the ultimate secret of the military state – the figure who sees everything from nowhere” 
(Stahl, 2013: 664). Representations of strikes from the perspective of the pilot are also 
important, however, in that they figure her as representative of soldiers' and CIA agents'
distancing from the violence of warfare. Coverage such as this incessantly asks “what is 
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must be like [for pilots] to sit in the virtual cockpit and fire missiles with a joystick from 
halfway around the world” before “go[ing] home and 'hav[ing] dinner with their 
families'” (ibid: 670). This portrayal of the drone pilot's daily experience frames much of 
the public debate around these programmes.
While explicitly structuring the drone debate around the psychology of the pilot 
and the potential normalisation of state violence, these representations intimate covert 
strikes themselves through articulations of geographical distance and temporal 
slightness. As the news article quoted above emphasises, an “airbase in the suburbs of 
Syracuse, New York” is now “one of the front lines” of covert counter-terrorism, a place
where “a US air pilot known only as Scott hunts down and kills people, identified as his 
country's enemies, 7,000 miles away” (The Sunday Times, 2013). The semi-anonymous 
and snippet quality of these details produces an implicit suspicion of secrecy 
surroudning Scott's and others' flights. At the same time, this characterisation of drone 
operations signifies an absence of actual strikes through this 7,000 mile distance, figuring
these unseen events as having been dispersed across two distinct spaces. Fellow 
coverage represents the drone operator “pressing his button” and the second-and-a-half 
delay before “the Hellfire rocket erupt[s] from the aircraft he is controlling”. This hints 
at ongoing unseen strikes as existing only within that slightness of time, and in the 
“8,000 mile” distance separating drone from operator “at Creech Air Force Base in 
Nevada” (Bowcott and Lewis, 2011). Indeed, the apparent evanescence of strikes is often
considered part of these programmes' greater significance. Coverage frequently 
characterises drones as weapons of war that dramatically reduce the density of actions 
involved in taking life, producing a “push-button conflict” (Macintyre, 2011), where 
“[a]ll it takes is a flick of the joystick and squeeze of the trigger” (The Sunday Times, 
2013), allowing “the enemy [to] be engaged by the click of a mouse from an air-
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conditioned bunker thousands of miles away” (Coughlin, 2013). As traces of implicit 
ongoing strikes, these abstracted references further signify the absence of more tangible 
traces or documentation of these events.
With these details framed as residue of strikes that were possibly secrets kept by 
the state, the absence of more specific traces becomes suggestive, intimating that this 
apparent slightness and diffuseness is potentially linked to that absence. Strikes are 
intimated as too spatially dispersed and evanescent to have left a substantial public 
mark. The secrecy produced through these snippets therefore becomes suggestive in its 
equivocal nature: it alludes to the unverifiable idea that the slightness and diffuseness of 
strikes contribute to their secrecy. Strikes are thus implicitly represented as significant 
in terms of being ephemeral. Within that significance, references to drones' 
“sophisticated cameras that beam back sometimes gruesome images [of both] insurgents 
[and] “collateral damage”” may hint at absent casualties, and even allude that such 
graphic images disturb and challenge an otherwise clinical and condensed decision-
making process (The Sunday Times, 2013). But those casualties are intimated as relevant 
only in indicating and raising questions over the diffuseness and slightness of strikes. 
The violence inflicted upon casualties risks being marginalised, as newsreaders are 
prompted to focus on the discomforting spatial and temporal intangibility of this 
practice.
As with representations of lynching, this representation of absent strikes as 
diffuse and slight events distances drone violence from wider society, focusing attention
on the struggle to understand and scrutinise this practice. The idea that “[f]or the first 
time in US history, a president regularly signs off on the killing of named individuals... 
acting as judge, jury and executioner” (McGreal, 2013a), hints at the possibility of 
ongoing secrecy and signifies the public absence of those targeted individuals. This 
185
secrecy frames this brief detail as suggestive, alluding to those targeted as remaining 
unknown in the public sphere, but insodoing it frames strikes as significant on account 
of their occurring regularly without public awareness – only the President is signing off 
on them. In the context of the above coverage, which represents strikes as lacking fixed 
spatial markers and substantial duration, this intimation represents strikes as ongoing 
but ephemeral: they appear to continue outside the public sphere but are possibly too 
slight and diffuse to comprehend. Newsreaders are invited to adopt the position of a 
public that is distanced from and cannot scrutinise these ephemeral events. The focus 
on this struggle to comprehend marginalises ethical consideration of casualties 
themselves; that marginalisation is itself obscured, since from this subject-position 
strikes are intelligible as irreducibly intangible events.
The barriers to public scrutiny were further intimated in discussion of the 
possibility of an “assassination court” (Foster, 2013) that could oversee the planning and 
conducting of covert strikes. This discussion again alluded to actual strikes in their 
temporal slightness. “Most experts”, according to one New York Times article, “say judges
do not have the alacrity or expertise to rule on a frantic call from the C.I.A. every time a 
terrorism suspect is in their sights” (Shane, 2012, emphasis added). With these 
articulations implicitly suggesting ongoing secrecy around strikes, they allude to those 
absent strikes in the image of a frantic phone-call as possibly too fleeting to be observed 
or to leave traces in the public sphere. Such fleetingness is further alluded to in 
references to the “speedy decisions” needed in response to “rapidly developing 
questions” over targeting as strikes unfold (Katyal, 2013). This intimation implicitly 
represents covert strikes as intangible events on account of their sparse and 
indeterminate spatial and temporal boundaries. These representations consequently 
shape a subject-position from which these events make sense as being too ephemeral to 
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account for, positioning strikes as distant from and unconnected to a public that is 
trying to scrutinise them.
As with lynching coverage, the struggle to comprehend becomes the meaning of 
covert strikes, shaping a subject-position focused on uncontrollable ephemerality and 
its consequences for public scrutiny. These representations of the intangible spaces and 
moments of strikes allude to absent casualties only as emblems of these events' 
insubstantial existence. While these allusions implicitly undercut rationalisations of 
strikes' effectiveness, since that effectiveness cannot be confirmed in public, they 
narrow the ethical orientation that witnesses are prompted to adopt. Intimations 
represent strikes as distanced and disconnected from the public, made intelligible and 
significant through the suggestive but unverifiable implications of that distance. The 
marginalisation of casualties' violation is naturalised by that same representation of 
intangibility.
Disintegrating violence
When press coverage materialises the spaces where covert strikes have been carried out,
this representational dynamic of distancing and marginalisation becomes more stark. 
Individual strikes are reported through sparse fragments of rumour, speculation and 
debris emanating from the sites where they occurred. These reports narrate strikes 
through the motif of the drone's missile hitting an object. “At least three missiles were 
fired at a house in the Shalam Raghzai region of South Waziristan, a semiautonomous 
mountainous tribal region straddling the border with Afghanistan”, states a typical 
account in The New York Times. “[A] second attack struck a suspected militant 
compound in Wacha Dana, about seven miles northwest of Wana, the main town of 
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South Waziristan. At least 14 people were killed in the first two attacks, [Pakistani] 
officials said”, before “a drone fired at a vehicle at Darnashtra in the Shawal area” hours 
later, killing “at least four people”. These details, the report notes, “could not be 
independently verified” (Masood, 2011).
As events, these three strikes are discursively suspended at the moment of their 
disintegration, represented by the detonation of missiles and the implicit damage or 
destruction of buildings and vehicle. No other information extends their spatial and 
temporal dimensions beyond this moment; their truncated narration signifies a 
perceptual distance from these events and their full dynamics. With no U.S. state 
invocation in response to these claims, derived from local residents who officials say “do
not necessarily provide accurate information” (ibid), a mere suspicion of secrecy is 
produced, framing this sparse local information as suggestive regarding the lacunae 
around those killed. In this framing, these statements intimate the suspected identities 
of casualties, “said to be foreigners” in hearsay fashion (ibid), as unconfirmed in the 
public sphere and as potentially shedding a different light on what has taken place 
unseen. Being intimated through the frozen moment of these events' disintegration, 
however, these absent bodies are figured as meaningful in indicating the ephemerality of
these strikes, their being fleeting events that leave little in their wake from which one 
could deduce further details.
Other research has concluded that this sparse reporting in the aftermath of the 
event, mediated by anonymous local officials and detailing only material targets and 
casualty figures, epitomises the repetitive nature of coverage of individual drone strikes 
(Ahmad, 2016; Pope, 2016). The consequences of this sparse representation of strikes 
and casualties can be elucidated from coverage of strikes that includes photographs of 
the debris left in their wake. Stock photographs of indistinguishable drones in flight or 
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sitting inert in hangers are likely to prompt disinterest and disengagement, since they 
leave viewers “perpetually on the cusp of war” without ever meeting expectations by 
revealing that war's violent dynamism (Ohl, 2015: 620). Photographs of the aftermath of
covert strikes, however, can perpetuate different dynamics, by inviting scrutiny of these 
spaces of residue that materialise independent of state channels of communication.
A typical photograph in The Observer, captioned “The wreckage of a car 
destroyed in an unmanned drone attack in Yemen a week ago”, hints at the unseen 
violence of a strike through its after-effects (Harris, 2013b; Figure 6). In affirming a 
strike occurred and then showing only an image of decayed wreckage, with the camera's
angle occluding any wider social context, the representation alludes to the apparent lack
of an enduring material marker at the site of the strike. References to independent 
groups' efforts to “track [drone] attacks” hint at state silence around this particular strike
(ibid). The lack of movement within this space signifies just how unlike the supposed 
dynamism and eventfulness of the strike this image is, while the scopic focus on rusting 
metal implicitly signifies the potential anonymity of such residue, with nothing on the 
surface of the car indicating the characteristics of the strike that produced it. Indeed, 
this anonymity appeared to have real consequences, with The Observer attributing the 
wreckage to a strike on 3 February 2013 (Harris, 2013a), whereas Reuters later referred 
to the apparent original “February 3, 2013 file photo” as showing “wreckage of a car 
destroyed in 2012 by a U.S. drone air strike” (Bayoumy, 2013), most likely a strike on 30
March in Azan, Shabwa province (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2012: YEM046).
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Figure 6: Car wreckage in February 2013 from reported drone strike in Yemen the previous 
year (Bayoumy, 2013; cropped version in Harris, 2013a, b).
An Associated Press report of a strike in Yemen on 19 April 2014 carried a similar
photograph of “a destroyed car”, contextualising it with claims that the strike “killed at 
least nine suspected al-Qaida militants and three civilians”. A security official quotes a 
“civilian survivor” as saying the strike “tossed [the SUV] some 20 metres... away”, 
producing “flying debris... while “explosions” continued for another 30 minutes” 
(Associated Press, 2014; Figure 7). Against these details, the burnt chassis of the vehicle 
signifies that the event itself has long passed, while its relative isolation within an 
otherwise-unremarkable space alludes to a dearth of material traces. The report ends by
noting that “[t]here was no immediate U.S. comment on the strike”, with the U.S. 
“typically not” acknowledging “[strikes] done by the CIA” (ibid).
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Figure 7: Car targeted by reported strike in Sawmaa area of al-Bayda province, Yemen, 19 
April 2014 (Associated Press, 2014).
A New York Times report extends this representational dynamic, presenting an 
image captioned “Tribesmen On the Rubble of a Building Destroyed On Sunday in an 
American Drone Strike Against Suspected Militants in Shabwa Province in 
Southeastern Yemen” (Worth et al, 2013; Figure 8). The long flat plain emphasises the 
absence of the building by focusing attention on the low wide mound of bricks and the 
now-empty space they presumably once filled, while the people milling around the 
rubble signify the uneventfulness of the image, with the drone having seemingly long 
gone. The uneventful and indistinct quality of this residue again appeared to affect 
coverage, with the Times having to issue a correction stating that the building whose 
rubble was pictured was destroyed not in 2013, as originally reported, but two years 
earlier (The New York Times, 2013b).
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Figure 8: Rubble of building hit by reported drone strike in south-eastern Yemen, 14 October
2011 (Worth et al, 2013; The New York Times, 2013b).
The visible marks of damage on all of these traces hint at dynamics of violence 
without being able to shown them. The state silence accompanying these reports 
produces a suspicion that these unseen events were secrets kept by the state from the 
public, framing this debris as significant in remaining in the public sphere and thus 
highlighting the absence of any markers of those targeted. This evidence of covertness 
thus implicitly signifies its inscrutability in relation to the claimed or unspoken 
identities of targets, intimating that casualties' identities perhaps could not easily be 
confirmed from this wreckage and rubble. This intimation shapes a subject-position of 
uncertainty over who was killed here and whether these secreted strikes achieved the 
professed aims of the covert programme. But in emerging from residue that highlights 
the scantness of public traces of these covert events, these intimations frame the strikes 
as too ephemeral, their footprints too insubstantial, for details and results to be 
confirmed in their wake. These events become meaningful in their seeming 
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intangibility, figuring absent casualties as significant only in indicating the struggle to 
comprehend what took place. This marginalisation is inconspicuous, since newsreaders 
are prompted to scrutinise the debris rather than consider how casualties are 
represented in their absence.
Even the more rapid reporting of strikes through social media extends this 
representational dynamic. A January 2015 strike in Marib, Yemen was initially reported 
by journalists on Twitter, with one re-tweeeted image, captioned “Just after Marib 
drone strike against #AQAP”, showing black smoke rising from the horizon into an 
empty sky over the sparse town (Scahill, 2015a; Figure 9). The smoke perches on the 
brink of immateriality, signifying that the strike has been and gone unseen without 
leaving much tangible or enduring trace. Appearing close to dissipation, the residue of 
the strike endlessly hints at the violence of the event while implicitly emphasising just 
how little is left behind. With the sparsity of the report producing a suspicion of secrecy,
and the space produced visually as secluded and distanced, this residue positioned far 
from the camera's eye alludes to the absence of the targeted bodies among these traces. 
This intimates the possibility that casualties' identities are inconclusive, and that such 
secluded spaces may be aiding those identities' secretion or the inability to verify 
claimed targets, with witnesses afforded only snatched images in the event's aftermath. 
But these intimations from less-than-material traces represent the event as ephemeral, 
by implicitly suggesting that such a strike occurs too quickly and leaves too little behind 
at its rumoured site. These intimations thus link the insubstantiality of the strike to the 
ambiguity over absent casualties, implicitly figuring strikes as intangible in-and-of-
themselves. In a dynamic echoing lynching coverage, this marginalises the violence 
inflicted upon casualties by making the latter significant only in reflecting the 
sparseness and slightness of strikes. Witnesses are prompted to focus on the fact that 
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instead of targeted bodies, there is only ever smoke.
Figure 9: Smoke from reported drone strike in Marib, Yemen, 26 January 2015 (Scahill, 
2015a).
Conclusion: 'a new way of warfare'
As covert drone strikes have become increasingly prominent in public portrayals of 
counter-terrorism strategy, news coverage and scholarly analysis have examined what 
this new prominence may inaugurate in terms of the waging of warfare. Drone strikes 
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are seen to offer “[a] radically different approach to warfare”, whereby “the bad guys are 
on the run without risking legions of boots on the ground” (D. Carr, 2013). Thus 
“warfare in the current era” includes “almost constant offensive measures” that “[fall] 
short of actual warfare” but nonetheless “regularly seek to damage or weaken rivals or 
gain an edge through violations of sovereignty and penetration of defences”. Such a 
development at “a level below “hot war” challenges both conventions in diplomacy and 
international law, not least regarding sovereignty” (The Observer, 2013). This notion of 
novelty is reflected in the titles of scholarly assessments, which point to drones as 'a 
frightening new way of war' which is 'transforming conflict, law, and policy' (Cohn 
2015; Bergen and Rothenberg, 2014).
In this narration of strikes' significance, readers are addressed as a member of a 
public which has a stake in this ongoing change. This is a policy “operating largely under
the public radar” (D. Carr, 2013), “prosecuted at the very margins of accountability... by 
secretive organisations... without defined goals or a willingness to discuss” (The 
Observer, 2013). 'Goodbye Cold War. Welcome to The Cool', one title addresses readers, 
affirming that “[w]e've entered a new era, in which death is delivered by drones... But 
what are the rules?” (Harnden, 2013, emphasis added). Such articulations, with their 
explicit and implicit claims of secrecy, shape a subject-position from which covert 
strikes 'make sense' as having brought the public into a new era of warfare without their 
having been consulted. Readers are prompted to feel dissatisfaction with this withholding:
after all, it is “we” who “still don't have answers to the most basic questions about the 
lethal powers the Obama administration has claimed”, with drone policy having led to 
“controversial killings that the executive branch refuses to legally or morally justify 
before the public” (Crockford, 2013, emphases added). Implicitly, then, this covert 
violence is disconnected from and does not reflect upon that public.
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As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, this subject-position of being 
distanced and unable to comprehend is implicitly shaped by wider coverage of the 
covert drone programmes. Various public residue of strikes are framed by a suspicion 
that they relate to state secrets, turning what would otherwise seem like arbitrary 
remainders into public evidence of hidden activities. This framing allows equivocal 
absences within these traces to intimate unverifiable ideas about people and objects that 
appear absent from the public sphere: that casualties' identities cannot be confirmed 
from the few traces left by strikes, that those identities are being kept secret or remain 
unestablished by the state, and that covert actors' targeting mechanisms are not as 
infallible as is proclaimed. These possibilities undermine explicit claims of the accuracy 
and efficacy of covert strikes and curtail any wider rationalisation of these programmes 
in terms of exceptional but necessary counter-terrorism. Insodoing, these hints and 
allusions from absence figure unseen strikes as possibly too spatially diffuse and 
temporally slight, and leaving too little material trace, for anyone to establish 'what 
happened'. These intimations therefore shape a subject-position focused on the struggle 
to comprehend intangible covert violence.
This discursive dynamic that intimates strikes as ephemeral events has 
important consequences for any notion of ethical witnessing towards drone strike 
residue. The ethical orientations shaped by this coverage were examined here through 
an historical affiliation between covert strikes and lynching practice, based on shared 
absences and distancing in their representation. The explicit representation of lynching 
as an aberrant regional throwback to past forms of violence invited a national news-
reading public in the United States to adopt a position from which the violence 
'confronted' them in its aberrance, in its cutting against signs of supposed broader 
societal progress. This subject-position saw lynching as unnerving owing to its 
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confounding causes and implications, and consequently focused on the struggle to 
comprehend its dynamics.
The use of this historical affiliation reveals that covert drone strike coverage 
prompts a similar subject-position – not through explicit narration, but through 
inadvertent hints and allusions that reshape the explicit claims made about these 
programmes. The intimation of unseen strikes as ephemeral, evanescent and 
insubstantial events prompts witnesses of residue to understand these programmes as 
significant in terms of being too intangible to comprehend. As with lynching, this shapes
a narrow ethical orientation towards strikes: absent casualties are intimated as merely 
reflecting the intangibility of strikes, marginalising the violence inflicted upon them 
from the meaning and significance of the practice. This marginalisation is made 
inconspicuous, since witnesses are prompted to scrutinise the rumours and debris left 
behind by strikes and thus to consider their own spatial, temporal and ultimately moral 
distance from these events, as suggested by the equivocal absences in that residue, rather
than consider how casualties are represented in their absence. Because this meaning-
making occurs implicitly, it goes unnoticed; the historical affiliation with lynching 
challenges this obscuration, by highlighting how absent casualties are positioned within 
the significance afforded strikes without that positioning being explicitly stated or 
visualised.
The intimations produced by this representational dynamic undercut 
articulations from the state which try to pre-condition understandings of covert strikes 
in line with some state rationale. While a rationalisation of 'targeted killing' is 
intermittently offered in the abstract, without reference to specific drone programmes, 
the state does not invoke a rationale for any secrecy surrounding unseen strikes. 
Covertness is thus represented through inference from the residue left behind by 
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strikes, without an accompanying state rationale for its use. This allows that suspected 
secrecy to help materialise spaces and identities that exceed the internal rationalisation 
of drone violence, as predominantly studied in critical scholarship. But because strikes 
are represented through non-state public traces, they complicate the question of ethical 
responsiveness towards state violence. These traces do not prompt public assent 
towards state actions, but nor do they invite dissent – only uncertain discomfort at 
strikes' ephemerality and insubstantial public footprint. Nor are casualties being 
dehumanised or effaced. Rather, witnesses are prompted to adopt a subject-position 
from which strikes match Jacqueline Goldsby's description of lynching as having been 
both “horrifying and banal” (Goldsby, 2006: 27): horrifying in that both forms of 
violence are represented as discomforting because confounding; banal in that witnesses' 
ethical orientation towards absence is narrowed to discomfort with intangibility, not 
ethical consideration of the violence inflicted upon casualties in-and-of-itself. Absent 
casualties become significant not in their being violated but in their reflecting that 
intangibility.
Ethical witnessing in this case would need to involve not dissent from the state's 
rationalisation of its violence – which is already undermined by allusions from residue 
– but an awareness of how residue already invites witnesses to see casualties as 
implicitly relevant or not. Just as with lynching, rather than accept strikes as distanced 
from the public, an ethical witnessing would need to acknowledge how residue connects
witnesses to these unseen events.
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Chapter 4
Finding and hiding the body: suspicion and opacity in 
the bin Laden raid
On the afternoon of May 1 2011 local time, President Obama and his national security 
team sat in front of monitors in the basement of the White House's West Wing. They 
were watching what was to be an historic moment in the history of the U.S.'s efforts to 
militarily defeat the al Qaeda franchise. It was the early morning of May 2 in Pakistan, 
where twenty-five U.S. Navy SEALs were being transported by helicopter to the 
suspected location of Osama bin Laden (CNN, 2013). President Obama watched via 
Sentinel drone surveillance footage and helmet-mounted cameras as those SEALs 
landed beside a large compound in the town of Abbottabad, made their way swiftly up 
the floors of the compound's main building, blowing up doors and shooting dead four 
residents before they reached the bedroom of the world's most-wanted terrorist.
Except President Obama wasn't watching this, at least not all of it. A couple of 
days after the raid that left Osama bin Laden dead was publicly announced, then-head of
the CIA Leon Panetta revealed that the live feed from the Navy SEALs' cameras was cut 
off once they entered the compound. “[T]here was a time period of almost 20 or 25 
minutes where we really didn't know just exactly what was going on... We had some 
observation of the approach there, but we did not have direct flow of information as to 
the actual conduct of the operation itself as they were going through the compound” 
(quoted in Swinford, 2011a). Obama and his team were not looking at footage of the 
raid as it happened; they certainly didn't see bin Laden being shot dead by one of the 
SEALs as they entered his bedroom.
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The confusion over what exactly President Obama was watching on those 
television monitors, and the contradicting of initial claims that he saw bin Laden die, 
aptly reflect the public image of the raid on the Abbottabad compound. This was a rare 
event in terms of contemporary covert action: a covert operation that was officially 
acknowledged by the state, with the U.S. revealing it had taken place and publicising 
certain details, from descriptions of what happened to photographs of Obama's national
security team monitoring the raid from afar. Part of the event's public significance lay in
its publicising the activities of the Joint Special Operations Command, with coverage 
singling out JSOC's Naval Special Warfare Development Group, known by its 
predecessor's name Navy SEAL Team Six, which undertook the raid under CIA 
authority (Dilanian, 2011; Scahill, 2013: 452). This publicising is significant considering 
that SEAL Team Six had already carried out ten to twelve operations within Pakistan; 
shortly after the raid, outgoing head of U.S. Special Operations Command Eric Olson 
revealed that SOCOM, of which JSOC is a subsidiary, was conducting around a dozen 
such covert kill/capture operations every night, though mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Shachtman, 2011; Travers, 2011). The Abbottabad raid, in other words, was a rare 
glimpse into the covert counter-terrorist activities of U.S. special forces. It stands out in 
the overall argument of this thesis for the same reason: this event and the secrecy 
surrounding it were addressed by the state to the public, with President Obama 
announcing the raid through a live press conference.
At the same time, as the above comments on Obama watching the raid indicate, 
this acknowledgement of the operation circulated alongside a number of ambiguities 
and contradictions surrounding the action. Claims would be made that were later 
retracted or altered; eyewitness testimonies could not explain what exactly people had 
seen; images were uncovered that failed to clarify what had happened or what they even
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showed. This was a covert operation revealed and then represented through its residue 
of rumour, speculation and inscrutable objects and images. Because of this, it was an 
operation announced to the public but remaining opaque. Surrounding the opacity of 
this residue was the official state acknowledgement not just that the raid had occurred, 
but that a key piece of residue was being kept hidden by the state: bin Laden's mutilated 
and mortally wounded body. This secretion was addressed to the public through state 
invocations of a rationale, not for the covertness of the operation, but for the covering up
of some of its remainders. The secrecy of the state, then, was produced in a unique way: 
it was officially broken regarding the event itself, then justified regarding one body, 
before appearing in coverage alongside other residue which was not acknowledged by 
the state and that remained contradictory or seemingly inscrutable. It is the discursive 
dynamic produced between the secretion of the body and residue of the raid that 
concerns the present chapter.
The potential for representations of the raid to be shaped by both acknowledged
secrecy and its visible traces has not been considered by previous research into the raid's
existence in public discourse. Prior analyses have focused primarily on the official U.S. 
articulations of the raid, documenting those articulations and suggesting the most likely 
interpellations of the public from them. In arguing that the U.S. fostered public 
complicity by framing the raid as heroic and legitimate, Hasian Jr. argues that hiding bin
Laden's body prevented alternative readings – that secrecy, as a tool of the state, 
discouraged further questioning (Hasian Jr., 2012: 1805, 1807). Hasian Jr. cites 
Rancière's example of the police attempting to discourage public interest in an event by 
shouting: 'Move along! There is nothing to see here!'. But Rancière's point is that such an
appeal “recall[s] the obviousness of what is there”, that is, it invites the public to think 
that something is worth seeing (Rancière, 2010: 37, emphasis in original). This is the 
201
argument of the present chapter: that the visible hiding of bin Laden's body could 
potentially prompt the public to be suspicious towards that act of hiding.
Jarvis and Holland get closer to the vein of this chapter, arguing that U.S. 
discourse subsumed the circumstances of bin Laden's killing within discussions of his 
death's political ramifications, with officials referring to the raid not in “descriptive, 
corporeal ways” but through allusion (Jarvis and Holland, 2014: 443). This chapter 
expands this notion of allusions to bin Laden's death and body by looking at public 
discourse more broadly, analysing all articles discussing the raid in eighteen British 
national newspapers over the first week of press coverage of the operation. While the 
analyses discussed above see state secrecy as something instigated and shaped by the 
state, the present analysis looks at how the official acknowledgement of hiding 
interacted with other residue that hinted equivocally at wider secrecy, reshaping the 
meaning attached to the state's secretion.
To examine this interaction, the chapter extends the historical affiliation used 
thus far through a particular representational aspect of early- to mid-twentieth century 
lynchings in the United States. Examining how analyses of recent covert counter-
terrorism have drawn on lynching photography to propose a parallel between the two 
practices, this chapter makes the case for rethinking this parallel, basing it not on the 
visualisation of bodies but on their secretion. The representational power of lynching 
photographs stemmed not solely from the ability to display bodies in particular ways 
but from that suppression of that documentation, so that the meaning attached to those 
bodies by lynchers could not easily be contested. Secretion was an act of indicating who 
had the authority to see, and to determine the meaning of, violence. This 
representational dynamic can be shown to be at work in representations of the 
Abbottabad raid, with the secretion of bin Laden's body acting to restrict the potential 
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for that body to signify things other than what the Obama administration intended of it.
The other residue of the raid that circulated in the public sphere, however, was able to 
intimate that secreted body, to allude to both it and the absent Navy SEALs, and 
insodoing to invite witnesses to consider the possibility that this unseen body might 
signify things beyond the state's own articulations.
As the chapter details, intimations of bin Laden's body had two representational 
consequences: it prompted newsreaders to understand the act of secretion as a 
precarious attempt to control meaning, thus undermining the perceived validity of that 
meaning; and it suggested to witnesses that state secretion was preventing public 
understanding of various other public traces of the raid. The absent body of bin Laden, 
in other words, carried meaning in excess of that assigned to it through its secretion and
by more explicit articulations of the raid and its significance. Yet this excess meaning 
did not invite dissent towards the raid. Rather, the dynamic between the acknowledged 
secretion of bin Laden's body and other opaque residue shaped a subject-position of 
suspicion. The implicit emphasis on the potential meanings of bin Laden's body invited 
readers to see that unverifiable meaning and its possible suppression as key to the raid's 
significance. Other residue, meanwhile, prompted a focus on the possible meaning and 
secretion of other absentees, such as the aims and tactics of the Navy SEALs themselves.
With the raid explicitly framed by both the Obama administration and news coverage as
reflecting a victory for a civilised counter-terrorist state over a cowardly and 
hypocritical Islamist terrorism, these suspicions were likely to shape a subject-position 
of uncertainty over this story and its attendant identities. While coverage of drone 
strikes shaped a subject-position focused on the struggle to comprehend ephemeral 
events, coverage of the Abbottabad raid shaped a subject-position of suspicion over how
absent residue might actually reflect on the narratives and identities being used to 
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explain the significance of the raid. The violence of the operation, however, was made 
meaningful only in terms of this self-absorbed suspicion that witnesses' understanding 
of that violence was being obstructed by secrecy; other ethical questions surrounding 
the use of force at Abbottabad were marginalised.
Lynching, Abu Ghraib, and the violated body
The significance of bin Laden's death is that in the recent past, such covert acts of 'just 
punishment' have been represented publicly through visible violated bodies. Rather than 
remain resolutely unknown, covert practices in the months and years following 11 
September 2001 have become symbolised through 'iconic glimpses' (Bhattacharyya, 
2008) of them being enacted, glimpses centring on the bodies of those affected. The 
rendition and detention of so-called 'enemy combatants' at the Guantánamo Bay prison 
became intelligible in public debate largely through images of shackled and kneeling 
detainees clad in orange jumpsuits and glimpsed through barbed-wire fencing, 
surrounded by U.S. military personnel (Van Veeren, 2011: 1729-39). Whereas such 
snippets of actual covert practices would have been rare in public discourse during the 
Cold War, these glimpses have circulated relatively freely over the past fifteen years 
such that they have become ubiquitous. To be sure, these images and testimonies remain
only the tip of the iceberg so far as these covert practices go, but their portrayal of actual
state covert operations marks a significant development.
That real violated bodies should form part of the mediation of covert action 
prompts the question of how they shape the public meaning of these operations. The 
violence at the heart of these covert practices is not exactly obfuscated in these 
representations; the image of restrained and downcast detainees certainly imparts 
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something of the treatment of these bodies. As discussed in the first chapter, these 
glimpses of covert action have been contextualised by state refusals to confirm or deny 
what they indicate about the actions undertaken by covert agents. These refusals, 
however, carry abstracted or generalised justifications for treating bodies in ways 
corresponding to the treatment hinted at by these glimpses. Refusing to confirm or deny
acts as a way of admitting what may be inadmissible, legally or morally, without 
confirming specific practices or offering clear lines of responsibility (Bhattacharyya, 
2008: 117-9). With lines of accountability rendered untraceable, all that is left are 
displays of those violated bodies and appeals to the identity of 'enemy combatants' as an 
abstract justification for possible 'exceptionalist' violence. This pre-conditioning of 
public discourse frames violated bodies as encapsulating the stakes of and rationale for 
the violence, despite being visible only in snippets of a largely-obscured and 
unconfirmed practice (ibid: 124).
Framed as iconic glimpses of these practices, violated bodies become defined by 
their physical vulnerability. Images of the Guantánamo prisoners represent this practice
as incontestable, since they are framed as only hinting at the practice's wider dynamics 
while leaving unclear any lines of responsibility therein. Contextualised as showing how
certain bodies can now be treated, these figures are defined by that treatment, by the 
lack of control over and defence of their own bodies. As such, they become metonyms 
for the downtrodden position of certain social groups, of particular configurations of 
sex, race and class, whose relative position in society is embodied in this treatment 
(Alexander, 1994). As witnesses are invited to understand these bodies through general 
justifications for the differential treatment of 'enemy combatants', a social group is thus 
defined on the basis of shared physical vulnerability, representing the identities of those 
visualised by their mere corporeality. This representation in turn shapes a subject-
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position whose understanding and affect unwittingly reiterates the rationale for the 
violence. That these snippets signify that much of the violence remains unseen prompts 
witnesses to react with horror at what else might be happening in secret. This reaction 
risks producing an identity schema of a civilised Western collective that normally would
not carry out such barbaric acts – that this incongruity between identity and action is 
why these practices are so upsetting and why they are being conducted largely in secret 
(Bhattacharyya, 2008: 139-41).
In the period following the 11 September 2001 attacks, a number of covert 
counter-terrorist practices have become knowable to the public through similar 
snippets of violated bodies. The one which has come to exemplify the dynamic outlined 
above is the torture of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In the handful of 
images that have become ubiquitous symbols of this torture (despite being only a 
fraction of the digital photographs taken at the prison by military personnel), prisoners 
appear to be posing in positions of humiliation and subservience relative to prison 
guards. This apparent posing – whereby detainees walk on their hands and knees with 
dog collars around their necks, or simulate homosexual sex acts with one another – has 
led analyses to conclude that these images are intended as 'proof' of the depravity and 
bestiality, and therefore moral inferiority, of the prisoners. Poses of prisoners' willing 
subordination to prison guards are designed as evidence of those prisoners' interiority, 
justifying their very treatment in this way (Carrabine, 2011: 15-18). While a public 
reaction of outrage would short-circuit this meaning-making, analysts have argued that 
as iconic glimpses of detainee treatment, these photographs nonetheless signify that the 
sexualised and animalistic poses therein are emblematic of the torture, that these 
meanings indicate why the violence is torture (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 128-30). As such, 
these images represent detainees as experiencing this treatment as torture because of the 
206
meanings implied by these poses; thus the violence becomes intelligible as 'revealing' the
sexualised racial identities of detainees, as sexually-repressed Muslim males (P. Owens, 
2010). Thus the identity schema which actually underpins the state's rationalisation of 
this treatment is reiterated. This analytic suggests that the public circulation of such 
violated bodies condemns them to a demonised (because racialised and gendered) and 
dehumanised (because defined by their corporeal vulnerability) identity.
Once again, the mediated witnessing of bodies in pain reiterates an 
understanding of those bodies which matches the rationale of the violence itself. In 
making this argument about Abu Ghraib, scholars have pointed to a parallel with the 
photographic documentation of lynchings in the United States. This parallel has been 
built on the foundations of a commentary by Susan Sontag (2004), in which she likens 
the photographs of grinning U.S. soldiers standing beside degraded detainees to 
photographs of white Americans standing nonchalantly beneath dead and mutilated 
black bodies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Sontag argues that 
similar aesthetic composition of these images photos reflects a shared representational 
dynamic that prompts witnesses to accept configurations of identity implied by the 
violence, becoming participants in discursive violence. Sontag nonetheless posits a 
significant difference between the two sets of photographs: while lynching photographs 
were “trophies... taken by a photographer in order to be collected, stored in albums, 
displayed”, the Abu Ghraib photos are “less objects to be saved than messages to be 
disseminated, circulated” (Sontag, 2004: 27).
Sontag's distinction has provoked counter-arguments. Hazel Carby directly 
addresses it by arguing that lynching photographs were equally intended to be 
circulated publicly, and that therefore the Abu Ghraib photos stand as “direct 
descendants of the postcards of lynched black bodies”, with both sets of photos acting as
207
“images and messages to be shared – in celebration or as a warning” (Carby, 2004). 
Further articles in subsequent years have reiterated a link between lynching 
documentation and the scenes of Abu Ghraib, characterising both as celebrations of a 
collective white supremacy over downtrodden non-white bodies, but have disagreed 
over whether this celebratory role operates through these photograph's use as private 
souvenirs or through their public dissemination and display (see Apel, 2005; Feldman, 
2005; Razack, 2005; Gordon, 2006; Mirzoeff, 2006; Philipose, 2007; Pugliese, 2007). 
The analytic discussed earlier suggests that images of violated bodies in subordinate 
poses can reiterate this celebratory rationale in either guise: as private souvenirs, they 
can act as proof of bodies' moral depravity; as public documents, they can signify the 
vulnerable cultural dispositions of those photographed. What this disagreement in the 
literature hints at, however, is the question of how this dynamic of essentialised physical 
vulnerability is enacted. It is unclear whether the mode of dissemination, be it public 
circulation or private secretion, is part of or even essential to this dynamic, or whether 
this meaning-making is simply a product of how bodies are visualised in any case.
It is a mistake to think that visualising the violated body is what gives these 
photographs their terroristic power, that is, their ability to act either as celebrations of 
one social group's domination over another or as evidence of the latter's incontestable 
treatment. In the case of lynching, the corpse of the lynch victim carries a dual 
representational dynamic, being both a source of the dehumanisation of black Americans
and evidence of that dehumanisation, an archive of white patriarchal identity in parts of 
the U.S. that demonstrates how that identity relied on terror for its own reiteration as 
'civilised' in opposition to black 'barbarity' (Rushdy, 2012: 66). This dual dynamic 
indicates the violated body's ability to signify things in excess of any meaning explicitly 
ascribed to it. The desecrated body does not intrinsically signify black identity as 
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incontestably vulnerable. Having been violated, the body carries the mark of an attempt 
by lynching perpetrators to make it signify a particular meaning; the body reflects a 
kind of discursive labour, of trying to fix the body's meaning for a particular audience.
The case of Emmett Till indicates this discursive labour, with Till having been 
lynched in 1955 during a visit to Mississippi, in an apparent attempt by his killers to 
reinforce a particular racial and sexual social order that the bodies of Northern black 
men were seen to implicitly threaten (Harold and DeLuca, 2005: 270-71). When publicly
displayed during his funeral at the request of his mother, and later when photographs 
were disseminated in radical black publications, Till's body was able to signify in excess 
of that intended by his murderers, with his body framed as revealing this discursive 
labour to a national black audience. This act of public display invited that audience to 
embrace Till's body, not as another piece of evidence of incontestable white supremacy, 
but as a grotesque indicator of the fraudulence of white Americans' claim to moral 
superiority in light of their own acts of barbarism (ibid: 280-83). Till's body, in other 
words, refused to play the role intended of it by Till's murderers. Social inferiority on 
the basis of physical vulnerability was revealed to be not an incontrovertible fact of life 
but a precarious message that had to be reiterated by acts of terrorism.
The meaning and identity attached to violated bodies are therefore a product 
not simply of those bodies' visualisation but of articulations which pre-empt those 
bodies' meaning, which prompt witnesses to see bodily characteristics as signifying 
particular things (Rancière, 2009: 84-5). It cannot be assumed that the Abu Ghraib 
photographs shape a subject-position which accepts the identity terms implied by the 
violence's enactment. Witnesses must be prompted to understand the represented body 
in the proper way. Even when pre-conditioned, that body can signify in excess of that 
intended of it by being framed as contradicting explicit claims of moral superiority, or 
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as reflecting more widely on society. This is why lynchers and those supportive of 
lynchings went to such trouble to qualify photographs with captions and post-process 
manipulation (adding and removing visual elements) that made clear what the 
photograph was supposed to say (Goldsby, 2006: 263-79). Different qualifications could 
therefore 'teach' other witnesses to read these photographs such that this discursive 
labour was revealed, undermining (though never entirely erasing) their terrorising 
power in the process (Rushdy, 2012: 69-70). These representational dynamics must be 
analytically acknowledged for any parallel between lynching and covert counter-
terrorism to robustly elaborate the representational power of the latter.
The potential for the violated body to signify multiple meanings allows for an 
expansion of the historical affiliation between contemporary covert counter-terrorism 
and lynching. As detailed previously using scholarship on the national representational 
dynamics of lynching, the majority of lynching's visual documentation was not 
circulated publicly but instead secreted among communities sympathetic to this 
violence. Lynching photographs were most likely disseminated through private 
transactions between photographers and local residents wanting a souvenir of a 
particular lynching, as well as through the mailing of picture postcards between friends 
and family members (Simpson, 2004; Kim, 2012). These distribution methods ensured 
that these photographs were seen only when sympathetic white owners and distributors
wanted it, and only in specific fora (Goldsby, 2006: 248-9). Without that documentation,
black communities would have found it more difficult to contest the meaning of 
lynched bodies and the practice as a whole, since they could neither highlight the 
discursive labour of those who framed these images nor re-contextualise those 
visualised bodies as evidence of barbarism. Because black audiences were unable to 
control when and how they gained access to these images, this secretion of 
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documentation signified who had the right to see these bodies and determine their 
meaning for themselves. Secretion was therefore a likely source of these images' 
representational power: that photographs of bodies were circulating but remained 
inaccessible ensured that the visualisation and meaning of violated black bodies could 
be neither controlled nor contested; knowledge of that secret circulation and lack of 
control would likely have reiterated the social inferiority of black citizens (ibid: 249-50).
The possibility that lynching's terroristic function partly lay in the secretion of 
its bodily evidence deepens the historical affiliation between lynching and covert 
counter-terrorism. The thesis' association of these two forms of violence, prompted by 
their shared absences and significations of distance, now allows us to examine obscured 
representational dynamics stemming from the hiding of bodies. The secretion of a 
violated body speaks to that body's potential to signify meaning in excess of anything 
ascribed to it through explicit rationalisations of that violence. Perpetrators' awareness 
of this potential leads them to secrete the body, as in the case of Emmett Till, whose 
killers hid his body by weighting it down in the nearby river, presumably intending for 
it never to be found. Indeed, by the mid-twentieth century, the absent body was 
designed to fulfil the dual celebratory and terroristic function previously performed by 
the most public spectacle lynchings, with “[h]istory” having “taught both blacks and 
whites how to fill in the blanks” and understand the meaning of the body gone missing. 
In this context, “[r]umour and speculation now performed the rhetorical violence 
formerly exacted by the public lynching” (Harold and DeLuca, 2005: 269). With the 
body secreted, rumours and speculations of unseen violence could define that violence 
for a wider population while restricting the potential for alternative readings. This 
restriction, however, relied on one other factor: that the rumours, speculation and other
things left in the wake of unseen lynchings did not allow that secreted body to 're-
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emerge'. Public traces of the violence which portrayed characteristics of the hidden 
body could undermine the meaning intended for that body through its secretion by 
perpetrators, by re-contextualising the act of secretion itself and highlighting that act's 
own discursive labour, as an attempt to obscure other meanings of the body.
Drawing on this idea of secretion's discursive role in the case of lynching, and of 
the potential for violated bodies to undermine the discursive labour of violence's 
perpetrators, this chapter re-frames analysis of the killing of Osama bin Laden. Rather 
than focus on how official proclamations from the Obama administration appeared to 
define bin Laden's death in terms of triumphalism, this chapter uses an historical 
affiliation with lynching to examine representational dynamics that stemmed from the 
secretion of bin Laden's body, and from the public debate that circled around this open 
secrecy. On the one hand, keeping bin Laden's corpse hidden, viewed only by select 
administration and Congress members, curtailed any potential alternative readings of 
that body, as well as the potential for the body to undercut the claims relayed by state 
officials. On the other hand, the state's articulated rationale for that secretion entered 
public discourse alongside other residue which was not acknowledged by the state. This 
juxtaposition between rationale and residue was able to intimate bin Laden's absent 
body in ways that reshaped the meaning of its secretion by framing the latter as 
discursive labour, as a state attempt to prevent certain interpretations of bin Laden's 
death. The role of secretion was therefore cast under suspicion. While this revealing of 
perpetrators' discursive labour occurred explicitly in the case of lynching, such a 
dynamic may be less obvious in the contemporary case. This historical affiliation can 
therefore be used to identify whether this dynamic is active in coverage of the bin Laden
raid in ways that go unnoticed, through unspoken allusions to absent bodies that 
reshape the meaning of those absentees.
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Accounting for a 'lightning raid'
The raid of the Abbottabad compound was widely interpreted as an assertion of control 
over the meaning of bin Laden's body. As Rebecca Adelman details, the small but steady 
stream of images and videotapes of bin Laden released in the years following 11 
September 2001 consistently ruptured U.S. state narratives of its counter-terrorism 
efforts. The uncontrollable appearance of bin Laden's image in the public sphere, and 
these videos' equivocal hints as to his location and physical health, implicitly signified 
both his physical evasiveness and the lack of information about his intentions and 
involvement in the planning of new terrorist attacks (Adelman, 2012: 772-5). This 
meaning was acknowledged by news coverage which interpreted the videos defiant 
taunts to America or the West (eg. Watson and McIntyre, 2001; Jeffreys, 2001; Palmer 
and Kolirin, 2002; D. Gardner, 2004; Shipman, 2007). So long as bin Laden was able to 
disseminate images of himself in the public sphere, his body would continue to 
undermine narratives of the superiority of the U.S.'s counter-terrorism capabilities 
relative to al Qaeda. With the announcement of his death, that usurping of a U.S. state 
narrative was supposed to end.
The press evoked this history of evasion in their initial coverage of the raid, with
headlines declaring 'After months of preparation, a lightning raid of deadly precision' 
(Rayner and Harnden, 2011), '40-minute raid that ended ten years of defiance' 
(Greenhill et al, 2011) and 'Osama bin Laden: it took years to find him but just minutes 
to kill him' (MacAskill, 2011a). Yet in characterising the raid by its slight temporality, 
these headlines highlight that the event is historically significant but has passed unseen 
and undocumented for public consumption. The covert quality of the operation was 
implicitly emphasised from the beginning.
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That knowledge of the raid remained partial even once it was officially 
acknowledged is reflected in initial news accounts, whose use of sparse White House 
and Pentagon details is embellished with evocative re-enactments. Describing the 
“heavy cloud rolling in over the town of Abbottabad” as creating “perfect conditions for 
the raid”, one emblematic Daily Mail account figuratively follows in the Navy SEALs' 
footsteps, from their having “been training extensively for days” using “a detailed mock-
up of Bin Laden's hideaway”, through various “dummy runs”, to their flying into Tarbela
Ghazi airbase in north-western Pakistan before the raid (Greenhill et al, 2011). The 
narrative describes how “sleeping citizens” were woken by “the clatter of four military 
helicopters thought to be two Black Hawks and two Chinooks”, how President Obama 
experienced “a heart-stopping moment” as the compound's guards opened fire and shot 
down one of the Black Hawks, and finally how “[t]wo dozen U.S. Navy SEALs – special 
forces – wearing night-vision goggles dropped into the high-walled compound by 
sliding down ropes from Chinooks... storm[ing] inside to secure the terror chief's 
hideaway room by room” (ibid). Yet having led readers through the Navy SEALs' 
operations, the implicit narrative pay-off of 'taking out bin Laden' is conspicuous in its 
absence. Instead, the narrative abruptly cuts to a note that “[f]ollowing the shootout with
Bin Laden, his body was carried out and taken away in one of the helicopters” (ibid; for 
a similar account, see Walsh, MacAskill and Addley, 2011). Without a description of the 
moment of bin Laden's death, the juxtaposition between the claim of that death and this 
absence leaves the narrative implicitly incomplete, hinting at ongoing secrecy around 
the ostensible key moment of the raid.
Despite this narrative lack in early accounts of the raid, the White House did 
release snippets of bin Laden's final moments that journalists drew upon to represent 
bin Laden's body in its absence. These details came closest to rendering his body such 
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that it would prompt an understanding of al Qaeda through his own physical 
vulnerability. These articulations built on bin Laden's secretion, since they ascribed 
characteristics to the al Qaeda leader without allowing witnesses access to his body to 
verify its meaning. So instead of releasing photographs of the corpse, “US officials sa[id] 
– and there is no independent verification of this fact – he was shot twice, once in the 
chest and once in the head” (Walsh, MacAskill and Addley, 2011). The descriptions of 
this final moment, whereby bin Laden “was killed with a precision shot just above the 
left eye, which removed part of his skull” (Ingham, 2011), reduces his body to its 
vulnerable corporeality. Coupled with statements of bin Laden's terroristic affiliation, 
these descriptions define his metonymic identity by that wrecked corporeality. These 
statements would therefore appear to reiterate state control over a body now rendered 
passive; as with lynching practice, the secretion of the body prevents alternative 
readings.
Subsequent snippets of information, however, alluded to uncertainty over the 
meaning and significance of the raid. It first emerged that the precise nature of the 
violence described above was unclear, with differing statements as to where bin Laden 
was shot on his body and how many times (Rayner, Swinford and Evans, 2011). More 
significantly, bin Laden's actions in those final moments were placed in doubt such that 
the meaning of his absent body was implicitly questioned. The Obama administration's 
initial account of the raid described bin Laden as having violently fought back against 
the Navy SEALs, using one of his wives as a human shield (Ingham and Flanagan, 2011). 
These details led to journalistic descriptions of bin Laden “screaming and firing his 
AK47 at the attackers” before “[t]he cowardly al-Qaeda chief grabbed his youngest wife 
Amal al-Sadah to use her as a shield” (C. Hughes and Myall, 2011). But the White House 
quickly altered this account, revealing that not only was bin Laden not hiding behind his
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wife when the SEALs entered his bedroom, he actually wasn't armed. These 
contradictions led coverage to ask how he could have 'resisted' those SEALs as the 
White House continued to insist, as well as whether adequate provisions had been made 
to try to capture rather than kill him (Peake and Pollard, 2011; Rayner, Swinford and 
Evans, 2011).
By undermining previous characterisations of bin Laden's behaviour that 
demonstrated his 'evil' and terroristic nature, these further snippets signified the 
equivocal absence of bin Laden's body and anything connected to it that would have 
aided his resistance. With these contradictions framed as significant traces of an event 
that had been conducted in secret, they alluded to bin Laden's absent body as possibly 
undermining the state's account. This allusion was boosted by U.S. officials' attempts to 
account for these contradictions, which further hinted at the discursive labour of 
secreting documentation of the raid. In reports of the White House briefing that 
corrected the state's narrative, spokesman Jay Carney was described as having “added a 
crucial detail. “Bin Laden was then shot and killed. He was not armed,” Carney 
disclosed. Asked how he had resisted if he had no gun, Carney declined to specify but 
said resistance does not require a gun” (MacAskill, 2011b). Juxtaposing explanations of 
the raid as a re-assertion of control over bin Laden's body, these details intimated that 
absent body as not playing the role intended of it in state accounts, as possibly 
contradicting those accounts. In a representational dynamic mirroring contests over the
meaning of lynchings, the secrecy that appeared to surround the raid was implicitly 
reframed as reflecting an effort to prevent alternative readings of the body and the 
event's significance. Carney's insistence that resistance does not require a firearm is 
framed by these intimations as such an effort to control meaning, thus undermining the 
state account by implicitly emphasising that the nature of that 'resistance' remains 
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unknown.
Subsequent declarations from the White House revealed that bin Laden had 
been interpreted as resisting when he ran back into his bedroom upon seeing the Navy 
SEALs in the corridor. The justification given for this interpretation by a member of the
Senate intelligence committee further alluded to the discursive labour of secretion. The 
statement is noteworthy in its defensiveness: “What you have to remember is that it was 
pitch dark. When they got into the room with bin Laden, they already had to go through
some other folks downstairs, two of whom they killed... By the time they got to him, 
they didn't know what they would find” (quoted in Swinford, 2011b, emphases added). The 
tone of the statement juxtaposes the suspicion of secrecy signified by these continued 
modifications of the official state account. That juxtaposition intimates the suggestive 
idea that absent documentation of the raid, the images and video footage taken by the 
Navy SEALs, might reveal a sequence of events unrecognisable as a heroic defeat of 
terroristic defiance, as explicitly claimed by White House and Pentagon sources. 
Contradictions in the details released by the state therefore risked implicitly framing the
secrecy surrounding the raid as an attempt to obscure cracks in that state narrative. 
Even before press coverage attended to the invisibility of bin Laden's body, the latter's 
absence was affecting the meaning of the event.
Finding and fixing the body
As noted, the ability of bin Laden to have evaded capture for so long formed a large part 
of the reported significance of the raid. The raid was represented as the end of a long 
and arduous manhunt: as one Independent article put it the day after the death was 
announced, “for all but a tiny number of people, until yesterday morning, for any sort of
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certainty on the whereabouts of the man who earned the title of the world's most 
wanted, one had to go all the way back to December 2001” (Buncombe, 2011). This 
referred to the period of fighting between coalition forces and Taliban and al Qaeda 
fighters in the Tora Bora mountains, during which bin Laden managed to slip away. In 
lieu of many concrete details on the raid itself, coverage contextualised his death by 
turning to CIA and U.S. Army efforts to track down bin Laden after his escape, and in 
particular to visualise his hidden body. This coverage framed that visualisation as key to 
the U.S. asserting control over bin Laden and the meaning of his body.
That bin Laden had remained so elusive for so long, leaving U.S. soldiers 
“snatching at thin air” in 2001 as they searched for evidence of his demise in Tora Bora 
(Rayner, 2011), implicitly put further importance on bin Laden's discovery constituting 
an assertion of U.S. control through visualisation. Press accounts of the CIA's operations
at Abbottabad explicitly represented those al Qaeda members who surrounded bin 
Laden as haphazard and bumbling in their efforts to remain invisible, contrasting with 
the professional and technical expertise of their pursuers. Accounts of the trail that led 
to Abbottabad focused on the courier whose family lived with bin Laden's in the 
compound and whose name was given away by detainees at Guantánamo Bay. Having 
been “key to maintaining bin Laden's secrecy for almost 10 years”, this courier was 
portrayed as having slipped up “[w]hen he made a phone call in 2010 [and] unknowingly
led the Americans to the doorstep of the world's most wanted terrorist” (Ross, 2011).
Yet these snippets of detail about CIA efforts contained ambiguities that alluded 
to meanings other than U.S. technical superiority. On discovering the Abbottabad 
compound, the CIA did not know who was inside it, believing only that “someone 
extremely important” was living there (Sengupta, 2011). Once they suspected it was bin 
Laden, the CIA set up a safe-house nearby in order to confirm his presence. This is 
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described as involving “monitor[ing]” and “extensive surveillance” by the patient and 
professional CIA agents, who had at their disposal “an arsenal of hi-tech equipment 
including telephoto lenses, eavesdropping devices and radars”, the aim being “to “find 
and fix” Bin Laden” (Walsh, 2011b). Yet “[d]espite the intense surveillance the CIA was 
unable to obtain a photograph of Bin Laden or a recording of the man, presumed to be 
the al-Qaida leader, who lived on the second and third floors” (ibid). Having positioned 
bin Laden's visualisation as key to ending his evasion and reasserting U.S. superiority, 
this coverage acknowledged that agents failed to identify bin Laden's bodily markers 
before the raid, implicitly undermining the characterisation of those agents' superior 
skills and technical capabilities. Given the absence of bin Laden's body from the public 
sphere after the raid, these attempts at contextualisation implicitly represented that 
body in its absence as jarring with the role assigned to it by the narrative of a 
triumphant end to a dogged manhunt.
Fixing the meaning of the body in line with U.S. articulations would therefore 
depend upon accounts of the death itself. Reports of the raid detailed the various 
methods used by the Navy SEALs and the Obama administration to confirm to their 
satisfaction that bin Laden had been killed. These methods revolved around identifying 
bodily markers, and as residue of a covert operation, details of these methods gained 
significance as public evidence of what had occurred in secret. It turned out that the raid
had been recorded by “[c]ameras mounted on the helmets of the American Navy SEALs”
and relayed by satellite back to Washington in real-time. After bin Laden was shot, “one 
of the SEALs took a photograph of bin Laden's face and wired it to Washington, where 
facial recognition software gave a 95 per cent certainty that it was the al-Qaeda leader”. 
Both “DNA analysis” and “identifi[cation] by one of his wives, who survived the raid”, 
were described as “later confirm[ing] that they had their man” (Evans and Rayner, 2011).
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This coverage confirmed that documentation of the raid existed, hinting at the 
possibility of a glimpse of this action. With the raid framed as an assertion of control 
over bin Laden's body, this documentation was represented as demonstrating the 
supreme importance of visualising bin Laden to control his meaning.
That confirmation of control, however, occurred not through the Obama 
administration's display of the mortally wounded body but its secretion of that body 
among military, executive and select Congressional figures. Control was signified 
through acknowledgement that bin Laden's corpse was now circulating only within 
these private political circles. Some of the most significant residue of the raid were 
therefore details of this secretion, which seemed to confirm that the U.S. now controlled
the circulation of this body, defining the latter by U.S. control and preventing 
alternative readings. Instead of witnessing the covert operation, newsreaders witnessed 
the Obama administration's act of secretion: as headlines noted, it was the 'Obama team'
that 'saw [the] drama unfold' (ibid), Obama who 'watched bin Laden die on live video' 
(Drury et al, 2011), although, as already noted, this turned out to be inaccurate. The 
witnessing of secretion was exemplified in the now-famous official photograph of the 
'Obama team' apparently watching the raid unfold on an out-of-frame TV screen 
(Figure 10). With the gazes of those pictured turned towards the left frame of the 
photograph, and two people at the back craning their necks to look over others' 
shoulders, this representation focuses attention on that act of gazing. With the image 
explicitly framed as showing President Obama and his national security team 
overseeing the raid, these figures are represented as the ones now in control of bin 
Laden's visibility. As with lynching, secretion signifies that the authority to see and 
determine the meaning of the body rests with those who enacted and supported the 
violence.
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Figure 10: The famous 'Situation Room photo' – the photograph was actually taken in an 
adjacent room (Crawford, 2012).
But while being framed as demonstrating the control of meaning through 
secretion, this photograph also intimates excess meaning. By figuring the absence being 
gazed at by the national security team as central to the image's importance – since the 
photo is meant to show the Obama team overseeing the raid – this residue highlights 
that this absence remains equivocal. Since whatever is being observed remains out of 
frame, witnesses to this residue are prompted to consider that it remains implicitly 
uncertain what this photograph reveals about the unseen operation, since the supposed 
key to this image's significance remains out of view and unknown. This residue 
consequently gains the kind of instability discussed in previous chapters, an instability 
over how exactly it relates to the unseen event. The juxtaposition between this absence 
and the gazes of the Obama team also produces a suspicion of state secrecy around what
221
exactly happened during the raid, despite the U.S. having acknowledged the operation. 
In the context of that suspicion of secrecy, this equivocal absence becomes suggestive 
and intimates that it remains unclear what exactly the secreted documentation of the 
raid, supposedly just outside the image's frame, does or does not prove about the raid. 
The photograph, in other words, implicitly represents the secretion of that 
documentation as problematic, as preventing clear public understanding. Even in this 
explicit visualisation of the U.S. gaze fixing bin Laden and controlling his visualisation, 
uncertainties about what took place undermine the meaning ascribed to that body by 
framing state secretion as only raising more questions.
Rationalising secretion
As a covert operation revealed by the state to the public, the Abbottabad raid 
distinguishes itself from other contemporary covert counter-terrorism which, when 
reported upon, normally passes without official acknowledgement. In the past, this 
acknowledgement would involve either an invocation from state officials for the public 
not to look at whatever was being glimpsed, or a refusal to confirm or deny and a mere 
justification of such action in general abstracted terms. The U.S.'s acknowledgement of 
the bin Laden raid did not represent a return to either of these modes of address, for 
these modes provided a rationale for the operation itself and for its having occurred 
outside of the public sphere. While the killing of bin Laden was certainly justified by the 
Obama administration quite explicitly, the rationale for secrecy that was provided 
pertained to the hiding of residue. The Obama administration did not seek to rationalise 
covertness so much as rationalise hiding the remainders of covert violence, specifically 
the corpse of Osama bin Laden. Press coverage interpreted this as an attempt to justify 
secretion in light of a competing U.S. desire to prove to the public that bin Laden had 
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indeed been killed. This interpretation positioned newsreaders as members of a public 
audience that would want to see such evidence, thus reiterating the importance of bin 
Laden's body to the meaning of the raid. As coverage continued, the state's rationale for 
secreting that body reverberated with other residue that was publicly available, rumours
and contradictions surrounding what had happened, which produced intimations of 
that hidden body.
The secretion of bin Laden's body was explicitly framed by the physical 
mutilation that had resulted from his death. Coverage noted that “[t]he U.S. [that is, the 
Obama administration] has pictures of Bin Laden's body – reportedly with a bullet hole 
above an eye, and another to the heart – and video of both the raid on his bolthole in the
Pakistani city of Abbottabad and his burial at sea” (Sears, 2011). This framing of 
secretion was promoted by President Obama himself in his own rationalisation of 
hiding bin Laden's body and his presumption that the question of making that body 
visible was one of providing evidence of bin Laden's death: “We don't trot out this stuff 
as trophies. We don't need to spike the football. We're absolutely certain that it is him... 
Certainly there's no doubt among Al Qaeda members that he is dead. You will not see 
Bin Laden walking on this earth again” (quoted in Tree and Sears, 2011). Obama's 
justification was interpreted as warning that visual evidence of bin Laden's body could 
be used as “an incitement to additional violence or as a propaganda tool” (Whittell, 
2011), a reading backed up by White House spokesman Jay Carney: “These are graphic 
pictures of someone who was shot in the head and it's not in our national security 
interests to allow these images, as in the past has been the case, to become icons to rally 
opinion against the U.S.” (quoted in Tree and Sears, 2011). The mutilated quality of bin 
Laden's corpse was emphasised by reports that the White House had decided not to 
release 'gruesome pictures' of 'Bin Laden's mangled corpse' (ibid) and by rumours that 
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his body had “a massive open wound across his eyes” leaving him “horribly disfigured” 
(Whittell, 2011), revealing “an empty eye socket and visible brain matter” (Greenhill and 
Sears, 2011).
These statements and rumours articulated the U.S. state's rationalisation of 
secretion in terms of the potentially provocative or inciting quality of bin Laden's 
physical mutilation, the potential for that mutilation to imply more than anything 
intended by the body's public release. This by itself does not prompt newsreaders to 
consider any such alternative meanings as having validity. These statements, however, 
were juxtaposed with the contradictory accounts of the raid itself, allowing for 
intimations that reframed the hiding of bin Laden's body. Having related this secretion 
to the fact that President Obama was being “urged to show the world proof that the 
terror chief had been killed – and put an end to the wild conspiracy theories”, coverage 
juxtaposed the “intense internal debate” over whether this proof should be revealed with
the fact that the White House had “come under fire” for “retract[ing] key details” of the 
raid. These corrected details included the idea that bin Laden had “joined in the fight” 
against the Navy SEALs, that he had used a woman as a human shield and that his wife 
had been killed during the assault (Tree and Sears, 2011). Another article explicitly 
connected the issue of releasing photos to these qualified details, arguing that the 
“clamour” for proof of bin Laden's death had “been fuelled, it must be said, by the 
shifting accounts of what precisely happened in the compound” (Cornwell, 2011).
By detailing corrections to the official narrative, this coverage associated the 
hiding of bin Laden's body with repeated and contradictory state attempts to articulate 
bin Laden's intentions and behaviour and so control the meaning of the raid. Details of 
those repeated attempts produce a suspicion of ongoing state secrecy around what took 
place in the compound, a suspicion that frames both the rumours of bin Laden's 
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gruesome mutilation and the contradictions in the public record of the raid as 
suggestive public traces that might reveal things otherwise obscured by state secrecy. As 
a result, those details intimate the idea that the hiding of bin Laden's body is a state 
attempt to prevent further such incongruities in the public narrative of the raid. By 
highlighting that attempt at a control of meaning, this intimation undermines that 
attempt by prompting witnesses to consider the possibility that bin Laden's corpse 
might suggest different meanings and that this is why it is being kept hidden. The 
subject-position produced is one focused on bin Laden's secretion in terms of what it 
potentially and discomfortingly reveals about the unseen event.
President Obama's decision not to release visual documentation soon became 
the primary framing of the raid. The Times' cover story of 5 May, 'President bars use of 
bin Laden pictures', detailed “three categories of photographic evidence - pictures of the
body taken in a hangar in Afghanistan before its transfer to the aircraft carrier USS Carl
Vinson; images of its disposal in a white shroud in the Arabian Sea; and pictures from 
the raid itself” (Whittell 2011). With this documentation's existence now reported, 
coverage turned to whether or not it should be publicly released. One Express article had
two writers respectively weigh up the pros and cons of releasing images of bin Laden's 
corpse. Both sides implicitly connected the issue of proving bin Laden's death to 
establishing the meaning of the raid. Stating that “those who lived in terror of the man” 
need “proof” of his death, the first writer counters the argument that the photos are too 
“graphically horrifying” by pointing out that “Bin Laden himself forced the world to 
witness possibly the most dreadful images it has ever seen”, those of the Twin Towers 
collapsing, and that “[a]ll of us, especially the families of the victims, need some form of 
catharsis. Let us see with our own eyes that the monster finally got what he deserved” 
(Blackburn, in Blackburn and Kelly, 2011, emphasis added). Visual proof is articulated 
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as that catharsis: demonstrating publicly that bin Laden is dead by using his corpse as 
evidence is represented as relating to the right to see. Whereas bin Laden once forced 
the presumed collective readership 'us' to view horrifying images, now 'we' can look at 
his body outwith the latter's control.
In arguing against releasing images, the second Express writer separates those 
wanting proof of death from the presumed readership: unlike the latter, those hankering
for proof are “the nutcases” who offer “crackpot theories” with “dreary predictability” 
after official acknowledgement of the raid. The writer then suggests what reactions to 
this news implies about collective identity, with the “jokes doing the rounds about his 
demise” standing as “a robust testimony to how civilised countries deal with the death of
the world's most wanted man and how we begin to put it into perspective” (Kelly, in 
Blackburn and Kelly, 2011). These statements frame responses to bin Laden's death as 
bearing on the identity of a collective readership: responding with humour instead of a 
desire to see the body is represented as a mark of 'civilised' sensibilities. Kelly similarly 
counters the idea that visualisation would re-establish some collective superiority: while
“[s]ome argue that not publishing is a sign of the West being too soft and effete”, she 
argues, “the operation to patiently hunt down and dispatch Bin Laden surely showed the
opposite: it was a quick, clean and precise illustration of a democracy exercising justice 
– especially for a superpower that has previously exhibited a tendency to carpet-bomb 
enemies back into the Stone Age” (ibid). An aversion to publishing is represented as 
cohering with, rather than curtailing, a demonstration of strength against terrorist 
enemies. The disagreement between the two writers is therefore not over the use of 
force, but over what counts as sufficient but justifiable catharsis through violence: the 
fact of a 'kill/capture' operation, or an additional disinterring of a corpse for public 
viewing.
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This debate implicitly acknowledges the multiple potential meanings of bin 
Laden's body: Kelly's references to the 'previous tendencies' of the U.S. and to 
'testimony' of a country as civilised point to the possibility of the U.S.'s actions being 
forwarded as evidence of something uncivilised. But more significantly, Kelly dismisses 
the argument that “because bullet-riddled corpses killed by Western troops in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are routinely paraded on Middle East TV channels it follows we 
should do the same” as “the age-old playground justification: “They did it first!””. 
Deciding whether or not to release photos requires “a rather more mature reflection”. 
“By publishing”, she writes, “America runs the risk of being seen as dancing on Bin Laden's 
grave, a ghoulish glorification of the sort associated with the hysterical zealots who 
follow their fallen idol's cause” (ibid, emphasis added). These statements characterise a 
vengeful gazing at mutilation as unbefitting a civilised collective. But in the conspicuous
absence of bin Laden's body from the public sphere, these comments make that absence 
ambiguous: it is unclear whether the problem with publishing stems from the vengeful 
'They did it first' attitude or from the act of making the body visible, due to how that body 
might be read by others. Hiding the body is implicitly represented as protecting against 
a negative public appraisal. With these comments represented as reporting on a covert 
operation, this ambiguity over the purpose of hiding bin Laden's body is framed as 
significant. It intimates the possibility that secreting the body merely obscures the 
implications of bin Laden's killing for a collective 'civilised' identity, and that the first 
writer Blackburn's demand for catharsis through visualisation risks revealing those 
implications. Explicit worries about the U.S.'s public image are reshaped and produce a 
subject-position focused on those worries' implications: perhaps they speak to a real but
secreted incoherence in a 'civilised' identity.
These allusions to bin Laden's secretion as precarious discursive labour became 
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more pronounced as coverage continued. One Times editorial argued for releasing 
photographic evidence with explicit reference to “the iconography of power” – that with
the 'War on Terror' having been inaugurated with “televised images of two planes 
crashing into the World Trade Centre”, the U.S. now had the ability to “close the circle” 
and “end... an often savage decade haunted by 9/11” by releasing these photographs 
(Boyes, 2011). These articulations represent the visualisation of bin Laden's bodily 
markers, a demonstration of control over their public circulation, as winning and 
ending the War on Terror. Yet the article also acknowledges that those who are against 
releasing any photographs are concerned that “triumphalism is in itself provocative and 
a betrayal of US standards of civilisation”. Boyes argues that this “misses the point”: 
showing the violated body transmits a “basic brutal message”, that bin Laden has been 
“shr[unk]” by the U.S. from being “a personification of the jihad” to mere “human 
status”. One needs a “cruel and tasteless” public photograph to “[convince]” people “that 
power ha[s] irrevocably changed hands” (ibid).
In making this argument, the article suggests the instrumental use of mutilated 
bodies without answering the charge explicitly raised that such a public display of 
brutality would undermine civilised precepts. The article simply notes that “[i]f the US 
Administration fails to do this, the pictures will leak out anyway” (ibid). By making this 
appeal, the article represents the release of photographs as important not in proving bin 
Laden's death, but in controlling the meaning of these pictures by releasing them oneself 
and framing their meaning therein. Framed as being part of the public record of a covert
event, the absence of an answer to the charge of betraying civilised values becomes 
significant, intimating that the secretion of brutal and tasteless images thus far is an 
attempt to foreclose such charges being applied to the operation itself. Intimating this 
attempt at controlling the meaning of the raid implicitly reduces its efficacy; while 
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Boyes claims withholding the images implies that “the US is somehow afraid of the 
consequences of its action”, this allusion to the reason for secretion shapes a subject-
position focused precisely on such a fear.
The argument that photos would probably be leaked played a wider role in 
shaping intimations of bin Laden's violated body. One commentary in fact made the 
case for not releasing the photos on the likelihood of their eventually coming out 
anyway, saying “[i]t's not about censorship. It's about ownership. Today Mr Obama 
doesn't want to be the US president who blithely throws out a photograph of his 
country's greatest enemy with an extra hole in his head... He understands [just] how 
incredibly unattractive this makes [the U.S.] seem to the rest of the world” (Rifkind, 
2011). Yet the same article also argues in favour of looking at any photo that is released, 
since “you must accept there is a degree of moral hypocrisy in simultaneously being 
glad, but not wanting not to know what that looks like... This is the dark side of our nice
safe world. Either you condemn it or you own it” (ibid). Contradictory positions on 
'ownership' aside, the idea that bin Laden's body might make the U.S. appear 
'unattractive' frames the absence of that body as equivocal: it perhaps reflects genuine 
moral concern, or public relations worries, or both. As part of commentary on an act of 
violence that has otherwise been kept hidden, this ambiguity alludes to bin Laden's body
as having multiple potential meanings which may explain its secretion.
Intimations of bin Laden's body finally prompted witnesses to consider why 
witnessing bin Laden's corpse would be desirable. These allusions emerged in reports of
fake photographs of bin Laden's body, which had been circulating online and were in 
fact used by major newspapers on their front pages before their were outed as 
spuriousness (Hill, 2011). Subsequently publishing these photographs while 
acknowledging their falsity, as at least one paper did on its website (Tree and Sears, 
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2011), implicitly characterised viewing that corpse as desired by the public, particularly 
when the photos appeared in articles discussing Obama's decision not to make any real 
images available. The emphasis in these fake photographs on the mutilation of bin 
Laden's body, however, contrasted the Obama administration's justifications for 
keeping the body hidden, since the latter rested precisely on that mutilation. These fake 
photographs are striking in their verisimilitude: it is difficult to establish from the 
photos alone that the wounding shown on bin Laden's body is a computer manipulation.
The statement that they are fake therefore paradoxically highlights their apparent 
'realness'. As residue, albeit purposefully misleading residue, of a covert raid, these 
visualisations of an absent body allude to the idea that simply witnessing the kind of 
mutilation bin Laden would have been exposed to is not enough, that verisimilitude is 
inadequate. This intimation reframes the explicit articulation of a public desire to see 
such images by rendering unclear why such desire would exist. Witnesses are invited to 
adopt a subject-position that is uncertain what kind of collective witnessing is being 
asked for on their behalf. The narrative of U.S. triumphalism is thus undermined by a 
focus on unanswered questions as to what the real absent body of bin Laden might 
reveal. In none of these subject-positions, however, is the violence itself given ethical 
consideration; it is implicitly represented as important only in terms of how secrecy 
might be obscuring its implications for a collective identity.
Living and dying in the Waziristan Mansion
As coverage of the raid developed in the days after it was revealed, further residue was 
turned up that went beyond rumours as to what took place. Some of this residue took 
the form of proxies for bin Laden's secreted body, traces of his activities in the period 
leading up to the Navy SEALs' assault. In officially releasing such traces, U.S. 
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government and military officials articulated what this residue revealed about the 
nature of bin Laden. Absent the al Qaeda leader's body, however, these traces stood as 
some of the most suggestive public evidence of the unseen covert event and the body's 
place within it; aspects of these traces went unremarked by the state or were explained 
in suggestive ways. These ambiguities and contradictions in the representation of these 
traces had the potential to allude to bin Laden's secreted body in ways that undermined 
official explanations.
On May 5 it was revealed that bin Laden had 500 Euros in cash and two 
telephone numbers sewn into his clothes when he was killed, moves interpreted as 
indicating he was prepared to make a quick escape from his compound if needed. This 
residue of the covert action, in the form of snippets as to what was found on bin Laden's
body, was translated in press accounts as markers of bin Laden's intentions and state of 
mind, evocative insights into his personality and thus indicators of the significance of 
the raid. The image of his keeping hold of foreign money and phone numbers was seen 
to indicate “[his] confidence” that “he'd get a headsup” about any impending U.S. strike 
on his home (Gardham, 2011), as well as his nervousness, that “[he] would would flee if 
there was any hint the CIA were closing in” (Fricker, 2011). These explanations of 
residue found on his body appear in the context of stories about bin Laden having been 
killed by just such a U.S. strike, and as a result represent bin Laden as overconfident, his 
anxious preparation ultimately useless in the face of U.S. military superiority. The 
failure of bin Laden's planning opposite U.S. capabilities did not go unnoticed: 'He was 
killed in his getaway kit', stated one headline (ibid).
Yet these explanations do not delimit the significations made by these items. In 
arguing that these items indicated bin Laden's anxious overconfidence that he could 
escape any attempted raid, coverage acknowledged that these items therefore suggested 
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bin Laden had a support network, a collection of “shadowy aides on 24-hour stand-by”, 
capable of “whisk[ing] him from his secret lair to a faraway mountain hideout”. As such, 
“US spooks [were] now desperately trying to get leads from their phone numbers, which
are registered to Pakistani networks” (ibid). One Times piece even interpreted these 
items as indicative of bin Laden's “belie[f] that he was under the protection of the state”, 
suggesting Pakistani government or military complicity in his hiding (Philp, 2011). With
these items implicitly framed as public traces of a covert operation, an event whose 
covertness had ensured it would pass unseen, the ambiguity of these items in relation to 
bin Laden's support network becomes suggestive public evidence. Framed by 
covertness, this residue's ambiguity hints at bin Laden's absent body as possibly not 
indicating a clear victory against al Qaeda, but as providing an opaque glimpse of a 
wider network that remains unvanquished.
This allusion is unlikely to have significantly reshaped the more explicit 
meaning given to the raid, since the possibility of a continuing threat does not 
necessarily subvert the role assigned to bin Laden's body by U.S. narratives. More 
significant, however, was the acknowledgement that bin Laden's intentions with these 
items remained unclear: “some insiders admitted they were baffled why the al-Qaeda 
head was carrying Euros when US dollars and Pakistan rupees are more accepted in the 
region” (Wheeler and Samson, 2011). Having been explicitly articulated as proxy 
markers of bin Laden's identity, these sewn items were able to intimate other 
possibilities regarding that identity, since they could not be fully accounted for by 
explicit explanations. Bin Laden's body was thus implicitly represented as remaining 
somewhat inscrutable, possibly even to state officials, alluding to the idea that his death 
might not fit a story of the U.S. defeating a nervous and overconfident terrorist. That 
these traces appeared on bin Laden's body therefore shaped a subject-position only 
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more aware of how hiding that body was an attempt to delimit his meaning. As with 
lynching discourse, that meaning is undermined once this discursive labour is revealed.
While this residue received some press attention, more prominent proxies for 
the absent body was footage of bin Laden taken while he was living in his compound, 
discovered among his belongings and released by the Obama administration a few days 
after the raid. These 'home videos' included a recording of bin Laden making a speech 
entitled 'Message to the American people', a recording of him apparently fluffing one of 
his lines while recording a similar speech and having to start again, and footage of him 
sitting on the floor in his compound watching television (N. Owens, 2011b; Figure 11). 
Descriptions of the footage's discovery figured it as demonstrating bin Laden's inability 
to further control the public circulation of his image; releasing this footage was 
interpreted as indicating the U.S. state's control over bin Laden's body. That control was
represented through descriptions of this “most revealing” of footage as “show[ing] a bin 
Laden that was clearly never meant to be seen outside his inner circle” (Sherwell et al, 
2011) – the implication being that this intention was now moot.
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Figure 11: Still from video footage found at Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad compound (N. 
Owens, 2011b).
Having been articulated as indicating U.S. control, the footage was charged with 
revealing bin Laden's identity as hypocritical. The released videos “show[ed] the 
difference between the public image of Bin Laden and the man he was when the 
cameras were turned off”, according to a Pentagon spokesman (quoted in C. Graham, 
2011), again highlighting bin Laden's loss of control over his image. Releasing these 
videos was said to have 'shatter[ed] a carefully cultivated image' (Nelson and Crilly, 
2011). Bin Laden was characterised on the basis of this footage as vain and self-
absorbed, with articles noting how his “shabby grey beard” in one video contrasted with 
an apparently dyed and trimmed beard in another where he was filming a piece of 
propaganda (ibid). The seeming focus on his own image was also read from a recording 
of him watching older footage of himself on TV, “consumed by his own vanity” (N. 
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Owens, 2011a). This video showed a “vain recluse, as much obsessed with his own 
image in the global media as with waging jihad” (Nelson and Crilly, 2011), again 
magnifying the sense that releasing these tapes marked bin Laden's failure to control 
that image any longer. As well as revealing his hypocrisy, this residue of the raid was 
also figured as humiliating the now-dead al Qaeda leader by revealing the phony nature 
of his staged persona. The footage showed a “frail”, “distinctly old and jaded” man akin 
to “a pensioner sitting out a cold winter while watching daytime television” (ibid), an 
“elderly grandfather with a cap on his head and blanket around his shoulders”, at a far 
remove from “the gun-toting rebel or the scholarly sheikh dictating messages to the 
outside world” (Harris, 2011).
These interpretations of the found footage frame the body of bin Laden as 
reflecting the hypocritical and effeminate nature of Islamic fundamentalism. Positioned 
as a prominent figure within al Qaeda, bin Laden's body and behaviour are then 
articulated as revealing the 'vain recluse' behind the 'jihad-waging rebel'. A particular 
configuration of race and gender is read from this footage of bin Laden's body, 
constructing a hierarchy between this humiliated identity and the identity of the 
presumed collective readership. This footage, however, does not provide a glimpse of 
the body's present condition, which has been explicitly secreted by the state. These 
videos circulated alongside a very public acknowledgement that the body they 
documented was currently being kept hidden. As such, these images could implicitly 
refer to that secretion. These references derived from an ambiguity in explanations of 
the images: the footage was positioned in press coverage as evidence both of bin Laden's
hypocritical vanity and of his symbolic dangerousness as a leading member of al Qaeda. 
The image of an old, weak man living “a life of claustrophobic domesticity” mirroring a 
dull retirement (Randall and Buncombe, 2011) implicitly jars with the characterisation 
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of this footage by intelligence officials as showing someone “still active in al-Qaida on 
both a strategic and tactical level” (Harris, 2011). The mundane scene documented in 
this video emphasises the footage's uneventfulness, its presumed dissimilarity from a 
violent raid against an ostensibly dangerous terrorist leader. This uneventfulness 
signifies that the residue is arbitrary, that these traces have an equivocal relation to the 
event itself. One Observer piece tackles this ambiguity head-on, asking: “what are these 
clips supposed to tell us?” (Beaumont, 2011).
The instability of these images in terms of their meaning was made suggestive 
once those images were framed as residue of a covert action, as public traces of an event 
that the state had kept secret from the public. These images circulated within the public 
debate that was by now unfolding over whether images of bin Laden's corpse should be 
revealed. Newspapers acknowledged that these home videotapes appeared to have been 
“released by US intelligence officials in an effort to scotch conspiracy theories that the al
Qaeda leader had not in fact been located and killed” (Nelson and Crilly, 2011) – 
conspiracy theories understood as a response to the absence of bodily evidence for that 
killing. This debate over making the secreted corpse public therefore juxtaposed public 
traces of video footage that rendered ambiguous the danger posed by bin Laden in life. 
The historical affiliation with lynching suggests that this ambiguity could undermine 
the explicit meaning ascribed the violated body. In this case, such a dynamic occurs 
implicitly: the juxtaposition between debate and images allowed the latter to intimate 
the unverifiable idea that the secreted body might actually undermine the U.S. state 
narrative of bin Laden's centrality to al Qaeda, and therefore the triumphalist reading of
the raid. This intimation therefore represents the secretion of that body as an attempt to
avoid precisely the kind of ambiguity of meaning that is hinted at by the released 
footage. Precisely because that footage was released in the context of a debate over 
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secretion, it raised the implicit question of what that body might reveal which its 
secretion would be curtailing.
Having taken place unseen but its location later identified by journalists, the raid
on the compound itself afforded further residue that extended beyond those traces 
officially released by the U.S. state. Comprising a number of buildings and a plot of land,
the compound remained largely intact, while the town of Abbottabad contained further 
traces in the form of rumours and speculation circulating among the town's residents. 
The Waziristan Mansion – so-called locally in reference to the mountainous region on 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that its residents were rumoured to have come from 
(D. Williams et al, 2011) – quickly became a prominent part of coverage of the raid, as 
did Abbottabad. Coverage of the compound's location included both speculation over 
the significance of that location and rumours regarding the compound's residents; both 
had the potential to shape the represented meaning of the covert event.
Articles were quick to highlight the contrast between the dominant past 
suspicions of bin Laden's location and where he had actually been hiding. Bin Laden 
himself was characterised as having “expected to go down in a blaze of glory in the 
mountains of Afghanistan or a remote hideout in Pakistan's tribal areas”, but instead he 
“met his end in a short firefight in Pakistan's answer to Aldershot” (Oborne, 2011a). Not 
only did this represent bin Laden as having been unable to determine how he died, but 
his death was framed as reflecting his hypocrisy, having revealed that his public image 
of rugged insurgent masked cowardice: “[t]he sprawling million-dollar hideaway” was “a
far cry from the dank caves that Bin Laden's acolytes were led to believe he was 
skulking in” (Parker, 2011). Yet the location of the unseen raid had the potential to 
intimate things beyond mere hypocrisy. References to bin Laden's comfortable 
existence acknowledged that his compound lay just a few hundred feet from 'Pakistan's 
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Sandhurst', the Pakistan Military Academy (Chapman, 2011), a fact that was portrayed 
as raising incredulity that Pakistani authorities could not have known of his presence. 
With this location and its possible implication of Pakistani collusion framed as a trace of
covert action, the implication was able to allude to bin Laden's body, and its location, as 
rendering U.S. triumphalism premature. Such a subject-position, however, could still 
have been accommodated within a U.S. narrative of the raid, since Pakistani collusion 
need not have undercut calls for renewed vigilance in the aftermath of bin Laden's 
death.
More significant were the rumours of bin Laden's late life in Abbottabad, 
relayed by neighbours and other residents. These rumours were drawn on by press 
coverage to tell a story of the raid's spectacular and surprising quality, that it should 
have taken place where it did, by contrasting the unprepossessing quality of the town 
with its most famous recently-deceased resident. Bin Laden, in the words of one Times 
article, “was cut down by American bullets among the cantonment barracks, elegant 
lawns, cricket fields, Christian churches, fish-and-chip shops and music schools of the 
country's social elite” (Loyd, 2011). As well as drawing on this image of the town to 
indicate bin Laden's hypocrisy over 'waging jihad' in such surroundings, coverage used 
this contrast to characterise him as an ill-fitting resident, one whose terroristic qualities 
made him stand out. Thus in headlines bin Laden became the 'Neighbour from hell' (A. 
Gregory, 2011), 'The Khans next door' with 'the darkest secret' (Oborne, 2011b), 'the 
terror godfather next door' (D. Williams et al, 2011) – characterisations that played on a 
supposed incongruity between bin Laden's inner disposition, as a dark and hellish 
person of terror, and his attempt to hide in a normal town as a normal neighbour. These
articles pointed to the testimony of Abbottabad residents to justify descriptions of bin 
Laden as a “[t]error mastermind” whose behaviour caused neighbours to “[grow] 
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suspicious”, for instance his banning nearby children from retrieving their cricket ball 
from his garden (A. Gregory, 2011).
The accounts of neighbours, however, did not quite fit this image of a hellish 
household whose actions provoked suspicion. Instead, neighbours characterised bin 
Laden as somewhat inscrutable in his life in Abbottabad. Residents of the compound 
who visited nearby shops “seemed pretty polite and decent... They were nice guys”. 
Moreover, “[i]t was never very clear” where the residents had arrived from six years 
earlier. No-one ever saw bin Laden in those subsequent years; in fact, “[n]o one 
suspected anything probably because they didn't interact much”. Far from suspicion, 
neighbours most frequently expressed disbelief: “It just doesn't make sense. Abbottabad 
was the most peaceful city of Pakistan” (ibid). Nor were residents apparently provoked 
by the construction of the compound: while articles articulated its security as 
extraordinary – noting its 18 foot walls, security cameras, barbed wire and lack of 
phone or internet connection – “[f]ar from being a highly impenetrable site” for 
residents, “children were invited into [the] compound to play with pet rabbits and [bin 
Laden's] offspring even attended the local school”. These statements contradict the idea 
that the compound would have inevitably revealed the presence of a terrorist 
mastermind; as one resident put it, “[o]nly when I found out that Osama Bin Laden had 
been killed in their house did I make the connection” (Flanagan 2011).
As part of the public record of this covert event in its aftermath, these statements
produce excess meaning. While coverage sometimes explained residents' lack of 
suspicion as evidence of a town in denial (Loyd, 2011), the contradiction between 
residents' statements and the narrative of 'growing suspicions' caused by an 
'extraordinary' compound alludes to bin Laden as remaining as inscrutable in death as 
he apparently was in life. The uncertainty produced by residents' accounts intimates the 
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idea that bin Laden's body continues to elude attempts to fix its meaning as representing
inevitable detection and defeat. This continued to the end of the the week's coverage of 
the raid, by which point the circumstances of bin Laden's “entirely secret life” in the 
compound were still up in the air and “the subject of conflicting reports”, for instance 
regarding his operational role within al Qaeda. All that was known were seemingly 
innocuous details of the compound – that it had “a cow, a large vegetable patch, and the 
children kept rabbits” (Randall and Buncombe, 2011) – details which emphasised the 
conspicuous absence of other more certain information about bin Laden's late life.
Scars of the raid
As already discussed, the significance of the Abbottabad raid is that unlike most 
contemporary covert counter-terrorism, this operation's secrecy was addressed by the 
state to the public, through an official acknowledgement that documentation of both the
raid and the body at its centre was being kept hidden. This acknowledgement was 
accompanied by a state rationale, not for the operation's covertness, but for secretion in 
its aftermath. The residue discussed so far constituted traces of the raid that the U.S. 
state acknowledged, addressed, and sometimes even propagated: from sparse details of 
how bin Laden was killed to home video footage retrieved from the compound. The 
resident testimonies, however, speak to a different category of residue: traces that were 
not addressed by the state but which existed outside of U.S. and Pakistani officials' 
accounts of what took place. When reported upon, these other traces of the raid had the 
potential to reshape how the secretion of bin Laden's body, and possible wider secrecy, 
was represented to witnesses confronted with all of this residue. As in the case of 
lynching discourse, the representation of secrecy as a way to contain the excess meaning
of the violated body could undermine its own representational power.
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Much of the initial coverage of the raid was given over to Sohaib Athar, an 
Abbottabad resident who inadvertently recorded details of the raid on Twitter as it 
occurred nearby. He began by noting the sound of a helicopter flying over the town that
night, followed by the sound of explosions, expressing uncertainty himself as to what 
was going on (Figure 12). Given their news representation as an inadvertent act of 
witnessing, these tweets signify the raid's covertness, with details gained through 
accidental resident testimonies that cannot establish what exactly they reveal. Press 
coverage furthered this emphasis by framing Athar's witnessing as his “tweet[ing] live to 
the world about US special forces storming Osama Bin Laden's lair” (Sabey, 2011, 
emphasis added), implying that the tweets captured an operation that was supposed to 
be hidden. Indeed, Athar's messages were re-tweeted thousands of times by other 
Twitter users. Yet these tweets' content is also significant. Athar argued with friends 
online that the helicopter was “too noisy to be a spy craft” and that one of the aircraft 
had been shot down (quoted in Ward, 2011). After hearing a “huge window-shaking 
bang”, he tweeted: “Since Taliban (probably) don't have helicopters, and since they're 
saying it was not “ours”, so must be a complicated situation”. As for the downed 
helicopter: “People are saying it was not a technical fault and it was shot down. I heard it
CIRCLE 3-4 times above, sounded purposeful” (quoted in Arthur and Hill, 2011).
Figure 12: The first of Sohaib Athar's tweets on the night of the bin Laden raid (Athar, 2011).
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These tweets are speculations as to the actions of the Navy SEALs in carrying 
out the raid. Athar questions what kind of aircraft are being used and thus what their 
purpose might be, highlights the issue of who is operating the aircraft in Pakistani 
airspace, discusses how the helicopter crashed, and proffers the movement of the 
aircraft as an important indicator of what was going on. Unlike the articulations of U.S. 
state and military officials, which positioned bin Laden and the end of his own control 
over his own body as the significance of the raid, these tweets located that significance 
in the actions of the Navy SEALs. Athar's tweets are framed as part of public traces of an
otherwise-covert event, becoming suggestive as a result. The uncertainties expressed in 
these tweets consequently allude to the actions of the absent Navy SEALs as open to 
question and as possibly incoherent given the noise of the 'covert' aircraft and the 
crashing of a helicopter. These intimations reframe the raid as unclear in terms of what 
it says about the intentions and efficacy of the SEALs' strategy. These allusions are 
unverifiable but remain discursively suggestive in the context of the apparent secrecy of 
the operation. Given that these tweets were reported in the context of the 
acknowledged hiding of bin Laden's body, and appeared alongside images of the 
helicopter wreckage being cordoned off and towed away by Pakistani soldiers (Figure 
13), these allusions represent the apparently broad secrecy surrounding the raid as a 
precarious attempt to prevent ambiguities in the narrative of what happened. By 
highlighting this discursive labour, these intimations undermine the state's efforts by 
hinting at aspects of the SEALs' actions that secrecy might be covering up.
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Figure 13: Wreckage of the crashed Navy SEALs helicopter at Abbottabad (Drury et al, 2011).
Similar intimations were produced across much of the press coverage beyond 
Athar's tweets. Further eyewitness testimony alluded to the SEALs' actions as 
inscrutable. One resident was quoted as having seen “two black gunship helicopters... I 
couldn't see them clearly in the night, but it was obvious that they weren't Pakistani”. 
“The buzzing overhead” lasted some five or six minutes, before residents heard “a loud 
explosion”: ““We rushed out of the house immediately,” says Muhammad Riaz, echoing 
the words of several residents across Abbottabad who hastened out on to the streets in 
panic. “When we came outside, I saw the helicopter on fire, there was smoke rising out 
of it” (Waraich, 2011). With these snatched glimpses producing a suspicion of overall 
secrecy, these eyewitness accounts represent the SEALs' manoeuvres as opaque through 
distanced views of unclear aircraft, odd sounds and fire and smoke left in its wake. 
Residents were described as having been “woken by shattering explosions” and hearing 
“[b]ursts of gunfire” until “[a] little later, the silhouettes of three helicopters could be 
seen rising and disappearing into the dark sky” (Sengupta, 2011). Framed as suggestive 
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public traces of a covert event, these sparse details emphasise the inability to establish 
the SEALs' actions from them, alluding to those actions as being possibly more confused
and haphazard than officially suggested. This intimation remains equivocal, however, as
these traces prompt newsreaders to adopt the perspective of residents for whom the 
operation is too ephemeral, “over in less than an hour”, after which “all they could see 
was thick dark smoke coming from the compound” (Hussain, 2011).
Precisely because of their seeming opacity, these traces were able to intimate the 
SEALs' actions and intent in ways that implicitly reshaped representations of the raid. 
One Reuters image taken from mobile phone footage on 2 May and reprinted in 
newspapers was purported to show “the compound in flames” soon after the Navy 
SEALs attacked (Walsh, 2011a; Figure 14). Yet this residue signified in excess of what 
was being asked of it by this coverage. Framed as public evidence of an event that was 
conducted in secret, the image becomes significant in its inscrutability: its composition 
of pitch black and large amorphous balls of light surrounded by smoke can represent 
the SEALs' covert actions only opaquely, since there is no indication in the image or 
surrounding text of what exactly is being shown here. Being linked by press coverage to 
the raid, the image implicitly provokes questions: what are the SEALs doing in this 
image? Are the balls of light explosions? Is this documentation of the raid being enacted 
or a later image? This representation of the raid discursively stutters, that is, it 
emphasises its instability in terms of what it shows about the unseen event, in particular 
whether it is an eventful image of the raid's unfolding or an uneventful one of its 
aftermath. When contextualised as a public trace of actions that were covert, this 
stuttering alludes to the absent bodies and technology of the Navy SEALs as possibly 
being able to shed light on what is visualised in this non-state glimpse. This intimation 
implicitly represents the likely secretion of those bodies and technology as a possible 
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attempt to prevent understanding of some of the residue left behind. The subject-
position produced is focused on the possible extent and purpose of secrecy.
Figure 14: Still from mobile phone footage of the Abbottabad compound taken on the night 
of the raid (Walsh, 2011a).
Other reports of the raid's aftermath documented suggestive traces of the 
SEALs' actions. Articles pointed to “[d]ramatic evidence of the strike” with “[t]he 18-foot
perimeter walls... pockmarked with bullet holes” (A. Gregory, 2011), “scars of Sunday's 
sensational raid” (Parker, 2011). Yet other coverage asserted that “[t]here were 
practically no signs of a fight” at the compound – “No bullet holes punctuated the walls” 
(Oborne, 2011a). Other journalists noted children's bikes, cooking pots and broken 
clocks “scattered around [bin Laden's] deserted compound” (A. Gregory, 2011), with one
clock “stuck at 2.20am – when the elite US Navy SEALs struck”, while just as 
significantly there lay “a twisted tangle of scorched metal” from the U.S. helicopter 
blown up by the SEALs after it crash-landed (Parker, 2011). These traces of the raid 
point to the actions of the Navy SEALs while emphasising their dissimilarity with those 
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actions – the possible bulletholes and helicopter wreckage do not provide a glimpse of 
those action but instead signify the absence of any such documentation. The stopped 
clock similarly defines those actions as distanced from newsreaders, who cannot see 
what happened at that frozen point in time. Once again, a suspicion of wider secrecy 
around the SEALs' actions is implicitly signified by apparent traces of unseen events; 
once framed by this secrecy, those traces allude to the absent special forces agents' 
actions and intentions as holding the key to this residue's unclear meaning but as having
been secreted. In the context of the U.S.'s acknowledged secretion of documentation, 
this intimation prompts witnesses to consider whether such secretion is as an attempt to
prevent any contesting of the state's narrative of the raid. While this shapes a subject-
position of suspicion towards that narrative, it also positions newsreaders alongside 
“[l]ocal children... rummaging through the fields, picking up pieces of the wreckage with
a view to selling them on” (Oborne, 2011a). The prompted focus, therefore, is on the 
difficulty in ascertaining what this wreckage might reveal about the raid.
The residue uncovered at the compound also alluded to Osama bin Laden's 
absent body. Articles referenced footage broadcast on Pakistani television that showed 
“a bloodstained carpet at the foot of a dishevelled bed” with “[p]illows... strewn over the 
mattress and other furniture... overturned” (Haynes, 2011). “Other rooms had been 
ransacked, with clothes scattered on the floor. A cot lay smashed in one of the seven 
bedrooms. The walls were riddled with bullet marks” (Hussain, 2011). These details act 
as evocative traces of the violence committed against those living in the compound, 
hinting at the actions the led to overturned furniture and spatters of blood. Yet when 
juxtaposed with discussion of bin Laden's body being kept hidden by the Obama 
administration, these traces invite readers to focus on the absence of that body from 
public representations. Stills from the Pakistani footage were reprinted within a number
246
of articles as the few visualisations of the interior of the compound (Drury et al, 2011; 
Figure 15). As ostensible evidence of the death of bin Laden, the stills emphasise the lack
of his body by showing only an empty room and pointing at the blood covering the 
carpet. As traces of an implicitly covert operation, these stills intimate his body as 
having been removed from these scenes and thus as having left them undefined as to 
what they reveal about the raid. The hiding of bin Laden's body is implicitly represented
as obscuring what did or did not take place, intimating the possibility that this was the 
state's intention. At the same time, the opacity of these traces prompts a focus on the 
difficulty in understanding what they indicate about what took place. Comprehending 
opaque residue becomes the implicit significance of the unseen event.
Figure 15: Still from video taken in Osama bin Laden's bedroom in the Abbottabad raid's 
aftermath (Drury et al, 2011).
Conclusion: the dilemmas of hiding
The raid on bin Laden's Abbottabad compound stands out from the vast majority of 
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contemporary covert counter-terrorism in that it was officially acknowledged by its 
state perpetrator. U.S. officials revealed that the raid had taken place and gave some 
details of what had happened. The Navy SEALs operation did not, however, designate a 
throwback to past portrayals of covert action. The U.S. did not provide iconic glimpses 
of the raid being enacted; aside from the fragmented testimony of Abbottabad residents 
and elliptical images, such glimpses were entirely absent. There were no glimpses of the 
bodies of those involved – only of those Obama administration officials who (partially) 
witnessed the raid themselves. And when the U.S. did acknowledge the raid, it did not 
articulate a rationale for the covertness of the operation; that covertness remained 
mostly implicit in the fact that the event had occurred out of public view before being 
officially linked to the United States. Instead of invoking covertness, U.S. officials 
admitted to, and attempted to justify, secreting residue of the operation in its aftermath: 
specifically, documentation of the raid taken by the SEALs, and the body of the man at 
its centre.
It is the hiding of this body, more than the triumphalist statements from 
President Obama and others, that is most significant in shaping the representational 
dynamics of the raid in public discourse. Hiding the body narrowed the possibility that 
its surface markers might be represented in ways that went against the framing 
provided by the Obama administration, for the simple reason that those markers were 
not publicly-available to be scrutinised and re-contextualised. This is a more compelling
basis for an historical parallel between covert counter-terrorism and lynching than 
discussed by critical scholarship: for in both cases, the representation of violence is 
shaped by the hiding of the violated body, with that secretion signifying who has the 
right to look and determine the meaning of the violence while curtailing the explicit 
articulation of alternative meanings.
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As this chapter's discussion of lynching pointed out, however, this 
representational power of secretion relies on unsubstantiated rumours and speculation 
representing the violence in ways that cannot be contested without access to the central 
proof of the act of violence. Were that bodily proof to be found, as in the case of Emmett
Till, or other traces unearthed, they might cast the act of hiding in a different light. If 
that act were admitted to, moreover, it may lose its representational power by 
producing public details that could then be scrutinised and contested. This possibility, as
suggested by this historical affiliation, was used to orient analysis of coverage of the 
Abbottabad raid. While Osama bin Laden's body was never publicly revealed, the 
Obama administration did confirm that secretion and articulate a rationale for it. 
Having been officially acknowledged, this act lost the representational power associated
with lynching not only because it could be traced to a particular group of individuals, 
but because it was justified to the public rather than left unspoken to signify defiance 
towards that public.
The state's admittance and rationalisation of secretion therefore circulated in the
public sphere alongside other residue of the raid, residue whose ambiguities and 
contradictions were highlighted by their framing as public evidence of an event that had
seemingly been conducted covertly. The U.S. released various details of the manhunt for
bin Laden, the raid itself and what had been discovered at the Abbottabad compound. 
While framing this residue as detailing a U.S. victory over a cowardly, anxious and 
hypocritical representative of terrorist barbarity, however, news accounts referenced 
aspects of this residue that did not appear to fit into the U.S. narrative of the raid. When 
framed as public traces of a covert event, these uncertainties alluded to bin Laden's 
absent body as possibly not fitting into the role assigned to it by this narrative, implicitly
representing the body's secretion as an attempt to cover up any incongruities in the 
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story of what had taken place. Meanwhile, other residue was uncovered by journalists 
and went unacknowledged by the state. These traces pointed to the actions of the Navy 
SEALs themselves while leaving those actions opaque. As further public evidence of a 
covert event, these traces alluded to the possibility that those actions too did not quite 
fit the narrative being officially offered about what had happened. The secretion of the 
SEALs' operation, of documentation of their actions, was implicitly represented as 
preventing public understanding of this visible residue. Finally, the public debate that 
ensued once it was revealed that bin Laden's body was to be kept hidden hinted at 
unspoken possibilities about what that secretion might say about a collective identity of 
supposedly civilised counter-terrorist states.
These intimations of bin Laden's absent body, and the bodies and actions of the 
Navy SEALs, implicitly represented the hiding of that body as a precarious attempt to 
control the meaning of the raid, to prevent any interpretation of the event that would 
contradict the U.S. state narrative. While such an attempt at control is intuitively 
obvious, its implicit highlighting by allusions to possibilities that went beyond the U.S. 
narrative framed that attempt as contestable and as worthy of scrutiny, undermining the
meaning ascribed by that narrative. Intimations of unverifiable ideas about the raid, and 
hints that secrecy was being used to curtail those ideas, implicitly shaped a subject-
position of doubt towards the public stories being offered by suggesting that different 
public traces rubbed against those stories and hinted at alternatives. The secrecy around
bin Laden's body, and the possibility of secrecy stretching beyond that body, was 
implicitly represented as preventing public understanding.
Placed in an historical affiliation with representations of lynching practice, press
coverage of the Abbottabad raid does not appear to have prompted newsreaders to 
assent to the covert violence that had passed unseen. The hegemony of the state's 
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triumphalist reading of its own violence was far from guaranteed. The representational 
dynamics produced by the combination of admitted secrecy and public residue instead 
prompted witnesses to recognise and scrutinise the discursive labour represented by the
state's control of bodies' visibility. From this subject-position, the meaning attached to 
bin Laden's death by the Obama administration appeared precariously reliant on hiding 
documentation of the raid. Because the secreted bodies and actions of those involved 
were intimated as possibly undoing the U.S. narrative of the raid, these intimations 
prompted witnesses of this residue to consider the troubling implications of that 
undoing for the claimed technically and ethically superior counter-terrorist collective 
identity, in opposition to a supposedly dangerous, arrogant and hypocritical terrorist 
outfit.
These intimations did not, however, shape a subject-position of dissent towards 
the covert violence committed in Abbottabad. The clear difference with the contesting 
of meaning in the case of lynching practice was that no attempt was made to cast bin 
Laden as the victim of racialised supremacist violence, as anti-lynching activists did for 
lynch victims by framing their mortally wounded bodies as evidence of the barbarity 
underpinning claims of white civilised superiority (Rushdy, 2012: 66-70). Instead, the 
implicit representation of bin Laden's secretion as an attempt to control the meaning of 
the raid and his body played into the representational dynamic identified in the 
previous chapter. Allusions to what the absent documentation of bin Laden and the 
Navy SEALs might reveal about the raid prompted witnesses to focus their attention on 
how secrecy was preventing public understanding. The subject-position that this 
constitutes is self-absorbed and insular, concerned with how absent bodies and 
documents might bear on the meaning of the raid and therefore on the collective 
identities implicated in it, and how any such implications were possibly being obscured 
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through the use of state secrecy. The inability of witnesses to comprehend the visible 
residue of the raid, and the possibility that secrets being kept from witnesses by the state
are perpetuating this incomprehension, becomes the perceived significance of the raid. 
Absent violated bodies are important not in terms of any ethical bearing of that violence
in itself, but in terms of how their absence might be rendering the raid opaque. The 
ethical orientation towards the use of force in this case is once again sharply delimited.
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Chapter 5
Landscapes of rumour in Sahara-Sahel kidnappings
On 15 June 2015, British and U.S. news media reported that a U.S. air strike on the 
eastern Libyan city of Ajdabiya had killed a leading al Qaeda-affiliated militant. 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a veteran of both conflict in Afghanistan and the Algerian civil 
war of the 1990s, had “earned a reputation as one of the most elusive jihadi leaders in 
the region”, having been “reported killed several times” yet remaining at large, to the 
point that he had been “nicknamed “Uncatchable” by French forces”. His reputation 
stemmed from his being “long a major figure in Saharan smuggling, hostage-taking, 
arms trafficking and insurgencies, including the conflict in Mali” that had culminated in 
a French intervention two years before. His killing would therefore constitute “a major 
strike against al-Qaida allied operations in the region” – “[i]f confirmed” (Stephen, 
2015).
This last qualifier seemed important, for news coverage repeatedly emphasised 
just how uncertain knowledge around this figure and around counter-terrorism in this 
region of the world could be. “[T]he truth about the man who lost an eye fighting the 
Russians in Afghanistan – or possibly in Algeria, fighting the military, depending on 
which source you believe – has always been as evasive as the man himself”, according to 
one analysis piece (J. White, 2015). Indeed, coverage of him in the past had speculated on
his own personal and political motivations for the activities linked to him, noting his 
fractious relationship with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which led to him 
forming his own group before appearing to pledge allegiance once more to 'Al Qaeda' in 
general (Joscelyn, 2015). Belmokhtar's ability to evade death and the opaqueness of his 
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motivations framed much of the coverage of his latest reported death, characterising 
this claim as tentative, difficult to verify and open to change. And sure enough, only a 
few days later, AQIM released a statement contradicting the Libyan government's claim,
reporting instead that the militant was “alive and well, as he wanders and roams in the 
land of Allah, supporting his allies and vexing his enemies” (quoted in Fenton, 2015).
In reporting the death of Belmokhtar as tentative and unconfirmed, news 
coverage described the air strike itself as having left little trace that could be used for 
such confirmation. The New York Times stated that “forensic proof” was needed to 
“declare with certainty” that he had been killed, and that “[g]iven the likely extent of the 
damage — multiple bombs were dropped on the target, officials said — that 
determination could take some time”. Thus while American officials “confirmed... the 
target of the strike”, “they expressed caution about his fate” (Schmitt, 2015). The 
impression given here is that the air strike had left little public trace beyond 'damage' 
that was now being assessed. The official acknowledgement of the military operation, 
then, existed in the public sphere alongside inferential rumour: that Belmokhtar may 
have escaped death once again given his ability to do so in the past, that the lack of a 
statement of mourning from Al Qaeda could indicate he was still alive, that the Libyan 
statement was a premature boast. Just as Belmokhtar himself existed in rumour, so too 
did the circumstances around the air strike.
This press coverage reflects a significant difference between coverage of 
counter-terrorism in the Sahara and Sahel regions of North Africa and the 
representations of covert action discussed thus far: while the latter drew on 
documentation of the aftermaths of these operations, along with claims as to what had 
happened and the procedures that had shaped them, representations in this case have 
relied predominantly upon rumours circulating about these events in the absence of 
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other public residue. The relative lack of residue around covert operations in the 
Sahara-Sahel – that is, around operations whose reporting produced the suspicion that 
they were a secret being kept by one or more states from the public – poses an empirical
challenge for this thesis. The foregoing chapters have examined how the combination of
covert violence residue and a suspicion of secrecy can produce intimations, hints and 
allusions of absent people and objects implicated in these operations that shape the way 
the latter are represented. Yet covert action in the Sahara-Sahel, aimed at rescuing 
people kidnapped by terrorist-affiliated groups and at hunting down members of these 
groups, has had a slimmer and more circumspect public existence. Residue of these 
operations often extends little beyond rumour and speculation that variously 
emphasises the unconfirmed quality of the information contained therein, the unknown
or questionable provenance of that information, and the fact that this information is 
contradicted by other claims. The aim of this chapter is to examine whether 
representations comprised of such rumour can produce intimations that shape the 
meaning of these unseen events.
In examining this possibility, the chapter considers the representational 
dynamics of rumour, particularly the ability of rumour to posit an ambiguous field of 
knowledge. By producing this field, rumours are able to shape a representation 
irrespective of claims of their truth or falsity, by emphasising their irresolvable 
possibility in a field of knowledge that remains unverifiable. The chapter combines this 
conceptualisation with an examination of the role that geographical qualities play in 
these representations. The long-standing U.S. and British state interest in North Africa 
as a potential terrorist threat has long been bolstered by a narrative premised on 
geography: the 'vast ungoverned spaces' of northern African states, filled with 
inhospitable desert and semi-arid terrain, have been interpreted as ideal for 
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fundamentalist Islamist groups to gather, train and carry out attacks without scrutiny or
state governance (Raleigh and Dowd, 2013). There has been a centuries-old association 
in European and American discourse between north Africa, particularly the Sahara 
desert, and Islamist violence, beginning with accounts of European explorers and 
slavery pioneers and culminating in the nineteenth-century notion of the Sahara as an 
inhospitable void, into which Christians could fall without chance of escape owing to 
Muslim barbarism and slave trades (McDougall, 2007: 21-3).
Today, these discourses of the danger of the Saharan and Sahelian voids are 
echoed in discussions of abductions and kidnappings of foreign tourists and workers, 
variously attributed to Islamist terrorists or associated smugglers. These events have 
been covered in the press from 2003 onwards, spearheaded by the abduction of thirty-
two foreigners, mostly Austrian, German and Swiss, in southeast Algeria. This 
kidnapping and those that have followed have been interpreted in media and policy 
circles as the most visible manifestations of a growing Islamist terrorist threat across the
Sahara-Sahel requiring a militarised response (Harmon, 2010: 17, 22-3; Grobbelaar and 
Solomon, 2015: 154-5), an interpretation which ignores how counter-terrorism and 
decades-long repression of political movements has increased local disaffection and 
boosted fundamentalism (Graham IV, 2011: 590-6). This interpretation has nevertheless
perpetuated, bolstered by ongoing kidnappings and abductions that range from one to 
five separate incidents each year, involving one to dozens to hostages at a time and 
continuing to the present day (see Sahara Overland (2016) for a list of kidnappings). 
Throughout coverage of these kidnappings, the landscapes of the Sahara and the Sahel 
have been referenced within rumours of hostage takers' activities – from assertions that 
the topography of this region affords them cover against efforts to detect their 
movements, to implicit notions that the kidnappers' familiarity and attunedness to this 
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terrain has enabled them to survive in these seemingly inhospitable areas for so long.
When coverage has turned to rumours of covert counter-terrorist responses to 
these kidnappings and hostage-takings, characteristics of the landscape have again 
appeared. At the same time, rumours of rescue attempts and manhunts for kidnappers 
have produced a suspicion of secrecy, through the frequent state silence that 
accompanies particular claims of military-intelligence activities and the sheer lack of 
public traces of rumoured operations. Rumour, landscape and secrecy thus all figure 
within these representations. This chapter examines how these three elements interact 
to shape the representation of these events. In doing so, the chapter extends the 
historical affiliation between covert counter-terrorism and lynching based on their 
public traces. Building on the third chapter's discussion of how lynching was defined 
nationally by the struggle to make sense of its position in U.S. society, and the idea in 
the fourth chapter that lynching perpetrators used secrecy to try to control the meaning 
of their violence, the present chapter examines how representations of lynching 
violence shaped the meaning of the natural landscapes where it took place. The frequent
prosecution of lynching in the rural outdoors figured the latter as embodying that 
violence, with the natural landscape in turn making the lynching victim meaningful in 
terms of her social abandonment. Thus topography and natural objects helped 
perpetuate particular meanings for lynching violence.
This chapter uses the historical affiliation with lynching to analyse how a similar
dynamic, of landscape making violence meaningful, is taking place in coverage of 
operations in the Sahara-Sahel: the natural landscape comes to embody the violence and
so gives the latter meaning by reverberating with imprints left of that violence and its 
absences on the surface of the terrain. In particular, the chapter argues that the 
suspicion of secrecy surrounding rumours of these operations prompts a particular 
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understanding of the absence at the centre of these portrayals of landscape. Descriptions
of the vast, barren homogeneity of the Saharan and Sahelian terrain juxtapose rumours 
of past or ongoing covert operations to implicitly emphasise the absence of material 
traces of these operations within the portrayed landscapes. At the same time, those 
rumours posit a field of ambiguous knowledge that becomes associated with these 
characteristics of the landscape. The geography of the region is figured as reflecting the 
ambiguity of knowledge. When these representations of landscape are then framed by a 
suspicion of secrecy, the absence of public traces becomes suggestive, intimating the 
possibility of the landscape's complicity in secrecy – the unverifiable idea that these 
geographical qualities are helping to conceal or obscure traces of covert operations. As 
with lynching, geographical markers are signified as appearing implicated in the 
prosecution of violence. This intimation, however, is signified as only a possibility, since
knowledge in this region is represented as indefinite and difficult to verify. It is this 
combination of suggestiveness and unknowability that forms the intimated meaning 
and significance of these representations, shaping subject-positions focused on the 
instability of knowledge and the possible role of terrain in that instability.
In detailing this discursive dynamic, the chapter examines three different 
periods of press coverage of Sahara-Sahel covert action, using the eighteen British 
national newspapers noted in the Introduction and, due to the volume of coverage, The 
New York Times only in the U.S. as sources. The three periods cover all articles on 
kidnappings and rescue attempts in the region from the start of 2010 to the end of 2013;
all articles on the hostage-taking at a gas plant in Algeria from 16th January to the start 
of February 2013; and all articles covering the manhunt for the hostage-taking's 
suspected organiser, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, from the time of the siege itself to May 2013,
when it transpired that reports of the manhunt's success had been premature.
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Rumours and the complicity of geography
The representations of covert operations discussed in previous chapters centred on 
traces left in those operations' wake. When identified as the remainders of unseen 
events, these traces were ascribed a quality of arbitrariness, an uneventfulness that made
it unclear what exactly they could reveal about 'what happened'. But these traces also 
signified a suspicion of secrecy, a suspicion that these events were a secret the state was 
trying to keep from the public, and as a result that arbitrariness became significant. It 
indicated that some things had escaped secretion and might therefore be suggestive as to
what had been kept hidden. That suggestiveness allowed the residue of covert violence 
to intimate things and ideas that were neither visible nor articulated.
In the case of representations of kidnappings and rescue attempts in the Sahara-
Sahel, two aspects of the representations complicate the above dynamic. Firstly, these 
events are primarily reported through rumour. While the previous cases also involved 
rumour-based statements as to what took place out of public sight and who was 
involved, kidnappings and rescue attempts in the Sahara-Sahel exist in the public sphere
almost entirely in rumours that are articulated and framed such that their speculative 
and indefinite quality is emphasised and appears to declaim responsibility for the veracity 
of their claims. As its basest, a rumour is simply a circulating statement or claim whose 
truth has not been confirmed. That such pieces of information are relied upon so 
heavily in coverage of Sahara-Sahel operations appears a consequence of journalists' 
inability to corroborate stories in a relatively untraversable part of the world for 
outsiders. Only the disappearance of foreign workers or tourists remained certain.
This deficit of well-corroborated information reflects Lecocq and Schrijver's 
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lament that when it comes to terrorism and counter-terrorism in the region, “nothing is 
known with any certainty”, due in part to “the very nature of the Sahara itself: the 
vastness of its area and the sparseness of its population, and the form its news takes”, 
with local media being scarce and “major sources of news” being “conversation and 
gossip” (Lecocq and Schrijver, 2007: 142). This deficit has shaped academic debate on 
covert action in the Sahar-Sahel, as demonstrated by the controversy that has met the 
work of anthropologist Jeremy Keenan, who claims to have unearthed evidence that 
counter-terrorism in the region “has involved the fabrication of a fiction of terrorism” 
(J. Keenan, 2009: 5), evidence qualified by others as “based on inference and rumours” 
(Richards, 2012: 495).
Within news accounts of counter-terrorism operations, however, these claims 
do not just remain unproven. They are articulated such that this lack of proof or 
confirmation is itself signified in a particular way, such that rumour operates in these 
representations not simply as a noun but as a verb. These representations indicate that 
it is rumoured that these events have taken place. In her discussion of the discursive 
dynamics of rumours and their circulation, Pamela Donovan argues that rumours can 
be articulated in multiple ways that imply different relations between the speaker of the 
rumour and the veracity of its claim. A rumour need not imply commitment by the 
speaker to that veracity; nor need the content of the rumour be articulated as 
unimpeachable or its veracity figured as key to the implied value of hearing it. 'Belief in' 
and 'scepticism towards' a rumour can mean quite different things to different speakers 
and listeners, reflecting different notions of the value of knowledge (Donovan, 2007: 74-
5).
One notion in particular is relevant to rumours of covert action in the Sahara-
Sahel. As Donovan details, articulations of rumour can imply that proving or disproving
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the rumour is neither possible nor the point of 'taking the rumour to heart'. Articulated 
claims can signify their rumour quality by simultaneously implying an ambiguous field 
of knowledge surrounding the event in question: an articulation akin to saying 'who 
knows whether such-and-such has occurred'. This 'who knows' articulation produces 
the very ambiguity which gives the rumour discursive power, since it suggests that the 
rumour can neither be proved nor disproved. This suggestion allows certain implications 
of the rumour – its portrayal of a particular kind of world or of particular 
characteristics of actors – to shape a representation and thus a hearer's imaginary 
regardless of the rumour's apparent veracity. “Not knowing”, then, “is an intrinsic part of 
the appeal and spread of the rumour”, since “[b]y declaring some things simply 
unknowable... the possibility that a story is true [becomes] just as likely as that it is false”.
This unknowability “helps preserve the 'lesson' or fearful meaning” of the rumour (ibid: 
77, original emphasis). Such a rumour can therefore produce a subject-position that sees
a particular field of knowledge as impenetrable to certainty while accepting the 
suggestibility of the rumour, the possibility and therefore significance of its content.
The field of knowledge around Sahara-Sahel kidnappings that these 'who 
knows' rumours colour as ambiguous is not, however, solely determined by those 
rumours. This speaks to the second aspect of these representations that complicates the 
dynamic of intimation. The cases of covert action discussed in previous chapters were 
publicly portrayed through traces of these operations in their aftermath, 
representational markers left in the wake of events that otherwise had gone unseen. 
When juxtaposed with the statement that an act of state violence had taken place, these 
markers produced state secrecy as a mere suspicion. This suspected secrecy in turn 
framed these markers as significant as public evidence of a covert operation and 
therefore rendered those markers suggestive as to what had taken place in secret. 
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Representations of covert action in the Sahara-Sahel stand out, then, in that there is 
often much less in the way of these public traces. To be precise, these representations 
often lack markers of material (or even less-than-material, dissipating, less tangible) 
traces of these operations deriving from the site where they are supposed to have 
occurred. There are fewer textual and visual accounts of what has been left behind by 
these operations; such traces are implicitly not within the public sphere. What are left 
behind and accessible are purported eyewitness testimonies of these events and, as 
discussed, rumours of what took place.
The particular quality of the representations being discussed, this lack of 
material trace, does not simply shape what is represented without drawing attention to 
itself; rather, these representations signify that lack as a representational marker in itself.
As discussed in the second chapter, representations of the aftermath of covert 
operations are able to signify things which are not corporeally present in the 
representation, through the juxtaposition of the statement that an event took place and 
uneventful markers which do not appear to fit the presumed qualities of that posited 
event. These publicly-visible traces consequently mediate absent traces of the posited 
covert event, signifying particular ideas of what is absent (Bille et al, 2010: 10). The 
difference with representations of Sahara-Sahel operations is that such visible traces 
which would allow for this mediation are themselves frequently absent.
There are nonetheless representational markers that juxtapose the positing of an
event: markers of the Saharan and Sahelien landscapes where these events are 
purported to have taken place. These textual and visual articulations of the Sahara-Sahel
mostly lack obvious signs of military violence: descriptions and photographs of 
scorched and burnt objects, smoke and fire, ambiguous surface markings, and fragments
of military equipment are much less frequent than in previous cases. What is articulated 
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instead is unremarkable and undifferentiated terrain and topography. These texts and 
images signify the uneventfulness theorised in this thesis, but of a different quality than 
in previous cases. The statement that an operation has taken place mostly juxtaposes 
geographical qualities which are seemingly untouched by military violence, signifying 
not only the arbitrariness of what is visible in the aftermath of these events but a sheer 
public lack of material trace of those events from where they supposedly took place. 
Alternatively, where such traces of a rumoured operation are represented, 
accompanying articulations of the spaces where the operation took place – of vast 
barren terrain, or of the material texture of sand or earth itself – signify that these traces
are not simply arbitrary but are incredibly slight or at risk of dissipating. This again 
shapes a subject-position focused on the insubstantiality of what is left behind, the 
absence of more definite and enduring traces. Rather than be produced through present 
traces which point to it for meaning, then, absence is instead signified through emptiness 
within the landscape.
Absence is not an homogeneous category, however, and these geographical 
qualities produce a particular understanding of the meaning and significance of this lack
of material trace. To analyse how this meaning is produced, this chapter draws on 
analysis of the discursive roles played by sparse and homogeneous landscape in 
representations of state violence. In his discussion of memoirs and films of soldiers who
served in the Gulf War, Geoffrey Wright argues that geographical qualities of the desert,
specifically its vast and undifferentiated topography, are figured as reflecting soldiers' 
psychological disorientation. The inability to orient oneself in “the sand and the open 
expanse of it” becomes a metaphor for these soldiers' emotional trauma and 
psychological disorientation (Wright, 2009: 1680). In addition, traces of military action 
such as uniforms and maps are represented as having been stained or bleached by the 
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material substance of desert sand. Framed as being part of soldiers' attempts to 
understand 'what happened' during their tours of duty, these representations allow “the 
desert” to “inscribe... [the] past on the surface of these artefacts... infus[ing] the uniform 
with particular shades of meaning”. For instance, the obscuration of old maps by layers 
of sand in Anthony Swofford's memoir Jarhead “does not make [Swofford's] past legible 
so much as it represents the past's illegibility” (ibid: 1679). Textual and visual markers of
the landscape, in other words, are able to overlap or conjoin traces of past military 
violence so that together they act as metaphorical markers, shaping the meanings 
attached to that violence by representing those meanings through metaphor.
This conceptualisation of the metaphorical potential of geography opens a way 
to analysing representations which lack the kind of residue discussed in previous 
chapters. In this case, however, characteristics of the landscape shape the meaning of 
covert operations not through the explicit articulation of metaphor by journalists, but 
through the landscape's juxtaposition with rumours that produce a suspicion of state 
secrecy.
In elaborating this analysis, the chapter extends the historical affiliation between
covert counter-terrorism and lynching practice, associating the two practices through 
their residue's shared representation within natural landscapes. As a response to societal
changes brought on by modernity, including increased free movement and property 
ownership among African-Americans, lynchers' act of hanging black citizens outdoors –
so that their feet could not touch the ground – reiterated those citizens' continued 
landlessness, their dispossession of a home and private land of their own (Alexandre, 
2008: 72-86). This violence also brutally regulated the movement of newly-free African-
Americans and so discursively curtailed their equal 'ownership' of public space (ibid: 85-
6, 98-9, 102). Crucially, these significations relied upon the spaces where lynchings were
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perpetrated: outdoor public places with suitable objects to hang bodies from. As such, 
those spaces and their objects became part of and shaped the meaning signified by that 
violence. In the case of lynchings committed in rural settings, narratives and 
photography of black bodies dangling from trees signified the rural outdoors as 
dangerous for black citizens and figured that space as one of social abandonment: with 
their hanging bodies left in the uninhabited wilderness, lynched black citizens and the 
social problems they represented were 'cast out' of society, along with the violence itself 
(ibid: 93-100). Stripped of any markers of their social relations, the meaning of those 
lynch victims' deaths and the violence involved was shaped instead by the landscape in 
which they were found, dissuading interest in the social world of the victim (ibid: 87-8).
This discursive dynamic relied on the lynch victim's body being infused with 
meaning by the natural landscape, just as material traces of the Gulf War were made 
meaningful through their contact with the desert. Lynch victims left in the outdoors 
signified landlessness and abandonment through their being relentlessly exposed to 
nature in public space, “hanging on trees left to the vagaries of the weather” (ibid: 89). 
Being 'tainted' by the outdoors in this way, the wider social context of these murdered 
bodies was marginalised from the meaning of the violence, as the natural landscape was 
represented as the relevant context of these events (ibid: 99). In this way, the spatiality of
lynching implicated the natural landscape in the violence: the meaning of rural outdoor 
spaces was seen to be shaped by lynching perpetrators at the expense of black citizens. 
Literary narratives of lynching therefore emphasised how, as a result of the violence 
that took place within them, the trees and forests of the American South appeared to 
actually embody that violence, retaining and signifying the memory of unseen lynchings
(Phillips, 2014: 467-70). Stories of lynching in one place could “transform, or reinvent, 
one's understanding of nature, regardless of geographical location”, turning trees and 
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forests into signifiers of lynching violence even for those who had not witnessed that 
violence. Narrations of lynchings could therefore produce a subject-position that 
associated aspects of nature with trauma, whereby the seemingly-benign landscape 
alluded to those black bodies “hanging, unnoticed, in the woods” (ibid: 471, 477).
The natural landscape emerged in African-American writers' narratives of 
lynching as made up of “see-no-evil, hear-no-evil natural objects” that appeared to be 
“themselves in cahoots with the social forces teeming against their black bodies' very 
existence” (Alexandre, 2008: 77). By overlapping traces of lynching violence, the natural 
objects of the landscape made those traces meaningful in reflecting social abandonment 
and a disconnect between the violence and wider society. That in turn gave the 
landscape itself meaning as being somehow implicated in this violence. The meaning-
making role of the landscape, however, meant that the representational dynamics of 
lynching violence need not remain under the control of lynching sympathisers; 
geographical qualities had the potential to 'taint' that violence in different ways, again 
explaining the need to 'fix' certain meanings through the secreted circulation of 
lynching postcards and, over time, the secretion of the practice itself in those 'unnoticed'
spaces (ibid: 91-3; Rushdy, 2012: 93-4, 97-100).
In extending the historical affiliation with lynching, the present chapter 
examines whether this representational dynamic, whereby geographical qualities come 
to embody and shape the meaning of violence, exists around covert counter-terrorism. 
Through this analysis, the chapter will argue that the natural landscape of North Africa 
is implicated in, and shapes the meaning of, covert violence – not through its rumoured 
or even witnessed effects upon bodies, however, but through its association with non-
bodily residue, in particular rumours of unseen operations. When detailing rumours of 
unseen events, news coverage articulates qualities of the landscape where these events 
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take place. With these events implicitly contextualised by this geography, the contrast 
between the vastness and barrenness of this terrain and claims of unseen kidnappings 
and state responses signifies the absence of public traces within these spaces. This 
allows those geographical qualities to reflect and embody, in a metaphorical fashion, the 
ambiguous field of knowledge signified by these rumours. These unseen events thus 
gain meaning through these qualities, with the natural landscape 'tainting' the signified 
absence of substantial markers, along with any slight material traces that are portrayed 
as having been made opaque by the desert sand.
At the same time, a suspicion of secrecy produced by these rumours and 
obscured traces frames this landscape as suggestive regarding what is absent. While in 
previous chapters a suspicion of state secrecy framed public traces as significant in 
having avoided secretion, here secrecy makes the landscape itself appear significant, 
since that landscape is represented as constituting the spaces where these operations 
took place while barely leaving a mark upon it. Through this framing, those same 
represented qualities of the landscape's texture and topography that embody the 
ambiguity of knowledge are figured as suggestive regarding events that have been 
conducted covertly within these spaces. This interplay between the unknowability 
fostered by rumours, geographical qualities and suspicions of secrecy produces meaning
in excess of what is explicitly articulated, intimating ideas about what remains absent 
within these landscapes.
The result, as argued in the following sections, is that just as representations of 
rural lynchings represented the natural landscape as complicit in the violence, so these 
representations intimate the equivocal possibility that the terrain of the Sahara-Sahel is 
helping to keep aspects of ongoing counter-terrorism hidden. These intimations 
therefore shape subject-positions which, as before, focus on the difficulty in making 
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sense of unseen violence. The difference here, however, is that these intimations link 
that struggle to comprehend not to ephemerality, as with drone strikes, or to secreted 
bodies, as with the bin Laden raid. Instead, they produce a subject-position focused on 
the idea that the landscape itself is making ongoing covert activities inscrutable. The 
rumours which constitute residue of these activities signify that proving or disproving 
such a notion is beside the point; it is the mere possibility that is significant.
Kidnappings and rescue attempts
Kidnap scenarios in the Sahara-Sahel are invariably represented through statements 
which are implicitly unconfirmed. The way they are articulated signifies that their 
claims are unverifiable, their veracity inscrutable, while linking that unverifiability to 
the region itself. This is part of these rumours' discursive power, since disproving them 
consequently appears impossible. At the same time, descriptions of landscape emphasise
the lack of material trace of these kidnappings. The representation of this geography 
alongside rumours, however, produces a suspicion of secrecy which allows qualities of 
the landscape to allude to the possibility of ongoing covert rescue missions that remain 
hidden due to geography, just as the terrain appears to allow kidnappers to elude 
detection.
When rumours of secret rescue attempts are articulated more explicitly, their 
juxtaposition with these same geographical markers highlights the absence of material 
traces of these attempts. That absence then becomes suggestive: not just of secrecy but 
of the landscape's possible complicity in that secrecy, a complicity in keeping these 
operations hidden. Being articulated in rumour, however, these accounts also portray 
the landscape as unknowable, with the truth or falsity of the rumours circulating within 
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it figured as unverifiable. This shapes a subject-position from which these operations 
are meaningful in terms of a perceived inability to determine whether or not kidnappers
and covert agents really are responsible for different things rumoured to be taking place
here.
When seven workers at a uranium mine in Arlit, Niger were reported captured 
in September 2010, coverage relied upon rumours and speculative statements which 
emphasised that they were unconfirmed. The New York Times' initial report began by 
stating that “[s]even people connected to a French nuclear company in Niger were 
kidnapped on Thursday” in Arlit, this according to a French Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson. The article then immediately shifts geographical perspective by noting 
President Sarkozy's promise that “France will do everything to liberate them, as we do 
each time” (de la Baume, 2010). The fact that almost all the information given in the 
article comes from French or Niger government sources juxtaposes the statement of the
kidnapping to signify a lack of public traces from the site of the kidnapping itself. 
Indeed, the French spokesperson says the hostages “had been captured in two locations” 
without providing any more detail, emphasising an absence of traces from those 
locations (ibid).
The same spokesperson says there is “no immediate claim of responsibility”. 
This expression of uncertainty about the kidnappers accompanies a Niger government 
statement that “the workers were kidnapped by a group of 7 to 30 men who spoke 
Arabic and Tamashek, the language spoken by the region's Tuareg tribes” (ibid). Given 
the lack of material trace, these two statements figure the latter claim as of unclear 
provenance, emphasising the ambiguity over the number of people and the speculative 
use of language to indicate the kidnappers' political affinities. Further statements are 
also characterised as rumour. The two French companies employing those kidnapped 
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are quoted as “confirm[ing] the kidnappings” while “provid[ing] no details on how [they]
had occurred”. This statement frames a subsequent reference to a Reuters report that “a 
local businessman and a mining official had said the victims were taken from their 
houses overnight while they slept” (ibid). The framing signifies that the latter eyewitness
testimony is a speculative and unconfirmed account which can neither prove nor 
disprove how the kidnappers were able to carry out this action.
These rumours and speculations are framed by discussion of the Sahel region. 
“The Sahel zone is extremely dangerous” and “we must redouble vigilance”, says 
President Sarkozy, while Areva has “recently become more concerned about potential 
threats from a Tuareg militant movement and from Al Qaeda’s north African affiliate” 
in Niger. The article ends by highlighting previous kidnappings in the region by both 
Tuareg rebels and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (ibid). These accounts of the past 
danger of the region frame rumours of the present kidnapping as entirely plausible; 
those rumours, however, continue to signify that definite information is being 
hampered by a dearth of public traces. With those rumours positioned as possibly 
reflecting a region-wide threat, that dearth and the consequent uncertainty over the 
identities and actions of the kidnappers is associated with that region. Geographical 
qualities thus frame this kidnapping as meaningful in the context of a regional threat, 
but in doing so the landscape of the Sahel is implicitly signified as a space where 
confirming details of such events is difficult.
Within that suggestibility and unknowability, coverage is able to intimate the 
possibility of ongoing covert rescue attempts being hidden by the landscape. The report 
of the kidnapping in the London Times used past kidnappings to speculate on possible 
responses from France, first noting that “[a]ccording to security sources, millions of 
dollars in ransoms have been paid [in past cases], although these have never been 
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publicly confirmed”. France itself is reported as making clear to armed groups through 
its “military and intelligence services” that “Paris will no longer negotiate”, while 
countries in the region have “open[ed] a joint military headquarters deep in the desert” 
in response to the threat of terrorism (Bremner, 2010). These brief references to past 
state action and military bases produce secrecy as the barest suspicion, that unseen 
activities in the region may be being kept hidden by the French state. These statements 
and that secrecy exist alongside references to “the remote desert” where previous 
kidnappings have occurred and references to the area's vast expanse, with Arlit lying 
“500 miles (800km) northeast of Niamey, the capital”. The kidnappers themselves are 
described as having escaped into this vast remoteness, with eyewitnesses claiming that 
“[t]he kidnappers' trucks were seen driving north towards the base of AQIM, an 
Algerian-led terrorist group that regards France as its main foreign enemy” (ibid).
Speculative references to past French state responses and hints of a military 
presence are thus framed by references to the nondescript vast remoteness of the 
Sahara-Sahel into which the kidnappers themselves disappeared. These references to 
the landscape emphasise the absence of material evidence of any state response to the 
kidnapping. That absence, however, is made suggestive by secrecy, intimating the 
possibility that a covert response is ongoing while remaining hidden in that same 
remote desert. The natural landscape is alluded to as being complicit in suspected state 
secrecy. This possibility is represented as unverifiable within the field of indefinite 
knowledge associated with this landscape, but for the same reason it appears difficult to 
disprove. Framed by secrecy, unconfirmed rumours of past ransom payments and 
references to French military capabilities therefore intimate that the Sahel is a place 
where covert action could be taking place but may be remaining hidden; the rumour 
basis of this allusion signifies that proving or disproving it is a fool's errand.
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Geographical qualities continued to shape accounts of kidnappings and rescue 
efforts. Coverage of the February 2013 kidnapping of foreign construction workers in 
Jama're, northern Nigeria, implicitly highlighted the ability of the kidnappers to 
disappear without a trace. One Daily Mail article described the kidnappers as having 
“attacked a prison and set two police vehicles on fire before killing a guard” at a 
workers' camp owned by constructed company Setraco. The article contrasts this 
knowledge with the relaying of the event by local government authorities, and a British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office statement that “[w]e are aware of reports and are 
making enquiries with the authorities”, hinting at officials' uncertainty as to where the 
kidnappers have gone. Meanwhile, accompanying photographs show not traces of the 
kidnapping but Setraco promotional materials of long, empty roads they have built in 
Nigeria (V. Allen, 2013). The region itself is then referenced: “[w]hile no-one has 
claimed responsibility so far”, the article continues, “Islamic extremists have carried out 
a bloody guerilla campaign in the past year, including kidnappings and murders”, some 
of which are then briefly detailed. The past history of the geographical area is used to 
speculate on the identity of the kidnappers, while the same area is implicitly signified as 
allowing the kidnappers to elude detection. This speculation on identity, however, is 
qualified by the note that while the kidnapping of two men last year in Nigeria was 
attributed by authorities to “[g]unmen [with] links to Boko Haram”, “[t]he sect later 
denied taking part in that abduction” (ibid). These statements implicitly figure northern 
Nigeria as a place where rumours are difficult to prove or disprove owing to a lack of 
substantial traces of events.
Having signified this unknowability, later reports alluded to the possibility that 
the landscape made it difficult to assess both kidnappers' and covert agents' actions. A 
month after the Jama're kidnapping, it was reported that the hostages had been executed
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by their kidnappers, now identified as Ansaru. Coverage of this claim – itself portrayed 
as rumour, with Setraco stating it “had heard nothing of any harm done to the hostages” 
– describes the British Ministry of Defence as “refus[ing] to comment on claims by the 
Islamist group Ansaru... that the murders were provoked by the arrival of British 
fighters jets in Nigeria amid rumours of a rescue mission”. Ansaru itself is quoted as 
claiming that “sightings of British military planes in the region... had triggered the 
decision” to execute the hostages (Owen, 2013). This claim of what Ansaru calls “[t]he 
Nigerian and British operation” is framed as rumour by other parties' responses: the 
British Foreign Office asks people “not to speculate at this extremely sensitive time”, 
while Nigerian officials “cast doubt on the claims by Ansaru”, saying that “[a]s far as I'm 
concerned, and to the best of my knowledge, nothing like that has happened”. An 
“intelligence official in the north” is also reported as having “doubted the report, 
although he said some suspects linked to the kidnapping had been arrested last week” 
(ibid). These contradictory and dismissive statements produce a mere suspicion of state 
secrecy around this unconfirmed operation.
These rival accounts of what has happened are contextualised by the statement 
that this execution comes a year after another failed rescue bid in Nigeria. Through this 
contextualisation, the rumours of both execution and rescue attempt are linked to the 
suggestive past of this geographical area; the claim of a failed rescue is implicitly 
supported by inference from what has previously taken place. This suggestiveness, 
however, is tied to implicit unknowability: these rumours emphasise their unverified 
quality, originating in claims of hearing or not hearing things, seeing or not seeing 
things, figuring this area as one where such claims can neither be proved nor disproved. 
Framed by a suspicion of secrecy, these claims intimate the possibility that the 
inscrutability of this area allows covert action to take place and remain largely unseen, 
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without leaving a material trace. This shapes a subject-position which sees the 
kidnappers and covert agents as mirroring one another in this regard: when police and 
intelligence officials refer to their own doubt over 'reports' of 'what has happened', it 
remains unclear whether they are referring to the executions, the rescue attempt, or 
both.
Through allusions to potential 'geographical secrecy', rumours of what has taken
place in the Sahel are represented as significant not in terms of their truth – since this 
remains unknowable – but in terms of their “'lesson' or fearful meaning” which is 
“preserve[d]” by the “atmosphere of ambiguity” that the rumours themselves foster 
(Donovan, 2007: 77). That lesson is the possibility of the region harbouring secret state 
operations without their leaving a material trace. Intimations from absence, the lack of 
residue of covert action, are thus able to reshape the meaning and significance of these 
representations. At the same time as hinting at possible secrecy and linking that secrecy 
to the landscape, those intimations render the rumoured events as unconfirmed, 
inviting newsreaders to focus on their unverifiability. Once again, the inability to 
comprehend covert action that has gone unseen implicitly defines these representations 
for witnesses, only this time it is a result of rumours and descriptions of landscape 
giving meaning to one another.
Topography and texture at In Amenas
The hostage-taking at a gas plant near the town of In Amenas, Algeria in January 2013 
was significantly different from the kidnappings that had previously taken place in the 
Sahara and Sahel regions. This was a hostage-taking where the perpetrators had stayed 
put, storming the gas complex before barricading themselves in as they were cordoned 
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off and surrounded by Algerian special forces. The disappearing act of kidnappers was 
not a central plank of news coverage. But the stationary position of the unfolding event 
did not guarantee a public view of what was happening. Frequent suspicions were raised
in news coverage of secrecy surrounding the actions of Algeria's special forces and its 
broader counter-terrorism programme, suspicions made possible by journalists being 
barred from the In Amenas site while the siege of the plant was ongoing. The result was 
that journalists were forced to rely on rumour and speculation as to what was 
happening at the cordoned-off site. In articulating these rumours, coverage drew on 
geographical qualities, referring to the topography of the area, the material texture of 
the North African desert, and previous kidnappings in the region. This allowed the 
desert to take on a metaphorical role: vastness, barrenness and homogeneity were 
figured as embodying the difficulty of proving or disproving activities in the region 
which lacked public traces. At the same time, a suspicion of secrecy around these 
rumours juxtaposed the absence of residue that was signified by uneventful geography. 
Insodoing, secrecy made these geographical qualities suggestive, allowing the landscape 
to intimate its possible complicity in the secretion of rumoured actions and events.
Coverage of the hostage-taking and subsequent siege frequently indicated the 
unverifiable or ambiguous quality of rumours about these events in ways that referred 
to the surrounding landscape. The New York Times front page story the day after the 
attack stated that “armed attackers in unmarked trucks” had seized a natural gas field 
and that “[h]undreds of Algerian security forces” had been sent to surround it, before 
noting that “[m]any details of the assault on the gas field in a barren desert near Libya's 
border remained murky” (Nossiter and Sayare, 2013b, emphasis added). The article 
indicates uncertainty surrounding the assault with reference to the barrenness of the 
area's topography, positing a lack of clarity and implicitly linking it to that topography: 
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barrenness contextualises that murkiness. The article then acknowledges “unconfirmed 
reports late on Wednesday” that “the security forces had tried to storm the compound 
and had retreated under gunfire from the hostage takers” (ibid). The articulation of this 
rumour acts to declaim responsibility for its veracity, with 'there are reports' 
emphasising its external and unclear provenance. Other details come from “claims by 
the attackers quoted by regional news agencies” and from Algerian state officials, while 
“[a]n oil company official who had knowledge of the attack” claims that the attackers' 
shutting down of production at the site was “an indication of carefully [sic] planning” 
(ibid). Again, these claims disavow responsibility for their veracity and emphasise their 
unconfirmed inferential status.
The article goes on to highlight that “how and why [the hostage-takers] chose In 
Amenas, which is more than 700 miles from the Malian border and is much closer to 
Libya, were among the unknowns” (ibid, emphasis added). Here, the vast barrenness of 
the Algerian desert discursively overlaps the sparseness and ambiguity of information 
around the hostage-taking, with the former framing and implicitly reflecting the latter 
as a result. The article then notes that “Islamist groups and bandits have long operated in
the deserts of western and northern Africa”, including the “vast expanse of northern 
Mali”, indicating the huge size of the relevant topography. The article further states that 
“regular kidnappings have occurred in the West African desert in recent years”, with 
“seven French citizens... presently being held” (ibid). The suggestive history of the 
geographical area is thus used to speculate on the hostage-takers' unknown motive and 
capabilities, making the gas field siege meaningful in terms of the indefinite dangers of 
the Saharan desert.
The article ends with a drawing showing the “Site of seized gas field” within 
Algeria and Algeria's position relative to other North African countries, on a bare-bones
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map that displays few other markings besides the town of In Amenas (ibid). The desert 
is related to the siege through visual characteristics of its size and apparent 
homogeneity. The online version of the article was accompanied by an “undated photo” 
of the gas field: displaying motionless Toyotas and a stretch of sand in front of gas tanks
and two lone distant figures, the image signifies its uneventfulness, showing no sign of 
an Islamist takeover. In the context of rumours which emphasise their uncertainty, this 
atemporal image of flat uneventful desert implicitly signifies the absence of publicly-
available residue from the site itself (Nossiter and Sayare, 2013a; Figure 16).
Figure 16: An “undated photo” of the In Amenas gas field (Nossiter and Sayare, 2013a).
Initial coverage of the assault and siege therefore drew upon rumours that 
signified an ambiguous field of knowledge while referencing the geography and 
topography of the area. As with discourse around rural lynchings, the natural landscape 
contextualises and comes to embody aspects of these events: the vast homogeneity of 
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the area contextualises and implicitly represents the sparse and indefinite quality of 
information, while the uneventful barrenness is referenced alongside and reflects the 
inability to know what exactly is happening at the gas site. At the same time, the absence
of public traces and the relaying of rumours through Algerian and oil company 
spokespersons signify a suspicion of secrecy surrounding the siege. Alongside these 
landscape references, this suspicion makes the absence of public material traces 
suggestive, intimating the idea that the unknowability of the landscape, as 
metaphorically reflected in its vast barrenness, is complicit in this secrecy. The subject-
position produced is one focused on the landscape, its possible role in shaping the 
ongoing siege, and the difficulty in proving either way.
As the siege continued over the following days, the press continued to articulate 
rumours of how the assault had occurred in ways which drew on the geography of the 
surrounding area. The kidnappers were described as elusive figures able to avoid 
scrutiny in the public sphere; indeed, “[u]ntil yesterday morning” according to one 
Observer piece, “few outside the specialised world of those who track north African 
jihadists groups affiliated with al-Qaida had heard of Abdul Rahman al-Nigeri”, the 
suspected ringer-leader of the assault on the plant. The same piece then implicitly 
speculated on the importance of landscape in this elusiveness, noting that “[t]he Libyan 
government yesterday denied as “baseless” claims that the attackers had crossed into 
Algeria from a base in south-west Libya”, while “[o]ther claims have suggested that the 
group – some 40 strong, equipped with four-wheel drive vehicles and satellite phones 
and heavily armed – started from Niger” (Beaumont, 2013). That these claims have 
unclear provenance or are flatly denied by state sources signifies their rumour quality. 
They are also linked to geographical features, namely the large distances within the 
Sahara, while references to satellite phones and 4x4 vehicles imply that the landscape is 
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difficult to traverse and navigate. The juxtaposition of rumour and landscape allows the 
latter to form the context for these details, making those rumours meaningful in terms 
of the vast distances of the Sahara. This in turn signifies those distances as implicitly 
embodying the ambiguity of knowledge around the kidnappers' movements and spread, 
their ability to elude detection across seemingly inscrutable spaces.
What is significant about this link between the landscape and the kidnappers' 
elusiveness is that it mirrors intimations of a counter-terrorist response. The 
remoteness of the In Amenas site was firstly articulated as having shaped the way the 
initial assault unfolded. “Until the siege on the remote In Amenas facility last 
Wednesday,” according to the New York Times, “dozens of North African desert camps 
were thought to be virtually impregnable, with steel-wire fences, long-range 
reconnaissance equipment and army patrols amid the sand dunes. But when the 
attackers came, taking dozens of foreign workers hostage, they faced little opposition... 
The attack clearly caught everybody by surprise” (Krauss and Kurlish, 2013). Implicit in 
this statement, reported alongside speculation that a lack of armed guards allowed the 
kidnappers to take over the plant easily, is the idea that the remoteness of the site 
shaped how the event unfolded. Remoteness is thus signified as relevant context for the 
kidnappers' capabilities. At the same time, the references to further gas installations and 
patrols among sand dunes signify a wider area of the Sahara as relevant to 
understanding this event. Remaining unseen themselves, however, these other sites also 
signify the absence of information about what is going on 'out there' in the Sahara 
desert. The landscape is once again framed as reflecting the ambiguous state of 
knowledge over possible responses to the siege. There is no explicit discussion here of 
covert counter-terrorism. But in the context of discussion of the ongoing hidden siege 
of the gas plant, the Saharan landscape is represented as significant in being a suggestive
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but inscrutable space.
When a counter-terrorist response was discussed, the metaphorical quality of 
the landscape produced intimations of things left unsaid. Journalists noted that “[t]he 
confusion” over how many people had been killed during the hostage-taking and 
subsequent Algerian assaults on the gas plant “reflected the murky circumstances at the 
gas field, near a remote town in southeastern Algeria”. Indeed, “[s]enior Algerian officials, 
hundreds of miles away in Algiers” were described as saying they were “in the dark 
themselves about some aspects of the events”, taking place at a “gas complex deep in the 
Sahara” (Nossiter, 2013, emphases added). Uncertainty around Algerian actions and 
references to being 'in the dark' signify secrecy as a mere possibility. The remoteness of 
the site contextualises these statements, such that remoteness implicitly reflects the 
difficulty in knowing what is taking place. The suspicion of secrecy makes this 
remoteness appear significant, since it exists in lieu of any public trace of events. This 
framing intimates the unverifiable idea that the remoteness of the landscape is complicit
in secrecy surrounding the raid.
Other articles produced this intimation sparsely but suggestively. One Guardian 
piece's narration of the siege begins by evoking the site's location: “Deep in the desert, 
special forces lay in wait, encircling a vast gas facility”. The piece then notes the 
speculative claim of an assault by Algerian troops on the complex: “By midday, the 
Algerian special forces had launched a military operation at the site”, but “[i]t was 
unclear how the rescue operation began” (Chrisafis and Borger, 2013). This account of 
an operation is framed by a reference to the remote desert, hinting at the 
impenetrability of the siege site through an image of the landscape. This allows the latter
to implicitly represent the imperceptibility of the siege. Indeed, given “an absence of 
reliable information from a crisis scene in one of the world's least accessible deserts”, states 
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The Times, all outsiders have to go on are “[r]eports emanating from the remote 
complex” which “flatly contradict each other” (Fletcher, 2013, emphasis added). This 
reference to geography provide implicit context for this contradictory information, 
giving the siege meaning in terms of its inaccessibility within this desert and allowing 
the latter to embody the contradictory nature of information. At the same time, the 
cordoning-off of the site hints at ongoing secrecy. This frames the remoteness of the site
as suggestive, intimating the idea of the landscape's complicity in that secrecy by making
it difficult to confirm or deny claims of Algeria's actions. Crucially, this intimation gives 
the representation of the siege meaning in terms of the natural landscape; the subject-
position which is shaped by this intimation is one which sees the siege as significant in 
terms of the possible role of the desert in producing uncertainty. As with rural 
lynchings, the socio-political dynamics of this violence are delimited by a natural 
context.
Allusions to the landscape's complicity grew through references to the texture 
and topography of the Sahara, with the materiality of sand metaphorically tainting 
sparse residue of the gas plant siege. Having noted the lack of definite information 
regarding the Algerian special forces assault, one Guardian article describes the scene of 
“the biggest and most dramatic foreign hostage-taking raid seen in Algeria or the Sahel”:
“The convoluted metal tubes, glowing eerily under bright night lights in a vast expanse of
flat featureless desert, give the gas field in the settlement at Tigantourine the look of an 
outpost on an alien planet, and it is scarcely more hospitable” (Chrisafis and Borger, 2013, 
emphases added). Within surrounding claims about Algeria's actions that highlight the 
inability to prove or disprove them, these descriptions of the landscape become 
associated with that uncertainty. The otherworldliness of the gas plant, with its eerie 
metallic construction, contextualises and thus gives meaning to the inability to verify 
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what is happening there; this uncanniness implicitly reflects the plant's inscrutability. 
The flatness and featurelessness of the sandy expanse signifies the slightness and 
uneventfulness of what is seemingly accessible to journalists. At the same time, 
references to a lack of information from the site produce a suspicion of secrecy, which 
frames this alien and featureless desert as significant in nonetheless being visible in the 
public sphere. With these landscape qualities emphasising the absence of any other 
residue, they hint at the idea that this disorienting and otherworldly terrain is keeping 
Algeria's actions hidden and inscrutable. The landscape is implicitly represented as 
preventing knowledge of what is going on, shaping a subject-position focused on the 
suggestiveness of the landscape.
This suggestiveness extended to accounts of what was taking place around the 
gas complex in the aftermath of the Algerian special forces assault. With the hostage-
takers having been killed by Algerian troops, attention turned to those hostages who 
remained unaccounted to. A senior Algerian official was quoted in the New York Times 
as saying of five missing foreign workers: “They've disappeared. We're not just going to 
abandon them like that”. The same article goes on to describe the successful escape of 
other hostages, implicitly as a speculation on what those missing workers might be 
going through. These successful escapees are described as having aimed for a “beacon of 
burning gas in the distance”, “walk[ing] over barren terrain of sand and rocks and small 
hills, from about 2 a.m. until the late afternoon with only short breaks”, and as having 
struggled to see the gas flame by dawn. Even once they saw vehicles in the distance they 
“feared they might be the assailants” (Kulish, 2013).
In describing the ordeal of escaped hostages, the article articulates the 
barrenness and the texture of the surrounding landscape and implies that this terrain 
has the ability to disorient people, such that they disappear into the desert. The barren 
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texture of the desert sand contextualises and implicitly embodies the inscrutability of 
the area, the inability to establish what has happened to hostages. This accompanies a 
suspicion of secrecy around Algeria's actions during and after the siege, signified by 
surrounding reports and this article's own reference to it being “unclear” who the 
Algerians were supposedly looking for (ibid). This disorienting barrenness is thus 
framed by secrecy as significant in standing in place of any public traces, alluding to the 
landscape's possible role in having shaped what has taken place at the gas site, given its 
ability to disorient people, while preventing clarity over current activities.
Allusions from the seemingly empty terrain reached its apogee in coverage 
which drew on visual markers of the desert to articulate rumours of the ongoing siege. 
The day after the kidnappers were reported as having stormed the plant, The Guardian 
produced an online “interactive” graphic of the “In Amenas gas field attack” (P. Allen, 
2013; Figure 17). Immediately noticeable is the lack of actual interaction. The graphic 
involves two alternating images, the first a satellite photograph of Algeria indicating the 
gas field's location relative to the town of In Amenas, and noting the time the assault 
began, 5am, “when heavily armed Islamists arrived at the living quarters in three 
vehicles”. Viewers then click 'Next >>' and the graphic 'zooms in' to show a new map, 
this time a satellite image pinpointing the gas complex, the residential areas and the 
road to the airport, accompanied by a sparse timeline of the kidnappers' actions and the 
Algerian army's response. The timeline emphasises the partiality of knowledge of what 
took place, containing details of how the militants attacked and took over the plant but 
fewer on Algeria's response: the timeline states that after the Algerian army “storm the 
complex” and fire on fleeing insurgents, “[d]eaths [are] reported”, before jumping to the 
following day when “AFP reports that the accommodation area has now been secured” 
but that an indefinite number of hostage-takers have taken refuge further inside the 
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complex (P. Allen, 2013).
Figure 17: Interactive graphic from The Guardian of the In Amenas gas field attack (P. Allen, 
2013).
The first of the two maps shows an area of north Africa thousands of miles 
squared while providing no glimpse of violence itself, only locating it near the Algerian-
Libyan border. The photographed topography signifies only the vast size of the Saharan 
desert. The second photograph, meanwhile, emphasises its uneventfulness by being 
framed as relating to an ongoing siege: in contrast to that event, the photo shows only a 
flat and undifferentiated desert expanse dotted with static and unpopulated roads and 
buildings. The siege itself is conspicuous in its invisibility - indeed, there is no 
indication of when the satellite photo was taken, a note on the left simply stating that it 
is taken from Google Earth. The image consequently signifies the inscrutability and 
inaccessibility of the siege from the public sphere, with newsreaders provided only an 
uneventful and atemporal glimpse of the gas complex and surrounding desert.
Accompanying a timeline whose sparse and indefinite details signify the 
speculative quality of information on the siege, this uneventful image become 
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metaphorical: viewers' aerial and temporal distance from a visually-abstract and 
featureless space implicitly reflects this inscrutability of events at the gas plant. Visual 
qualities of the landscape therefore contextualise the absence of clear public traces of 
unseen violence. The implicit notion of ongoing Algerian secrecy around the site then 
makes this featurelessness suggestive: because it relates to ongoing secret state action, 
the desert is framed as significant in terms of the inscrutability that it is represented as 
embodying. This dynamic thus alludes to the metaphorically-inscrutable landscape as 
complicit, as somehow helping to keep these events and any material trace obscured in 
public. Viewers are invited to understand the siege through the suggestive lack of 
material residue within this flat featureless terrain.
Photographs from the ground shaped similar subject-positions. Alongside 
details of a lack of certainty over the number of hostages killed during an Algerian 
assault on the plant, and the statement that “[t]here were also questions about the tactics 
used by the Algerians to break the hostage standoff”, one front-page piece carried a 
photograph of “[t]he In Amenas gas facility where yesterday's operation to free hostages 
ended in fatalities” (Borger and Winter, 2013; Figure 18). The image emphasises the 
distance between the camera's vantage point and the gas plant, with a trail of rocks 
through the sand designating a road stretching from the foreground to the plant in the 
far distance. The flat barrenness of the foreground's terrain signifies the image's 
uneventfulness in relation to the hostage-taking and subsequent assault. Once again, the
image's temporal relation to events – whether this is a stock image of the plant or one 
taken during the out-of-sight siege – is unclear. Given the rumours surrounding the 
Algerian assault, the emphasised distance and barrenness contextualise and implicitly 
embody the inaccessibility of the site, and the consequent inability to prove or disprove 
claims about what is happening. The landscape of the surrounding desert is implicitly 
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figured as a place where knowledge is difficult to attain. Because these surrounding 
rumours also convey a suspicion of Algerian state secrecy, this terrain is framed as 
significant in lieu of public traces of the siege, intimating that the landscape may be 
playing a role in that secrecy. Images of flat featureless sand become metaphors for the 
inscrutability of events, defining those events by the evocative lack of residue within 
this barren terrain.
Figure 18: Photograph of the In Amenas gas facility (Borger and Winter, 2013).
Once the siege of the Tigantourine plant was declared over – after some 
confusion over whether all the hostage-takers had been killed – journalists were finally 
allowed access to the gas complex, resulting in descriptions of the plant and living 
quarters. These descriptions continued to allude to the the desert as shaping and 
obscuring residue of unseen events. One New York Times front-page piece in early 
February offered the suggestion, through new hostage testimonies, of the hostage-
takers' original intention to blow up the plant, while those same testimonies were 
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qualified as contradicting Algerian statements on the hostage-takers' actions. As a result,
the piece argues, “questions remain” over whether more lives could have been saved by 
Algerian special forces, while “[w]hat happened next” after the terrorists attempted to 
move the hostages in 4x4 cars and the Algerians attacked them “is still unclear” 
(Nossiter and Kulish, 2013). In referencing 'questions' over Algeria's actions, the article 
points to the rumour that those actions led to the loss of hostages' lives, while also 
signifying ambiguity around information in the aftermath of the siege.
Alongside such rumour is a representation of the site of the siege, with the 
article stating that to visit the plant is “to appreciate... its vulnerability” given its distance
from other towns; indeed, “[t]he isolation appears total; there is nothing around it but a 
sea of sand” (ibid, emphasis added). The vast barrenness and material texture of the 
terrain is thus emphasised and contextualises the uncertainty over what took place. The 
article then describes material traces left in the wake of the siege that can finally be 
documented: the “fierceness of the fight... is still evident” in the form of bullet holes and 
“deep gashes” in a wall, while “a jumble of shredded, carbonised vehicle remnants stick 
out of the sand” (ibid, emphasis added). The physical proximity of sand and material 
residue of secreted violence becomes metaphorical in the context of rumour: the 
inability to prove or disprove claims about the siege is implicitly embodied in this 
obscuring of residue by the desert. Meanwhile, the remoteness of the gas complex in a 
large flat expanse resonates with references to a lack of definite knowledge about what 
took place while the complex was sealed off from the outside world.
Since the same rumours that allow the desert to embody an ambiguity of 
knowledge also produce a suspicion of secrecy on the part of the Algerian state, the 
topography and texture of the Saharan desert becomes significant in their tainting this 
material residue of secret actions. Because the terrain only offers up public traces of the 
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hostage-takers' and Algeria's actions that fails to clarify what took place, and because the
landscape appears to shape the physical appearance of those traces, that terrain is 
alluded to as possibly contributing to Algeria's secrecy. This intimation remains only a 
possibility because of the signified difficulty in proving or disproving claims about the 
siege. Yet that ambiguity is precisely what allows for this allusion, since the rumours of 
what took place associate a lack of definite knowledge with the surrounding terrain. 
This material residue and its tainting by sand is represented as suggestive but equivocal. 
As with representations of rural lynchings, this coverage makes violence meaningful 
through the natural landscape which surrounds and conjoins traces of that violence. 
Newsreaders are prompted by this sparse residue to consider the suggestiveness of the 
landscape more than anything else.
The manhunt for Mokhtar Belmokhtar
Within hours of news of the hostage-taking at the Tigantourine plant, it was announced 
that a manhunt for its suspected mastermind had began, and with that coverage turned 
to discursively constructing the man known as Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Through rumours
of his activities throughout the years, he was represented as intangible, and as having 
unclear public markers: he was “apparently... involved in a series of kidnappings in 2003 
that captured 32 European tourists”; he had previously been “falsely reported to have 
been killed in 1999” and subsequently “condemned to death several times by Algerian 
courts” – the implication being he had evaded these death sentences. Even his 
involvement in the current hostage-taking remained unverified, since “[i]t was not clear 
whether Mr. Belmokhtar was at the scene or commanding the operation from afar” 
(Erlanger and Nossiter, 2013, emphasis added). These representations of Belmokhtar fit 
a pattern in British and U.S. public discourse since 11 September 2001, whereby 
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Islamist terrorists and insurgents are represented as ghostly figures able to easily evade 
detection and disappear into the landscapes where they operate (Prestholdt, 2009; 
Gusterson, 2012). In the case of Belmokhtar, however, coverage of the manhunt 
referenced the landscape of the Sahara such that the demonisation of this figure was 
complicated by allusions to the inscrutability of both Belmokhtar's and counter-terrorist
agents' actions in the desert. Unlike past counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
here both terrorist and counter-terrorists appeared ghostly.
Rumours of Belmokhtar's characteristics were often articulated with reference 
to the landscape where he was thought to operate. “It may be a while before we can be 
sure whether Belmokhtar took part”, says one piece in the Independent on Sunday, “[b]ut, 
given his reputation as “the uncatchable one”, we might guess that the man with more 
lives than a desert wildcat has lived to fight another day” (Morgan, 2013). Belmokhtar's 
ability to evade operations to track him down is here implicitly connected to his being 
familiar with the desert, his being attuned to that landscape like a native species. The 
same article also raises the issue of how he and his men were able to “cross the 
thousands of kilometres of open desert between his base in Gao and In Amenas, with up
to 100 men and 20 4x4 vehicles, unnoticed by the Algerian army or secret services” 
(ibid). Rumours and speculation of Belmokhtar's involvement and capabilities are thus 
connected to the vast desert expanse, figuring this expanse as one where information is 
difficult to verify and hostage-takers can seemingly carry out their actions with ease.
This implicit connection between the hostage-takers and the landscape shaped 
early coverage of developing manhunt efforts (eg. Parker and Dunn, 2013; Worth, 
2013). More significant than this initial framing, however, was coverage that drew on 
rumours of various secret actions unfolding in the course of the manhunt. These 
rumours referenced geographical characteristics of northern Africa, such that the 
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landscape appeared significant in light of that secrecy, allowing it to intimate the idea of 
wider ongoing covert operations that the landscape was helping to keep hidden.
These unverifiable intimations began as newspapers reported the belief that 
Belmokhtar and the remainders of his group had retreated to Mali, the site of France's 
recent Operation Serval to oust Islamist militants from the north of the country. The 
movements of these and other “Islamist militants now on the run” are described 
speculatively with reference to the surrounding terrain: these men are “hiding out in 
their own forbidding landscape, a rugged, rocky expanse in northeastern Mali” 
representing “one of Africa's harshest and least-known mountain ranges” (Nossiter and 
Tinti, 2013). The New York Times quotes one Malian officer as indicating a lack of 
information on the militants in a way that similarly signifies geographical inscrutability:
“We don't know how many [militants] there are. They have learned to hide where the 
French can't find them”. The number of militants is reported as being “in dispute”, “with 
estimates varying from a few hundred fighters to a few thousand”. This uncertainty over
numbers is linked to militants' “dispers[ing]” and “hiding” in the “vast and complicated” 
terrain, which resembles a “natural fortress, with innumerable hideouts”. One military 
official reports that the militants have had years to “build installations” and “modify 
caves”, but that “the precise locations of their refuges remain a mystery” (ibid, emphasis 
added). All of these rumours and speculations around militants' movements associate 
the inability to gain clear knowledge with the geography of northern Mali. This 
geography contextualises and implicitly represents the inaccessibility and inscrutability 
expressed by these rumours: not only does the landscape appear to allow the Islamists to
regroup and evade detection, but it is represented as reflecting the ambiguity around the
Islamists' actions.
At the same time, this coverage propagated rumours of covert French and 
290
African activities which similarly referenced geography. According to the same article, 
French special forces “are very likely already operating in the Adrar des Ifoghas, 
performing reconnaissance and perhaps preparing rescue operations for French hostages 
believed to be held in the area” (ibid, emphases added). The qualifiers 'perhaps' and 
'likely', along with the note that these are claims by a third party, emphasise that such 
operations remain unproven while producing a suspicion of covertness. The piece goes 
on to state that the French have been flying fewer sorties over the region in recent days, 
“from which I deduce a lack of targets”, says a Western military attaché (ibid). The 
recourse to inference again highlights the rumour quality of these details. These 
rumours are contextualised by the above references to geography, such that the latter 
are implicitly represented as embodying the inscrutability of likely covert action. 
References to vast expanses of rocky hills implicitly provide the context for these 
rumours, with the terrain's impenetrability signifying the difficulty in establishing what 
is taking place and the absence of public residue. That these rumours are spread by non-
state sources and military attachés “not authorised to speak on the record” (ibid) also 
produces a suspicion of secrecy around French special forces. This secrecy frames 
descriptions of the landscape as significant, given the lack of public evidence for covert 
action within them. The absence is consequently intimated as possible, but unprovable, 
evidence that operations are ongoing but hidden by the inscrutability and inaccessibility
of the terrain. Possible covert action is therefore represented as significant in terms of 
the opaque landscape.
The framing of covert action as significant in terms of suggestively empty 
landscape continued throughout coverage of the manhunt for Belmokhtar. Another 
article in the London Times explicitly articulated covert agents' “international manhunt” 
as “closing in” on Belmokhtar's location, but accompanying details complicate this 
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articulation. While the manhunt is said to be “led by French forces and backed by a 
British spy plane”, the article notes that “[c]overt US operatives are also on the trail of 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar”. Meanwhile, Belmokhtar is “being pursued by Algerian troops 
from the north”, with Algerian commandos having crossed the border into Mali “on at 
least two occasions” in their search for him (Haynes et al, 2013, emphasis added).
These statements of different facets of a manhunt are ambiguous: they do not 
make clear whether all these forces are 'closing in' on the same area, whether only one 
'trail' is being followed. These erratic details appear alongside descriptions of the Adrar 
des Ifoghas mountains, an “area of desert valleys, mountains and caves” where 
Belmokhtar “is believed to be” – a rumour that implicitly suggests where these covert 
agents and troops are themselves now operating. These valleys and mountains are 
implicitly represented as difficult to decipher, with a North Africa expert speculating 
that “[w]e may be about to enter the world of drones. The Americans and everyone else 
will have got their satellites on [the area]” (ibid). The ambiguity of the different claims 
about the manhunt is contextualised by this idea of the landscape's own opacity, with 
the latter overlapping the former. The references to a spy plane and covert operatives, 
however, also signify ongoing secrecy. As a result, this coverage alludes to the idea of a 
link between that secrecy and the opacity of the landscape, as explaining the muddled 
account of what is happening. The idea that knowledge is indefinite in this opaque 
landscape, however, makes proving or disproving this allusion seem beside the point – 
it merely affirms that such a role for the landscape is possible.
Intimations from barren desert expanses reached their peak with reports in 
March that Belmokhtar had been killed by Chadian special forces. Both Belmokhtar's 
death and the manhunt that had been searching from him were described through 
rumour and speculation that implicitly posited an ambiguous field of knowledge in this 
292
regard. While the MailOnline explicitly articulated Belmokhtar's death in triumphalist 
tones, saying the “veteran Al-Qaeda leader['s]... death will be a major blow to Islamist 
rebels in northern Mali”, it qualified that “[h]e is believed to be one of several extremists 
killed today when Chadian armed forces in northern Mali 'completely destroyed' a 
terrorist base around midday”. This claim of his death is further qualified as being 
according to a Chadian statement “read on national television” (Hills, 2013, emphasis 
added). These qualifications signify that this death remains unconfirmed and implicitly 
emphasise distance between the event and its being reported through news media. 
These emphases were perpetuated by statements that Belmokhtar's death “was 
announced on Chadian state television but has not been confirmed by other sources” 
and that meanwhile France had “declined to comment” on the reported killing of the 
AQIM leader Abou Zeid in the same area (ibid).
The disavowed quality of these rumours – the fact that the news article declaims
responsibility for their truth – juxtaposes the description of the base as destroyed; 
together, they signify the lack of public residue of this operation other than rumours 
that remain unconfirmed. Indeed, the Daily Mirror's report of the attack linked this lack 
to the uncertainty over whether Belmokhtar had been killed, quoting a French army 
source as saying “[t]he base is obliterated and so it will be difficult to carry out DNA 
tests on those killed”. This statement frames identifying Belmokhtar's body as 
important, further emphasising that claims of his death remain unconfirmed. The same 
source then says that “[t]he intelligence appears credible but there is no absolute 
verification” (S. White, 2013). A reported statement from Chad's President in another 
article echoes this link between a lack of residue and the disavowed quality of rumours 
in coverage: “We have proof [Belmokhtar] is dead, but we could not film it because he 
blew himself up”. This statement is juxtaposed with reports of Islamist militants being 
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able to evade detection and death, fleeing population zones before carrying out “a series 
of brazen insurgent attacks”. The reports of Belmokhtar's death are therefore implicitly 
framed as requiring public evidence to be convincing (Starkey and Sage, 2013). Finally, 
in articulating all this ambiguity around Belmokhtar's death, coverage describes the 
landscape where French and African forces are operating, “the mountainous Tigargara 
area” of northern Mali, with the “assault to retake Mali's vast desert north from AQIM” 
having driven the latter “back into the surrounding desert and mountains” (Hills, 2013, 
emphasis added). The uncertainty suggested by these rumours is thus contextualised 
within the terrain of Mali's desert where militants are hiding.
The subject-position produced by these representations of rumour and 
landscape can be elaborated through the photographs that accompany these news 
reports. One article carried a mugshot-style photograph of Belmokhtar apparently 
taken from a propaganda video, along with an image of the gas plant near In Amenas 
and a photograph purporting to be of “the foothills of the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains” 
(ibid). The mugshot photo signifies Belmokhtar's elusiveness up until this point, 
implying that visualisation has been thus far restricted to such videos, echoing coverage 
of Osama bin Laden (see previous chapter). The image of the Tigantourine gas plant, 
like the images analysed earlier, signifies its uneventfulness, further emphasised by the 
fact that the unseen events covered in the article occur in a different space and time to 
the gas plant siege. The image of the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains is similarly figured as 
uneventful: ostensibly related to a special forces manhunt, it instead shows still, calm 
and undifferentiated terrain entirely lacking any trace of either terrorists or covert 
agents (Figure 19).
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Figure 19: Reported photograph of “the foothills of the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains” (Hills, 
2013).
Significantly, this terrain is both uneventful and unspecified in space and time; 
framed only as an image of a mountain range, it fails to clarify where and when this 
covert operation occurred. As a marker of this mountain range, the image signifies the 
geographical characteristics of this entire area and, implicitly, the absence of public 
residue of rumoured special forces actions within that area. All that appears available is 
this undifferentiated terrain. Contextualising the uncertainty around Belmokhtar's 
death, this emptiness becomes a metaphorical marker of that lack of definite knowledge.
When framed by a suspicion of state secrecy, of ongoing covert operations in this area, 
the undifferentiated barren topography of this image therefore becomes significant in 
light of the apparent lack of public traces and the consequent ambiguity embodied in 
this barrenness. This representation thus intimates the unverifiable idea that covert 
actions are continuing without leaving residue in this landscape. What this leaves 
uncertain, however, is whether that lack of residue really reflects and confirms state 
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secrecy, or whether instead it simply reflects the inability of any such residue to endure 
within this harsh landscape. The extent to which absence indicates the landscape's 
complicity in secrecy is therefore left unresolved. But since the landscape implicitly 
embodies the ambiguity of knowledge around French and African operations, the fact 
that intimations cannot be proven is represented as beside the point. What matters is its 
possibility within this terrain. The subject-position produced is one focused on the 
irresolvable ambiguity of an empty landscape.
The uncertainty over whether barrenness indicated secrecy continued as the 
press reflected on reports of Belmokhtar's death. The Sunday Times articulated both 
Belmokhtar's death and the “international manhunt” for him through rumour, noting 
that “[t]he reported killing of Belmokhtar”, now being “check[ed]” by the British 
Government, “appeared to be the culmination of an offensive by French and Chadian 
troops”. These qualifications emphasise the unconfirmed and inferential quality of this 
information. That this is the culmination of an offensive also signifies a larger military 
operation, in the course of which “[b]oth French and American forces” are “reported to 
have joined the hunt for Belmokhtar” (Allen-Mills, 2013, emphases added). These 
references to an offensive of which Belmokhtar's death 'appeared to be' the culmination,
absent any documentation of these actions, hint at the possibility of secrecy.
In articulating these rumours of the operation's success, the article references 
the area where this offensive is taking place, stating that “[a]ccording to a report in The 
New York Times last Friday, [the French and Chadian troops] were concentrating their 
efforts on a 15-mile zone in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains, near the border with 
Algeria”, using a “British spy plane” to “provid[e] realtime images” of this landscape. 
Belmokhtar himself is described as having “buil[t] a formidable power base in the 
mountainous wastelands of the inner Sahara”, while Islamist fighters associated with him 
296
are now “hiding in an especially difficult zone” (ibid, emphasis added). Equivocal 
rumours of a secretive action against Belmokhtar are thus contextualised by references 
to barren and inhospitable terrain that itself requires careful scrutiny. These references 
allow the mountainous wastelands to implicitly embody the equivocal nature of 
reported actions, while also implicitly signifying the lack of a publicly-visible trace of 
this Chadian special forces operation, or indeed of any such actions as part of a U.S.-
French manhunt.
The metaphorically opaque landscape is itself framed by the suspicion of secrecy
that surrounds the manhunt, making that landscape appear significant in its reflecting a 
lack of clear public residue. This framing intimates the possibility that covert operations
are ongoing in the region but that any trace is successfully being hidden by the terrain of
this 'difficult zone'. Once again, the natural landscape contextualises and 'taints' unseen 
violence: the apparent lack of material trace, reflected in this terrain, becomes the 
meaningful context for the violence, defining the latter by what this lack might suggest 
about the role of the landscape. But because rumours of Belmokhtar's death posit an 
ambiguous field of knowledge around the manhunt, this meaning is qualified as 
remaining neither proved nor disproved. The natural landscape comes to embody that 
ambiguity of knowledge and signifies that it cannot be known whether the absence of 
public traces reflects state secrecy, or simply the natural consequences of barren and 
inhospitable terrain.
Coverage of the manhunt for Mokhtar Belmokhtar therefore continually 
alluded to the idea of the landscape's complicity in a wide degree of state secrecy, while 
also emphasising that the confirmed truth of this notion was less important than its 
mere possibility. The subject-position produced by these representations focused on 
that possibility, on the irresolvable suggestiveness of the topography and terrain.
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Conclusion: barrenness or secrecy?
It did not take long for rumours of Islamist terrorist activity in the Sahara-Sahel to 
quash reports of Belmokhtar's death: two months after the Chadian operation, 
simultaneous attacks on an army base and a French-owned uranium mine in Niger 
were claimed to be the work of Belmokhtar. The significance of this fact was not lost on
journalists, with these bombings characterised as “the latest suggestion that Belmokhtar 
is alive, after the Chadian army claimed in March it had killed him in a raid” (Hirsch, 
2013). The attacks themselves were represented through inferential rumour, with a 
security expert in Niger claiming “[t]here is evidence from the vehicles that the attackers
were using and the way that they were able to plan and co-ordinate these attacks that 
they had inside help” (ibid). Having noted “[c]onfusion” caused by “conflicting claims” 
about the numbers of attackers and casualties, the article states that the French defence 
minister has “confirmed... that French special forces had intervened in the aftermath of 
the attack at Agadez, killing two of the attackers”. These forces are “believed to have 
been stationed in the area since 2010” (ibid). While detail on the bombers is articulated 
as ambiguous, and a previous counter-terrorism success is revealed as illusory, this 
report hints at ongoing military-intelligence action outside the public sphere.
It is this representational dynamic of suggestiveness and unknowability that has 
structured coverage of kidnappings and rescue attempts, hostage-takings and manhunts,
in the Sahara-Sahel. Having analysed representations that rely on material traces of 
covert counter-terrorism in the case of drone strikes, and those that draw on the 
acknowledged secretion of targeted bodies in the case of the bin Laden raid, this chapter
has examined counter-terrorism cases where such traces and confirmations of secretion
are much sparser and more circumspect. The operations carried out in response to 
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kidnappings in this region have most frequently been represented through rumour and 
speculation, ambiguous claims of unclear provenance and inference from past 
operations. The challenge that these representations posed for this thesis was whether 
such seemingly insubstantial and indefinite residue of covert operations could be 
producing intimations that were shaping the meaning and significance of these 
operations.
The key to examining whether such intimations were being produced was the 
representational dynamic taking place between three elements: rumour, landscape and 
secrecy. Rumours of rescue attempts and manhunts implicitly posited an ambiguous 
field of knowledge, giving the impression that proving or disproving particular claims 
was difficult to the point of being pointless. Alongside this ambiguity were descriptions 
of the landscape where these rumoured operations took place. Geographical qualities of 
vast expanses, barren terrain and undifferentiated topography, alongside description of 
the material texture of desert sand, were used by journalists to give these sparse reports 
depth and context. In contextualising rumours of unseen events that left behind little 
residue, these geographical characteristics implicitly signify that absence, and 
consequent ambiguity of knowledge, by metaphorically embodying them. As with 
representations of rural lynchings, the natural landscape delimited the represented 
socio-political context of the violence.
In this case, the vast undifferentiated barrenness of the Saharan and Sahelian 
terrain discursively 'tainted' rumours of ongoing covert operations, signifying that 
knowledge in these places was ambiguous, that these geographical qualities and the 
absence of residue at their centre reflected that intangibility of provable knowledge. 
Finally, non-state rumours of rescue efforts or manhunts juxtaposed these descriptions 
of unremarkable, undifferentiated topography to signify a mere suspicion of secrecy, a 
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suspicion that these rumoured actions were secrets being kept by different states inside 
and outside the region. As previously argued, this suspicion of secrecy has the ability to 
make the residue of covert counter-terrorism suggestive, by figuring that residue as 
public remainders of an otherwise-secreted operation, which in turn emphasises 
ambiguities and lacunae within that residue. In the case of Sahara-Sahel operations, this 
suspected secrecy also emphasises an absence, one signified not by traces themselves but
by public geographical qualities of barrenness, homogeneity and vast distances, qualities
which secrecy frames as significant precisely in their lacking clear markers of these 
operations.
With this absence of residue in an unremarkable landscape made suggestive, 
these representations were able to intimate the idea that this inscrutable landscape was 
'complicit' in obscuring or tainting any public traces of covert counter-terrorism. Like 
representations of rural lynchings a century earlier, the landscape was figured as 
embodying the violence and its characteristics, in this case its intangibility. The absence 
of traces within the landscape was made suggestive. At the same time, however, because 
these covert actions were reported through rumour – rumour that implied an 
ambiguous field of knowledge – this suggestiveness was itself intimated as unverifiable. 
As a result, intimations left unclear whether the lack of residue on the surface of the 
landscape reflected state secrecy or simply the natural and normal condition of this 
surface, its unremarkable barrenness. Secrecy, and the landscape's role in it, remains 
unresolved. These intimations therefore made rescue attempts and manhunts 
meaningful in terms of the ambiguity of that lack identified in these landscapes. 
Landscape became the meaningful context of these events, but it remained unclear 
whether the absence of residue within it revealed anything at all.
The subject-positions produced as a result of this give further support to the 
300
proposed historical affiliation between contemporary covert counter-terrorism and 
lynching in the United States. Despite their wildly contrasting motives and methods, 
just as lynchings by the early twentieth century had become more subterranean 
practices increasingly learned of nationally through rumour and speculation (Rushdy, 
2012: 97-107, 129-36), so covert operations in the Sahara-Sahel have been represented 
internationally in the same way. As discussed, national representations of lynching 
portrayed the practice as one whose violence was difficult to comprehend in relation to 
modern society, focusing attention on how to understand it in that context, and shaping 
a public subject-position on those terms. In the case of drone strikes, this subject-
position of worried impotence, to echo Goldsby (2006: 148), revolves around the 
seeming ephemerality of strikes, their being too fleeting in-and-of-themselves to be 
scrutinised and managed in a democratic polity. With the raid on Osama bin Laden's 
compound, that subject-position was defined by suspicion over what bin Laden's 
secreted body might reveal about the operation and those who conducted it.
In the case of Sahara-Sahel operations, the difficulty in comprehension revolves 
around the idea that definite knowledge in this vast landscape is unattainable – that all 
one can say for certain is that the presence and activities of covert operatives across this 
region is possible. Articulated through rumours that posit ambiguity within this 
geographical region, these representations signify that “no-one's knowledge can be 
greater than anyone else's” here, and that therefore “the possibility that a story is true is 
just as likely as that it is false” (Donovan, 2007: 77). Witnesses of these rumours are thus 
invited to focus on the suggestive ambiguity of the absence at the centre of the 
portrayed terrain. Being defined by this absence, the natural landscape is made 
meaningful in its embodying the intangibility of covert violence: qualities of the 
landscape signify that intangibility, and the unverifiable knowledge produced therein. 
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Assent towards state violence is not produced by these representations, but neither is 
dissent. Rather, this coverage represents covert action as important in terms of the 
inability to determine what has happened, and unprovable possibilities that circulate in 
its wake. Like rural lynchings a century earlier, these operations are implicitly defined 
by, and embodied within, their natural surroundings. That this covert violence has a 
socio-political, not just natural, context, and deserves ethical consideration on that basis,
is marginalised from the represented significance of these events.
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Conclusion
Resistance and recovery in the debris
The residue piles up: rendition and detention
In December 2014, a report by the U.S. Senate intelligence committee thrust covert 
action into the spotlight once again. The report was a list of findings and an executive 
summary of the long-running investigation into the CIA's detention and interrogation 
of terrorist suspects at black sites throughout the world (Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2014). The report detailed the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques 
used against around one hundred detainees held between 2001 and 2009 and heavily 
critiqued the CIA's own claim that these techniques were invaluable for acquiring 
information on future terrorist attacks.
Behind the damning assessments of the CIA's techniques and truthfulness, the 
Senate report effectively produced new public traces of this covert CIA programme, 
traces which perpetuated state secrecy in the public sphere. The report was regularly 
framed as having confirmed and detailed the use of “secret CIA torture practices 
conducted over seven years at hidden sites around the world” (McCarthy, 2014). Those 
secret or 'black' sites were listed as being in Cuba, Iraq, Lithuania, Thailand, Romania, 
Afghanistan and Poland. Yet the report itself made no mention of these countries. As the
Washington Post noted, the public version of the Senate report “refers to the agency's 
post-Sept. 11 “black sites” as color-themed codes” (Goldman and Tate, 2014). The names
of the states housing these secret prisons were left out of the report presented to Senate 
intelligence committee members, replaced with unique letters. These identification 
codes were then redacted by the Obama administration prior to publication of the 
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report's summary (Black, 2015; Figure 20). The result is a report summary where codes 
obscuring the names of states are themselves obscured.
Figure 20: Extract from Senate intelligence committee study of CIA rendition and detention, 
showing redaction of country codes (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014: 97).
The redaction of codes which obscure information anyway seems like an 
absurdity, a secretion of secretion that only further signifies that secrecy. Equally 
significant, however, is that these states were still repeatedly named in news coverage. 
State hosts of black sites were not explicitly identified by the report summary but by 
journalists' efforts at 'decoding', in the Post's words, “[o]ther details in the report” 
(Goldman and Tate, 2014). For instance, the Associated Press pointed to unredacted 
details in the public summary that indicated Poland was the host of one of the CIA 
secret prisons from 2002 to 2003 (Associated Press, 2015). The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism correlated information on the transfer dates of detainees with publicly-
available flight path data to identify the black site coded 'Violet' as residing in Lithuania 
(Black, 2015). Different seemingly-unrelated or innocuous details were thus translated 
by journalists into new residue: for instance, both The Washington Post and The Intercept 
produced maps pinpointing the colour-coded prisons where this covert programme had
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taken place (Goldman and Tate, 2014; Tate, 2014). Through this correlation and 
collation, different details of CIA detention were represented as public residue of those 
black sites whose locations had been redacted. These details were represented as 
significant in having passed through the net of secretion, existing in the public sphere 
and allowing for speculation on where covert action had occurred.
The residue of the CIA detention programme neither started nor ended with 
this Senate report. In 2009, ABC News claimed to have identified a former horse riding 
academy building in Lithuania as having been bought by the CIA in 2004 and used as a 
secret prison. The report cited “sources who saw the facility” who described the facility's
interior, while flight logs appeared to confirm that “CIA planes made repeated flights 
into Lithuania” until the prison was closed in November 2005 and the prisoners moved 
to 'warzone sites' in the Middle East (Cole and Ross, 2009). The U.S. Senate report 
would later cite internal CIA records showing that the intelligence agency had decided 
to expand the then-incomplete 'Violet' black site in mid-2003, “given the growing 
number of CIA detainees”, with the facility remaining open until 2006 (Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2014: 98). A 2009 Lithuanian parliamentary report 
identifies two different black sites in Lithuania: 'Project No. 1', which appeared to be the
site identified by ABC News, and 'Project No. 2' in a different village, with both built in 
collaboration with Lithuania's State Security Department. In the case of the second 
newer Project, the report cited “the layout of the building, its enclosed nature and 
protection of the perimeter” as having allowed the CIA to carry out actions 
unmonitored. The “real purpose” of 'Project No. 2', according to a subsequent 
Lithuanian prosecutors' office investigation, “may not be revealed as it constitutes a 
state secret” (quoted in Black, 2015).
This refusal has not stopped residue of this black site appearing in the public 
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sphere. A report from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism identifies a “windowless 
white warehouse about the size of an Olympic swimming pool” as having been 
constructed in 2004 and “soon bec[oming] a topic of gossip among the 750 inhabitants 
of Antaviliai, a small hamlet ten miles north of the Lithuanian capital and encircled by 
pine forest” (ibid). The report cites anonymous villagers as having watched the site 
constructed at night “using brand new equipment that was out of place among the 
tumbledown factory buildings, allotments and unpretentious Communist-era housing 
blocks”. Villagers also saw “English-speaking security guards” patrol the site perimeter, 
“vehicles with tinted windows” driving in and out of the base and regular visits from the
van of a local restaurant (ibid). The Bureau report is accompanied by a photograph of the
alleged black site, an anonymous low-rise building surrounded by tall pines and fencing,
which separate the photographer from the site (Figure 21). The context provided by the 
article suggests that this is a photograph of the facility after the CIA's programme has 
allegedly been discontinued – that is, the photo is framed as residue of covert activities 
that have passed unseen, except in peripheral glimpses by villagers.
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Figure 21: Alleged site of CIA secret prison in Antaviliai, Lithuania (Black, 2015).
The details provided by villagers do not rest easily with statements from the 
Lithuanian prosecutors' office that the site was not being used to hold prisoners. Those 
snatched glimpses of possible covert action, meanwhile, are not acknowledged by the 
state alleged to have carried it out, producing a suspicion of secrecy around the site. The
details relayed by Antaviliai residents are not usually dwelt upon in scholarly discussion 
of the public representation of the CIA detention programme (see chapter four). Rather 
than provide a glimpse of the enactment of torture carried out at these facilities, these 
public traces constitute residue, traces which signify that covert activities have passed 
unseen in many parts of the world beyond glimpsed occurrences at Guantánamo Bay 
and Abu Ghraib. A suspicion of secrecy frames villagers' statements, and their 
contradicting other claims about what happened in Lithuania, as significant. This allows
these statements to intimate unverifiable ideas about the wider logistics and 
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infrastructure of maintaining these black sites – the apparent need to import new 
materials to house detainees, the possible feeding of guards and prisoners at the facility 
and the implicit contrast between these more banal aspects of black site operations and 
other known details of detainees' (mal)treatment at such sites. These traces therefore 
implicitly represent the rendition and detention programme in ways that exceed a focus 
on the extremities of the practice, as thought to be shaped by photographs of detainees 
and torture.
The photograph of the warehouse is particularly interesting in that it appears 
unremarkable and unenlightening of any past covert activities. When framed as a 
former CIA site, however, the aesthetic composition of the photograph produces a 
suspicion of state secrecy, with the photographer's distance emphasising the inability to 
access and document the site's interior. This secrecy implicitly highlights that which the 
photographic residue of the facility cannot verify, the myriad contextualising details of 
the CIA's struggle to secure sites for their secret prisons and of what went on there. The 
photograph becomes defined by its ambiguity: it is unclear what exactly is being shown 
here, what exactly the photograph might reveal about detention practices in Lithuania 
and elsewhere. Even its temporal significance is rendered ambiguous: the suspicion of 
secrecy highlights both the uneventfulness of the site and the absence of any markers of 
those detained there; this framing emphasises the inability to confirm how – even if – 
covert rendition practices which appear to have left few public traces ended here.
This ambiguity as emphasised by secrecy allows the image of the facility to 
produce excess meaning: specifically, suspicions of a wider infrastructure and set of 
unseen practices involved in rendition, detention and interrogation that relied upon 
unremarkable and inconspicuous places. The suspicion of secrecy frames the apparent 
banality of the image of the warehouse to intimate the unverifiable idea that such 
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nondescript sites were precisely what the CIA wanted and required to carry out its 
covert activities. Indeed, the uneventfulness of the site is framed by secrecy as 
suggestive: the possibility of rendition and detention taking place here without drawing 
wide attention intimates the unverifiable idea that such practices could be continuing in 
similar nondescript sites elsewhere – or even that witnesses do not know the full story 
about the apparent ending of the practice here. The inconspicuousness of the warehouse
intimates the journalistic effort required to link it to the rendition programme, and 
therefore the precarity of that link – perhaps, it alludes, other sites have not yet been 
identified in this way. Once again, the extremities of the torture itself does not dominate
the meaning of the covert operation because the bodies of those tortured do not take up 
the representational frame. Instead, the non-bodily residue of the Antaviliai site is made 
suggestive by secrecy, focusing attention on questions over where these black sites were 
located and why those locations were chosen. The issue of space, and particularly how 
anonymous space has perhaps contributed to largely unseen CIA practices in this and 
other states, becomes the focus.
The covert practice of rendition, then, is constructed and framed rather 
differently when this residue circulates in public discourse. Witnesses are not prompted 
by these representations to think they are witnessing and responding to visible suffering
– bodies are conspicuous in their absence. As such, witnesses are not prompted to think 
they are having an imagined response to “what the other [the suffering subject] is 
presumed to be feeling” (Adelman and Kozol, 2014). But witnesses are nonetheless 
positioned by these representations in relation to the U.S. and other states involved in 
rendition and detention, and to unknown detainees at sites such as these. Those political
subjects, and ideas about their characteristics, are intimated in their absence. These 
public traces are not some idle addendum to the already-told story of rendition; they 
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produce excess meaning and so reshape that story, including the positioning of a 
presumed public readership towards these covert events.
The reason this Conclusion begins with a discussion of rendition and detention – a 
practice that on the face of it belongs to a different category of covert action than those 
covered in this thesis – is that these newly-uncovered traces sharpen what is at stake in 
representations of covert action residue. Scholarly discussion of state practices at so-
called black sites has revolved around particular representations of these activities and 
the ethical challenge they are seen to pose. These representations are the photographs of
prisoners in orange jumpsuits patrolled by imposing soldiers, and of prisoners 
physically abused by prison guards for the camera's eye. Scholarship has asked what it 
means to view these photographs, to witness suffering bodies juxtaposed with soldiers 
in control (see chapter four). The persistent concern expressed is that when visualised, 
these bodies are marked visually and textually by the U.S. state as dangerous, or are 
visualised by their torturers as sexually repressed and depraved on account of their race,
such that they appear to confirm the overlapping metonymic identities of 'terrorist' and 
'Muslim male' through their appearance and behaviour. They become evidence of 'what 
Muslims and terrorists are like'. The powerless and violated qualities of these bodies are 
therefore thought to signify the downtrodden position of these metonymic identities, 
and to interpellate that position for those similarly racialised, and prompt feelings of 
cultural superiority or even enjoyment on the part of others (Van Veeren, 2011: 1730-7; 
Pugliese, 2007: 253-61). The violence becomes intelligible as inevitable, as incontestable.
The analytic of this scholarship, then, has focused on the potential for witnesses to 
become complicit in discursive violence, in the demonisation and dehumanisation of 
detainees.
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The residue discussed above does not reiterate this dilemma. Indeed, what 
makes these non-bodily traces of rendition and black sites significant is that they do not 
afford a glimpse of suffering, and as such they do not pose the challenge of what it 
means to witness that suffering. As this thesis has argued, covert counter-terrorism can 
be represented in ways that signify the absence of sufferers, and therefore curtail any 
'recognition' of their suffering subjectivities and understanding of that suffering as 
ethically meaningful on those terms. Surrounded by a suspicion of secrecy, the traces of 
rendition discussed above signify that the bodies of those rendered, detained and then 
abused inside these black sites are absent from the public sphere. Indeed, the residue of 
these sites leaves unclear to whom if anyone they relate – it is unclear whether this 
residue should be understood as being of specific renditions of particular persons, and 
who those persons would be. Instead of detainees' suffering, this residue hints at a wider
infrastructure of state violence, the existence and unverifiable characteristics of an 
apparatus supporting these black sites. Far from being a spectacle of corporeality, this 
residue alludes to invisible structures which supported and maintained that violence.
This meaning-making hints at a final crucial part of the historical affiliation 
between covert counter-terrorism and lynching, setting the basis for this Conclusion. 
By circulating in public discourse and shaping the representation of black sites, this 
residue of buildings and distanced eyewitnesses avoids defining the practice through the
extremities of its violence. Those extremities, the spectacle of subordination and 
wounding on detainee bodies, are instead contextualised by intimations of the wider 
infrastructure of the practice. With this residue circulating alongside more bodily 
documentation, they have the potential to deprive the latter of its status as an iconic 
glimpse of the practice, a representation that 'stands in' for the unseen whole and 
signifies that it contain the meaning of the practice despite revealing only one part of it 
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(Bhattacharyya, 2008: 58). The residue discussed above works against this dynamic by 
alluding to a larger array of social practices that help constitute black site operations but
which remain unseen. This residue does not replace broken bodies as an iconic glimpse 
of rendition; rather, it signifies the absences left in the place of such a glimpse.
Lynching has entered contemporary popular culture through its extremities: 
visual portrayals which focus on the limp hanging bodies of those lynched while 
showing the mob and spectating crowd surrounding those bodies. The practice has been
conceptualised within this aesthetic arrangement: the spatial scene and temporal 
moment of that hanging and spectating is what constitutes lynching for most analyses. 
But the conceptualisation of lynching through the extremities of the violence was a 
contested act during the first half of the twentieth century. Not all social commentators 
and political activists took it as given that lynching was simply defined by spectacles of 
the mutilated hanged body and the mob (Rushdy, 2012: 97-100). Observers and anti-
lynching organisers saw this presumption as having a crucial consequence for national 
understandings of lynching and its weaving into narratives of U.S. history, one that 
would shape how this and subsequent violence against racial minorities would be made 
meaningful in public discourse. In other words, the conceptualisation of lynching 
through its extremities would shape the potential for ethical responsiveness.
The historical affiliation between lynching and covert counter-terrorism 
therefore points to how the political dynamics of violence can depend upon the 
distinction between its extremities and its seemingly more arbitrary remainders. Both 
practices exist and circulate within a representational economy, to repeat the adaptation
of Campbell's (2007) term, where this distinction shapes the meanings ascribed to them. 
Yet the question of ethical responsiveness has nearly always been answered narrowly in 
terms of responding to the extremities, of witnessing the wounded body and the 
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experience it expresses. This Conclusion therefore examines what this distinction might
suggest about the potential for ethically responding to the residue discussed throughout 
the thesis, the non-bodily traces of unseen violence. As discussed in the Introduction, 
the literature on both state secrecy and war representations consistently maintain that 
an ethical response to state violence requires a recognition of the suffering subjectivities
of those violated. Framed within the above distinction, this position argues that ethical 
witnessing requires access to the extremities of violence, the suffering person whose 
experience is communicated through its embodiment, which allows witnesses to 
acknowledge its ethical significance through an affective response. From this 
perspective, the arbitrary remainders discussed throughout this thesis are just that: 
inconsequential left-overs of a practice that must be sensorily accessed elsewhere, by 
other means, for ethical witnessing to be possible. The secrecy of these counter-
terrorism programmes is once again posed as an impediment, this time to ethics.
But rather than seek out the extremes, what happens if we stay with the residue 
of covert counter-terrorism and consider what ethical responsiveness might mean in 
relation to non-bodily traces of unseen violence? This Conclusion argues that, just as 
with lynching in the early and mid-twentieth century, an analytical focus on the 
extremities of a violent practice can obscure its broader political dynamics, including 
the representational practices that make it and related violence possible. Switching 
focus to residue opens the possibility for an ethical response defined by self-awareness, 
an awareness of how witnesses help shape the meaning of violence in ways that are 
obscured by that violence's definition through its extremities as distanced and 
disconnected from wider society.
Having framed covert action residue in terms of a focus away from the 
extremities, the Conclusion asks how an ethical response of self-awareness could be 
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produced, given that the thesis has demonstrated how representations of residue 
produce narrow ethical orientations. In answering this question, it is determined that 
the ethical witnessing of contemporary covert counter-terrorism cannot be about 
retrieving knowledge of suffering from that residue. That suffering is signified as absent;
searching for it in order to 'recognise' others' subjectivities risks compounding the 
representation of covert counter-terrorism as intangible and disconnected from those 
left with its remainders. The scholarly desire to determine the possibility for such 
recognition betrays an understanding of ethical witnessing as a way of resisting state 
discourses that determine the meaning of state violence. This begs the question, since as 
shown throughout the thesis those discourses are usually present only in the abstract 
and are undermined by intimations from residue, which hint at possibilities that 
represent the terms of those rationalisations as invalid. In the case of covert counter-
terrorism, ethics cannot be about presuming the hegemonic of state frames of meaning. 
The key to ethical witnessing as self-awareness is a prompting of witnesses to consider 
how residue positions them as distanced and disconnected from covert violence, and 
how this production of distance shapes the (in)significance afforded absences. Placing 
covert action in an historical affiliation with lynching, on the basis of a shared dynamic 
of absence and distancing, is not just as an analytical tool but a normative one, a way to 
shape this particular form of ethical responsiveness towards unseen violence.
In order to contextualise this argument, the Conclusion begins by summarising 
the theory and analyses of the previous chapters.
Secrecy, absence, and the rationalisation of state violence
This thesis began with the question of what it means to witness state violence that is 
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designed to be covert. While the literature on war and media frames the witnessing of 
war as a matter of whether one is able to 'recognise' suffering – that is, to have an 
affective response to a person's experience of suffering through a representation, and 
through that response be prompted to accord that person's experience ethical 
significance – representations of contemporary covert counter-terrorism do not fit this 
analytic. These representations neither neither provide nor efface markers of sufferers' 
subjectivities, but offer only non-bodily traces of state violence. Rather than presume 
that the question of ethical responsiveness is therefore moot, the Introduction expressed
scepticism regarding this definition of ethical witnessing: the act of recognising 
subjectivity is shaped by socio-cultural discourses of what counts as a marker of 
subjectivity, and demands that beings therefore express the 'right' marker in order to 
spark ethical consideration. Moreover, this definition of responsiveness ignores how 
even when recognisability is curtailed, representations can shape ethical orientations 
towards absence – that is, they can prompt witnesses to think and feel certain things 
towards the absence of certain people, and by extension towards those absentees. 
Ethical witnessing of today's covert counter-terrorism is a matter of how those absences
are made intelligible and given significance.
The Introduction further noted that this misunderstanding of absence was 
shared by the literature on covert action, which has aimed to detail the implementation 
and operational results of such activities, and as such has chased the hidden file, the state
archives that would provide these details. This analytic positions the secrecy 
surrounding covert action as an impediment to analysis, in that it produces absences in 
the public record that act as barriers to knowledge. This neglects how covert operations 
breach those archives and enter the public sphere, both through their enactment and in 
the traces they leave behind, and insodoing represent secrecy within public discourse. 
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The thesis has therefore aimed to stay with the secret as secret and to resist filling in the 
absences – to explore how secrecy and absence materialise in the public sphere as 
recognisable, because signified, through these public traces.
The importance of this public existence of secrecy and absence is that it affects 
what it means to witness covert violence and to ethically respond to it. For if ethical 
witnessing need not involve the recognition of subjectivities, and if secrecy and absence 
can be signified by traces of violence rather than by the state itself, what would it 
therefore take for representations of these traces to rationalise covert violence, to 
prompt assent towards the use of force? Rationalisation is premised upon the reiteration
of a public narrative that pre-conditions the meaning of representations of state 
violence, such that those representations appear to echo the terms within that narrative. 
Where such echoing prompts witnesses to understand sufferers in demonised or 
dehumanised ways, curtailing recognition of their suffering as having ethical import, the
violence in question is rationalised. But non-bodily traces of covert action, and the 
secrecy and absence they materialise, need not echo any such narrative for covert 
violence, particularly if the state rarely acknowledges those traces and does not 
articulate a narrative which rationalises the possible use of secrecy. The conceptual 
challenge presented by these traces is one of ethical orientations towards state violence 
that go beyond rationalisation and its putative opposite 'resistance', that exceed a binary 
of assent and dissent; if the state does not address its use of covertness to the public and 
rationalise that use, talk of resisting that rationalisation is specious. Again, the issue is 
how absences in the public sphere, not 'recognisable' experiences of suffering, are made 
meaningful and prompt witnesses to respond to them.
With this analytical focus, the thesis moved on to conceptualise both secrecy and
absence as part of, rather than curtailing, representational dynamics. The first chapter 
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found that past theorisations of the secrecy surrounding covert action have presumed 
that such secrecy becomes part of public representations thanks to two things: 
articulations from the state and glimpses of covert violence. Conceptualising secrecy as 
a state instrument for shaping public discourse, and that glimpses of covert operations 
align the witness' perspective with that of the perpetrators of violence, this literature has
theorised that secrecy, as articulated by the state, rationalises the use of covertness 
related to these glimpses and therefore prompts assent towards covert violence. 
Representations of contemporary covert counter-terrorism do not fit this model of 
secrecy: they involve neither invocations of secrecy by the state nor glimpses of covert 
agents in action. These representations instead suggest that secrecy can be signified as a 
mere suspicion, through the rumours and debris left in the public sphere by such 
operations, and that this need not involve the articulation of an accompanying rationale.
Such suspected secrecy can prompt witnesses of these traces to consider questions 
about the use of covertness and the state's covert power, questions raised by the absence 
of any rationalisation of secrecy. The representational dynamics of secrecy need not be 
instigated or determined by the state.
Just as secrecy can materialise through representational practices, so too can 
absence be represented and thus 'made present' to witnesses. The second chapter used a 
comparative example of two representations with similar aesthetics qualities, one of an 
Israeli airstrike on Gaza, the other of a drone attack in Yemen, to demonstrate how 
secrecy and absence can materialise through that left in the wake of an unseen state 
action, and can then implicitly signify possibilities about what happened that undermine
any rationalisation of that violence. These significations turn representations of covert 
action's traces from enigmatic to suggestive. The chapter conceptualised the rumours, 
speculation, snippets of information, debris and smoke left in the public sphere as 
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residue, that which signifies a covert action has passed unseen, and theorised these 
significations of unverifiable possibilities as intimations from absence. These 
intimations are produced because the suspicion of secrecy that is produced by residue 
frames that residue as significant in that it has been left in the public sphere and not 
been secreted by the state. Residue is thereby represented as possibly revealing things 
which covertness would have otherwise obscured. This framing incorporates the 
equivocal absences in this residue, ambiguities around that which is absent from these 
representations and by extension the public sphere. Being equivocal but framed by 
secrecy as significant, these absences allude to unverifiable possibilities as to what they 
might suggest about the unseen event.
The second chapter therefore demonstrated that these intimations curtail the 
rationalisation of covert violence, by preventing residue from echoing the terms of that 
rationalisation and implicitly challenging the validity of that rationalisation in the case 
of these unseen events. This does not mean, however, that these intimations prompt 
ethical responsiveness towards these events and dissent towards their state perpetrator; 
this is a matter of how witnesses are positioned by intimations towards the unseen 
violence and its absent casualties. To understand the representational consequences of 
that which is left unspoken on that which is absent, the chapter conceptualised an 
historical affiliation between covert counter-terrorism and lynching. Affiliation, 
developed from narrative strategies in the prose fiction of W.G. Sebald, involves the 
association of disparate violent events based not on the violence itself but 
representational echoes in their aftermath. In the case of covert action and lynching, this
affiliation derived from traces that shared an absence of violated bodies, which in both 
cases figures the unseen violence as distanced from wider society. Historical affiliation 
was conceptualised as a way to analyse whether dynamics identified in one set of 
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representations were present but obscured in the other set. The juxtaposition of 
representations of contrasting violence can reveal whether that which is absent is 
nonetheless represented and given significance in a way which goes unnoticed in one 
case, because implicit, but which is more explicitly articulated in another. The affiliation
with lynching was therefore designed to examine any implicit or intimated ethical 
orientations towards absent violence and casualties produced by residue of that 
violence.
Having laid this theoretical groundwork, the thesis analysed three empirical 
cases where contemporary covert counter-terrorism is represented through its residue. 
The first of these was that of the covert drone strike programmes in Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia. The third chapter began by examining the past critical scholarship on the 
drone programmes, finding that this scholarship conceptualises drone warfare from 
within the visualisation methods, operating procedures and materials that are used to 
prosecute strikes. This again frames secrecy as a barrier to research, while neglecting 
how the public event of strikes, their narration through their public traces, might 
materialise spaces and identities in the world that do not match the internal 
rationalisation of drone violence through its operationalisation. By examining 
representations of drone strike residue, from snippets of targeting mechanisms to 
material debris, in press and social media coverage, the chapter argued that this residue 
signifies a suspicion of secrecy such that the absence of casualties within this residue 
becomes suggestive. This residue thus intimates possibilities that casualties' identities 
are being kept hidden or cannot be confirmed, that secluded spaces help to obscure 
information, and that targeting mechanisms are fallible or flawed. While undermining 
the U.S. state's abstracted rationalisation of 'targeted killing', these intimations implicitly
represent unseen strikes as too ephemeral, too fleeting in space and time and too 
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materially insubstantial in their public footprint to be understood. These intimations 
produce an ethical orientation similar to those of past lynching representations, which 
explicitly articulated the practice as discomforting in that it rubbed against wider 
societal progress and was therefore confounding in its causes and implications. In both 
cases, this shapes an ethical orientation towards unseen violence that focused on the 
struggle to comprehend its dynamics, marginalising absent casualties as relevant only in 
indicating that which causes this struggle – in the case of covert strikes, the intangibility
of this practice.
Not all covert counter-terrorism goes unremarked by the state in the same way. 
The fourth chapter used the case of the raid on Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad 
compound to examine a covert action where both the operation and some of its secrecy 
was acknowledged and rationalised by the U.S. – the acknowledged secrecy being not 
the covertness of the action itself, but the hiding of bin Laden's mortally wounded body. 
While previous scholarship has asserted a parallel between the visualisation of detainees 
at Abu Ghraib prison and photography practices around lynching a century earlier, this 
chapter used the Abbottabad case to reframe the association between counter-terrorism
and lynching, basing it not on visualisation but on secretion. Lynching photography was
rarely publicised nationally, being disseminated mainly among locals sympathetic to the 
practice. The secretion of that documentation, rather than its visual composition, was 
the source of its representational power, as rumours and speculation in lieu of those 
documents could reiterate understandings of who had the power to see and define the 
meaning of these violated bodies. That power, however, relied on that act of secretion 
itself not being re-contextualised as an attempt to curtail other possible readings of the 
body; such a representation could undermine the power of secrecy by highlighting its 
discursive labour and hinting at those potential readings.
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The chapter argued that this was precisely the representational dynamic that 
took place in news coverage of the bin Laden raid. By hiding documentation of bin 
Laden's body but then justifying this as an attempt to avoid negative connotations, 
rather than leaving secretion unacknowledged, U.S. officials allowed the act of hiding to
circulate alongside other residue of the raid – from rumours of what took place to the 
material marks left at the compound – which was either released officially or was not 
similarly addressed by the state. Framed as public evidence of a covert event, this other 
residue reframed the act of hiding bin Laden's corpse, by signifying ambiguities and 
contradictions regarding the actions of absent bodies, namely bin Laden and the Navy 
SEALs who conducted the raid. These absences intimated the possibility that these 
absent bodies did not fit the role assigned to them by the U.S. narrative of the raid as a 
U.S. triumph over a cowardly and hypocritical terrorist threat. These intimations 
implicitly represented the hiding of bin Laden's body and documentation of the raid as 
an attempt to cover up any such incongruities in the official story; by highlighting that 
discursive labour, and the possibilities suggested by these incongruities, these 
intimations undermined the official rationalisation of the raid and the accompanying 
identity schema. But again, the ethical orientation produced by these intimations was 
neither assent nor dissent towards the violence of the raid; rather, it was one focused on 
considering what the hiding of the body might imply about proclaimed high ideals of 
the U.S. in carrying out the raid, and how secrecy might be preventing understanding of
these implications. The subject-position produced was therefore self-absorbed.
In the fifth chapter, the thesis turned to a case of covert counter-terrorism 
which has, by contrast, produced very little in the way of residue. Efforts to rescue those
kidnapped by terrorist affiliates in the Sahara and Sahel, and the manhunt for Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar across this region, has been represented primarily through rumours of 
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unclear provenance and speculation inferred from past events. These details are 
articulated in news coverage such that they imply an ambiguous field of knowledge, that
truth is difficult to establish. At the same time, these rumours have been contextualised 
by references to the Sahara-Sahel landscape in terms of vast, barren and 
undifferentiated terrain, and in terms of the materiality of the Saharan desert. These 
characteristics take on a metaphorical role in this coverage, juxtaposing rumours of 
operations such that they appear to confirm and reflect the ambiguity of knowledge. 
Finally, absences and contradictions highlighted by different claims and rumours 
around these operations produced a suspicion of secrecy, related to states both inside 
and outside the region.
The fifth chapter argued that this interaction of rumour, landscape and secrecy 
shaped representational dynamics that could again be illuminated through an historical 
affiliation with lynching. As within representations of rural lynchings a century earlier, 
rumoured rescues and manhunts gained meaning through the surrounding landscape. 
With rumours of operations framed by descriptions of terrain, and sparse debris 
'tainted' by desert sand, the socio-political context of the violence was delimited to this 
natural landscape. As with rural lynchings, the landscape was in turn made meaningful 
through this violence: the barren homogeneity of the Sahara-Sahel landscape was 
represented as meaningful in reflecting the intangibility of these covert actions, in 
representing the lack of clear material traces of what had happened. This absence within
the landscape was framed by a suspicion of secrecy as itself suggestive, intimating the 
possibility that this inscrutable terrain was obscuring or tainting any public traces of 
ongoing counter-terrorism efforts. As with rural lynchings, the landscape was implicitly
represented as possibly 'complicit' in violence, in this case in its secrecy. But because this
same landscape reflected an ambiguity of knowledge, that complicity was represented as
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significant because neither provable nor disprovable. The ethical orientation this shapes
is one narrowly focused on the suggestiveness of the barren desert, on whether the 
absence of residue within it reveals anything. From this subject-position, the violence of
these operations is significant in reflecting that inability to determine anything for 
certain. As with lynchings in the rural United States, interest in the violence's wider 
social dynamics is negated, as its meaningful context is restricted to natural geography.
Beyond the extremities
The previous empirical chapters demonstrate that covert counter-terrorism is ascribed 
wider significance through possibilities suggested by intimations. That unspoken 
meaningfulness and significance is signified as a meaning and significance for someone. 
The articulations of press and social media coverage presume, and explicitly or 
implicitly position readers within, a particular relevant readership. News coverage 
“address[es] interpretive communities” by “point[ing] to its context”, by making textual 
and visual references that require newsreaders to position themselves within that 
interpretive community in order to understand these references' contextualised 
meaning (Dekavalla, 2010: 640). Within that context, secrecy and absence are able to 
intimate meanings that exceed those given to these events by explicit articulations. But 
these intimations are then able to shape the represented (un)importance of these 
operations to the interpretive community that is being addressed by that coverage, 
provided these intimations are recognised from that subject-position.
As has been discussed, the representational dynamic that shapes this significance
can be illuminated through an historical affiliation with lynching in the United States 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In both historical cases, 
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violence is represented as difficult to comprehend, owing to its apparent distance from 
that society and the obfuscation of its political dynamics that this involves – for 
instance, through the secretion of the body. Lynching in contemporaneous public 
debate was contextualised and historicised in ways that tried to explain its emergence 
and persistence. At the same time, news and literary representations of the practice 
portrayed the violence in ways that centred the supposed incomprehensibility of what 
was happening, the challenge of relating the violence to the perceived social dynamics of
modern society. This framing echoed a popular fixation on the most spectacular aspects 
of the violence, those that were rarely documented for a national news-readership but 
which had come to define lynching. “[A] mob, a noose, a swinging body defiled”, was 
seen to constitute both the practice and what it was that made it so disturbing for the 
national population (Trotti, 2014: 852). It was the spectacle of the body and the mob, 
unseen but vividly imagined through news and literary accounts, that constituted 
lynching's violent epicentre.
Consequently, lynching in public discourse was defined through the extremities 
of its violence in a way that de-contextualised it, removing lynching from its position 
within a wider spectrum of terrorising violence against black individuals and 
communities; this violence and humiliation did not share in the spectacle of mob 
murder but nonetheless intersected it as efforts to maintain white domination in parts 
of the United States (K. Williams, 2005). This de-contextualisation had the knock-on 
effect of delimiting the political dynamics of lynching, of what that practice looked like 
and how it was perpetrated, which set narrow criteria for identifying and articulating 
whether the practice was sustaining itself or was floundering. As a result of this focus on
the extremities of this violence, the reduced observance of those extremities from the 
late 1930s onwards produced a narrative that lynching was declining. This gradual 
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disappearance of the spectacle of the mob lynching was given particular significance in 
public discussion: given that lynching had been represented nationally as aberrant 
within and therefore a challenge to the progress of modern society, the fading of 
precisely those spectacular elements thought to reflect this challenge was seen to signal 
the winning out of that progress (Rushdy, 2012: 100-5). Lynching's disconnect from 
wider society was seen to be confirmed. Whatever “social order that sanctioned [this] 
form of racial violence” was perceived as disappearing along with lynching's extremities,
and the end of the “anomal[y]” of this practice was given meaning as “a sign of... a 
mature and civilised society” (ibid: 102, 105).
The focus on the extremities of lynching violence therefore delimited 
understandings of the latter's political dynamics in a way that obscured the dynamic that
was being perpetuated through the consumption of national media coverage. The 
interpretive communities signified by this news coverage gave the violence meaning in 
terms of a national newsreadership's struggle to comprehend it, marginalising the 
relevance of lynch victims themselves to their being mere indicators of this struggle. 
Defining lynching through the spectacle of the mob and lynched body deterred 
acknowledgement of the role that this subject-position itself might play in shaping how 
this violence and solutions to it were considered. With the decline of the spectacle 
lynching, the discursive structures implicated in that violence were thought to have 
eroded; representations of the practice that shaped subject-positions of 
incomprehension were not considered within those structures. This demonstrates that 
the “stakes of [a] fixation on the extremities of the practice” were bound up in how that 
practice was represented in relation to wider society, and whether public discourse 
would affiliate that violence with other practices within society that produced similar 
discursive dynamics but “did not “look” like lynching murders” from the perspective of 
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its most spectacular manifestations (Goldsby, 2006: 284, 289).
The popular conceptualisation of lynching through its extremities provides an 
opening to consider what ethical responsiveness towards covert action residue might 
mean. The critical literature on ethical witnessing of counter-terrorism has largely 
stayed within the analytic discussed in the Introduction: that ethics depends upon 
whether markers of the subjectivities of those targeted by these covert operations are 
present in representations of their suffering, since those markers are necessary for 
witnesses to 'respond to', and thus recognise the ethical import of, that suffering. The 
absence of those markers allows for prisoners, suspected insurgents or simply those 
made casualties of counter-terrorism to be demonised or dehumanised, their 
subjectivities warped or effaced to portray their suffering as unworthy of an ethical 
consideration that would contest this violence. Those witnesses who adopt this 
understanding of casualties are therefore complicit in a state rationalisation of violence. 
That counter-terrorism should pose this challenge to ethical witnessing is a claim based 
on iconic glimpses of these operations: those which display the manipulated or 
mutilated body alongside its controlling counter-terrorist agents – most notably, the 
prisoners and soldiers of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay (Apel, 2005; Dauphinée, 
2007; Van Veeren, 2011) – and those which remove those bodies entirely from the 
representational field, representing counter-terrorism through military-technological 
lenses (Mirzoeff, 2005; Stahl, 2010). As iconic glimpses, these representations have been 
seen to capture the meaning of the wider practices they instantiate. It is significant, then,
that these glimpses reveal the supposed extremities of contemporary counter-terrorism,
the act of inflicting violence, by representing either violated bodies or the spectacular 
effects of military power. It is the extremities of counter-terrorist violence that have 
become iconic.
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Residue offers no such glimpse. It is related in news coverage to those 
extremities, and perpetually hints at possibilities surrounding the enactment of violence,
but it does so by representing counter-terrorism through the latter's arbitrary 
remainders. Residue therefore challenges the analytic of ethical witnessing repeated in 
the literature on counter-terrorism. Public traces of the materials, spaces and networks 
that supported black site detention challenge bodily glimpses of violence 'standing in' 
for rendition and detention, as if they encapsulate the political dynamics of the practice. 
With these public traces circulating alongside those more iconic glimpses, they re-
situate the question of ethical witnessing by suggesting that they too are part of the 
dynamics that constitute this violence, that materialise it in the world through 
representational practices.
These traces of the operation of black sites therefore challenge the ideas of 
causation, maintenance and historical affinities which are signified by the most visceral 
bodily markers of this U.S. state activity. When taken as constitutive of the practice, the 
latter markers offer a sharply circumscribed idea of what is required to contest the 
meanings ascribed to this practice. The spectacle of suffered bodies and controlling 
guards frames the issue of witnessing as, once again, one of assent or dissent towards 
violence that is rationalised by state narratives of its actions. In the same move, this 
spectacle circumscribes the historical lineage of this violence, suggesting that scholars 
and commentators look to violence which took a similar representational form to these 
extremities in order to understand what ethical challenge they pose. This 
circumscription ultimately suggests that so far as ethical witnessing is concerned, 
responding to the extremities of this violence is key; the suffering body comes to 
encapsulate the ethical challenge posed by this practice. The question then becomes how
much this glimpse of violence's extremities allows us to see: is it possible to recognise 
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the experience of suffering and thus its ethical import? Responding ethically to these 
state practices is translated as recognising how the bodies of those targeted “speak of 
and through [their] damaged corporeality” (Adelman, 2009: 52). That signification of 
suffering is now demanded of those bodies, on the grounds that the imaginative 
recognition of subjectivities produces dissent towards those state actions (ibid: 65-75). It
becomes difficult to imagine that an ethical witnessing of counter-terrorism violence 
could come about in any other way.
While critical scholarship raises the question of recognisability in order to 
provoke questions of witnesses' complicity in hegemonic discourses of state violence, 
this framing of ethical responsiveness centres the extremities of state practices and 
dismisses the representational dynamics of its residue as irrelevant to that violence. The 
idea that an ethical response must recognise suffering and the conceptualisation of 
counter-terrorism through the infliction and embodiment of violence end up mutually 
supporting one another. This consequently gives a narrow view of how such state 
violence exists in the public sphere and who becomes involved in its representational 
dynamics through acts of witnessing. Glimpses of the suffering body involve witnesses 
in the meanings attached to covert violence; but residue also involves them, in a manner
that is just as significant. By positioning newsreaders in relation to both the unseen 
casualties and the state perpetrator of covert operations, residue shapes how 
newsreaders are prompted to see the significance of foreign policy actions that they 
cannot witness. Residue need not represent suffering to nonetheless “establish the 
conditions of possibility for a political response” to this violence (Campbell, 2007: 361). 
Focusing on the extremities will obscure the ethical orientations from news coverage 
which perpetuate covert violence's discursive dynamics, and therefore will overlook 
what an ethics of witnessing might mean in the case of contemporary covert counter-
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terrorism. Ethics, then, must be decoupled from suffering.
Resisting recovery
If we do turn to the seemingly arbitrary remainders of covert counter-terrorism, what 
kind of ethical witnessing can be gained from them? Key to answering this is what 
exactly this residue signifies to witnesses that they are witnessing. As this thesis has 
argued, residue signifies that it does not document a claimed event but its aftermath, 
and that therefore it cannot offer a glimpse of the event and of those involved. But 
intimations produced by this residue do prompt witnesses to adopt positions of 
understanding in relation to both casualties and the state perpetrator of this violence, 
despite the signified absence of these figures from the public sphere. Absences within 
residue do not remain inert indicators that something is missing, but are made 
suggestive by secrecy and hint at ideas about what is absent.
The analyses of previous chapters, however, suggest that these intimations 
cannot be said to prompt ethical witnessing. The ethical orientations produced by these 
hints and allusions – that is, what these hints prompt witnesses to believe is acceptable 
to think and feel towards unseen violence, absent casualties and the state – are rather 
narrow. These orientations focus on unverifiable possibilities suggested by equivocal 
absences, and their implications for an addressed interpretive community. These 
possibilities include the idea that covert drone strikes are too ephemeral to establish in 
their aftermath who exactly they killed; that documentation of Osama bin Laden's death
and corpse is being kept secret to prevent alternative readings of the raid that killed 
him; and that events in the Sahara-Sahel are simply unknowable due to their 
obscuration and disappearance within a vast barren landscape. If the simplest definition 
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of ethics is that which concerns “the conduct of the subject toward another... as a subject
in her own right” (Adelman and Kozol, 2014), then the ethical orientations produced by 
intimations of covert action's intangibility only weakly address that conduct. The 
potential ethical import of the violence inflicted by these operations – that is, a 
consideration of this violence in terms of the conduct of both state and witness towards 
other subjects, an acknowledgement and interrogation of the possibility that this 
violence challenges or breaches an ethical form of such conduct – is marginalised. The 
violence perpetrated by the state is represented as discomforting on the grounds of its 
intangibility, while casualties enter the lens of this ethical orientation only as reflecting 
this intangibility.
What, then, would constitute ethical responsiveness towards this residue and its 
absences? It is worth repeating Adelman and Kozol's definition of recognising the other 
as a subject in her own right, as quoted in the Introduction: this recognition “is more 
than being aware of [other subjects'] existence, or curious about their circumstances, or 
able to see them, or saddened by the thought of their pain; it is an attunement to their 
capacity to suffer, the ascription of ethical urgency or significance to that suffering, and 
a consideration of how I, as a spectator, might be involved in it” (ibid). What do we think
is necessary for the rumours and debris left by unseen violence to allow for an 
attunement to beings' capacity to suffer, to prompt an ascription of urgency to that 
suffering, and to invite witnesses to consider their potential involvement in it?
In asserting what is required for this attunement, critical scholarship on 
representations of war and counter-terrorism frequently asks whether representations 
allow for an ethical 'encounter' between witnesses and those represented, “an 
empathetic encounter” which allows for “the possibility for viewing [others] as equal” 
and therefore “entitled to the same [treatment]” as us (Van Veeren, 2011: 1735). A 
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recognition of the ethical import of others' suffering is framed in this scholarship as 
requiring co-presence with that suffering, in order that witnesses are then prompted by 
that suffering to think and feel differently. To recognise others' subjectivity is to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of their claim for recognition, which can in turn 
“challenge... a prevailing rule or norm” of what qualifies as being recognisable (Brincat, 
2014: 401). It in this sense that Butler foregrounds the importance of those norms that 
determine how one qualifies for recognition as human, as entering the category of 
human with the ethical worth that accrues from this (Butler, 2009). The problem with 
this formulation of ethical witnessing is that it is uncertain whether the imaginative 
experience of encountering suffering subjectivities necessarily produces ethical 
witnessing. Just as the norms of humanness are reiterated over time, so markers of 
subjectivity and of suffering experience are not universal and objective, but are socio-
culturally constructed. To invest in an affective response to such markers is to ignore 
the potential fallibility of such a response. Suffering may be misread or easily ignored.
Beyond the normative problem with defining ethical witnessing as the 
recognition of subjectivities, it is worth considering why recognition is put forward as 
ethical responsiveness, and what analytic this position encourages towards 
representations of state violence, the scholarly attitude that is adopted. These issues 
together hint at an alternative understanding of ethical responsiveness in the case of 
covert action residue. To answer the why question first, the scholarly desire to locate 
markers of subjectivity within representations of war stems from the perceived need to 
prevent dehumanisation. That dehumanisation is a result of state narratives for its 
violence which, by pre-conditioning public discourse, pre-empt how witnesses 
understand glimpses of state violence as meaningful (Shepherd, 2008). Insodoing, those 
glimpses are framed as echoing the terms of these narratives, as being intelligible 
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through those narratives. When those terms dehumanise sufferers, the glimpsed 
violence inflicted on those sufferers is consequently rationalised. If ethics is therefore 
about disrupting that rationalisation by recognising subjectivity, ethics is turned into a 
matter of resistance, a resistance of state rationalisations. This understanding of ethics 
in turn suggests that the normative stance of critical scholars should be one of 
'dissidence', a refusal to allow people and practices to be incorporated within a 
hegemonic discourse that would subsume the singularity of their identities, that would 
“impose and fix ways of knowing” those “deterritorialised and decentred sites of 
political life”, so as to “legitim[ise] the violence of the modern state” towards them 
(Ashley and Walker, 1990: 263, 261, 262). The search for ethical responsiveness is 
consequently framed as resistance towards hegemonic modes of knowing that already 
pre-condition public discourse, and would otherwise rationalise state violence.
The problem with parsing ethics, in witnessing and in scholarship, as resistance 
is that, as demonstrated through this thesis, while the United States provides general 
rationalisations of ongoing counter-terrorism strategy, potentially allowing covert 
operations to be rationalised along those lines, the secrecy that is signified by the 
residue of these operations is not rationalised by the state when represented in public 
discourse. And in cases where secrecy is addressed, as in the bin Laden raid, the 
rationale for the covertness is partial and ambiguous, failing to cover all public traces of 
these operation. The meaning of this secrecy, and the meaning it gives in turn to unseen 
state violence, is therefore not pre-conditioned by the state. As a result, intimations 
produced by the residue of covert counter-terrorism undermine any rationalisation of 
these operations on the more general grounds that the state does articulate. These 
intimations thereby undermine the demonisation or dehumanisation of absent 
casualties; they are not represented in ways that conform to state narratives of its own 
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actions, but indeed are alluded to as possibly undermining the terms of those narratives.
A state rationalisation of its violence is therefore not what is curtailing an ethical 
consideration of the violence committed in these cases. Resistance is not the appropriate
definition of ethical witnessing here – it takes the the hegemony of state rationalisations
of violence for granted, and foregrounds witnesses' relationship to the state perpetrator 
of these covert activities, at the expense of the relationship that witnesses have with the 
non-state residue that these activities leave behind. In the representations covered in 
this thesis, it is that residue, and the absences and intimations that materialise because of
it, which demands an ethical response and poses a challenge to ethical witnessing, not 
frames of meaning disseminated by the state.
What analytic, then, does a view of ethics as recognition of subjectivities 
propose? This understanding of ethics places a particular kind of demand upon 
representations, a demand that it provide the means to resist demonisation and 
dehumanisation, namely markers of suffering. Ethics is consequently translated into a 
practice of recovery, whereby both scholars and witnesses sift through these 
representations for evidence of the lived experience of those whose injuries and deaths 
are the product of that which is documented for us. Recovery constitutes a particular 
approach to absence, a witnessing act that attempts to make things present, to salvage 
hidden significations in a move akin to archaeology (Wylie, 2009: 279). Rebecca 
Adelman argues that the reproduction and endless scrutinising of the Abu Ghraib 
torture photographs by critical scholars, despite the inability of those tortured bodies to 
consent, reflects a belief in “a civic duty to undo Abu Ghraib” by “confronting” these 
images in a “persist[ent]... effort to extract meaning” from them (Adelman, 2009: 67, 73). 
To insist that such representations can produce meanings outside a dehumanising frame
is to demand that representations be able to offer up the lived suffering of others (Abbas,
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2010).
That demand, and the impulse to recovery motivated by it, will be frustrated by 
covert action residue, as those who are made casualties of these operations are signified 
as absent from the speculations and piles of debris that witnesses are left to encounter. 
This residue is made meaningful in these representations as lacking markers of 
subjectivity because the bodies that would instantiate those markers are not co-present 
with witnesses within this residue. To demand that residue offer up these markers is too
ask something of these representations that they cannot offer; to demand witnesses 
keep looking for these markers is to ask for a great individual effort of witnessing that is
both difficult to motivate, given residue does not itself prompt it, and to risk fatalism.
The practice of recovery has a further consequence which allows for the 
formulation of an alternative to ethics-as-resistance. In his discussion of textual and 
visual documentation of slavery in the Americas, Stephen Best notes a similar desire and
frustration on the part of the scholars. Historians have constructed new methodologies 
for discovering traces within this archive of slaves' lived experience, for uncovering 
“critical truths... hidden in unalloyed traces”. Yet this search has led those same scholars 
to confront the ethical dilemma of relying on an archive, in the form of documentation 
by slavery institutions, that was implicated in the very process of effacing the ethical 
worth of slaves. The archive, in other words, offers up traces of slaves “recorded in the 
act of their annihilation”, making for “an impoverished archive” (Best, 2011: 159). The 
temptation of scholars faced with this impoverishment is to invest that slavery archive 
with a reification of the loss at its heart. Thus documents of slavery are made 
meaningful within “a narrative of the impossibility of retrieval”, whereby the “desire to 
recover the evidence of lives apparently lost to history” makes any trace of those lives 
within this archive appear to further confirm that loss, to reiterate that impossibility of 
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recovery, through those traces' elliptical quality (ibid: 156). This reification of loss and 
the endless confirmation that recovery is impossible is a possibility that is similarly 
present in the question of an ethical response to covert action residue. In the face of this 
dilemma, Best challenges scholars to abandon “the imperative to recover” which reifies 
loss, and to therefore “[stop] presuming absence” as if that absence is always evidence of 
the need for its replacement with presence (ibid: 159, 160).
It is this turn away from recovery that would allow for ethical responsiveness in 
the case of residue. Instead of fighting against the absences in residue, and try to recover
significations which are supposedly obscured by that dynamic, an ethical response 
would let absence be. It would focus on examining the process by which absences, and 
the people and objects they speak to, are implicitly given meaning within these 
representations, a process that otherwise goes unnoticed by witnesses because the 
meanings being ascribed to absences and absentees are not explicitly articulated within 
these portrayals. Without presuming to identify and come to 'know' experiences of 
suffering, this kind of responsiveness nonetheless acknowledges the ethical significance 
of suffering that remains absent. It also crucially examines the role of the witness, her 
role in marginalising the violence of these operations through ethical orientations that 
only narrowly address this violent conduct towards other subjects.
An ethical responsiveness that resists the impulse towards recovery is in fact 
already present within a concept threaded throughout this thesis, that of historical 
affiliation. The ethical import of this approach to traces of unseen violence is implicit in 
W.G. Sebald's prose work The Rings of Saturn, whose narrative weaves together residue 
of different violence events to produce imaginative archives that are premised precisely 
on “the impossibility of recovery”. The accumulated memories and debris of Rings 
represent “a repository of... depletion without end”, of traces that endlessly hint at 
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“people, events and stories as permanently irrecoverable” (Sheehan, 2012: 736). In the 
face of this “depletion without end” (ibid), Sebald's narrative 'suspends' that depletion by 
implicitly connecting historical events. Rather than bemoan a “stringent [notion] of 
absolute loss”, the narrative of Rings circumvents that temporal loss by “produc[ing] new
[historical] affiliations”, through “a constellation of incongruous, semi-surreal... 
relationships” of coincidence across time (ibid: 737). As discussed in the Introduction 
and chapter two, when traces of contrasting violence are narratively associated in this 
way, the resonance of their similar qualities – for instance, their absences – can prompt 
the reader to consider relationships between those events, not in terms of 'what 
happened', but in terms of how these events gain meaning and significance through 
traces in ways that go unspoken (Bernstein, 2009: 45-50). By highlighting inconspicuous
similarities in the representation of intuitively quite different events, historical 
affiliation can prompt different ethical orientations towards those events and the 
violence that was involved. Historical affiliation is not just a method, but a model of 
ethical responsiveness to residue.
Ethical witnessing here is not premised on recovering and recognising suffering,
but on recognising how witnesses are being prompted to adopt ethical orientations 
towards unseen violence and absent casualties that make those things meaningful in 
ways that go unspoken, that are implicit rather than explicit, and thus are not signified 
to witnesses as such. The reason this response to representations of residue is ethical is 
that, to follow Adelman and Kozol's definition, an attunement to other beings' capacity 
to suffer need not involve imagining that one can identify and thus respond to an 
experience of suffering within a representation. An attunement to that capacity to suffer
can exist towards those we never see and are never co-present with. The second and 
third criteria then become crucial: ascribing ethical significance to that suffering and an 
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examination of how we might be involved in it. An historical affiliation does not 
guarantee meeting the second criterion, but it meets the third by prompting an 
examination of one's own ethical orientations, and thus prompts witnesses to consider 
how ethical significance is being ascribed or denied to absent victims of violence in ways
that do not draw attention to themselves.
When applied to the rumours and debris of covert counter-terrorism, this 
practice of turning away from recovery and towards the affiliation of residue can 
prompt a self-awareness that in this way challenges the ethical orientations discussed 
throughout this thesis. The historical affiliation between covert counter-terrorism and 
lynching produces this kind of ethical witnessing by highlighting how representations 
of these covert operations' residue prompt witnesses to adopt an ethical orientation that
marginalises the violence inflicted by these operations, that fails to consider the ethical 
import of that violence, as something that demands ethical consideration in-and-of-
itself. This ethical responsiveness is not about adopting a position of dissent towards 
covert violence through one's witnessing of its traces, although such a response may be 
ethically defensible. Rather, it is about scrutinising thoughts and feelings that this 
residue already invites one to adopt and, insodoing, examining what one occludes from 
one's thoughts and feelings as a result without that occlusion being spoken. In this sense,
this form of ethical responsiveness is about questioning whether the positions that 
witnesses take towards covert violence as a result of its residue can be considered 
ethical position simply because they involve scepticism and discomfort towards the 
actions of the state. While some may call for outrage in response to these covert 
activities, implying that current levels are insufficient (T. Gregory, 2012), the historical 
affiliation approach acknowledges the understandings and affects prompted by residue 
that might already curtail assent but equally complicate notions of dissent.
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The historical affiliation with lynching referenced throughout this thesis has 
suggested that witnesses are invited to adopt a subject-position from which these covert
events are distanced from her. As the thesis has demonstrated, the orientations prompted 
by the residue of covert counter-terrorism are ones that think of the unverifiable 
possibilities suggested by absences in residue, and that therefore feel discomfort 
towards the intangibility of these unseen operations, their perceived distance from the 
populations of the states pursuing these policies. As with lynching, these practices 
become meaningful in terms of 'confronting' society with the problem of understanding,
rather than implicating that society in any way.
Given this production of distance – spatial, temporal and ultimately moral – 
between witnesses and covert counter-terrorism, the historical affiliation with lynching 
can prompt self-awareness in terms of witnesses' connection to these operations through 
residue: that beyond the extremities of state violence, these rumours and debris are also 
part of the public existence of these operations, and newsreaders' encounters with these 
traces make these unseen events meaningful in particular ways. Ethical witnessing 
would involve self-awareness of two things: first, of how the narrative of intangibility is 
a product of this relationship between newsreaders and residue; and second, of how that
narrative positions witnesses towards absent casualties and the state in unspoken ways, 
focusing critique and scrutiny on some aspects of these covert operations but occluding 
others. Through this residue, witnesses' critical response to covert action becomes 
defined by the idea of distance, an epistemological and thus moral distance between the 
public and these operations. Ethical witnessing would question whether this is a 
sufficiently ethical response to the unseen violence at the centre of these events.
Residue cannot foster this kind of ethical witnessing alone. To reverse the 
critical scholarship's notion of recognition, residue does not return the gaze of the 
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witness or “look back in unexpected ways” (Kozol, 2014: 91), a discordant signification 
that might prompt the witness to become “'conscious' of himself [sic], leading to his need
to turn this gaze around and look at himself” (Chow, 2003: 342). What residue offers is 
more akin to a blank gaze, an encounter where that which is being witnessed does not 
appear to 'recognise' or respond to the witness, as theorised by Anat Pick in relation to 
creaturely representations of humans and animals (Pick, 2011: 155-62). Such blankness 
is unlikely by itself to motivate witnesses to some form of action against suffering, the 
“burden of making something happen” that is often placed on representations of such 
suffering (Adelman and Kozol, 2014).
But if allowed to reverberate with other historical practices of violence through 
their shared absences, residue can provoke a rethinking of what ethical witnessing 
might mean, by highlighting parts of, and banishments from, our ethical orientations 
that we do not notice ourselves. Responding to that blank gaze does not mean 
continuing to search within it for something that simply is not there; it means 
scrutinising the ways we are already implicitly provoked by that blankness, 
acknowledging how we end up seeing that blankness as indicating one thing (distance) 
rather than another (connectedness). And this acknowledgement can only happen by 
seeing the ethical stakes in our methodologies towards traces of unseen violence, and 
giving up on recovering a real gaze within the fragmented statements, grainy footage 
and empty spaces left behind by covert counter-terrorism. “For what is ethics if not my 
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